Dahlia Scheindlin on Israeli Opinion—Gaza: The Human Toll

J. Steven Morrison: Good morning, good evening. This is Steven Morrison. He is a senior Deputy Director of the Institute for Strategic International Problem (CSIS), a think tank that has a headquarters in Washington.

Today, we will send the 17th CSIS Gaza: Human Damage Series. On October 7, Hamas slaughtered 1200 citizens in Israel, detained 251 hostages, and began the series on November 13, 2023, shortly after the war between Israel and Hamas.

This is the result of CSIS's "CSIS Boat Alliance for Global Health Security". This is a joint production with my colleagues, Michel Steque, who is in charge of humanitarian agenda at CSIS. And John Alterman, a senior vice president who leads the Middle East program in CSIS.

Before introducing this speaker, I would like to thank my colleagues Sofia Hershield for adjusting and compiling all of them. And for the wonderful production teams of Eric Ruditzky and Chi Yu.

Today, Dr. Dahlia Shindlin, a political strategy of Israel and public weapons, came. She has advised eight national campaigns in Israel. Active in more than 15 countries. Fellow of the Century Foundation. Regularly contributed to the Guardian, Harletz, New York Times, etc. He has authored The Crooked Timber of Democracy in Israel and was published in September last year and was well received. It is widely read and respected. Readed her documents makes it a great workmanship. This time, I would like to mention her recent books on the water crisis on the west coast of Gaza and the Jordan river, Israel's opinion on the crisis, and how to explain it.

Welcome, Dahlia. I am honored to be with you. Thank you for making time. I'm really honored today.

Dahlia Shindrin: Thank you for your invitation.

Dr. Morrison: First, let me ask a rough question. Today, I would like to use it to better understand the tide of Israel. How is Israel breaking the health crisis and humanitarian crisis developed in Gaza? < SPAN> J. Steven Morrison: Good morning, good evening. This is Steven Morrison. He is a senior Deputy Director of the Institute for Strategic International Problem (CSIS), a think tank that has a headquarters in Washington.

Today, we will send the 17th CSIS Gaza: Human Damage Series. On October 7, Hamas slaughtered 1200 citizens in Israel, detained 251 hostages, and began the series on November 13, 2023, shortly after the war between Israel and Hamas.

This is the result of CSIS's "CSIS Boat Alliance for Global Health Security". This is a joint production with my colleagues, Michel Steque, who is in charge of humanitarian agenda at CSIS. And John Alterman, a senior vice president who leads the Middle East program in CSIS.

Before introducing this speaker, I would like to thank my colleagues Sofia Hershield for adjusting and compiling all of them. And for the wonderful production teams of Eric Ruditzky and Chi Yu.

Today, Dr. Dahlia Shindlin, a political strategy of Israel and public weapons, came. She has advised eight national campaigns in Israel. Active in more than 15 countries. Fellow of the Century Foundation. Regularly contributed to the Guardian, Harletz, New York Times, etc. He has authored The Crooked Timber of Democracy in Israel and was published in September last year and was well received. It is widely read and respected. Readed her documents makes it a great workmanship. This time, I would like to mention her recent books on the water crisis on the west coast of Gaza and the Jordan river, Israel's opinion on the crisis, and how to explain it.

Welcome, Dahlia. I am honored to be with you. Thank you for making time. I'm really honored today.

Dahlia Shindrin: Thank you for your invitation.

Dr. Morrison: First, let me ask a rough question. Today, I would like to use it to better understand the tide of Israel. How is Israel breaking the health crisis and humanitarian crisis developed in Gaza? J. Steven Morrison: Good morning, good evening. This is Steven Morrison. He is a senior Deputy Director of the Institute for Strategic International Problem (CSIS), a think tank that has a headquarters in Washington.

Today, we will send the 17th CSIS Gaza: Human Damage Series. On October 7, Hamas slaughtered 1200 citizens in Israel, detained 251 hostages, and began the series on November 13, 2023, shortly after the war between Israel and Hamas.

This is the result of CSIS's "CSIS Boat Alliance for Global Health Security". This is a joint production with my colleagues, Michel Steque, who is in charge of humanitarian agenda at CSIS. And John Alterman, a senior vice president who leads the Middle East program in CSIS.

Before introducing this speaker, I would like to thank my colleagues Sofia Hershield for adjusting and compiling all of them. And for the wonderful production teams of Eric Ruditzky and Chi Yu.

Today, Dr. Dahlia Shindlin, a political strategy of Israel and public weapons, came. She has advised eight national campaigns in Israel. Active in more than 15 countries. Fellow of the Century Foundation. Regularly contributed to the Guardian, Harletz, New York Times, etc. He has authored The Crooked Timber of Democracy in Israel and was published in September last year and was well received. It is widely read and respected. Readed her documents makes it a great workmanship. This time, I would like to mention her recent books on the water crisis on the west coast of Gaza and the Jordan river, Israel's opinion on the crisis, and how to explain it.

Welcome, Dahlia. I am honored to be with you. Thank you for making time. I'm really honored today.

Dahlia Shindrin: Thank you for your invitation.

Dr. Morrison: First, let me ask a rough question. Today, I would like to use it to better understand the tide of Israel. How is Israel breaking the health crisis and humanitarian crisis developed in Gaza?

I want to understand the different factors that come into play and what that means in terms of indifference or opposition or support or compassion. Obviously, the Hamas massacre on October 7 and the hostage taking had a big impact, and you write about that. The ICC, the International Court of Justice, the threat of further action had some impact.

There's also the government itself, the agenda of the Netanyahu government, Israeli domestic politics, and the deep and toxic rift between the government and the UK institutions over the years.

So there's a lot of different factors at play. You've followed it more than anyone else and tried to summarise it accurately, summarise how opinions have been formed.

So can you give us, if you can, in a few words, the big picture of how things have evolved over time?

Dr. Scheindlin: Thank you. Thank you.

Because sometimes there's a contradiction between how Israelis feel about the Palestinians, about Gaza, about the war, about the concept of future peace, and how they feel about their own government.

And in Israeli society, of course, people's attitudes are deeply divided. In some ways, I was hoping that Israeli society would become more rigid and that major changes would occur. In some ways, it did. In some ways, I was hoping that Israeli society would become more rigid and that major changes would occur.

I don't want to be too abstract, but I want to focus on a couple of different trends. One is that the start of this war created a very belligerent attitude among the Israeli public.

The immediate reaction, other than shock, grief, confusion, fear and uncertainty, was that there was no option other than a very aggressive war, which was perceived by the Jewish population of Israel as primarily a defensive war.

However, even when the war has shifted to the goal of defeating a more aggressive, more aggressive, to defeat the military and government structure of Hamas, and actually causes great damage to the Gaza people. This was fully supported.

Israeli Palestinian citizens have a completely opposite attitude toward almost all. That's why when we started talking about the split among the Israeli people, we had to say that the Israeli people were the largest layers.

First of all, the Jews of Israel felt very far. However, the government set goals like a change of government.

Under such circumstances, Israel had little awareness that Gaza had to be responsible for Gaza's humanitarian situations and Gaza citizens. The Israelians have to say that there is almost no tendency to distinguish civilians and combatants.

Hamas and Gaza's Ministry of Health have not distinguished between combatants and no n-combatants, and from the beginning, Gaza has been saying that Gaza has no guilt or suggests.

A very famous person has recently made a statement from the Secretary of Defense to the former National Security Advisor and the current Secretary of Finance. The statement that justifies such a thing, such as cutting food, water, and fuel, has been brought to international judicial court and international criminal court, and Israel is intentionally charged with such war crimes. I am. < SPAN> However, even when the war has shifted to the goal of defeating Hamas's military and government structures, and even when the war actually caused a major damage to the attitude of Gaza people. , People fully supported this.

Israeli Palestinian citizens have a completely opposite attitude toward almost all. That's why when we started talking about the split among the Israeli people, we had to say that the Israeli people were the largest layers.

First of all, the Jews of Israel felt very far. However, the government set goals like a change of government.

Under such circumstances, Israel had little awareness that Gaza had to be responsible for Gaza's humanitarian situations and Gaza citizens. The Israelians have to say that there is almost no tendency to distinguish civilians and combatants.

Hamas and Gaza's Ministry of Health have not distinguished between combatants and no n-combatants, and from the beginning, Gaza has been saying that Gaza has no guilt or suggests.

A very famous person has recently made a statement from the Secretary of Defense to the former National Security Advisor and the current Secretary. The statement that justifies such a thing, such as cutting food, water, and fuel, has been brought to international judicial court and international criminal court, and Israel is intentionally charged with such war crimes. I am. However, even when the war has shifted to the goal of defeating a more aggressive, more aggressive, that is, to defeat Hamas's military and government structures, and actually causes great damage to the attitude of Gaza people. This was fully supported.

Israeli Palestinian citizens have a completely opposite attitude toward almost all. That's why when we started talking about the split among the Israeli people, we had to say that the Israeli people were the largest layers.

First of all, the Jews of Israel felt very far. However, the government set goals like a change of government.

Under such circumstances, Israel had little awareness that Gaza had to be responsible for Gaza's humanitarian situations and Gaza citizens. The Israelians have to say that there is almost no tendency to distinguish civilians and combatants.

Hamas and Gaza's Ministry of Health have not distinguished between combatants and no n-combatants, and from the beginning, Gaza has been saying that Gaza has no guilt or suggests.

A very famous person has recently made a statement from the Secretary of Defense to the former National Security Advisor and the current Secretary. The statement that justifies such a thing, such as cutting food, water, and fuel, has been brought to international judicial court and international criminal court, and Israel is intentionally charged with such war crimes. I am.

But the Israelites ... from the Israeli Jews's perspective, they think this is a matter of wartime and a problem to survive. And this is related to war. At the same time, the majority of Israelites can tell the Jews and Palestinians living in Israel, but are deep anger at the government.

So this is a bit different from the s o-called national fla g-like rally, which can be seen in many countries during the war.

In the first six months, the approval rating for the Israeli government was a decline in the prime minister, its political parties, and the coalition government. The general trust in the government was the lowest ever.

Some politically recovered. Looking at the people's feelings about the current ruling and coalition governments, it is not yet possible to reproduce the success of the November 2022 election. However, as people settle into a more familiar pattern, they are gradually recovering.

But let's introduce another familiar pattern we know. He talked about the division between Israeli Jewish residents and Palestinian residents, or Arab residents, but there are deep divisions among Jewish residents. This division is, first, is a classic division between people who are sel f-acknowledgments, right, righ t-wing, and Nakamichi. Don't believe that some people say that the left wing, the right wing, and the middle road are passes, and don't care. It is one of the factors that predicts all attitudes against Israel Palestinian conflict and Israel's politics. < SPAN> But the Israelites ... from the perspective of Israeli Jews, I think this is a matter of wartime and a problem to survive. And this is related to war. At the same time, the majority of Israelites can tell the Jews and Palestinians living in Israel, but are deep anger at the government.

So this is a bit different from the s o-called national fla g-like rally, which can be seen in many countries during the war.

In the first six months, the approval rating for the Israeli government was a decline in the prime minister, its political parties, and the coalition government. The general trust in the government was the lowest ever.

Some politically recovered. Looking at the people's feelings about the current ruling and coalition governments, it is not yet possible to reproduce the success of the November 2022 election. However, as people settle into a more familiar pattern, they are gradually recovering.

But let's introduce another familiar pattern we know. He talked about the division between Israeli Jewish residents and Palestinian residents, or Arab residents, but there are deep divisions among Jewish residents. This division is, first, is a classic division between people who are sel f-acknowledgments, right, righ t-wing, and Nakamichi. Don't believe that some people say that the left wing, the right wing, and the middle road are passes, and don't care. It is one of the factors that predicts all attitudes against Israel Palestinian conflict and Israel's politics. But the Israelites ... from the Israeli Jews's perspective, they think this is a matter of wartime and a problem to survive. And this is related to war. At the same time, the majority of Israelites can tell the Jews and Palestinians living in Israel, but are deep anger at the government.

So this is a bit different from the s o-called national fla g-like rally, which can be seen in many countries during the war.

In the first six months, the approval rating for the Israeli government was a decline in the prime minister, its political parties, and the coalition government. The general trust in the government was the lowest ever.

Some politically recovered. Looking at the people's feelings about the current ruling and coalition governments, it is not yet possible to reproduce the success of the November 2022 election. However, as people settle into a more familiar pattern, they are gradually recovering.

But let's introduce another familiar pattern we know. He talked about the division between Israeli Jewish residents and Palestinian residents, or Arab residents, but there are deep divisions among Jewish residents. This division is, first, is a classic division between people who are sel f-acknowledgments, right, righ t-wing, and Nakamichi. Don't believe that some people say that the left wing, the right wing, and the middle road are passes, and don't care. It is one of the factors that predicts all attitudes against Israel Palestinian conflict and Israel's politics.

According to a survey conducted by the Israeli Democracy Institute in February 2024, providing food and pharmaceuticals from international organizations unrelated to Hamas and UN Palestinian Refugee Relief Projects (UNRWA), which has already been several months. -Of course, when asked if the Israelites had to fully support this, they agreed or opposed, and the attitudes were greatly divided due to the political differences in people's political identity. In other words, about 60 % of the lef t-wing Jews are supported, while righ t-wing Jews only support less than 20 %, and the middl e-throatists are equal. This pattern can be listed a lot of these numbers, but during this war and long before the war, it was a very consistent pattern. Needless to say, in the Jewish Israel society, the right wing is the majority and the left wing is a minority. And the Nakamichi school is also a minority, which is only about a quarter. However, when combined with left wings and middl e-tunatists who share many attitudes, it usually reaches 40 % of Jewish Israel society and includes Arab citizens who are slightly less likely to sympathize with the same route. Become a little more

But in relation to the conflict, occupation between Israel and Palestine, and all of them, we do dozens of ways to destroy the attitude and ideologic attitude of Israeli and Israeli Jews. It will be a familiar pattern that has been seen in the year.

Dr. Morrison: Thank you. In the essay announced on May 30, why is the Israelites withstand the war? This question is partially taken up. Hamas is a common enemy. This is the power to unite. It is not possible to underestimate the profoundness of October 7. You have a debate that the media is important to the media actions and reports, but not enough to explain it. I wanted you to talk a little more. < SPAN> In a survey conducted by the Israeli Democracy Institute in February 2024, it provides food and medicines from international organizations that have already been a few months and have been unrelated to Hamas and UNRWA (UNRWA). What the Israelites, of course, asked if they had to fully support this, but the attitude was greatly divided into people's political identity. In other words, about 60 % of the lef t-wing Jews are supported, while righ t-wing Jews only support less than 20 %, and the middl e-throatists are equal. This pattern can be listed a lot of these numbers, but during this war and long before the war, it was a very consistent pattern. Needless to say, in the Jewish Israel society, the right wing is the majority and the left wing is a minority. And the Nakamichi school is also a minority, which is only about a quarter. However, when combined with left wings and middl e-tunatists who share many attitudes, it usually reaches 40 % of Jewish Israel society and includes Arab citizens who are slightly less likely to sympathize with the same route. Become a little more

But in relation to the conflict, occupation between Israel and Palestine, and all of them, we do dozens of ways to destroy the attitude and ideologic attitude of Israeli and Israeli Jews. It will be a familiar pattern that has been seen in the year.

Dr. Morrison: Thank you. In the essay announced on May 30, why is the Israelites withstand the war? This question is partially taken up. Hamas is a common enemy. This is the power to unite. It is not possible to underestimate the profoundness of October 7. You have a debate that the media is important to the media actions and reports, but not enough to explain it. I wanted you to talk a little more in detail. According to a survey conducted by the Israeli Democracy Institute in February 2024, providing food and pharmaceuticals from international organizations unrelated to Hamas and UN Palestinian Refugee Relief Projects (UNRWA), which has already been several months. -Of course, when asked if the Israelites had to fully support this, they agreed or opposed, and the attitudes were greatly divided due to the political differences in people's political identity. In other words, about 60 % of the lef t-wing Jews are supported, while righ t-wing Jews only support less than 20 %, and the middl e-throatists are equal. This pattern can be listed a lot of these numbers, but during this war and long before the war, it was a very consistent pattern. Needless to say, in the Jewish Israel society, the right wing is the majority and the left wing is a minority. And the Nakamichi school is also a minority, which is only about a quarter. However, when combined with left wings and middl e-tunatists who share many attitudes, it usually reaches 40 % of Jewish Israel society and includes Arab citizens who are slightly less likely to sympathize with the same route. Become a little more

But in relation to the conflict, occupation between Israel and Palestine, and all of them, we do dozens of ways to destroy the attitude and ideologic attitude of Israeli and Israeli Jews. It will be a familiar pattern that has been seen in the year.

Dr. Morrison: Thank you. In the essay announced on May 30, why is the Israelites withstand the war? This question is partially taken up. Hamas is a common enemy. This is the power to unite. It is not possible to underestimate the profoundness of October 7. You have a debate that the media is important to the media actions and reports, but not enough to explain it. I wanted you to talk a little more.

But since then, you have said that this is a problem of Israeli's collective identity, a phenomenon of society as a whole related to the strict closure of Gaza dating back to 2007. I just wanted some of these things to explain.

Dr. Dr. Shindrin: Yes, one of the most impressive things that I looked at such problems and showed this is when I talked to the Israelites, that is, the moderate left. It includes the middle school, and the people who are called the righ t-wing, that is, most of the Jewish Israelites, but after October 7, what they often talk about is Gaza. Is it so bad? We gave them Gaza. What more do you want? They gave Gaza on October 7 just because they were, they hated Jews, or because they became Hamas supporters. He deeply denied the reality of life in Gaza and the reality of Israel's Gaza rule.

That is, I have been trying to point out for many years, along with many colleagues and human rights activists related to knowing the input and output of this dispute. Even after Israel's withdrawal from the settlement, Gaza is still under Israeli's effectiveness, withdrawing the army from inside Gaza, but many other things that affect life in Gaza. Was maintaining. You don't need to see all the lists, but most of the intersections except Rafa were adjusted to the Egyptian side. The sea, spaces, electromagnetic fields, and all of the entry and exit have completely restricted immigration, import, and exports. Especially in the west coast of the Jordan River, immigration to Gaza was an exception rather than rules. Just by moving, I had to do a huge amount of government office work and basically ask for permission. < SPAN> But you have since said that this is a problem with the Israeli collective identity, a phenomenon of society as a whole related to the strict closure of Gaza until 2007. I just wanted some of these things to explain.

Dr. Dr. Shindrin: Yes, one of the most impressive things that I looked at such problems and showed this is when I talked to the Israelites, that is, the moderate left. It includes the middle school, and the people who are called the righ t-wing, that is, most of the Jewish Israelites, but after October 7, what they often talk about is Gaza. Is it so bad? We gave them Gaza. What more do you want? They gave Gaza on October 7 just because they were, they hated Jews, or because they became Hamas supporters. He deeply denied the reality of life in Gaza and the reality of Israel's Gaza rule.

That is, I have been trying to point out for many years, along with many colleagues and human rights activists related to knowing the input and output of this dispute. Even after Israel's withdrawal from the settlement, Gaza is still under Israeli's effectiveness, withdrawing the army from inside Gaza, but many other things that affect life in Gaza. Was maintaining. You don't need to see all the lists, but most of the intersections except Rafa were adjusted to the Egyptian side. The sea, spaces, electromagnetic fields, and all of the entry and exit have completely restricted immigration, import, and exports. Especially in the west coast of the Jordan River, immigration to Gaza was an exception rather than rules. Just by moving, I had to do a huge amount of government office work and basically ask for permission. But since then, you have said that this is a problem of Israeli's collective identity, a phenomenon of society as a whole related to the strict closure of Gaza dating back to 2007. I just wanted some of these things to explain.

Dr. Dr. Shindrin: Yes, one of the most impressive things that I looked at such problems and showed this is when I talked to the Israelites, that is, the moderate left. It includes the middle school, and the people who are called the righ t-wing, that is, most of the Jewish Israelites, but after October 7, what they often talk about is Gaza. Is it so bad? We gave them Gaza. What more do you want? They gave Gaza on October 7 just because they were, they hated Jews, or because they became Hamas supporters. He deeply denied the reality of life in Gaza and the reality of Israel's Gaza rule.

That is, I have been trying to point out for many years, along with many colleagues and human rights activists related to knowing the input and output of this dispute. Even after Israel's withdrawal from the settlement, Gaza is still under Israeli's effectiveness, withdrawing the army from inside Gaza, but many other things that affect life in Gaza. Was maintaining. You don't need to see all the lists, but most of the intersections except Rafa were adjusted to the Egyptian side. The sea, spaces, electromagnetic fields, and all of the entry and exit have completely restricted immigration, import, and exports. Especially in the west coast of the Jordan river, immigration to Gaza was an exception rather than rules. Just by moving, I had to do a huge amount of government office work and basically ask for permission.

So all life in Gaza was controlled by Israel. But Israel cannot deny that. Some people criticize Israeli media coverage during the war, but when I say inadequate, I mean you have to go back to the media coverage of the past 20 years. Why was this not known in Israeli society? Were people deliberately not looking?

But you really had to look to find that information. But most Israelis were claiming that basically nothing was wrong politically in Gaza. Israel gave it to them. Israel gave it to them. Hamas was elected. The elections were held in 2006, and the majority of Gaza residents today were not even born yet. But that is a very simple understanding in Israeli society. So they have no context for why this escalated.

I'm not going to justify what happened on October 7th. No one needs to justify it. Enough already. It's a crime against civilians, it's terrorism. It's the worst thing. But at the same time... no, not at the same time. I just want to point out that, as Israeli policy went along, year after year after year, I and anyone who was following the situation knew that some kind of escalation was going to happen. I didn't have to work to know that. There had been many escalations between Israel and Hamas before. And I just had to understand that what had happened before would probably happen again, and each time it would be worse.

That's the nature of an unresolved military conflict. And when you're preoccupied with something as severe as this, that deeply affects people's lives and is restrictive - something that blocks almost any opportunity, leads to a 45 percent unemployment rate, a situation with no horizons, a situation of people who are essentially trapped - you can't be sure that pressure is going to manifest itself violently in some way.

And what I saw after October 7 was that the Israelis were basically stuck in that perspective. They couldn't see beyond that. Because the sense that the Israelis were very surprised was something we felt every time the ground war escalated. You can call it a war -- I call it a war -- between Israel and Hamas, before that, that is, from 2009 -- I'll leave out all the names, but 2009, 2012, 2014, 2021.

Every time, the Israeli side said, where does this come from? What do they want from us? We gave them Gaza. They have no reason to do this to us other than hatred, anti-Semitism, a kind of racism, America First, wanting to kill only America. And so we had to fight back in a primitive way. Whatever international law says, Israel's actions are justified.

For many Israelis, the idea that we have to adhere to international law and adhere to standards like the laws of war and human rights and better treatment of civilians and protection of civilians during war is an answer that Israelis throw at you every day. We don't live in that kind of world. Look at what Hamas has done. This is the area we're in. Why should we hold ourselves to that standard?

You have to understand this. It's painful to watch. And at the same time, this was kind of the public environment, the public information, the consciousness of Israelis before October 7. So when people blame the media's coverage of the war, I think it goes much deeper.

Dr. Morrison: Yes. You explained it very well.

We deal with the suffering, provide basic health services, and need to expand the development of diseases and needs for reconstruction, etc. In order to do so, let's talk to the question of what the new cooperation is modest, quiet, or not exposed to spotlights. You recently wrote many articles about the hygiene crisis of water in the Gaza and the West Bank of the Jordan River and what it means for the people of Israel. You have argued about the epidemiological space shared between Palestinians and Israelites and the need to recognize it. We know that UNICEF and Israel authorities are currently negotiating to restore the power of an important pallous plant in Kang Yunis. We know that there are many precedent between Israel and Palestinian experts in the medical / public health and partnerships. Is there a promising moment? Also, how do you think? It has a heritage, has a history, and is currently ongoing and needs to cooperate. I will talk about polio as a new, or a newly formed one. But you write about this heritage: < SPAN> Israel's stakeholders (official, no n-governmental organizations) and partners who work in Gaza have dealt with suffering, provide basic health services, and need to develop and rebuilding. In order to deal with, let's talk about what is a modest, quiet, or a new cooperation that doesn't take a spotlight. You recently wrote many articles about the hygiene crisis of water in the Gaza and the West Bank of the Jordan River and what it means for the people of Israel. You have argued about the epidemiological space shared between Palestinians and Israelites and the need to recognize it. We know that UNICEF and Israel authorities are currently negotiating to restore the power of an important pallous plant in Kang Yunis. We know that there are many precedent between Israel and Palestinian experts in the medical / public health and partnerships. Is there a promising moment? Also, how do you think? It has a heritage, has a history, and is currently ongoing and needs to cooperate. I will talk about polio as a new, or a newly formed one. But you write about this heritage: We deal with the suffering, provide basic health services, and need to expand the development of diseases and needs for reconstruction, etc. In order to do so, let's talk to the question of what the new cooperation is modest, quiet, or not exposed to spotlights. You recently wrote many articles about the hygiene crisis of water in the Gaza and the West Bank of the Jordan River and what it means for the people of Israel. You have argued about the epidemiological space shared between Palestinians and Israelites and the need to recognize it. We know that UNICEF and Israel authorities are currently negotiating to restore the power of an important pallous plant in Kang Yunis. We know that there are many precedent between Israel and Palestinian experts in the medical / public health and partnerships. Is there a promising moment? Also, how do you think? It has a heritage, has a history, and is currently ongoing and needs to cooperate. I will talk about polio as a new, or a newly formed one. But you write about this heritage:

Dr. Shindrin: Yes, it is very difficult to find a promising thing now, but there are many things that happen to happen. I think you can find the biggest hope in the past, not a distant past. I'm not a public health expert or a doctor. But I think these issues will affect the lives of all people. I first used the term "common epidemiological family" between the Israeli and the Palestinians, a group of epidemiologists and public health authorities, partnership and international partnership and international Israeli Palestinian Jordan. With the support of the institution, he wrote about exciting initiatives to contain the bird flu that was popular at the time. And they ... they did. Because I had been thinking for many years. The cooperative relationship in various forms established under the Oslo agreement has a huge problem in the Oslo agreement, despite its essentially permanent Israeli rule. , They were still on the way. However, the idea that these two groups should cooperate with epidemiology and public health seem to be quite basic, Dr. Shindrin: Yes, that is now a promising thing. It's very difficult, but there's a lot to do to happen. I think you can find the biggest hope in the past, not a distant past. I'm not a public health expert or a doctor. But I think these issues will affect the lives of all people. I first used the term "common epidemiological family" between the Israeli and the Palestinians, a group of epidemiologists and public health authorities, partnership and international partnership and international Israeli Palestinian Jordan. With the support of the institution, he wrote about the exciting initiatives to contain the bird flu that was popular at the time. And they ... they did. Because I had been thinking for many years. The cooperative relationship in various forms established under the Oslo agreement has a huge problem in the Oslo agreement, despite its essentially permanent Israeli rule. , They were still on the way. However, the idea that these two groups should cooperate with epidemiology and public health seem to be quite basic, Dr. Shindrin: Yes, it is very difficult to find a promising thing now. But there are many things that happen to happen. I think you can find the biggest hope in the past, not a distant past. I'm not a public health expert or a doctor. But I think these issues will affect the lives of all people. I first used the term "common epidemiological family" between the Israeli and the Palestinians, a group of epidemiologists and public health authorities, partnership and international partnership and international Israeli Palestinian Jordan. With the support of the institution, he wrote about exciting initiatives to contain the bird flu that was popular at the time. And they ... they did. Because I had been thinking for many years. The cooperative relationship in various forms established under the Oslo agreement has a huge problem in the Oslo agreement, despite its essentially permanent Israeli rule. , They were still on the way. However, the idea that these two groups should cooperate with epidemiology and public health seem quite basic,

But even in these worst circumstances... I say we are living through the worst decades. For the last 20 years, there has been a really terrible relationship, especially between Israel and the Gazans, because Hamas and Israel did not allow any kind of, you know, free passage, even normal activities that would have been allowed under the Oslo Accords. But of course there are ways to interact. That is, patients come from Gaza, with the help of local and international NGOs. Coordination for these patients has to be done with the Gaza authorities, with the Gaza hospitals, with the Israeli hospitals. Medical personnel need to share information. These programs are also supported by NGOs. But for this to happen, people have to travel from Gaza to Israel and back. Again, these are partnerships between professionals supported by NGOs, and allowed by the Israeli authorities. This kind of thing has been happening in various forms for many years. And I think everyone is aware of the need for it. There have been some efforts like this in the corona era.

Since 2009, Prime Minister Netanyahu has been a right-wing government. This could be another way that the Israeli public, who don't know much about the situation, can really benefit. Nobody made a fuss about these things. Nobody hid them. It wasn't a secret. Some were reported. If you wanted to know about these projects, you could find out by looking at the websites of the various NGOs or talking to them. But there wasn't much public outcry. People weren't against it. I was able to do some research during the corona period with an NGO called Gisha, which deals with freedom of movement in Gaza, and the majority of Israelis were okay with Israel training medical professionals from Gaza and bringing them to Israel.

What we see now is that when governments want to justify something, they know how to do it, just without publicly saying "it's okay" or making big headlines. When Israel was able to reopen some of the damaged water pipes that run from Israel to Gaza, or to get fuel into northern Gaza, the Israeli government did not tell its citizens to get fuel into northern Gaza through the Palestinian Water Authority.

The Israeli government did not tell its citizens to get fuel into northern Gaza through the Palestinian Water Authority. When the right-wing media picks up on something like this, they might get some indignant headlines for a few hours to a day, but I think in most cases, governments have a lot of strategies to justify these efforts.

For example, even if we see hard-line right-wing movements trying to block humanitarian aid in Gaza, at the end of the day, when governments want to get aid through, they know how to deal with these protesters, they know how to keep trucks in Gaza, even if the distribution is very poor.

But what I want to say is that the Israeli government cannot go back on its citizens' resistance to this kind of cooperation for very basic needs, which are for the citizens of Gaza and also for the people of Israel. These things have to be done, whatever the political aspects.

Dr. Morrison: Now, you've made the argument that in previous wars, the Israeli government's approach to what was cut off in terms of basic needs -- water, fuel, electricity, medicine, food -- was to secure a minimum floor that would prevent, perhaps, starvation, prevent total destruction, but that would allow them to keep the pressure on Hamas through the suffering of the population, as part of the strategy of the war.

What we're seeing now is that when governments want to justify something, they know how to do it without publicly saying, "It's OK," or making big headlines.

When Israel was able to reopen some of the damaged water pipes that run from Israel to Gaza, or put fuel in northern Gaza, the Israeli government did not tell its citizens that it was going to put fuel in northern Gaza through the Palestinian Water Authority.

The Israeli government did not tell its citizens that it was going to put fuel in northern Gaza through the Palestinian Water Authority.

When the right-wing media picks up on something like this, it might get an indignant headline for a few hours to a day, but I think in most cases, governments have a lot of strategy to justify these efforts.

For example, even if you see hard-line right-wing movements trying to block humanitarian aid in Gaza, at the end of the day, when governments want to get aid through, they know how to deal with these protesters, they know how to keep trucks in Gaza even if the rations are very poor.

But what I'm saying is that the Israeli government cannot go back on this kind of public resistance to cooperation on very basic needs, which are for the citizens of Gaza and also for the people of Israel. These things have to be done no matter what the political aspects are.

Dr. Morrison: Now, you've made the argument in previous wars that the Israeli government's approach to what was cut off in terms of basic needs - water, fuel, electricity, medicine, food - was to ensure a minimum floor that would prevent starvation, perhaps, prevent total destruction, but that could keep the pressure on Hamas through the suffering of the population as part of the strategy of the war. What we see now is that when governments want to justify something, they know how to do it, just without publicly saying "it's okay" or making big headlines. When Israel was able to reopen some of the damaged water pipes that run from Israel to Gaza, or to get fuel into northern Gaza, the Israeli government did not tell its citizens to get fuel into northern Gaza through the Palestinian Water Authority.

The Israeli government did not tell its citizens to get fuel into northern Gaza through the Palestinian Water Authority. When the right-wing media picks up on something like this, they might get some indignant headlines for a few hours to a day, but I think in most cases, governments have a lot of strategies to justify these efforts.

For example, even if we see hard-line right-wing movements trying to block humanitarian aid in Gaza, at the end of the day, when governments want to get aid through, they know how to deal with these protesters, they know how to keep trucks in Gaza, even if the distribution is very poor.

But what I want to say is that the Israeli government cannot go back on its citizens' resistance to this kind of cooperation for very basic needs, which are for the citizens of Gaza and also for the people of Israel. These things have to be done whatever the political aspects are.

Dr. Morrison: Now, you've made the argument that in previous wars, the Israeli government's approach to being cut off in terms of basic needs - water, fuel, electricity, medicines, food - has been to ensure a minimum level of security that would prevent starvation, prevent total destruction, but that could keep pressure on Hamas through the suffering of the population, as part of the strategy of the war.

You claim that the government should be a strategic transformation to the expansion of such cooperation. You have clearly specified various principles, including partnerships, lon g-term strategies, data, stocks, shares, and transparency. I mention these various precedents.

Please tell me a little more about how real it is. As we know, how do you support this while hostile tsunamis for health care and humanitarian programs? However, as you mentioned, if you make a decision to expand your cooperation, you still have the ability to manipulate and execute it.

Is there a prospect of your claim?

Dr. Shindrin: Yes, what I just want to say is that just saying that I will be the benefit of Israel does not mean that it will be the interest of the current civilian government.

The interest of the current administration is to maintain the administration by strengthening the far right forces, and the incentives that the power wants is basically the occupation and settlement of Gaza.

Dr. Morrison: That's right.

Dr. Shindrin: In other words, what I wanted to say is that it is the profit of the country of Israel. This is because it can be indicated that Israel is trying to comply with humanitarian, an international humanitarian law and war law on the international stage.

We deal with the suffering, provide basic health services, and need to expand the development of diseases and needs for reconstruction, etc. In order to do so, let's talk to the question of what the new cooperation is modest, quiet, or not exposed to spotlights. You recently wrote many articles about the hygiene crisis of water in the Gaza and the West Bank of the Jordan River and what it means for the people of Israel. You have argued about the epidemiological space shared between Palestinians and Israelites and the need to recognize it. We know that UNICEF and Israel authorities are currently negotiating to restore the power of an important pallous plant in Kang Yunis. We know that there are many precedent between Israel and Palestinian experts in the medical / public health and partnerships. Is there a promising moment? Also, how do you think? It has a heritage, has a history, and is currently ongoing and needs to cooperate. I will talk about polio as a new, or a newly formed one. But you write about this heritage: < SPAN> Israel's stakeholders (official, no n-governmental organizations) and partners who work in Gaza have dealt with suffering, provide basic health services, and need to develop and rebuilding. In order to deal with, let's talk about what is a modest, quiet, or a new cooperation that doesn't take a spotlight. You recently wrote many articles about the hygiene crisis of water in the Gaza and the West Bank of the Jordan River and what it means for the people of Israel. You have argued about the epidemiological space shared between Palestinians and Israelites and the need to recognize it. We know that UNICEF and Israel authorities are currently negotiating to restore the power of an important pallous plant in Kang Yunis. We know that there are many precedent between Israel and Palestinian experts in the medical / public health and partnerships. Is there a promising moment? Also, how do you think? It has a heritage, has a history, and is currently ongoing and needs to cooperate. I will talk about polio as a new, or a newly formed one. But you write about this heritage: We deal with the suffering, provide basic health services, and need to expand the development of diseases and needs for reconstruction, etc. In order to do so, let's talk to the question of what the new cooperation is modest, quiet, or not exposed to spotlights. You recently wrote many articles about the hygiene crisis of water in the Gaza and the West Bank of the Jordan River and what it means for the people of Israel. You have argued about the epidemiological space shared between Palestinians and Israelites and the need to recognize it. We know that UNICEF and Israel authorities are currently negotiating to restore the power of an important pallous plant in Kang Yunis. We know that there are many precedent between Israel and Palestinian experts in the medical / public health and partnerships. Is there a promising moment? Also, how do you think? It has a heritage, has a history, and is currently ongoing and needs to cooperate. I will talk about polio as a new, or a newly formed one. But you write about this heritage:

Nevertheless, when I wrote this policy analysis, I proposed to use a long-term, direct-use-immediate crisis to build a foundation for long-term public health cooperation. I want to point out. I started thinking in January. In other words, at that time, it was far from the time when Israel had to be frankly not to get this policy.

Nobody in Prime Minister Netanyahu's head, but if I read the policy correctly, it was the minimum measures to avoid visible hunger, not to a T, but there was visible hunger. This was a failed strategy in the early months of the war, not to mention immoral and a violation of international law. Going back to 2007, this was also a failed strategy, immoral and a violation of international law. Israel had some version of this strategy, conceptually, to drive the political population into a corner through the denial of basic needs, almost throughout that period, but it was a failure from day one. Because of this, the population doesn't rebel against Hamas, and Hamas doesn't care if the population suffers. We've seen that since this war began.