Economic and fiscal outlook March 2024 - Office for Budget Responsibility

Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2024

The last update of the forecast was published on 6 March 2024 in the March 2024 Economic and Fiscal Outlook. For the key messages of the forecast, please see the Executive Summary or the full report on our website.

Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2024

6 March 2024 - 3, 28 MB

Chapter 2 presents our five-year economic outlook. It includes updated projections in light of recent developments and the impact of policies in the Spring Budget.

Chapter 3 details the policy measures announced since the Autumn Statement last November, updates on some previous measures, and considers policy risks and uncertainties.

Chapter 4 presents our rationale and five-year public spending forecasts. It also explains our forecasts for lending and other financial transactions. All this, together with new policy decisions, produces our borrowing and debt outlook.

Section 5 provides an assessment of the government against its fiscal targets and assesses the likelihood that they will be achieved in line with our central forecast under current policies. We consider uncertainties in the economic and fiscal forecasts and risks to the government's ability to achieve its objectives. We also examine the sensitivity of the fiscal forecasts to alternative economic scenarios.

Appendix A contains detailed summary tables of the economic and fiscal forecasts.

At a glance

Supporting documents

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March 2024 Economic and fiscal outlook – charts and tables: Executive summary

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March 2024 Economic and fiscal outlook – charts and tables: Chapter 2

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March 2024 Economic and fiscal outlook – charts and tables: Chapter 3

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March 2024 Economic and fiscal outlook – charts and tables: Chapter 4

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March 2024 Economic and fiscal outlook – charts and tables: Chapter 5

Information or data released at the request of external parties since the first publication of this document. XLSX 6 March 2024 - 3. 14 MB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 3, 39 MB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 2, 96 MB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 875. XLSX March 6, 2024 - 279, 41 KB XLSX 2024 March 6, 2024 - 3, 04 MB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 99, 11 KB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 154. 02 KB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 202. XLSX March 6, 2024 - 1, 86 MB XLSX 2024 March 6 - 209, 75 KB

March 2024 Economic and fiscal outlook – charts and tables: Annex A

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March 2024 Economic and fiscal outlook – detailed forecast tables: policy

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March 2024 Economic and fiscal outlook – detailed forecast tables: receipts

Past forecasts XLSX 6 March 2024 - 3. 14 MB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 3, 39 MB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 2, 96 MB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 875. XLSX March 6, 2024 - 279, 41 KB XLSX 2024 March 6, 2024 - 3, 04 MB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 99, 11 KB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 154. 02 KB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 202. XLSX March 6, 2024 - 1, 86 MB XLSX 2024 March 6 - 209, 75 KB

March 2024 Economic and fiscal outlook – detailed forecast tables: expenditure

Fiscal risks and long-term forecasts XLSX 6 March 2024 - 3. 14 MB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 3, 39 MB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 2, 96 MB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 875. XLSX March 6, 2024 - 279, 41 KB XLSX 2024 March 6, 2024 - 3, 04 MB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 99, 11 KB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 154. 02 KB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 202. XLSX March 6, 2024 - 1, 86 MB XLSX 2024 March 6 - 209, 75 KB

March 2024 Economic and fiscal outlook – detailed forecast tables: debt interest ready reckoner

Prosperity trends report XLSX 6 March 2024 - 3. 14 MB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 3, 39 MB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 2, 96 MB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 875. XLSX March 6, 2024 - 279, 41 KB XLSX 2024 March 6, 2024 - 3, 04 MB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 99, 11 KB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 154. 02 KB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 202. XLSX March 6, 2024 - 1, 86 MB XLSX 2024 March 6 - 209, 75 KB

March 2024 Economic and fiscal outlook – detailed forecast tables: aggregates

Short guide and explanation XLSX 6 March 2024 - 3. 14 MB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 3, 39 MB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 2, 96 MB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 875. XLSX March 6, 2024 - 279, 41 KB XLSX 2024 March 6, 2024 - 3, 04 MB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 99, 11 KB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 154. 02 KB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 202. XLSX March 6, 2024 - 1, 86 MB XLSX 2024 March 6 - 209, 75 KB

March 2024 Economic and fiscal outlook – detailed forecast tables: economy

Further publications

March 2024 Devolved tax and spending forecasts

Preface XLSX 6 March 2024 - 3. 14 MB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 3, 39 MB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 2, 96 MB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 875. XLSX March 6, 2024 - 279, 41 KB XLSX 2024 March 6, 2024 - 3, 04 MB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 99, 11 KB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 154. 02 KB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 202. XLSX March 6, 2024 - 1, 86 MB XLSX 2024 March 6 - 209, 75 KB

March 2024 Devolved tax and spending forecasts – charts and tables

Overview

Log of substantive contact between the Office for Budget Responsibility and Treasury Ministers and their Special Advisers and private office staff, between 22 November 2023 and 5 March 2024

Economic outlook

March 2024 Economic and fiscal outlook – charts and tables (zip file)

Tax outlook

March 2024 Economic and fiscal outlook – detailed forecast tables (zip file)

Government performance against fiscal targets

Supplementary documents

Risks and uncertainties

March 2024 Economic and fiscal outlook – alcohol elasticities

Introduction XLSX 6 March 2024 - 3. 14 MB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 3, 39 MB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 2, 96 MB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 875. XLSX March 6, 2024 - 279, 41 KB XLSX 2024 March 6, 2024 - 3, 04 MB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 99, 11 KB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 154. 02 KB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 202. XLSX March 6, 2024 - 1, 86 MB XLSX 2024 March 6 - 209, 75 KB

March 2024 Economic and fiscal outlook – ready reckoner

Box 2. 1: Policy impacts on the economy XLSX 6 March 2024 - 3. 14 MB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 3, 39 MB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 2, 96 MB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 875. XLSX March 6, 2024 - 279, 41 KB XLSX 2024 March 6, 2024 - 3, 04 MB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 99, 11 KB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 154. 02 KB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 202. XLSX March 6, 2024 - 1, 86 MB XLSX 2024 March 6 - 209, 75 KB

Long-term economic determinants – March 2024 Economic and fiscal outlook

Box 2. 2: Impact of further instability in the Middle East on the economy XLSX 6 March 2024 - 3. 14 MB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 3, 39 MB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 2, 96 MB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 875. XLSX March 6, 2024 - 279, 41 KB XLSX 2024 March 6, 2024 - 3, 04 MB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 99, 11 KB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 154. 02 KB XLSX March 6, 2024 - 202. XLSX March 6, 2024 - 1, 86 MB XLSX 2024 March 6 - 209, 75 KB

March 2024 Economic and fiscal outlook monthly profiles

Box 2. 3: Net migration forecasts and their impact on the economy

March 2024 Economic and fiscal outlook – fuel duty receipts by vehicle type

Real GDP and the exit gap

March 2024 Economic and fiscal outlook - Work capability assessment reform

Box 2. 4: Performance of Brexit forecast assumptions

March 2024 Economic and fiscal outlook - Universal credit budgeting advances

Labour market performance in Brexit scenarios

March 2024 Economic and fiscal outlook – Changes to in-work spending on universal credit spending

Income and household savings

March 2024 Economic and fiscal outlook – Fuel duty

Credit conditions and the housing market

March 2024 Economic and fiscal outlook – Health and disability spending

Current account and net lending by sector

VAT Retail Export Scheme (VAT RES) abolition: updated estimate

Nominal GDP and its composition

Presentations

March 2024 Economic and fiscal outlook – presentation slides

Comparison with external forecasts

March 2024 Economic and fiscal outlook – speaking notes

Introduction

March 2024 Economic and fiscal outlook – 5 things video transcription

Policy announcements in the March 2024 Budget

Previous forecasts

Box 3. 1: Policy responses to ex-ante forecast revisions

Publications

Update on past measures
Box 3. 2: Impact of personal tax policy on labour supply
Box 3. 3: VAT retail export scheme: 2020 Review of policy costing for 2020
Policy risks
Introduction
Classifications and other statistical changes
Public sector evidence
Box 4. 1: The impact of tax loopholes on the budget

Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2024

Public sector spending

Box 4. 2: Government spending plans after the review

Box 4. 3: Sensitivity and volatility of debt spending
Compiled from
Financial transactions
Box 4. 4: Sensitivity of asset purchase units to market conditions
Risks and uncertainties

Box 4. 5: The impact of immigration on fiscal forecasts
Introduction
Budget targets
Box 5. 1: Developments in public sector net debt (excluding the Bank of England) since 2000
Acknowledging uncertainties
This Economic and Fiscal Outlook (EFO) sets out the OBR's central outlook for the five years to 2028-29, taking into account recent data and government policy announced up to the 2024 Spring Budget, and the uncertainties surrounding it. The forecasts represent our consensus view as the three independent members of the OBR Budget Committee (BRC). We take full responsibility for the judgments underlying this forecast and for the conclusions reached.
I am extremely grateful to OBR staff for their dedication, professionalism and expertise. The forecasts have been prepared with the assistance of the following organisations: the Treasury, HM Insise and Tuvels, Department for Work and Pensions, Department for Levelling Up, Department for Housing and Communities, Department for Education, Department for Energy Security and Net Zero, Home Office, Department for Transport, Department for Health and Social Care, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, Transitional Maritime Authority, the Office for National Statistics, UK Debt Management Office, National Savings and Investment, British Business Bank, BBC, Homes England, UK Government Investment, Government Proportionality Department, Independence Service, Scottish Government, Scottish Tax Commission, Welsh Government, Department for Communities and Finance in Northern Ireland, Transport for London and various civil servant pension schemes. Helpful discussions have also been held with various financial chief executives. We thank them for their engagement and insights.
In addition to the government, we had useful discussions with the Bank of England, the National Institute for Economic and Social Research, the Institute for Fiscal Studies, the Resolution Foundation and the Institute for Government. We also benefited from discussions with Hamish Low, Madeleine Sumption, Alan Manning and Tessa Hall. We also thank the Advisory Committee subgroups Labour Markets and Migration, Macroeconomics and Econometrics for knowledge sharing.
The implementation date for the Budget and this forecast was announced on 27 December, giving the required 10 weeks notice for budget-related events as laid out in the Memorandum of Understanding between the Office for Budget Responsibility, the Treasury, the Department for Work and Pensions and HMRC. However, the forecasts were delayed due to the earlier than usual implementation date of the budget and the publication of the key population and labour market reports in early February. As a result, we produced only two advance forecasts instead of the usual three. This made the forecasting process more difficult than usual, but did not impede the final forecasts.
On January 25, we published a timetable on the main stages of economic outlook as soon as the memorandum signature was agreed. This time, the number of days from the final economic outlook to the budget date was adjusted from 21 business days to 23 business days. This is to respond to the fact that the Ministry of Finance has been requested to extend the first window to determine the main policy from the budget from the Ministry of Finance 5 to 6 days after submitting the final budget outlook. Ta. In addition, in order to ensure time to fully consider the meaning of the latest data of ONS, the period of creation of pr e-economic prediction has been extended by one day. Thanks to ONS for providing pr e-access rights to these datasets that made this prediction possible. In the constraints of this compressed timetable, the overall process was efficiently functioned and the deadline was observed at all stages. The prediction schedule of this EFO is as follows:
The OBR staff has created the first economic forecasts that incorporate the latest interest rates, other market decisions, and data announced since the last forecast in November 2023. The first economic forecast was submitted to the Prime Minister on January 17.
Using the economic determination factors obtained from this economic forecast (nominal income and components of expenditures, unemployment rates, inflation rates, interest rates, etc.), we have various taxes and expenditures to determine the financial position. We asked related government agencies for predictions for components. We were able to discuss in detail with the officers in charge of these predictions, examine changes in predictive methods, and evaluate the recent tax and expenditure data. In many cases, the BRC demanded changes in methodology and recent interpretation of data. The first budget outlook was sent to the Prime Minister on January 30. On January 25, we announced a timetable on the main stage of economic outlook as soon as the memorandum signature was agreed. This time, the number of days from the final economic outlook to the budget date was adjusted from 21 business days to 23 business days. This is to respond to the fact that the Ministry of Finance has been requested to extend the first window to determine the main policy from the budget from the Ministry of Finance 5 to 6 days after submitting the final budget outlook. Ta. In addition, in order to ensure time to fully consider the meaning of the latest data of ONS, the period of creation of pr e-economic prediction has been extended by one day. Thanks to ONS for providing pr e-access rights to these datasets that made this prediction possible. In the constraints of this compressed timetable, the overall process was efficiently functioned and the deadline was observed at all stages. The prediction schedule of this EFO is as follows:
The OBR staff has created the first economic forecasts that incorporate the latest interest rates, other market decisions, and data announced since the last forecast in November 2023. The first economic forecast was submitted to the Prime Minister on January 17.
Using the economic determination factors obtained from this economic forecast (nominal income and components of expenditures, unemployment rates, inflation rates, interest rates, etc.), we have various taxes and expenditures to determine the financial position. We asked related government agencies for predictions for components. We were able to discuss in detail with the officers in charge of these predictions, examine changes in predictive methods, and evaluate the recent tax and expenditure data. In many cases, the BRC demanded changes in methodology and recent interpretation of data. The first budget outlook was sent to the Prime Minister on January 30. On January 25, we published a timetable on the main stages of economic outlook as soon as the memorandum signature was agreed. This time, the number of days from the final economic outlook to the budget date was adjusted from 21 business days to 23 business days. This is to respond to the fact that the Ministry of Finance has been requested to extend the first window to determine the main policy from the budget from the Ministry of Finance 5 to 6 days after submitting the final budget outlook. Ta. In addition, in order to ensure time to fully consider the meaning of the latest data of ONS, the period of creation of pr e-economic prediction has been extended by one day. Thanks to ONS for providing pr e-access rights to these datasets that made this prediction possible. In the constraints of this compressed timetable, the overall process was efficiently functioned and the deadline was observed at all stages. The prediction schedule of this EFO is as follows:
The OBR staff has created the first economic forecasts that incorporate the latest interest rates, other market decisions, and data announced since the last forecast in November 2023. The first economic forecast was submitted to the Prime Minister on January 17.

Box 4. 5: The impact of immigration on fiscal forecasts
This economic forecast included energy and financial market data based on 10 business day averages to 23 January and was sent to the Treasury on 5 February. This economic forecast included energy and financial market data based on 10 business day averages to 23 January and was sent to the Treasury on 5 February. Where we thought it would be useful, we commissioned relevant teams at the Treasury to provide analysis to inform our views and we discussed general, but not crisis specific, forecasting issues with external experts.
This second economic forecast formed the basis for the next fiscal forecast. Discussions with HMRC, DWP and other departments provided an opportunity to consider further analysis, changes in methodology and alternative forecast judgements. We sent our second and final fiscal forecast to the Chancellor on 14 February.
At the same time, we conducted an engagement and analysis process to assess which policy measures announced in the Budget were likely to have a concrete impact on our economic forecasts and to inform our forecasts. This required several engagements with the Treasury and other departments to refine both the specification of the policy package and our assessment of its impact.
We also reviewed the costings of individual tax and spending measures published since the November 2023 forecasts. As usual, OBR and BRC staff sought further information or changes to almost all of the draft costings prepared by departments. We found all policy measures in this forecast to be reasonable and central.
In parallel with the development of the final economic outlook, we have undertaken an initial assessment of the economic and fiscal impacts of the new policy package. This builds on our earlier analysis, which enabled us to take into account the initial package of measures set out by the Treasury on 16 February. We have incorporated this package into our preliminary post-measures forecasts, which we sent to the Chancellor on 20 February, to provide an early view of the impact of the fiscal measures on the economy and the finances. This preliminary forecast was prepared using in-house models with off-the-shelf calculations (rather than being sent to Treasury forecasters).
As per the agreed timeline, Treasury presented the final package of measures that it judged would move our economic forecasts forward on 22 February. As a result, we sent Treasury the final economic outlook on 27 February and the near-final fiscal outlook on 28 February. Final policy decisions that do not significantly impact the economic forecasts will be provided by Treasury on 29 February, and the final fiscal forecasts will be completed on 1 March and sent to Treasury on the same day.

Box 4. 5: The impact of immigration on fiscal forecasts
During the forecast period, BRC held dozens of review and challenge meetings with officials from other ministries and agencies, as well as many staff-level and individual-level meetings with external stakeholders. The BRC was provided with all the information and analysis it requested and was not pressured by ministers, consultants or officials to change its conclusions as the Outlook progressed. The BRC met with the Prime Minister three times during the preparation of the Outlook (1 February, 13 February and 27 February) to discuss the Outlook. A detailed diary of substantive contact with ministers, ministerial offices and special advisers is available on our website. This also includes a list of special advisers and parties who received the near-final draft EFO on 1 March.
Bronwyn Curtis OBE, Baroness Hogg and Ms Susan Rice, non-executive directors of the OBR, have provided further assurances about how the OBR is engaging with the Treasury and other departments. This includes reviewing any correspondence that OBR staff feel breaches, or could be interpreted as breaching, the memorandum's requirement to "confine itself to factual comment only". This review takes place as soon as possible after the publication of each EFO. Any concerns that outside directors may have will be raised with the Vice-Minister of Finance or the Special Committee on Finance, if they deem it appropriate.
We welcome your comments on our analysis and presentation. Please send your comments to [email protected].
Budget Responsibility Committee
Richard Hughes, Professor David Miles CBE, Tom Josephus
1. 1 The British economy has escaped from the two global shocks of Pandemic and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, with a decline in inflation and a stagnation of production. The inflation rate in November has declined at a higher rate than expected, and the market is now expected to fall more rapidly. This should boost shor t-term growth outlook and accelerate the recovery of living standards from the record fall of last year. However, the mi d-term economic outlook is still severe. One of the major changes in economic outlines is the increase and an increase in the UK population. However, the increase and increase in no n-active population offset the impact on the entire working population, and the GDP level forecast five years later is almost flat from the fall, and the GDP level per person decreases slightly.
1. 2 The overall outlook on finances is the same as in November. Due to inflation and decrease in interest rates, the government's forecast debt and social welfare costs decrease, but the revenue is reduced. With such a pr e-predictive change, the finances in the next two years will improve £ 20 billion, but the borrowing for five years has not changed. The budget proposal has announced a pure tax reduction package, such as reducing the main rate of national insurance premiums for employees and sel f-employed employees, and the cost will be partially collected from future tax increase. It is expected that the ratio of taxes to GDP will increase to the highest level of the postwar period, the cost of debt decreases, and the expenditures per capita to public services are substantially suppressed. 。 This is enough to satisfy our government's tax rules in 2028-29, with a historic decrease in a historic small difference of £ 8. 9 billion in 2028-29. Richard Hughes, David Miles CBE, Tom Josephus
1. 1 The British economy has escaped from the two global shocks of Pandemic and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, with a decline in inflation and a stagnation of production. The inflation rate in November has declined at a higher rate than expected, and the market is now expected to fall more rapidly. This should boost shor t-term growth outlook and accelerate the recovery of living standards from the record fall of last year. However, the mi d-term economic outlook is still severe. One of the major changes in economic outlines is the increase and an increase in the UK population. However, the increase and increase in no n-active population offset the impact on the entire working population, and the GDP level forecast five years later is almost flat from the fall, and the GDP level per person decreases slightly.
1. 2 The overall outlook on finances is the same as in November. Due to inflation and decrease in interest rates, the government's forecast debt and social welfare costs decrease, but the revenue is reduced. With such a pr e-predictive change, the finances in the next two years will improve £ 20 billion, but the borrowing for five years has not changed. The budget proposal has announced a pure tax reduction package, such as reducing the main rate of national insurance premiums for employees and sel f-employed employees, and the cost will be partially collected from future tax increase. It is expected that the ratio of taxes to GDP will increase to the highest level of the postwar period, the cost of debt decreases, and the expenditures per capita to public services are substantially suppressed. 。 This is enough to satisfy our government's tax rules in 2028-29, with a historic decrease in a historic small difference of £ 8. 9 billion in 2028-29. Richard Hughes, Professor David Miles CBE, Tom Josephus
Risks and uncertainties
1. 2 The overall outlook on finances is the same as in November. Due to inflation and decrease in interest rates, the government's forecast debt and social welfare costs decrease, but the revenue is reduced. With such a pr e-predictive change, the finances in the next two years will improve £ 20 billion, but the borrowing for five years has not changed. The budget proposal has announced a pure tax reduction package, such as reducing the main rate of national insurance premiums for employees and sel f-employed employees, and the cost will be partially collected from future tax increase. It is expected that the ratio of taxes to GDP will increase to the highest level of the postwar period, the cost of debt decreases, and the expenditures per capita to public services are substantially suppressed. 。 This is enough to satisfy our government's tax rules in 2028-29, with a historic decrease in a historic small difference of £ 8. 9 billion in 2028-29.

Box 4. 5: The impact of immigration on fiscal forecasts
1. The CPI inflation rate in the fourth quarter of last year was 4. 2%, 0. 6%lower than expected in November. It is expected that an average of 2. 2 % this year will be 2. 2 % and 1. 5 % in 2025, and will gradually return to the goal at the end of the expected period. The decline in the central inflation outlook is due to the expected drop in global energy prices. It is also expected that the decline in energy prices will be passed on to reduce the cost of the entire economy, and the labor market will continue to relax, so that the domestic inflation rate will decrease. Our central expectations are that the current confusion in the Red Sea contributes to the inflation rate (0. 2 % points). However, through a scenario that inflation reaches a peak of nearly 6%per year due to the soaring of energy prices, the risk of expanding disputes in the Middle East is also taken into account. 1. 3 This margin is only a part of the risk surrounding the central outlook. If the dispute in the Middle East is expanding or the domestic wage pressure is not eased as soon as possible, inflation may recover and stop over the long term. In addition, some main factors that lead to mediu m-term economic growth, such as pure immigrants, participation in the labor market, and growth of productivity, are uncertain. Financial outlooks are particularly susceptible to the influence of interest rate trends that have recently fluctuated abnormally. As of November, the market forecast of the mediu m-term bank interest rate is 2 % higher than the premise of the book forecast, and 1/20 % low. The financial outlook also depends on the increase in tax burden, including the increase in fuel tax, which has not actually been implemented since 2011. Despite the promise of increasing or more of the GDP or more, it is assumed that the government will not grow public expenditures per person in the next five years, despite the comparable or more promise of GDP.
1. The CPI inflation rate in the fourth quarter of last year was 4. 2%, 0. 6%lower than expected in November. It is expected that an average of 2. 2 % this year will be 2. 2 % and 1. 5 % in 2025, and will gradually return to the goal at the end of the expected period. The decline in the central inflation outlook is due to the expected drop in global energy prices. It is also expected that the decline in energy prices will be passed on to reduce the cost of the entire economy, and the labor market will continue to relax, so that the domestic inflation rate will decrease. Our central expectations are that the current confusion in the Red Sea contributes to the inflation rate (0. 2 % points). However, through a scenario that inflation reaches a peak of nearly 6%per year due to the soaring of energy prices, the risk of expanding disputes in the Middle East is also taken into account. 1. 3 This margin is only a part of the risk surrounding the central outlook. If the dispute in the Middle East is expanding or the domestic wage pressure is not eased as soon as possible, inflation may recover and stop over the long term. In addition, some main factors that lead to mediu m-term economic growth, such as pure immigrants, participation in the labor market, and growth of productivity, are uncertain. Financial outlooks are particularly susceptible to the influence of interest rate trends that have recently fluctuated abnormally. As of November, the market forecast of the mediu m-term bank interest rate is 2 % higher than the premise of the book forecast, and 1/20 % low. The financial outlook also depends on the increase in tax burden, including the increase in fuel tax, which has not actually been implemented since 2011. Despite the promise of increasing or more of the GDP or more, it is assumed that the government will not grow public expenditures per person in the next five years, despite the comparable or more promise of GDP.
1. The CPI inflation rate in the fourth quarter of last year was 4. 2%, 0. 6%lower than expected in November. It is expected that an average of 2. 2 % this year will be 2. 2 % and 1. 5 % in 2025, and will gradually return to the goal at the end of the expected period. The decline in the central inflation outlook is due to the expected drop in global energy prices. It is also expected that the decline in energy prices will be passed on to reduce the cost of the entire economy, and the labor market will continue to relax, so that the domestic inflation rate will decrease. Our central expectations are that the current confusion in the Red Sea contributes to the inflation rate (0. 2 % points). However, through a scenario that inflation reaches a peak of nearly 6%per year due to the soaring of energy prices, the risk of expanding disputes in the Middle East is also taken into account.

Foreword

Along with the 1, 5 inflation pressure, market participants are now expecting a rapid decline in interest rates than in autumn. Bank interest rates are expected to drop further from the current peak, 5. 25%, to 4. 2%in the last quarter of 2024. On average, bank interest rates decrease to 3, 3 %further, almost 3/4 %of the expectations in November. Gilt yields have dropped by about 1/20%, and government debt costs are much lower than expected in November. However, the expectations are still unstable, as the forecast of bank interest rates in 2028 fluctuates between 2. 7 and 4. 2 % from the expectation as of November.

Since November 1. 6, there have been a lot of news on the population size and forecast of the UK. Based on the updated withdrawal data and the January population forecast, the UK's total population in the UK will increase from 55 million in 2023 to 57 million at the end of the forecast, and will increase by 1. 3%(1 million) from November. It is expected. The tw o-thirds of this increase are due to the rise in the estimated value of the current British population in consideration of the 2021 census and the subsequent pure immigrants, and most of the remaining pure immigrants in predictions. It is. It reached the highest ever 745. 000, but there were about 70, 000 pure immigrants a year in mi d-2023 than expected in November. Supported by the policy measures announced since the previous prospect, the central prediction of this prediction assumes that the number of pure immigrants per year will decrease from 245. 000 to 315. 000 as of November as of November. It decreases. In addition, a scenario that increases or decreases in annual immigrants per year may be considered, and the GDP level in 2028-29 may be increased by about 1. 5 %, but there is almost no uncertain impact on GDP per capita. Maybe. , along with the 1 and 5 inflation pressure, market participants are currently expecting a steeper interest rate than fall. Bank interest rates are expected to drop further from the current peak, 5. 25%, to 4. 2%in the last quarter of 2024. On average, bank interest rates decrease to 3, 3 %further, almost 3/4 %of the expectations in November. Gilt yields have dropped by about 1/20%, and government debt costs are much lower than expected in November. However, the expectations are still unstable, as the forecast of bank interest rates in 2028 fluctuates between 2. 7 and 4. 2 % from the expectation as of November.

Since November 1. 6, there have been a lot of news on the population size and forecast of the UK. Based on the updated withdrawal data and the January population forecast, the UK's total population in the UK will increase from 55 million in 2023 to 57 million at the end of the forecast, and will increase by 1. 3%(1 million) from November. It is expected. The tw o-thirds of this increase are due to the rise in the estimated value of the current British population in consideration of the 2021 census and the subsequent pure immigrants, and most of the remaining pure immigrants in predictions. It is. It reached the highest ever 745. 000, but there were about 70, 000 pure immigrants a year in mi d-2023 than expected in November. Supported by the policy measures announced since the previous prospect, the central prediction of this prediction assumes that the number of pure immigrants per year will decrease from 245. 000 to 315. 000 as of November as of November. It decreases. In addition, a scenario that increases or decreases in annual immigrants per year may be considered, and the GDP level in 2028-29 may be increased by about 1. 5 %, but there is almost no uncertain impact on GDP per capita. Maybe. Along with the 1, 5 inflation pressure, market participants are now expecting a rapid decline in interest rates than in autumn. Bank interest rates are expected to drop further from the current peak, 5. 25%, to 4. 2%in the last quarter of 2024. On average, bank interest rates decrease to 3, 3 %further, almost 3/4 %of the expectations in November. Gilt yields have dropped by about 1/20%, and government debt costs are much lower than expected in November. However, the expectations are still unstable, as the forecast of bank interest rates in 2028 fluctuates between 2. 7 and 4. 2 % from the expectation as of November.

1. 7 also suggests that the latest evidence is more likely that the increase in economic inertia after the parallel shock will last than before. The no n-active population of the productio n-age population was no longer seen from the peak after inflation, as suggested in the previous data, but instead recovered to 9. 3 million. There are more 700, 000 people than before the pandemic. Approximately on e-third of the inactive aging population has a lon g-term disease as the main reasons that do not become a labor force. It is estimated that more than 300, 000 labor supply will increase in ful l-time conversion due to policy related to children's expansion, welfare reform, and personal tax cuts announced at the past three financial events. However, "financial carryover", which continues from the freezing of individual tax, is also heavy on working motivation, offset on e-third of the increase, and has a total of about 200, 000 changes. However, as a result of considering all the factors described above, the labor rate will continue to decrease from 64. 3%, the peak of every quarter, and will be 62. 8%in 2028, which is expected to be 0. 5%below the forecast as of November. 。

1. Eight population increases, but the working population declines, so the prospect of potential production high growth in the next five years is about 1 % per year, almost flat from November. The increase in pure immigrants, the decline in interest rates, and the decrease in energy prices have increased population, corporate investment, and productivity. However, recent data on labor participation, population dynamics, and other factors has revised the overall trendy participation rate and average working hours. As a net effect of these changes, the production level in 2028 is 0. 1 % lower than expected as of November, but rises by 0. 1 % in consideration of budgeting policies that boost labor supply. 1. 7 also suggests that the latest evidence is more likely that the increase in economic inertia after the parallel shock will last than before. The no n-active population of the productio n-age population was no longer seen from the peak after inflation, as suggested in the previous data, but instead recovered to 9. 3 million. There are more 700, 000 people than before the pandemic. Approximately on e-third of the inactive aging population has a lon g-term disease as the main reasons that do not become a labor force. It is estimated that more than 300, 000 labor supply will increase in ful l-time conversion due to policy related to children's expansion, welfare reform, and personal tax cuts announced at the past three financial events. However, "financial carryover", which continues from the freezing of individual tax, is also heavy on working motivation, offset on e-third of the increase, and has a total of about 200, 000 changes. However, as a result of considering all the factors described above, the labor rate will continue to decrease from 64. 3%, the peak of every quarter, and will be 62. 8%in 2028, which is expected to be 0. 5%below the forecast as of November. 。
1. Eight population increases, but the working population declines, so the prospect of potential production high growth in the next five years is about 1 % per year, almost flat from November. The increase in pure immigrants, the decline in interest rates, and the decrease in energy prices have increased population, corporate investment, and productivity. However, recent data on labor participation, population dynamics, and other factors has revised the overall trendy participation rate and average working hours. As a net effect of these changes, the production level in 2028 is 0. 1 % lower than expected as of November, but rises by 0. 1 % in consideration of budgeting policies that boost labor supply. 1. 7 also suggests that the latest evidence is more likely that the increase in economic inertia after the parallel shock will last than before. The no n-active population of the productio n-age population was no longer seen from the peak after inflation, as suggested in the previous data, but instead recovered to 9. 3 million. There are more 700, 000 people than before the pandemic. Approximately on e-third of the inactive aging population has a lon g-term disease as the main reasons that do not become a labor force. It is estimated that more than 300, 000 labor supply will increase in ful l-time conversion due to policy related to children's expansion, welfare reform, and personal tax cuts announced at the past three financial events. However, "financial carryover", which continues from the freezing of individual tax, is also heavy on working motivation, offset on e-third of the increase, and has a total of about 200, 000 changes. However, as a result of considering all the factors described above, the labor rate will continue to decrease from 64. 3%, the peak of every quarter, and will be 62. 8%in 2028, which is expected to be 0. 5%below the forecast as of November. 。
1. Eight population increases, but the working population declines, so the prospect of potential production high growth in the next five years is about 1 % per year, almost flat from November. The increase in pure immigrants, the decline in interest rates, and the decrease in energy prices have increased population, corporate investment, and productivity. However, recent data on labor participation, population dynamics, and other factors has revised the overall trendy participation rate and average working hours. As a net effect of these changes, the production level in 2028 is 0. 1 % lower than expected as of November, but increased by 0. 1 % in consideration of budgeting policies that boost labor supply.
1. 9 The output profile is somewhat weak in the near term, but strengthens somewhat in the second half of the decade. GDP growth is expected to remain at 0. 1% in 2023, 0. 4 percentage points below our November forecast. However, it is projected to grow to 0. 2% in 2024 as interest rates fall and real household incomes recover. GDP growth recovers to around 2% by mid-decade as the economic easing winds down, and returns to the assumed trend of around 1% in 2028. Real GDP levels rise by 0. 2% in 2028-29, driven by demand growth in the near term and supply growth in the medium term. Risks to the medium-term real GDP outlook remain elevated. The outlook for productivity growth is the most significant and uncertain forecast risk, and there is considerable uncertainty in our projections for immigration and labor force participation. 1. 10 Real GDP per capita, which has been steadily declining since the beginning of 2022, is projected to be 1¼% below its pre-implementation peak in the first half of 2024. The persistent weakness in per capita output is due to rising inactivity rates and sluggish productivity growth, which, even after recording a recovery from the pandemic, have remained well below the average during the economic crisis in recent years. Real GDP per capita is expected to begin to recover in the second half of this year and to recover to pre-implementation levels in 2025. Real GDP per capita will rise from the forecast horizon to about 4. 5% above the pre-fixed peak, but will remain at about 3/4 of the A% level projected in November.
1. 11 The recovery in production will be driven mainly by a recovery in household consumption growth to around 2% from 2025 to 2028. This growth will be stronger than in November due to rising household incomes, a sharp slowdown in inflation, and lower interest rates. In contrast, business investment is expected to contract by around 5% this year as past interest rate hikes raise the cost of capital and weigh on business investment. Investment will then strengthen as interest rates fall and demand is observed. Recent trade data has been volatile and has undergone significant revisions. Nevertheless, we expect trade volumes to remain subdued over the next few years due to slower growth in the UK and global economies and the effects of Brexit. From 2024 to 2028, we expect export and import volumes to grow at average annual rates of 0. 3% and 0. 1%, respectively. As a result, their contribution to net trade growth over the forecast period will be negligible. 1. 12 A slowdown in GDP growth in the near term will result in a modest rise in the unemployment rate in 2024, followed by a fall in unemployment as the pace of recovery quickens. The latest ONS statistics show that the unemployment rate fell to 3. 8% in the fourth quarter of 2023. In contrast, entitlement data, measuring the number of people on incapacity benefits, have remained stable in recent months, and the surplus rate has slowed to a slower upward trend since mid-2022. We therefore judge the unemployment rate to rise modestly, peaking at 4. 5% in the final quarter of 2024, consistent with our forecast of weaker economic growth and increasing economic space. The peak unemployment rate will be around 1. 6 million, a small decrease of around 40, 000 from our November forecast, but six months earlier. The unemployment rate is then projected to fall to the estimated structural level of 4. 1% by 2028.
1, 13 We expect nominal average wage growth to halve in 2024 from a 30-year high of around 7%, due to falling inflation and an easing labour market. Nominal income growth will be slightly weaker than expected in November, due to less persistent inflation. For total labour income, this weaker nominal income growth is partly offset by a faster increase in the number of people working. Nominal wage and salary levels, the key determinant of the fiscal outlook, will therefore be 0. 3% lower at the forecast horizon than in November, roughly in line with the revision to nominal GDP.
1. 14 Living standards are expected to recover faster than expected in November, rising by around 1% per year over the forecast period. 2022-23 remains the financial year with the largest year-on-year decline in living standards since ONS records began in the 1950s. However, we expect real household income per capita to recover to its pre-fixed peak by 2025-26, two years earlier than we expected in November. The faster recovery in living standards is due to the fact that the negative terms of trade shock from higher imported energy prices has been reversed more quickly and completely than expected. The Budget's policies will further boost household incomes, with the further cut in the main National Insurance rates alone providing an immediate boost of 1/2 percentage point.
1. 15 Nominal GDP is expected to grow at an average annual rate of 3. 3% over the forecast period, slightly lower than we expected in November due to the lower inflation outlook. The slower growth in the GDP deflator, combined with little change in the path of real GDP, leads to a medium-term level of nominal GDP that is 0. 3 percentage points lower than previously expected. For the other major nominal tax bases, both income growth and nominal consumption growth will weaken in the short term, but will accelerate in the medium term. Over the forecast period, the evolution of both tax bases is roughly in line with the evolution of nominal GDP.
1. The financial situation is still very severe due to the high debt, the sluggish economic growth, and the rise in interest rates for more than 10 years. In order for the government to stabilize debt in the middle term, it is necessary to make the basic financial balance of about 1. 3%of the GDP (excluding expenditures, excluding interest), which is about 1. 3%of GDP. 。 On the other hand, the 2010s were able to stabilize debts on average with a 2. 1 % basic budget deficit. Based on the current policy, by 2028-29, the basic financial balance is increased by 1. 1 %, and the basic fiscal expenditure is reduced by 1. 7 %, which will make the basic financial balance surplus and the reduction of debt. It is expected to be achieved. However, the budget deficit is a big difference between two large numbers (revenues and expenditures are currently exceeding £ 1 trillion), and our central predictions on borrowing and the trajectory of debt over the next five years. Gender is considerable.

1. 17 Compared to the outlook as of November, the basic financial outlook before the measures has improved slightly in the short term, but is almost flat at the end of the forecast period. Borrowing is expected to decrease by £ 10 billion this year and about 10 billion pounds in the next two years. This is mainly for lower interest rates and inflation reductions in debt and welfare costs. However, due to a decrease in inflation, the name tax revenue increases and decreases. As a whole, the borrowing in 2028-29 before considering fiscal policy measures has decreased only by 800 million pounds than expected in November.

1. 18 In this financial framework, the government has announced a preliminary package, including a significant pure tax reduction, and is expected to increase an average of £ 8 billion per year. As a whole, the direct and indirect effects of the measures increased by 12. 7 billion pounds in 2024-25, and the number was reduced to £ 5. 2 billion in 2028-29. As a result, borrowing after each year for the five-year prediction period will increase slightly from November, increasing by 4. 4 billion pounds in 2028-2029.

1. 19 The financial measures that are estimated to have the largest direct financial impact are as follows:

Further reduction of the national insurance premium rate (NICS). In April 2024, it will be 10. 7 billion pounds by 2028-29, including reducing the main tax rate of employees and self-employed NICS by 2 pounds.

Reforms to the current non-dosage regime from April 2025, raising revenues by an average of £3. 1 billion between 2026-27 and 2028-29.

Chapter 1: Executive summary

Overview

A number of new taxes and other revenue-raising measures, including the introduction of a customs and carbon border adjustment mechanism, HMRC's anti-avoidance and compliance measures, and a one-year extension of energy profits tax.

Increasing capital spending on the NHS-focused public sector productivity programme by an average of £900 million per year from 2025-26 to 2027-28, and reducing spending on resources by an average of £800 million per year from 2025-26 onwards.

1. 20 The indirect effects of these policies on the economy will be a small boost to demand in the short run and labour supply in the medium run. The boost to demand will come mainly from higher household incomes due to short-term tax cuts. The NIC cuts and the high-income child reforms for high-income earners also increase labour supply by improving work incentives. By the end of the projection period, about half of the fiscal benefits from these effects are offset by the additional debt expenditure for borrowing required to finance the policy package.

Economic outlook

1, 21 Taxes as a share of GDP are projected to rise to 37. 1% in 2028-29, 4. 0% higher than the pre-budget level. Of this increase, 2. 9% is projected to be realised by the end of 2023-24, with the remaining 1. 1% to be realised thereafter by 2028-29. Over the full period, the key policy decisions to increase taxes from March 2020 will increase taxes by 2. 0% of GDP, of which the income tax base freeze accounts for 1. 3% of GDP. These are partly offset by significant tax cuts of 0. 9% of GDP, of which the NICS tax cuts announced in this Budget and in November 2023 account for 0. 7% of GDP.

Chart 1.1: CPI inflation

The ratio of expenditures in 1. 22 GDP will steadily decrease from 44. 5 % this year to 42. 5 % in 2028-2029, but is expected to be about 3 % exceeding the pandemic level. Debt interest rates account for about 0. 4 % of GDP out of the decrease from this year to 2028-2029. The biggest contribution to the reduction is due to a 1. 0 % reduction in GDP spending by category for public services over the next five years. It is expected that social welfare expenditures will increase by 0. 4 % of GDP by partially offsetting this. This is because the increase in the number of cases leads to an increase in medical benefits and disability benefits, and the combination of aging and triple locks leads to an increase in pension spending.

1, 23 Our central prediction is expected to steadily decrease from 4. 2 % of this year to 1. 2 % in 2028-29. It is predicted that the increase in revenues is 0. 9%of the GDP ratio by 2. 9%, and the decrease in expenditures contributes to 2. 1%of the GDP ratio. Cash bases are expected to decrease from 114. 1 billion pounds in 2023-24 to £ 394 billion in 2028-29. Compared to the forecast as of November, borrowing is slightly increased by GDP on a average of five years to 0. 1 %. As shown in Fig. 1. 6, our central borrowed prediction has a wide range of risks, which will be described later.

1, 24 Pure debt (excluding England Bank) in the central prediction (excluding England Bank) has risen from 88. 8 % this year to a peak of 93. 2 % in GDP in 2027-28, and then GDP in 2028-29. It drops slightly to 92. 9 %. This is almost the same route as the previous forecast. The broader name debt indicators rose from 97. 6%this year to 98. 8%in 2024-25, and then decreased to 94. 3%of GDP in 2028-29.

Chart 1.2: Net migration and participation rate

1. 25 Government's major fiscal goal is to reduce the pure debt of the public sector except for England in the fifth year and the final year. The median of this prediction is achieved with a margin of 8. 9 billion pounds (GDP 0. 3 %), lower than the 13 billion pound (GD P-0. 4 %) margin in November. Given that the prediction of prior measures is almost flat until 2028-29, the decrease in leisure is mainly due to policy measures.

1, 26 The headroom of £8. 9 billion is lower than the average of £26. 1 billion each Chancellor has made in tax offences since 2010. It is also very low compared to the risks around our forecasts, summarised below. Based on five years of historical forecast errors, there is a 54% chance that the fiscal target will be met under current policies. This is higher than the 56% chance we had in November. The forecast includes an additional revenue of £4. 8 billion from the government's intention to reverse the 5P cut in 2028-29 and raise fuel prices in line with RPI inflation. If tariffs are left at their current rates, as in this Budget and all fiscal events since 2011, almost half of the headroom in 2028-29 would be removed. 1. 27 The supplementary target of public sector net borrowing of 3% of GDP or less in 2028-29 is also met in our central forecast. This faces a wider margin than the fiscal obligation, at £56. 8 billion, or 1. 8% of GDP (down £4. 8 billion from November). History suggests that this margin is consistent with a 72% chance of meeting the supplementary target.

Chart 1.3: Real GDP and real GDP per person

1. 28 Historically large fluctuations in energy prices, interest rates, wage growth and population growth have led to significant revisions to recent economic and fiscal outlooks. We continue to highlight the uncertainties surrounding our forecasts and the possibility that any of our key judgements may prove to be overly optimistic or pessimistic. The main risks to this forecast are:

Our central forecast is that inflation will return to target this year, but the outlook remains highly uncertain. Externally, conflicts in the Middle East pose risks to global goods and energy markets. The scenario in Box 2. 2 shows that an escalation of the current Middle East conflict could lead to a significant reduction in energy supplies from the region and further disruption to global goods supply chains. In this scenario, quarterly inflation would soar to over 7%. This would lead to an average five-year forecast increase in borrowing of £23. 1 billion, which could lead to a rise in primary debt to GDP ratios of 0. 8% by 2028-29. Domestically, wage growth is centrally expected to slow next year, but wages could become stickier and sustain higher inflation for longer.

Our forecasts are based on bank interest rates and market forecasts for ghilding yields, and although these forecasts have declined significantly due to a decrease in inflation, they are still fluctuating abnormally (see around 4. 3). Since the end of November, the forecast of the medium bank interest rate has fluctuated between 2, 7 % to 4, 2 %, and the 1 0-year gilt yields have fluctuated between 3, 5 % and 4, 7 %. 。 If all the effective interest rates of all central government debts are increased by 0. 3%, the peak of debt decreased in FY2028-29 will increase or increase by about £ 9 billion.

A major change in the prediction from November was incorporated, incorporating the updated pure immigration prediction and the ONS labor survey data. In particular, considering the changes in the policy announced after November, the future immigration level is very uncertain and difficult to predict. According to our scenario, if the annual immigration is about 200, 000 or less than the 315, 000 predictions of ONS in the medium term, the GDP in 2028-29 may increase or decrease by about 1. 5 %. be. However, the impact on GDP per person is much smaller, and its direction is unclear. In scenarios with the highest immigration, borrowing decreases by 19. 9 billion pounds than forecast horizons, and basic debt decreases by 3. 1 % compared to GDP. The descending scenario is symmetrical, borrowing up 190. 9 billion pounds, and basic debt increases 3. 1 % compared to GDP.

According to the economic and financial outlook in November 2023, the annual productivity increase rate was 1. 5 % higher or lower, and by 2028-29, the borrowed money would decrease or increased by more than 40 billion pounds. The growth of the overall productivity has not changed since November, but in the revised data, the population is more than the same, so the level at the start is 1/20 % lower. It is.

Chart 1.4: Real household disposable income per person

The level of economic inertia remains significantly higher than before the pandemic. In July 2023, financial risks and financial risks and sustainability reports examined the levels of Inasha and lowering scenarios for the future. In the downhill scenario, the production age population ratio decreased by 1. 2 % by 2027-28, GDP decreased by 1. 5 %, borrowings increased by 21. 3 billion pounds, and GDP's debt increased by 3. 4 %. The upper scenario was almost symmetrical, but the decrease in borrowings and debt was slightly smaller.

Fiscal outlook

1. 29 There is also a serious risk in the implementation of the fiscal policy stated by the government. There are the following risks in the medium term:

According to the financial outlook, the tax vs. GDP ratio rises by 1. 1 % from the current level, approaching the highest in the post-war GDP by 2028-29. About tw o-thirds of this increase are due to freezing tax deductions, increasing the sales of about 7 billion pounds for each year's extension. It also depends on fuel tax slides, which have an additional revenue of about 4. 8 billion pounds by 2028-2029.

There must be no detailed spending plans after the current expenditure review period ending in 2024-25. Each ministry expenditure in the next four years of the forecast is based on the two rough assumptions set by the government. These assumptions are no longer the actual increase in per capita departments in the next five years. Upon this range, the government, especially the NHS labor plan, which means 3. 6 % of the real growth every year, and maintains a constant GDP, 2 % of the GDP defenders. I promise. In order to achieve these pledges and other pledges for schools, childcare and overseas assistance, it is necessary to reduce all other ministries' budgets by 2. 3 % from 2025-26 from 2025-26. Before the expenditure review in November 2015 and October 2021, the government added an average of £ 39 billion to £ 32 billion, respectively.

Chart 1.5: Public sector net borrowing: change since November

2. 1 This chapter shows our latest forecasts regarding the economy in Table 2. 1:

Prerequisites of our regulations, including primary product prices, financial and financial policies, world economy, and exchange rates (paragraph 2.)
Inflation outlook (from 2. 9).
Fix forecast for potential productivity that takes into account the latest population and labor data (from paragraph 2. 14).
Expectation of real GDP and production gap (from 2. 22).

Expectations of labor markets, including the expected route of employment, unemployment, and income (from paragraph 2. 31).

Household income, savings rate, housing market outlook (from 2. 39)

Opportunity for current account and name GDP (from paragraph 2. 45). 1. 29 There is also a serious risk in the implementation of the fiscal policy stated by the government. There are the following risks in the medium term:

Chart 1.6: Public sector net borrowing

Chart 1.7: Public sector net debt excluding the Bank of England

Performance against the Government’s fiscal targets

2. 1 This chapter shows our latest forecasts regarding the economy in Table 2. 1:

Prerequisites of our regulations, including primary product prices, financial and financial policies, world economy, and exchange rates (paragraph 2.)

Chart 1.8: Underlying debt falling headroom: changes since November

Inflation outlook (from 2. 9).

Risks and uncertainties

Fix forecast for potential productivity that takes into account the latest population and labor data (from paragraph 2. 14).

Expectation of real GDP and production gap (from 2. 22).
Expectations of labor markets, including the expected route of employment, unemployment, and income (from paragraph 2. 31).
Household income, savings rate, housing market outlook (from 2. 39)
Opportunity for current account and name GDP (from paragraph 2. 45). 1. 29 There is also a serious risk in the implementation of the fiscal policy stated by the government. There are the following risks in the medium term:
According to the financial outlook, the tax vs. GDP ratio rises by 1. 1 % from the current level, approaching the highest in the post-war GDP by 2028-29. About tw o-thirds of this increase are due to freezing tax deductions, increasing the sales of about 7 billion pounds for each year's extension. It also depends on fuel tax slides, which have an additional revenue of about 4. 8 billion pounds by 2028-2029.

2. 1 This chapter shows our latest forecasts regarding the economy in Table 2. 1:
Prerequisites of our regulations, including primary product prices, financial and financial policies, world economy, and exchange rates (paragraph 2.)

Chapter 2: Economic outlook

Introduction

Inflation outlook (from 2. 9).

Fix forecast for potential productivity that takes into account the latest population and labor data (from paragraph 2. 14).
Expectation of real GDP and production gap (from 2. 22).
Expectations of labor markets, including the expected route of employment, unemployment, and income (from paragraph 2. 31).
Household income, savings rate, housing market outlook (from 2. 39)
Opportunity for current account and name GDP (from paragraph 2. 45).
Comparison with recent external forecasts (from paragraph 2. 48)
Key measurements (percentages unless otherwise stated)
November 2023

Table 2.1: Key economy forecast assumptions and judgements

March 2024	Increase/decrease	Gas prices	2024 average (£ A Therm)
Crude oil prices	2024 average ($ A Barrel)	1.2	0.8	↓
Bank rates	Final quarter 2024	82	77	↓
Golden yield	10-year maturity (spot)	4.9	4.2	↓
Inflation rate	Final quarter 2024	4.5	3.9	↓
Box 5. 1: Developments in public sector net debt (excluding the Bank of England) since 2000	2023Q3 level	2.8	1.4	↓
-0. 1	Potential output	0.1	2024-2028 average growth rate	↓
This Economic and Fiscal Outlook (EFO) sets out the OBR's central outlook for the five years to 2028-29, taking into account recent data and government policy announced up to the 2024 Spring Budget, and the uncertainties surrounding it. The forecasts represent our consensus view as the three independent members of the OBR Budget Committee (BRC). We take full responsibility for the judgments underlying this forecast and for the conclusions reached.	2023-24 5-year total (MNE)	1⅔	1⅔	–
Employment rate (16+)	2028 average	1.5	1.8	↑
63. 3	62. 8	Real GDP	2024 growth rate	↓
Real GDP per capita	2028 Level in 2028 (index, 2019 = 100)	0.7	0.8	↑
105. 5	104. 7	Unemployment rate	Top	↓
Nominal income	Average growth rate from 2024 to 2028	4.6	4.5	↓
RHDI per capita	2023-24 5-year total (MNE)	2¾	2½	↓
102. 3	104. 7	Nominal GDP	Level in 2028 (BN Pound)	↑
3. 190	3. 179	Key: ↑ higher, ↑ lower, - unchanged	2. 2 The expected path of the Bank Rate has fallen significantly from the November forecast (left side of Figure 2. 1). Taking into account the market determinants for the 10 trading days up to January 23, market participants expect the Bank Rate to fall more sharply over the course of the year, reaching 4. 2% in the last quarter of 2024, 0. 8 percentage points lower than the November forecast. Thereafter, the Bank Rate is expected to be 3. 3%, 0. 7 percentage points lower than previously expected. The shallower short-term profile of the Bank Rate corresponds to inflation falling below expectations. However, expectations remain unstable, as the Bank Rate forecast for 2028 fluctuates between 2. 7 and 4. 2% from November expectations.	↓
2. 3 Yields have also declined on all tracks compared to November (right table, Exhibit 2. 1). At the close of the market window, the 10-year Gilt yield was 3. 9%, 0. 6 percentage points lower than November. Similarly, the 25-year Gilt yield has fallen to 4. 6%, 0. 4 percentage points lower than November expectations. Despite these recent declines, the 10-year yield is still four times higher than its pre-Ukrainian invasion level of 0. 9%. [1] Yields have remained volatile since November forecasts, with the 10-year yield ranging from 3. 5% to 4. 7%, in part due to changing bank expectations.

Key forecast assumptions

Monetary policy and gilts

Since the forecast of November 2. 4, the market expectations for gas prices have been falling toward the last level before Russia invades Ukraine (the left panel in Figure 2. 2). Our forecast states that the wholesale gas price will be 76 penses in 2024 and 84 in 2025. This value is 46 penses and 32 pencils lower than expected in November. In the medium term, the wholesale price of natural gas will settle to about 78 pencils by 2028. This is 20 pencils lower than in November, but 28 pencils higher than the average of 50 pencils before the fan.

2. 5 The market forecast for the Brent crude oil price in 2024 also fell down from the expectation as of November, and the number of $ 77 per barrel was reduced by 7%(the right panel in Figure 2. 2). In British pounds, crude oil prices in 2024 fell 10%, reflecting the pound height as of November as of November, to £ 61 per barrel. In recent months, fluctuations in crude oil prices have been relatively low. Despite the impressive risks in the Middle East, the market forecasts for the price in 2024, the price in 2024, has been in the width of $ 74 to $ 86. Box 2. 2 examines the potential impact of the expansion of the Middle East dispute on British energy, products, and economic prices.

Chart 2.1: Bank Rate and gilt yields by years to maturity

Commodity prices

2. 6 The situation in the world economy has improved from the expectation as of November as the growth and elasticity of the rise in energy and interest rates has increased from the conventional expectation. According to the World Economic Outlook update announced by IMF in January, the global GDP growth rate in 2024 is expected to be slightly increased to 3. 1%, and the mediu m-term growth rate is expected to be flat at around 3%(left in Figure 2. 3). The Middle East conflict has emerged as a great risk for global prospects, especially when the disconnection of major routes promotes further inflation (see BOX 2. 2). The trad e-i n-weight exchange rate rose by about 2%from the outlook as of November 2023 (right panel, figure 2. 3). The pounds rose 4 % for the dollar, 1 % against euros, and 3 % against yen in 10 business days until January 23. Since the forecast in November 2. 4, expectations for gas prices have continued to fall toward the last level before Russia invaded Ukraine (the left panel in Figure 2. 2). Our forecast states that the wholesale gas price will be 76 penses in 2024 and 84 in 2025. This value is 46 penses and 32 pencils lower than expected in November. In the medium term, the wholesale price of natural gas will settle to about 78 pencils by 2028. This is 20 pencils lower than in November, but 28 pencils higher than the average of 50 pencils before the fan.

2. 5 The market forecast for the Brent crude oil price in 2024 fell down from the expectation as of November, down 77 per rells (the right panel in Fig. 2. 2). In British pounds, crude oil prices in 2024 fell 10%, reflecting the pound height as of November as of November, to £ 61 per barrel. In recent months, fluctuations in crude oil prices have been relatively low. Despite the impressive risks in the Middle East, the market forecasts for the price in 2024, the price in 2024, has been in the width of $ 74 to $ 86. Box 2. 2 examines the potential impact of the expansion of the Middle East dispute on British energy, products, and economic prices.

Chart 2.2: Gas and oil prices

World economy and the exchange rate

2. 6 The situation in the world economy has improved from the expectation as of November as the growth and elasticity of the rise in energy and interest rates has increased from the conventional expectation. According to the World Economic Outlook update announced by IMF in January, the global GDP growth rate in 2024 is expected to be slightly increased to 3. 1%, and the mediu m-term growth rate is expected to be flat at around 3%(left in Figure 2. 3). The Middle East conflict has emerged as a great risk for global prospects, especially when the disconnection of major routes promotes further inflation (see BOX 2. 2). The trad e-i n-weight exchange rate rose by about 2%from the outlook as of November 2023 (right panel, figure 2. 3). The pounds rose 4 % for the dollar, 1 % against euros, and 3 % against yen in 10 business days until January 23. Since the forecast of November 2. 4, the market expectations for gas prices have been falling toward the last level before Russia invades Ukraine (the left panel in Figure 2. 2). Our forecast states that the wholesale gas price will be 76 penses in 2024 and 84 in 2025. This value is 46 penses and 32 pencils lower than expected in November. In the medium term, the wholesale price of natural gas will settle to about 78 pencils by 2028. This is 20 pencils lower than in November, but 28 pencils higher than the average of 50 pencils before the fan.

Chart 2.3: World GDP growth and the exchange rate

Fiscal policy

Box 2.1: The economic effects of policy measures

2. 7 The large fiscal support to households, businesses and public services implemented during the pandemic and subsequent energy crisis is now largely withdrawn as both crises subside. Borrowing continues to decline over the forecast period as other crisis-related support is withdrawn, net taxes continue to rise (mainly through the continued freeze of personal income tax thresholds) and sectoral spending declines as a share of GDP. Taken together, core borrowing falls by 3 percentage points of GDP against our forecast (with the largest decline in 2024-25) and puts the primary debt-to-GDP ratio on a downward trajectory by 2028-29 according to our central forecast. Fiscal policy support to demand falls against our forecast, although a combination of fiscal and monetary policy will help output reach potential growth and inflation to 2% over the forecast period.

2. 8 Compared to November, the path of core lending remains largely unchanged in our forecast. The decline in debt interest expenditures will be offset by a small increase in the primary deficit, especially in the final year of this Parliament. About half of this deficit reflects discretionary fiscal easing in the Spring Budget, which will increase the primary deficit by 0. 2% of GDP on average relative to the forecast. As noted in Box 2. 1, the policy measures in this Budget are estimated to provide a temporary, small boost to demand in the short run (0. 2% of GDP) and a similar but permanent boost in the medium run (0. 2% of GDP). The measures will slightly reduce inflation in the short run and only slightly increase it thereafter.

Chart A: Impact of policy measures on real GDP

Our economic forecasts take into account the economic effects of the most recently announced government policies. This includes the demand-side effects of the policy package as a whole, calculated using fiscal "multipliers" derived from the empirical literature and regularly reviewed. They also take into account the effects of policies on the supply side of the economy, where there is credible evidence suggesting that the measures have a substantial, additional and sustained impact on potential output.

With the policy announced in this spring budget, it is estimated that borrowing from 2024-25 will increase by 14 billion pounds and an average of £ 8 billion from 2025-26. These policies are estimated to increase the GDP an average of 0. 3 % during the prediction period due to the effects on both the economic demand side and the supply side (Chart A). Immediate demand stimuli measures (blue bar graphs) reflect the further permanent tax cuts of NICS and the temporary freezing of fuel tariffs that boost the real tax after income. Two financial measures are expected to have a permanent impact on supply. It is estimated that GDP in 2024-25 will increase by 0. 1 % due to the additional reduction of NICS (yellow bar graph) and the child allowance for high-income child (HICBC) (green bar graph). After 2025-26, the impact will increase to 0. 2%, as more people will adjust labor supply according to changes in economic incentives. Box 3. 2 indicates an overview of the modeling of labor supply.

It is estimated that these two financial measures will increase labor supply of about 100, 000 people (ful l-time conversion (FTE)) in the final year of the prediction. This is the estimation last year, which combines NICS, childcare, welfare reforms, and other measures announced at the past two financial events, all of these estimates are highly uncertain and may be corrected. be. In addition, as described in box 3. 2, the net effect of recent changes in financial policy to labor supply must be taken into account the negative effects of the continuation of the freezing of personal income tax. As mentioned in the box 3. 2, recent upward revisions of the population size have increased our estimates on both costs and labor supply due to NIC reductions in the fall of 2023 (these corrections have been frozen. It is also reflected in the impact of the standard amount). In other measures other than tax system, childcare and welfare reform are also at risk. The childcare fee for free from April estimated to boost 60, 000 employees, but gained additional funds for childbirth support. The policy announced in this spring budget has estimated that borrowing from 2024-25 will increase by 14 billion pounds and an average of 8 billion pounds a year from 2025-26. These policies are estimated to increase the GDP an average of 0. 3 % during the prediction period due to the effects on both the economic demand side and the supply side (Chart A). Immediate demand stimuli measures (blue bar graphs) reflect the further permanent tax cuts of NICS and the temporary freezing of fuel tariffs that boost the real tax after income. Two financial measures are expected to have a permanent impact on supply. It is estimated that GDP in 2024-25 will increase by 0. 1 % due to the additional reduction of NICS (yellow bar graph) and the child allowance for high-income child (HICBC) (green bar graph). After 2025-26, the impact will increase to 0. 2%, as more people will adjust labor supply according to changes in economic incentives. Box 3. 2 indicates an overview of the modeling of labor supply.

It is estimated that these two financial measures will increase labor supply of about 100, 000 people (ful l-time conversion (FTE)) in the final year of the prediction. This is the estimation last year, which combines NICS, childcare, welfare reforms, and other measures announced at the past two financial events, all of these estimates are highly uncertain and may be corrected. be. In addition, as described in box 3. 2, the net effect of recent changes in financial policy to labor supply must be taken into account the negative effects of the continuation of the freezing of personal income tax. As mentioned in the box 3. 2, recent upward revisions of the population size have increased our estimates on both costs and labor supply due to NIC reductions in the fall of 2023 (these corrections have been frozen. It is also reflected in the impact of the standard amount). In other measures other than tax system, childcare and welfare reform are also at risk. The childcare fee for free from April estimated to boost 60, 000 employees, but gained additional funds for childbirth support. With the policy announced in this spring budget, it is estimated that borrowing from 2024-25 will increase by 14 billion pounds and an average of £ 8 billion from 2025-26. These policies are estimated to increase the GDP an average of 0. 3 % during the prediction period due to the effects on both the economic demand side and the supply side (Chart A). Immediate demand stimuli measures (blue bar graphs) reflect the further permanent tax cuts of NICS and the temporary freezing of fuel tariffs that boost the real tax after income. Two financial measures are expected to have a permanent impact on supply. It is estimated that GDP in 2024-25 will increase by 0. 1 % due to the additional reduction of NICS (yellow bar graph) and the child allowance for high-income child (HICBC) (green bar graph). After 2025-26, the impact will increase to 0. 2%, as more people will adjust labor supply according to changes in economic incentives. Box 3. 2 indicates an overview of the modeling of labor supply.

Inflation

It is expected that the CPI inflation rate in 2024-25 will decrease by 0. 2 % due to this budget measure, but it maintains the 5P reduction of fuel tax for another year and almost reflects the effect of freezing liquor tax. 。 Some of the effects have increased rapidly in 2025-26, and raising the planned fuel tax increases the CPI inflation rate by 0. 1 %. By 2028-29, the fiscal stimulus has led to a slight increase in inflation, a cumulative 0. 1 % point, and the overall level of CPIs remains almost flat until the end of our horizontal problem. Capital gain tax reduction for real estate will increase real estate transactions by about 2 % in the short term before the remaining period of this prediction ends.

Chart 2.4: CPI inflation

α) See the 2019 predictive evaluation report and the economic and financial outlook for November 2020.

Chart 2.5: Contributions to CPI inflation

Box 2.2: Economic implications of further instability in the Middle East

B) In recent online articles, we introduce our labor supply models and how they applied to the NICS reduction in 2023: OBR, The Labour Suppry Implications of the Autumn 2023 National. Insurance Contributions Cut, 2024. In addition, the operation of capital cost models and recent implementation status (OBR, the Economic Impact of Full Spending, 2024) has been published.

2. 9 The inflation rate in November has dropped significantly more than expected. The CPI inflation rate fell to 4. 2 % in the last quarter of 2023, which was the first highest level in 41 years to 4. 2 % in the last quarter of 2023, down 0. 6 points to November expectations. The monthly inflation rate in November was at least the largest decline in industrial consensus since 2014. [2] Compared to the expectation as of November, the easing domestic inflation pressure is consistent with our fixes that are operated slightly more than we had previously assumed (see Paragraph 26). The CPI inflation rate in 2024-25 is expected to decrease by 0. 2 %, but this almost reflects the effect of maintaining the 5P reduction of fuel tax for another year and freezing the liquor tax. I'm doing it. Some of the effects have increased rapidly in 2025-26, and raising the planned fuel tax increases the CPI inflation rate by 0. 1 %. By 2028-29, the fiscal stimulus has led to a slight increase in inflation, a cumulative 0. 1 % point, and the overall level of CPIs remains almost flat until the end of our horizontal problem. Capital gain tax reduction for real estate will increase real estate transactions by about 2 % in the short term before the remaining period of this prediction ends.

α) See the 2019 predictive evaluation report and the economic and financial outlook for November 2020.

B) In recent online articles, we introduce our labor supply models and how they applied to the NICS reduction in 2023: OBR, The Labour Suppry Implications of the Autumn 2023 National. Insurance Contributions Cut, 2024. In addition, the operation of capital cost models and recent implementation status (OBR, the Economic Impact of Full Spending, 2024) has been published.
2. 9 The inflation rate in November has dropped significantly more than expected. The CPI inflation rate fell to 4. 2 % in the last quarter of 2023, which was the first highest level in 41 years to 4. 2 % in the last quarter of 2023, down 0. 6 points to November expectations. The monthly inflation rate in November was at least the largest decline in industrial consensus since 2014. [2] Compared to the expectation as of November, the easing domestic inflation pressure is consistent with our fixes that are operated slightly more than we had previously assumed (see Paragraph 26). It is expected that the CPI inflation rate in 2024-25 will decrease by 0. 2 % due to this budget measure, but it maintains the 5P reduction of fuel tax for another year and almost reflects the effect of freezing liquor tax. 。 Some of the effects have increased rapidly in 2025-26, and raising the planned fuel tax increases the CPI inflation rate by 0. 1 %. By 2028-29, the fiscal stimulus has led to a slight increase in inflation, a cumulative 0. 1 % point, and the overall level of CPIs remains almost flat until the end of our horizontal problem. Capital gain tax reduction for real estate will increase real estate transactions by about 2 % in the short term before the remaining period of this prediction ends.
α) See the 2019 predictive evaluation report and the economic and financial outlook for November 2020.

Chart B: CPI inflation in the adverse scenario

2. 10 We currently expect the inflation rate for the next two years to decrease faster than expected in November. Our central expectations are that the quarterly inflation rate will decrease to the target inflation rate of 2%in the second quarter of 2024, which is about one year earlier than expected in November. It is expected that the inflation rate in 2024 will be 2. 2%, to 1. 5%in 2025, and to rise to 2%of the target inflation rate in 2028. However, this forecast is quite uncertain from domestic and foreign inflation pressure, especially the pressure over energy prices. In order to quantify this uncertainty, a fantastic error was created showing the scope of the result of the inflation rate when the past predictive error became a reasonable guideline for future prediction errors (Fig. 2. 4). Overall in 2025 suggests that the probability of an average inflation rate exceeding 4%is about one-tenth, and the probability of the average inflation rate belo w-1%is about one-tenth.

2. 11 Inflation in 2024 has been reduced from 3. 6%to 2. 2%because the market forecast for energy prices has dropped significantly since November. Our forecasts depend on the OFGEM price limit falling to 1. 620 pounds in April, the average from April to the end of the year to 1. 550 pounds, down about 20 % from November forecasts. [3] The direct effect of the decline in energy prices is about tw o-thirds of this year's CPI inflation rate of 1 % on average, reducing the inflation prospect of 2024. It is expected that the indirect effect of the decline in energy prices will continue to give a gentle downward pressure on the CPI inflation rate since the latter half of 2024. This is more than offsetting a small upward revision (0. 2 % points in the first half of 2025) due to the effects of the Red Sea disturbance in 2024 and 2025. The domestic inflation rate will decline slightly in 2024 and 2025, but will rise slightly in 2026 and 2027. 2. 10 We currently expect inflation in the next two years to decrease faster than expected in November. Our central expectations are that the quarterly inflation rate will decrease to the target inflation rate of 2%in the second quarter of 2024, which is about one year earlier than expected in November. It is expected that the inflation rate in 2024 will be 2. 2%, to 1. 5%in 2025, and to rise to 2%of the target inflation rate in 2028. However, this forecast is quite uncertain from domestic and foreign inflation pressure, especially the pressure over energy prices. In order to quantify this uncertainty, a fantastic error was created showing the scope of the result of the inflation rate when the past predictive error became a reasonable guideline for future prediction errors (Fig. 2. 4). Overall in 2025 suggests that the probability of an average inflation rate exceeding 4%is about one-tenth, and the probability of the average inflation rate belo w-1%is about one-tenth.

2. 11 Inflation in 2024 has been reduced from 3. 6%to 2. 2%because the market forecast for energy prices has dropped significantly since November. Our forecasts depend on the OFGEM price limit falling to 1. 620 pounds in April, the average from April to the end of the year to 1. 550 pounds, down about 20 % from November forecasts. [3] The direct effect of the decline in energy prices is about tw o-thirds of this year's CPI inflation rate of 1 % on average, reducing the inflation prospect of 2024. It is expected that the indirect effect of the decline in energy prices will continue to give a gentle downward pressure on the CPI inflation rate since the latter half of 2024. This is more than offsetting a small upward revision (0. 2 % points in the first half of 2025) due to the effects of the Red Sea disturbance in 2024 and 2025. The domestic inflation rate will decline slightly in 2024 and 2025, but will rise slightly in 2026 and 2027. 2. 10 We currently expect the inflation rate for the next two years to decrease faster than expected in November. Our central expectations are that the quarterly inflation rate will decrease to the target inflation rate of 2%in the second quarter of 2024, which is about one year earlier than expected in November. It is expected that the inflation rate in 2024 will be 2. 2%, to 1. 5%in 2025, and to rise to 2%of the target inflation rate in 2028. However, this forecast is quite uncertain from domestic and foreign inflation pressure, especially the pressure over energy prices. In order to quantify this uncertainty, a fantastic error was created showing the scope of the result of the inflation rate when the past predictive error became a reasonable guideline for future prediction errors (Fig. 2. 4). Overall in 2025 suggests that the probability of an average inflation rate exceeding 4%is about one-tenth, and the probability of the average inflation rate belo w-1%is about one-tenth.

The expected expansion of conflicts in the Middle East has a great risk to the global economy. So far, the impact on the economy has been mainly caused by the turmoil of the Red Sea route. Transportation costs from China, measured by the Shanghai Container Index, have increased more than twice the average of the past, but are less than half of pandemics. The impact on the world energy market is still continuing. However, given that this area is important for oil and gas supply around the world, an increase in energy prices is an important risk in more disadvantaged scenarios.

The World Bank's "larg e-scale confusion" scenario was used to explore the potential impact of the Middle East region. In this scenario, oil and gas wholesale prices are 75% higher than central predictions. Natural gas prices peaked in early 2025, and the petroleum prices reached in mi d-2024 at the highest ever in name. Later, the price of both products falls rapidly in the central prediction. It is also assumed that the global supply chain of the product intensifies and reaches the peak in the last quarter of 2024.

In this scenario, the CPI inflation rate peaks in 7. 4 % in the second quarter of 2025 (Chart B). Based on recent energy shocks and pas s-through analysis to inflation ratio, inflation is assumed that the inflation rate will decrease slowly to the baseline. C At the end of the prediction period, the price level has risen by 6 % from the beginning. This impact is brought by the following:

Potential output

Direct effect of energy price (yellow bar graph). The rise in petroleum prices is immediately reflected in the consumer price of the fuel, increasing the cost of products that use petroleum, such as food and transportation. The maximum price limit of OFGEM delays the impact on the peak in the mi d-2025 on consumer utility bills.

Impact on indirect energy prices (green bar graph). Later, the effects of the second round of energy shock became dominant. The rise in energy prices peaked in mi d-2025, and until the beginning of 2026, the inflation rate was maintained to the baseline or more, and the price was transferred to commercial prices and no n-vending prices.
In order to estimate the effects of the impact of supply chain's confusion (purple bar graph), the boost reaction adjusted in line with the British economy was calculated based on the IMF investigation to estimate the inflation effect of the world's trade trade. The effect of D peaked in mi d-2025 and weakened in two years.
Based on the modified of our small models, it is assumed that bank interest rates will rose rapidly in response to shocks, and inflation and interest rates will lead to a recession that lasts over a year since early 2025. The exit gap is abou t-5%in mid-2026. In this scenario, the growth rate will recover rapidly when inflation rates are eased and bank interest rates fall below central predictions. However, by 2028, some surplus production capacity remains, causing the economy to shrink about 1. 5%. In the long term, as the influence of inflation shocks fades, the output gap is reduced, and the real GDP and bank interest rates are expected to return to the central prediction. The impact of this inflation scenario on the finances will be considered in Chapter 5.
This scenario means that the second large inflation shock will occur continuously, and there is a risk that households and companies will begin to expect a mediu m-term inflation rate. In that case, domesti c-led inflections may rise further, bank response will increase, and GDP growth may decrease.

Chart 2.6: Potential output growth and level changes since November

Labour supply

α) The shor t-term impact of the World Bank and the Middle East conflict in the product market, October 2023.

b) Measurement values by the World Bank Federal Reserve Bank. The index returns to the past standard value over a year and a half after reaching the same level as pandemic.

Chart 2.7: Trend total hours worked

Adult population

Box 2.3: Net migration forecast and its impact on the economy

d) Andriantomanga, Z., et al, Global Supply Chain SHOCKS: Challenges for Inflation And Monetary Policy in Sub-Saharan Africa, February 2023.

Chart C: Net migration by nationality and visas granted by type

E) In consideration of recent demand reactions to changes in monetary policy, small models have been revised so that production gaps correspond to changes in the name interest rate of banks. For more information, see the Working Paper No. 4 "Small Model of the British Economic" published in July 2012.

2. 12 RPI inflation has dropped significantly than expected in November. It fell to 5. 5%in the last quarter of 2022 from the final quarter of 2022 to 5. 5%in the last quarter of 2023. This is 1. 2%lower than expected in November. According to the central prediction, the RPI inflation rate decreases to 1. 7%in the first quarter of 2025, as the CPI inflation rate is slowed down and the growth of mortgage repayments decreases. After that, the RPI will steadily rise according to the CPI inflation rate, an average of 2. 0%in 2025, 2. 5%in 2026, and 2. 9%after 2027.

2. 13 The annual increase rate of GDP deflators, which measure the prices of all goods and services produced in Japan, was 7. 5%in the third quarter of 2023. This was 0 or 3 points higher than expected in November. This difference is due to the fact that the UK export price has risen faster than import prices. Like CPIs and PPIs, GDP deflators are expected to slow down in the short term. The growth rate in 2024 is expected to be 1. 5 % and 1. 2 % in 2025, all of which are about 1. 5 % lower than expected in November. Later, the growth rate of the GDP deflator rose almost in conjunction with the CPI inflation rate, and the level of GDP deflator in 2028-29 was 0. 4 % lower than the prediction as of November.
2. 14 Potential productivity outlines have hardly changed since November, but the numbers have been significantly modified. Figure 2. 6 summarizes changes and explain the details of each element in the remaining part of this section:

The potential production level in 2023 was 0. 1%lower than expected in November. This is because about half of the weakness of the GDP result from November reflects the structural factors. According to the components, the new labor force survey (LFS) indicates the increase in the adult population, which has been offset due to a decrease in the working hours and average working hours. Overall, the estimated value for total working hours in 2023 increased by 0. 4 %. Due to the slightly lower potential production, the trend productivity level in 2023 was 0. 5 % lower.

Chart D: Net migration forecast and scenarios

The growth of potential production from 2024 to 2028 has not changed from the prediction as of November, reflecting the offset factors. As the number of pure immigrants increased from expected, the population growth rate increased. However, this is offset by trendy employment rate and average working hours in the adult population in the UK. The latter change was brought by the latest analysis (see paragraph 2. 18) regarding the population composition of the workin g-age population. New data indicates that British population is focused on lower participation groups (under 25). The continued effects of fiscal resistance have also reduced the average working hours. 2, 13 The annual increase rate of GDP deflators, which measure the prices of all goods and services produced in Japan, was 7. 5%in the third quarter of 2023. This was 0 or 3 points higher than expected in November. This difference is due to the fact that the UK export price has risen faster than import prices. Like CPIs and PPIs, GDP deflators are expected to slow down in the short term. The growth rate in 2024 is expected to be 1. 5 % and 1. 2 % in 2025, all of which are about 1. 5 % lower than expected in November. Later, the growth rate of the GDP deflator rose almost in conjunction with the CPI inflation rate, and the level of GDP deflator in 2028-29 was 0. 4 % lower than the prediction as of November.

2. 14 Potential productivity outlines have hardly changed since November, but the numbers have been significantly modified. Figure 2. 6 summarizes changes and explain the details of each element in the remaining part of this section:
The potential production level in 2023 was 0. 1%lower than expected in November. This is because about half of the weakness of the GDP result from November reflects the structural factors. According to the components, the new labor force survey (LFS) indicates the increase in the adult population, which has been offset due to a decrease in the working hours and average working hours. Overall, the estimated value for total working hours in 2023 increased by 0. 4 %. Due to the slightly lower potential production, the trend productivity level in 2023 was 0. 5 % lower.
The growth of potential production from 2024 to 2028 has not changed from the prediction as of November, reflecting the offset factors. As the number of pure immigrants increased from expected, the population growth rate increased. However, this is offset by trendy employment rate and average working hours in the adult population in the UK. The latter change was brought by the latest analysis (see paragraph 2. 18) regarding the population composition of the workin g-age population. New data indicates that British population is focused on lower participation groups (under 25). The continued effects of fiscal resistance have also reduced the average working hours. 2. 13 The annual increase rate of GDP deflators, which measure the prices of all goods and services produced in Japan, was 7. 5%in the third quarter of 2023. This was 0 or 3 points higher than expected in November. This difference is due to the fact that the UK export price has risen faster than import prices. Like CPIs and PPIs, GDP deflators are expected to slow down in the short term. The growth rate in 2024 is expected to be 1. 5 % and 1. 2 % in 2025, all of which are about 1. 5 % lower than expected in November. Later, the growth rate of the GDP deflator rose almost in conjunction with the CPI inflation rate, and the level of GDP deflator in 2028-29 was 0. 4 % lower than the prediction as of November.

2. 14 Potential productivity outlines have hardly changed since November, but the numbers have been significantly modified. Figure 2. 6 summarizes changes and explain the details of each element in the remaining part of this section:

The growth of potential production from 2024 to 2028 has not changed from the prediction as of November, reflecting the offset factors. As the number of pure immigrants increased from expected, the population growth rate increased. However, this is offset by trendy employment rate and average working hours in the adult population in the UK. The latter change was brought by the latest analysis (see paragraph 2. 18) regarding the population composition of the workin g-age population. New data indicates that British population is focused on lower participation groups (under 25). The continued effects of fiscal resistance have also reduced the average working hours.
The Budget measures cumulatively boost potential output growth by 0. 2 percentage points above our expectations. As outlined in Box 2. 1, this is mainly due to the effect of the additional cuts in NICs, with a small additional contribution from the changes to the high-income child benefit.
Overall, these changes have only modestly increased the level of potential output in 2028 by 0. 1% from November.

2. 15 Our forecasts of potential labour supply incorporate the results of the reweighted EDP published in February. We have used this data as a guide to current UK population and demographics. However, there is still considerable uncertainty in the latest labour market data, as the ONS will switch to the Transformed LFS survey later this year. This could further impact on our understanding of labour supply and potential output.

Chart E: Real GDP and real GDP per person differences from our central forecast

2. 16 Over the forecast period, we expect total hours worked to be 0. 7% higher than in November (Figure 2. 7). This reflects a slightly higher starting point for the latest ADR results, followed by a slightly higher projected growth rate than in November. Based on pre-budget measures, the trend in total hours worked is broadly flat due to offsetting factors. The adult population grows faster throughout the forecast due to updated immigration assumptions. However, due to the latest data on the demographic composition of the active population and updated analysis of the impact of fiscal cuts on work intentions, labour force participation and average hours worked are expected to fall more rapidly than in November. The fiscal measures offset this, increasing total hours worked by 0. 3% over the forecast period (Box 2. 1). The diagram in Figure 2. 7 shows how hours worked would change under alternative immigration scenarios (Box 2. 3).

2. 17 The adult population at the end of the projections will be 57. 3 million, an increase of 1 million (1. 8%) from November, mainly due to higher net migration. The revised LFS data incorporates historically high levels of migration over the past two years and detailed results from the 2021 census. The UK adult population in 2023 is estimated to be 54. 8 million, an increase of almost 700, 000 (1. 3%) from the data proposed in November. We have also factored in higher estimates of future net migration, based on a recent data breach and updated ONS population projections published in January. As a result, net migration will decline from the 670s in mid-2023 to settle at around 670s in mid-2023. 000, up from the latest ONS medium-term estimate of 315. This is down from 245. in November. Box 2. 3 looks in more detail at the latest projections for net migration and its potential economic impact.

The ONS update, released immediately after the November 2023 forecast, revised net migration significantly upwards. 000, up from the initial forecast of 140. The latest data on home country visas shows that visa issuances peaked at about 1. 4 million per year up to the first quarter of 2023, before declining somewhat thereafter (Figure C, right). Of these, work visas, especially conditional visas, continued to increase in 2023, while student visas declined slightly and humanitarian visas fell significantly. New immigrants are mainly from non-EU countries, with EU net migration turning negative in 2021 from over 250, 000 in 2016 (Figure C, left). The large number of migrants and the different dynamics of different visa types have created uncertainty about the trajectory of net migration.

In January, the ONS published its latest net migration forecast. It forecasts that the number of migrants will increase from 000 to 315. 000 in 2027-28, which is the steady-state level of 245. 000, which was assumed in the previous forecast and used in the November 2023 forecast. The ONS based this new assumption on the historical average over the 10 years to mid-2023, and the Horizon selection reflects consultation with an expert panel.

We use the new ONS medium-term immigration forecast as the end point of our five-year projections. There is still considerable uncertainty in this forecast, but we believe it provides a reasonable estimate of the stable level of net immigration, based on consultation with immigration experts. However, we have adjusted the short-term path of net immigration to include a steeper short-term decline than the ONS linear path (Figure D). This reflects two factors:

First, the recent increase in immigration, particularly student immigration, should lead to an increase in immigration in the short term.

Second, the changes in immigration policy announced shortly after the November 2023 EFO are likely to reduce immigration in the short term substantially. c The Home Office estimates that these policies, together with those announced in May 2023, would reduce immigration by 300, 000 people (mostly dependents) in a hypothetical scenario in which they were implemented in the year to September 2023. Most policies will be in place by April 2024, so immigration levels are expected to fall substantially from this point on.

Trend participation in the labour force

This means that net migration is expected to average around 350, 000 per year over the forecast period, up from 290, 000 in November. Cumulatively, this would add an additional 350, 000 people to the UK population over the next five years (around 3 million adults). However, these estimates are particularly sensitive to alternative assumptions about future immigration levels, the proportion of past immigrants remaining in the UK, and the impact of government policies.

In making our economic forecasts, we estimate that the average employment rate of immigrants entering the UK over the forecast period will be slightly higher than the resident population over the five-year forecast period. This reflects a combination of three factors:
Age: immigrants are more likely to be of working age (16-64) on entry.
Configuration: The configuration of immigrants after Brexit has shifted to groups (students, dependents, etc.), which had a historical low participation rate. However, these groups have a rising rate of participation under the new immigration system. For example, according to LFS data, the immigration economic activity rate that came to the UK to enroll has risen from 30 % in 2019 to 48 % in the year from June 2023. This is probably because the results of the new graduates have made it easier for students to enter the labor market after school.
Dynamic: In the medium term, the longer the immigration stay, the more likely it is to participate in the labor market. This tends to be reversed in 10 years, but it has exceeded our forecast.

Chart 2.8: Trend participation rate

Average hours worked

In consideration of the uncertainty about the flow of immigrants in the future, pure immigrants will increase or decrease by 200, 000 in the medium term, and the total population from 2028 to 29 will increase or decrease by 1 million or decrease. The alternative scenario was considered (Fig. D).

Trend productivity

In high immigration scenarios, pure immigrants decreased by about 1. 6 million from the current level, and in 2028-29, 5. 15 million people settle a year. Consider its potential economic impact:

The blue bar graph assumes that additional immigrants have the same working hours as the existing population. This may reflect investments that respond so that the capital per worker does not change, or the capital per worker may be offset by the rise of TFP. It is also assumed that additional immigrants have the same participation rate as the existing population. Under this assumption, GDP in 2028-29 increases 1. 5 %, but GDP per person hardly changes.
The yellow triangle shows that the capital is not adjusted at all due to the increase in immigration, the number of capital available per worker decreases, and the overall productivity decreases. The GDP in 2028-29 is still high, but the percentage is as small as 1 %, but the GDP per person is below our central prediction 0. 4 %. configuration: The configuration of immigrants after Brexit has shifted to groups (students, dependents, etc.) with a historical low participation rate. However, these groups have a rising rate of participation under the new immigration system. For example, according to LFS data, the immigration economic activity rate that came to the UK to enroll has risen from 30 % in 2019 to 48 % in the year from June 2023. This is probably because the results of the new graduates have made it easier for students to enter the labor market after school.

Dynamic: In the medium term, the longer the immigration stay, the more likely it is to participate in the labor market. This tends to be reversed in 10 years, but it has exceeded our forecast.

Real GDP and the output gap

Real GDP

In high immigration scenarios, pure immigrants decreased by about 1. 6 million from the current level, and in 2028-29, 5. 15 million people settle a year. Consider its potential economic impact:

The blue bar graph assumes that additional immigrants have the same working hours as the existing population. This may reflect investments that respond so that the capital per worker does not change, or the capital per worker may be offset by the rise of TFP. It is also assumed that additional immigrants have the same participation rate as the existing population. Under this assumption, GDP in 2028-29 increases 1. 5 %, but GDP per person hardly changes.

Chart 2.9: Real GDP growth forecast

The yellow triangle shows that the capital is not adjusted at all due to the increase in immigration, the number of capital available per worker decreases, and the overall productivity decreases. The GDP in 2028-29 is still high, but the percentage is as small as 1 %, but the GDP per person is below our central prediction 0. 4 %. Configuration: The configuration of immigrants after Brexit has shifted to groups (students, dependents, etc.), which had a historical low participation rate. However, these groups have a rising rate of participation under the new immigration system. For example, according to LFS data, the immigration economic activity rate that came to the UK to enroll has risen from 30 % in 2019 to 48 % in the year from June 2023. This is probably because the results of the new graduates have made it easier for students to enter the labor market after school.

Chart 2.10: Level of real GDP and real GDP per person

Output gap

Dynamic: In the medium term, the longer the immigration stay, the more likely it is to participate in the labor market. This tends to be reversed in 10 years, but it has exceeded our forecast.

Chart 2.11: Output gap

Expenditure composition of GDP growth

In high immigration scenarios, pure immigrants decreased by about 1. 6 million from the current level, and in 2028-29, 5. 15 million people settle a year. Consider its potential economic impact:

Chart 2.12: Contributions to real GDP growth

Box 2.4: How are our Brexit trade forecast assumptions performing?

The green rhombus is assumed that almost all adults have a scenario where they enter with a work visa, and assuming that additional immigrants have a much higher participation rate (about 90 %, not 63 %) than the British adult population. It has an impact. As a result, the impact on GDP in 2028-29 increased to 2. 2 %, and GDP per capita exceeded our prediction by 0. 8 %.

The impact of immigration scenarios, which has 115. 000 pure immigrants between 2028-29, is symmetrical. These scenarios suggest that the increase (decrease) of immigrants generally boosts (decrease) the production level of the entire economy, but the impact of this impact and the impact on living standards per capita are extremely uncertain. I am. Immigration age, education, skill level, immigration participation rate, and corporate investment reactions are all factors that determine the impact of immigrants per capita. Chapter 4 examines the impact of pure immigrants on finance.

α) The committee was held on December 12, 2023 after the government's latest immigration policy was announced.

b) This is Hall, T., A. MANNING and M. SUMPTION, Projecting Uk Net Migration, Center for Economic Performance, Occasional Paper No..

Chart F: Trade intensity in the UK and rest of the G7

c) These policies include restrictions on accompanying dependents of social care workers, and to require social care companies to register for the quality committee (CQC) for visa, and are a skilled worker visa. Includes the increase in salary standards, changes in the lack of occupational list, and raising the minimum income required for family visas. These were made in addition to the previously announced policies that restrict most of the students to bring dependents.

(D) The Ministry of Home Affairs, a statement on legal immigration: estimates an impact on immigration, December 21, 2023.

e) 2023: Based on EDI data shown in the box 2. 3 of the economic and financial outlook.

F) Based on the forecast of ONS, it was assumed that about 85 % of the immigrants were 16 years or older.
G) Migration Advisory Committee, point system and salary threshold for immigration, referral to January 2020, the committee said that "the evidence base on immigration on productivity is the other. It's not as powerful as the affected field ... Mac's view is that there is no strong evidence that it has a significant impact. "

2. 18 For the share of historical and projected trends, we have lowered our estimates compared to November. It now stands at 62. 8%, roughly stable over the projection period, and by 2028 will be 0. 5 percentage points lower than in November. This reflects the interplay of several factors:

Chart G: Goods and services trade in the UK and rest of the G7

Demographic changes have a significant impact on labour force participation. The recent LFS review has seen an increase in the share of 16-24 year-olds and women in the population. Also, the ONS projections show that the share of the population aged 16-24 and 65+ is expected to increase over the projection period. These groups have lower participation rates than observed, so overall participation rates will be lower than historical and projected.

The redefined LFS data show that people with long-term illnesses account for around 30% of the inactive population, an average of 0. 4 percentage points higher than previously estimated, or around 130, 000 more.

Previously announced measures related to the 2023 fiscal event (including NICS, welfare and childcare reform measures) will boost labour force participation by around 0. 6 percentage points over the projection period (see Box 3. 2 for details). The policies announced in the Budget will increase participation by 0. 1 percentage points, but taken as a whole, these outweigh the 0. 2 percentage point impact of the fiscal drag.

Chart H: Breakdown of growth in UK service exports since 2016

Net migration will also increase participation due to the younger immigrant age profile. Recent immigrants are concentrated among students and dependents, who participate less than the overall population. However, this is offset in our projections by a shift in the immigrant age profile towards prime working age and by evidence that immigrants are more likely to be employed in the short term the longer they stay.

2. The average working hours of the trend are also reduced in comparison with our predictions due to demographics and policy impacts that reduce participation. In comparison with our predictions as of November, trendy working hours begin to decrease by 0. 4 % in 2023. Upon finance bases, the average working hours for predictions are slightly weakened by the effects of financial drugs on labor incentives (but this is 0. 2 % of this budget measure (0., but this is a 0. 2 % point (this budgetary measure). As a result, the average trend working time in November was 0. 3 % below.

In the latest 2, 20 latest data, the population of production activity increased, but the production of production was slightly decreased, so the initial trend of 2023 was reduced by 0. 5%from November. However, the average productivity increase rate from 2024 to 2028 has a 0. 9%, almost flat. Productivity is composed of capitalization (equivalent to changes in capital stock per hour of labor) and ful l-element productivity (TFP) (economic efficiency when producing products by combining capital and labor). Ra:

Capital deepening has contributed to 0. 2 % points to the annual average productivity rise rate between 2024-2028, and has almost flat since November.

TFP contributed 0. 7 % points to the average productivity increase rate from 2024 to 2028, which has not changed since November. There are two small offset factors. The recent growth of TFP is weaker than expected, but it is estimated that the decline in the mediu m-term gas price will slightly raise the growth of TFP.

2. 21 Due to the net effect of these changes, the trend productivity level in 2028 will decrease by 0. 6 % from November. This reflects recent data, which indicates that working hours have increased at a level where the production is almost flat. 2. The average working hours of the trend are also reduced in comparison with our predictions due to demographics and policy effects that reduce participation. In comparison with our predictions as of November, trendy working hours begin to decrease by 0. 4 % in 2023. Upon finance bases, the average working hours for predictions are slightly weakened by the effects of financial drugs on labor incentives (but this is 0. 2 % of this budget measure (0., but this is a 0. 2 % point (this budgetary measure). As a result, the average trend working time in November was 0. 3 % below.

Capital deepening has contributed to 0. 2 % points to the annual average productivity rise rate between 2024-2028, and has almost flat since November.

2. 21 Due to the net effect of these changes, the trend productivity level in 2028 will decrease by 0. 6 % from November. This reflects recent data, which indicates that working hours have increased at a level where the production is almost flat. 2. The average working hours of the trend are also reduced in comparison with our predictions due to demographics and policy impacts that reduce participation. In comparison with our predictions as of November, trendy working hours begin to decrease by 0. 4 % in 2023. Upon finance bases, the average working hours for predictions are slightly weakened by the effects of financial drugs on labor incentives (but this is 0. 2 % of this budget measure (0., but this is a 0. 2 % point (this budgetary measure). As a result, the average trend working time in November was 0. 3 % below.

Labour market

Capital deepening has contributed to 0. 2 % points to the annual average productivity rise rate between 2024-2028, and has almost flat since November.

Participation

Chart 2.13: Inactivity of 16-to-64-year-olds

Unemployment and employment

22 Real GDP growth in 2023 is 0. 1%, 0. 4 percentage points lower than our November forecast. This reflects a lower ONS revision for Q3 2023 growth and weaker than expected Q4 GDP growth (released after our forecast was finalized). Timely survey indicators generally suggest that economic activity may be stabilizing and picking up slightly. For example, the S& P Global/CIPS UK Composite PMI has suggested an expansion in economic activity in recent months, with the flash reading for February above its historical average.

2. 23 As a result, we expect GDP growth to accelerate only modestly to 0. 8% in 2024 as the economy remains constrained by sluggish real wage growth, the ongoing impact of recent interest rate hikes, and weakening fiscal support. We expect growth to accelerate to around 2. 0% in 2026 as interest rates fall and the economy loses room. We expect the exit gap to narrow by the end of 2027, returning to potential growth at an average of 1. 8% in 2027 and 2028. The GDP level at the end of the forecast period will be 0. 2% lower than in November.

2. 24 Risks to the real GDP outlook remain high. As always, the outlook for productivity growth is the most significant and uncertain forecast crisis. Weak investment, energy price volatility and the effects of Brexit make up for the continued weakness since the financial crisis. There are also significant risks to the outlook for labour force participation and average working hours, given the effects of ageing and the outlook for long-term illnesses among working-age people. There is also considerable uncertainty in the projections for the level and composition of net immigration, as is evident in the scenarios in Box 2. 3. The financial crisis, the pandemic and the energy price shock also show that there is always a risk that unexpected external shocks will have a significant impact on the UK. If past forecast errors are a reasonable guide to future forecast errors, there is a two-in-five probability that annual GDP growth will be negative in 2024.

Chart 2.14: Unemployment and employment rates

Average earnings

2. 25 Real GDP per capita continuously decreased from the first quarter of 2022 (the longest decrease since the 1955 recording started), decreasing 0. 7%in 2023. Our core predictions have fallen 1. 4%in 2024 and recover to the peak for the first time in 2025. The level of real GDP per capita is expected to decrease by 3. 4%in 2028 than in November as of November. This is due to the downward revision of the starting point of the GDP per capita by ONS, which is due to an increase in the population effect and the decrease in the prospect of the trend participation rate. In recent years, in recent years, in recent years, although the increase in pure immigrants has become a major driving force in GDP growth, it may not have a significant effect on the production per capita under reasonable assumptions. It indicates that there is.

2. 26 We have determined that the economy in November is slightly loose than expected. This is consistent with the fact that the domestic inflation rate and the indicator of the resentment surveys have decreased earlier than expected. The exit gap in the third quarter of 2023 wa s-0. 1 %, down 0. 2 % from November. However, it is very uncertain to estimate the size because the exit gap has the property that cannot be directly observed. Therefore, the estimate was updated using several models (Chart 2-11). Most models suggest that the exit gap was almost zero in late 2023, suggesting that the economic survey was still in demand.

Chart 2.15: Nominal and real earnings growth

Household income and saving

2. 27 Exit gap is expected to expand to abou t-1%at the end of 2024 from the zero level. Demand policy measures to highlock demand are that the GDP growth rate in 0. 2025 exceeds the potential growth rate in the production gap, and the negative exit gap is reduced in late 2027. This is about half a year earlier than the expected November forecast, mainly due to a decrease in market expectations for interest rates. 2. 25 Real GDP per capita has been declining continuously from the first quarter of 2022 (the longest decrease since the 1955 recording) decreased by 0. 7%in 2023. Our core predictions have fallen 1. 4%in 2024 and recover to the peak for the first time in 2025. The level of real GDP per capita is expected to decrease by 3. 4%in 2028 than in November as of November. This is due to the downward revision of the starting point of the GDP per capita by ONS, which is due to an increase in the population effect and the decrease in the prospect of the trend participation rate. In recent years, in recent years, in recent years, although the increase in pure immigrants has become a major driving force in GDP growth, it may not have a significant effect on the production per capita under reasonable assumptions. It indicates that there is.

Chart 2.16: Real household disposable income per person

2. 27 Exit gap is expected to expand to abou t-1%at the end of 2024 from the zero level. Demand policy measures to highlock demand are that the GDP growth rate in 0. 2025 exceeds the potential growth rate in the production gap, and the negative exit gap is reduced in late 2027. This is about half a year earlier than the expected November forecast, mainly due to a decrease in market expectations for interest rates. 2. 25 Real GDP per capita continuously decreased from the first quarter of 2022 (the longest decrease since the 1955 recording started), decreasing 0. 7%in 2023. Our core predictions have fallen 1. 4%in 2024 and recover to the peak for the first time in 2025. The level of real GDP per capita is expected to decrease by 3. 4%in 2028 than in November as of November. This is due to the downward revision of the starting point of the GDP per capita by ONS, which is due to an increase in the population effect and the decrease in the prospect of the trend participation rate. In recent years, in recent years, in recent years, although the increase in pure immigrants has become a major driving force in GDP growth, it may not have a significant effect on the production per capita under reasonable assumptions. It indicates that there is.

Credit conditions and the housing market

2. 28 Real consumption is expected to fall below expectations in late 2023, and in 2024, up to 0. 7 %, which is expected to continue in the short term. Household consumption will increase after 2025, and the average growth rate in 2025 and 2026 is expected to reach 2. 0%. The strengthening of consumption profiles reflects the increase in household income, a sudden deceleration of inflation, and a decrease in interest rates. According to the central prediction, the savings ratio will stop in the short term before the lon g-term average decreases slowly (see Paragraph 2. 41). Reflecting on future real wages, household savings, and uncertainty about housing prices, consumption predictions have tw o-way risks.

Chart 2.17: Mortgage rates and house prices

The current account and sectoral net lending

2. 29 Corporate investment has been unstable and has been significantly fixed, but as of the end of 2023, it was 3. 0%exceeding the expected November forecast. It is expected that corporate investment will contribute in the short term, as past interest rates increase capital costs and spending is compressed. Later, as interest rates decrease and economic demand increases, investment increases. Despite the stronger growth in the middle term, the cumulative investment from 2024 to 2028, and the stock growth rate will be almost flat as of November as of November.

2. 30 We predict that in addition to Blegjits, the amount of trade will be sluggish for the next few years due to the slowdown in the British and global economy. Recent trade data has been unstable and has been significantly revised. However, it is almost in line with our assumption that Bregjits (the percentage of exports and imports in GDP) will decrease by 15 % over the long term (see around 2. 4). From 2024 to 2028, exports will increase by 0. 3%and will increase by 0. 1%from November. With the increase in domestic demand, it is expected to increase 0. 1%a year from 2024 to 2028, and will increase by 0. 4%from November. Recent turmoil in the Red Sea is a risk of global trade and energy prices (see the Enclosed Article 2. 2), but our central prediction does not have a major impact on British trade. 2. 28 Real consumption is expected to fall below expected in late 2023, up 0. 7 % in 2024, which will continue to be sluggish in the short term. Household consumption will increase after 2025, and the average growth rate in 2025 and 2026 is expected to reach 2. 0%. The strengthening of consumption profiles reflects the increase in household income, a sudden deceleration of inflation, and a decrease in interest rates. According to the central prediction, the savings ratio will stop in the short term before the lon g-term average decreases slowly (see Paragraph 2. 41). Reflecting on future real wages, household savings, and uncertainty about housing prices, consumption predictions have tw o-way risks.

Chart 2.18: Sectoral net lending

Nominal GDP and its composition

2. 30 We predict that in addition to Blegjits, the amount of trade will be sluggish for the next few years due to the slowdown in the British and global economy. Recent trade data has been unstable and has been significantly revised. However, it is almost in line with our assumption that Bregjits (the percentage of exports and imports in GDP) will decrease by 15 % over the long term (see around 2. 4). From 2024 to 2028, exports will increase by 0. 3%and will increase by 0. 1%from November. With the increase in domestic demand, it is expected to increase 0. 1%a year from 2024 to 2028, and will increase by 0. 4%from November. Recent turmoil in the Red Sea is a risk of global trade and energy prices (see the Enclosed Article 2. 2), but our central prediction does not have a major impact on British trade. 2. 28 Real consumption is expected to fall below expectations in late 2023, and in 2024, up to 0. 7 %, which is expected to continue in the short term. Household consumption will increase after 2025, and the average growth rate in 2025 and 2026 is expected to reach 2. 0%. The strengthening of consumption profiles reflects the increase in household income, a sudden deceleration of inflation, and a decrease in interest rates. According to the central prediction, the savings ratio will stop in the short term before the lon g-term average decreases slowly (see Paragraph 2. 41). Reflecting on future real wages, household savings, and uncertainty about housing prices, consumption predictions have tw o-way risks.
2. 29 Corporate investment has been unstable and has been significantly fixed, but as of the end of 2023, it was 3. 0%exceeding the expected November forecast. It is expected that corporate investment will contribute in the short term, as past interest rates increase capital costs and spending is compressed. Later, as interest rates decrease and economic demand increases, investment increases. Despite the strong growth in the middle term, the cumulative investment from 2024 to 2028, and the stock growth rate will be almost flat as of November as of November.

Chart 2.19: Nominal GDP changes since November

Comparison with external forecasters

Chart 2.20: Comparison of forecasts for cumulative growth in real GDP

Our forecasts in June 2016 that the UK export will decrease by 15 % compared to the EU. As a result, GDP's trade integration has declined, the potential productivity of the British economy is reduced by 4 % (compared to the EU residue), and its effects will appear completely in 15 years. Reducing trade integration reduces productivity because trade can promote competition and to specialize in countries relatively efficient.

Table 2.2: Comparison of GDP growth, CPI inflation and unemployment forecasts

The Trade Cooperation Agreement (TCA) signed in December 2020 has set a trad e-i n-relationship condition after Breggitte between the UK and the EU. However, the TCA is still ongoing, and the UK will apply the actual test to imports from the EU from April 2024, and will impose further declarations from October 2024.
2024	2025	2026	2027	2028
Total strength in the UK and other G7 countries
The trade volume of the entire developed country has dropped sharply during the pendemic pandemic in 2020. However, the British trade aggregation (exports + imports in GDP) has not recovered as in other G7 countries since then (Chart F). Even in the third quarter of 2023, the British trade aggregation remained 1. 7 % below the pandemic level in 2019. In contrast, the average of other countries in the G7 is 1. 7 % higher than the pandemic level.	0.8	1.9	2.0	1.8	1.7
The strengthening of the trend of trade, the forecast of further strengthening regulations, and the uncertainty about future trade policy may have influenced the trade between the UK and the EU during this period. The trade trade between the EU and other countries and the other countries increased by more than on e-third between 2019 and 2022 at the current price. On the other hand, goods trade between the UK and the EU only increased by about 10 % during the same period. According to the ONS corporation survey from the beginning of 2024, about half of export companies and tw o-thirds of imported companies report additional costs due to the change of regulations after the migration period. Similarly, an agent survey by England has shown that the EU's trade friction has been squeezed on export demand, and this year is likely to worsen as the new regulations of the UK and the EU are enforced. c	2.2	1.5	1.6	1.9	2.0
Our predictions that the UK exports will decrease by 15 % after the EU referendum in June 2016 < SPAN> in June 2016. As a result, GDP's trade integration has declined, the potential productivity of the British economy is reduced by 4 % (compared to the EU residue), and its effects will appear completely in 15 years. Reducing trade integration reduces productivity because trade can promote competition and to specialize in countries relatively efficient.	4.4	4.4	4.2	4.2	4.1
The Trade Cooperation Agreement (TCA) signed in December 2020 has set a trad e-i n-relationship condition after Breggitte between the UK and the EU. However, the TCA is still ongoing, and the UK will apply the actual test to imports from the EU from April 2024, and will impose further declarations from October 2024.
Total strength in the UK and other G7 countries	0.2	0.6	1.1
The strengthening of the trend of trade, the forecast of further strengthening regulations, and the uncertainty about future trade policy may have influenced the trade between the UK and the EU during this period. The trade trade between the EU and other countries and the other countries increased by more than on e-third between 2019 and 2022 at the current price. On the other hand, goods trade between the UK and the EU only increased by about 10 % during the same period. According to the ONS corporation survey from the beginning of 2024, about half of export companies and tw o-thirds of imported companies report additional costs due to the change of regulations after the migration period. Similarly, an agent survey by England has shown that the EU's trade friction has been squeezed on export demand, and this year is likely to worsen as the new regulations of the UK and the EU are enforced. c	2.6	2.7	2.2
Our predictions that the UK exports will decrease by 15 % after the EU referendum in June 2016 < SPAN> in June 2016. As a result, GDP's trade integration has declined, the potential productivity of the British economy is reduced by 4 % (compared to the EU residue), and its effects will appear completely in 15 years. Reducing trade integration reduces productivity because trade can promote competition and to specialize in countries relatively efficient.	4.5	4.8	5.0
Our forecasts that the UK's exports will decrease by 15 % after the EU referendum in June 2016 in the UK and G7 countries in June 2016. As a result, GDP's trade integration has declined, the potential productivity of the British economy is reduced by 4 % (compared to the EU residue), and its effects will appear completely in 15 years. Reducing trade integration reduces productivity because trade can promote competition and to specialize in countries relatively efficient.
The trade volume of the entire developed country has dropped sharply during the pendemic pandemic in 2020. However, the British trade aggregation (exports + imports in GDP) has not recovered as in other G7 countries since then (Chart F). Even in the third quarter of 2023, the British trade aggregation remained 1. 7 % below the pandemic level in 2019. In contrast, the average of other countries in the G7 is 1. 7 % higher than the pandemic level.	0.4	1.2	1.8	1.7	1.5
The strengthening of the trend of trade, the forecast of further strengthening regulations, and the uncertainty about future trade policy may have influenced the trade between the UK and the EU during this period. The trade trade between the EU and other countries and the other countries increased by more than on e-third between 2019 and 2022 at the current price. On the other hand, goods trade between the UK and the EU only increased by about 10 % during the same period. According to the ONS corporation survey from the beginning of 2024, about half of export companies and tw o-thirds of imported companies report additional costs due to the change of regulations after the migration period. Similarly, an agent survey by England has shown that the EU's trade friction has been squeezed on export demand, and this year is likely to worsen as the new regulations of the UK and the EU are enforced. c	2.3	1.9	2.1	2.2	2.1
Our predictions that the UK exports will decrease by 15 % after the EU referendum in June 2016 < SPAN> in June 2016. As a result, GDP's trade integration has declined, the potential productivity of the British economy is reduced by 4 % (compared to the EU residue), and its effects will appear completely in 15 years. Reducing trade integration reduces productivity because trade can promote competition and to specialize in countries relatively efficient.	4.5	4.5	4.5	4.6	4.7

The strengthening of the trend of trade, the forecast of further strengthening regulations, and the uncertainty about future trade policy may have influenced the trade between the UK and the EU during this period. The trade trade between the EU and other countries and the other countries increased by more than on e-third between 2019 and 2022 at the current price. On the other hand, goods trade between the UK and the EU only increased by about 10 % during the same period. According to the ONS corporation survey from the beginning of 2024, about half of export companies and tw o-thirds of imported companies report additional costs due to the change of regulations after the migration period. Similarly, an agent survey by England has shown that the EU's trade friction has been squeezed on export demand, and this year is likely to worsen as the new regulations of the UK and the EU are enforced. c

Trade composition ratio of British and G7 countries

Chapter 3: Policy measures

Introduction

In British trade, since the pandemic, a large gap has occurred between goods and service performance, and has expanded (Fig. G).

The British trade growth rate (export + import) was greatly below other G7 countries. As of the end of 2023, British trade is about 10 % below the level of 2019, but is about 5 % higher in the third quarter of the G7 countries.
On the other hand, the British service growth rate was the strongest in the G7. At the end of 2023, it exceeded the level of 2019 by about 12 %, but in the third quarter of the G7, about 9 % exceeded the G7.
The difference between goods and service trade after British British reflects many factors. First, service trade, which is a comparative advantage of the United Kingdom, has grown at a pace exceeding its trade trade since 2008. Second, the trade barrier after Brexit has brought more friction to goods than the service. Fourth, digitalization has become easier for some service trade than before, and is becoming less dependent on physical proximity.

Policy announcements in the March 2024 Budget

What is the driving force behind the growth of British service trade?

British service trade has continued to grow strongly, including the relationship with the EU, despite the increase in trade barriers after Brexit. Looking at the configuration by department, about tw o-thirds of the growth of trade services since 2019 are leading by the "Other Business Services" department, including management consultants, research and development, and advertising (Chart H). 。 In contrast, financial services and transportation exports have been delayed to other departments, and each has decreased by 5 and 9 %to 2, 0 %. These are the most susceptible sectors due to the effects of blepjit friction.

The powerful growth of the UK's "Other Business Services" may reflect several factors. First, the trade barrier with the EU may be lower than the strict regulations such as goods and banking businesses. In the second G, exports to the United States have shown a particularly powerful growth, which may have been supported by recent pounds and incorporate outsourcing operations on the U. S. company to the UK. H Finally, it is suggested that service companies may avoid trade barriers by selling through overseas subsidiaries. In British trade, since the pandemic, a large divergence has occurred between goods and service performance, and has expanded (Fig. G).
The British trade growth rate (export + import) was greatly below other G7 countries. As of the end of 2023, British trade is about 10 % below the level of 2019, but is about 5 % higher in the third quarter of the G7 countries.

On the other hand, the British service growth rate was the strongest in the G7. At the end of 2023, it exceeded the level of 2019 by about 12 %, but in the third quarter of the G7, about 9 % exceeded the G7.

The difference between goods and service trade after British British reflects many factors. First, service trade, which is a comparative advantage of the United Kingdom, has grown at a pace exceeding its trade trade since 2008. Second, the trade barrier after Brexit has brought more friction to goods than the service. Fourth, digitalization has become easier for some service trade than before, and is becoming less dependent on physical proximity.
What is the driving force behind the growth of British service trade?
British service trade has continued to grow strongly, including the relationship with the EU, despite the increase in trade barriers after Brexit. Looking at the configuration by department, about tw o-thirds of the growth of trade services since 2019 are leading by the "Other Business Services" department, including management consultants, research and development, and advertising (Chart H). 。 In contrast, financial services and transportation exports have been delayed to other departments, and each has decreased by 5 and 9 %to 2, 0 %. These are the most susceptible sectors due to the effects of blepjit friction.
The powerful growth of the UK's "Other Business Services" may reflect several factors. First, the trade barrier with the EU may be lower than the strict regulations such as goods and banking businesses. In the second G, exports to the United States have shown a particularly powerful growth, which may have been supported by recent pounds and incorporate outsourcing operations on the U. S. company to the UK. H Finally, it is suggested that service companies may avoid trade barriers by selling through overseas subsidiaries. In British trade, since the pandemic, a large gap has occurred between goods and service performance, and has expanded (Fig. G).
The British trade growth rate (export + import) was greatly below other G7 countries. As of the end of 2023, British trade is about 10 % below the level of 2019, but is about 5 % higher in the third quarter of the G7 countries.

The difference between goods and service trade after British British reflects many factors. First, service trade, which is a comparative advantage of the United Kingdom, has grown at a pace exceeding its trade trade since 2008. Second, the trade barrier after Brexit has brought more friction to goods than the service. Fourth, digitalization has become easier for some service trade than before, and is becoming less dependent on physical proximity.

Table 3.1: Total effect of Government decisions since November 2023

What is the driving force behind the growth of British service trade?
British service trade has continued to grow strongly, including the relationship with the EU, despite the increase in trade barriers after Brexit. Looking at the configuration by department, about tw o-thirds of the growth of trade services since 2019 are leading by the "Other Business Services" department, including management consultants, research and development, and advertising (Chart H). 。 In contrast, financial services and transportation exports have been delayed to other departments, and each has decreased by 5 and 9 %to 2, 0 %. These are the most susceptible sectors due to the effects of blepjit friction.
The powerful growth of the UK's "Other Business Services" may reflect several factors. First, the trade barrier with the EU may be lower than the strict regulations such as goods and banking businesses. In the second G, exports to the United States have shown a particularly powerful growth, which may have been supported by recent pounds and incorporate outsourcing operations on the U. S. company to the UK. H Finally, it is suggested that service companies may avoid trade barriers by selling through overseas subsidiaries.	As a whole, our assumptions on the impact of Brexit seem to be as planned, and recently published research is generally consistent with these estimates. However, considering the challenges of the confusion due to the simultaneous impact of geopolitical trends that affect Braeggit, pandemic, and other global trade, it is still difficult to make a solid conclusion. Trade data is unstable, especially service trade is easily corrected. In addition, the complete implementation of the TCA will further increase the barrier of goods trade with the EU. It is expected that the impact of Bluejit will appear completely a few years after the complete implementation of these barriers. Until then, we will continue to consider Brexit projects.	(a) OBR, Brexit and the Obr's Brexit Forecast, Octom 2018. Detailed analysis of trade and productivity relevance is box 2.	b) See. Box 2. The economic impact of Brexit on investment and immigration is 4 in March 2023 for economic and tax prospects.	c) See. Box D: Briefing Agent on the Bank of England, February 2024, February 2024.	d) Resolution Foundation, Ending Stagnation: New economic strategy for the UK, December 2023.
e) World Trade Organization, World Trade Report 2019: The Future of Trade In Services, Octom	f) Springford, J., Brexit, Four Years ON: Correspondence to two trade paradox, January 2024.	G) The EU's property trade is about 60%exceeding the EU's foreign trade trade. I n-EU trade is almost the same as the EU's World Service Trade. See European Commission, Single Market Scoreboard, Integration of Goods and Services, February 2024.	H) Financial Times, UK, Consultation Nation, January 2024.	I) For example, British software providers can ship the product directly to EU customers, but may be more strict regulations under TCA. Instead, British companies can choose to supply software through a subsidiary of EU to avoid these regulations. BREINLICH, H. and M. Magli, SHOULD WE STAY or SHOULD WE GO? Corporate decisions, recent publications.	Springford, J., Brexit, four years on: Responses to two trade paradoxes, January 2024, estimates that the impact of Brexit on the UK will be consistent with a 4-5% reduction in GDP to date. NIESR, revisiting the Brexit impact, November 2023, GDP will be lower 5-6 % by 2035. Goldman Sachs, UK-The structural and cyclical costs of Brexit, February 2024, estimates that the GDP impact from the referendum will be 5 %.	2. 31 Our projections incorporate the ONS LFS estimates of the UK population size and composition, published in February. While this improves the representativeness of the data, issues of small sample sizes and volatility in the recent period will take time to resolve. [4] We therefore decided to de-emphasize the LFS data from the past six months when considering the near-term outlook. Instead, we consider a broader set of indicators, including administrative data sources and surveys.
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
2. 33 Revalued data from the LFS puts the employment rate at 62. 8% in the last quarter of 2023. This is 1. 5 percentage points lower than the peak of 64. 3% in the first quarter of 2020 and 0. 5 percentage points lower than the November forecast. A combination of demographic effects and the budget policy effects outlined in paragraph 14 results in the employment rate remaining broadly stable over the forecast period. At 62. 8% in 2026, this forecast is quite close to the Bank of England forecast of 62. 3%.	0.2	2. 34 From a post-pandemic low of 3. 6% in the August 2022 quarter, it rose to 4. 3% in the July 2023 quarter. According to new weighted ADR data, the unemployment rate has since fallen, to 3. 8% in the fourth quarter of 2023. In contrast, the number of recipients, which indicates the number of people receiving unemployment benefits, has remained stable in recent months, and the layoff rate has shown a gradual upward trend since mid-2022. The number of vacancies per unemployed person has also fallen further compared to last year, and recent surveys suggest that hiring and retention are now less of an issue for businesses.	2. 35 We consider this evidence, and the broader evidence, to be consistent with some further easing of labor market conditions. We expect the unemployment rate to rise moderately and peak at 4. 5% in the final quarter of 2024. The unemployment rate peak would correspond to about 1. 6 million jobseekers, six months earlier but slightly lower than expected in November. The unemployment rate then rises to 4.	7.2	5.6	5.9
2. 36 Although the ADR rebalancing has raised employment levels, the employment rate is still near its post-pandemic lows and employment growth has weakened across a range of indicators. The employment rate is expected to fall from 60. 2% in the final quarter of 2023 to 60. 0% in the final quarter of 2024. Reflecting a decline in labor force participation over the medium term, the employment rate is expected to reach 60. 1%, 0. 5 percentage points lower than projected in November, at the end of the forecast. This results in the employment rate falling by 0. 6 percentage points from its post-pandemic peak of 60. 8%.	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.4	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.5	0.8	0.0
2, 39 Based on ONS output in the third quarter of 2023, it is estimated that the per capita indicator of the living standard has increased by 0. 8 % in the 2023-24 fiscal year. This is the decline of 2. 2%in the 2022-23 fiscal year, and since the record began in the 1950s, the number of living standards has been the largest year-in-year. In FY2024-25, the RHDI per person is expected to continue to recover and increase by 1%per year, rather than continuing to fall as expected in November in November. The declining inflation rate between 2023-24 and 2024-2025 (the blue bar graph in Fig. 2. 16) reverses the status of the trade shock, which was seen in 2022-23 due to the decline in primary product prices, and the RHDI growth per person. It is partially reflected to push up. In 2022-23 and 2023-24, the transfer of interest rates to the deposit interest rate supported the growth of RHDI per capita, but in 2024-25, this tendency spread to most regular mortgages. It is expected to be reversed (purple bar graph). The tax system and benefit policy contribute to the rise of RHDI in 2024-25, but during the prediction period, the decline in the increase in exponential welfare benefits will hinder the growth (yellow bar graph).	0.3	2, 40 RHDI per capita has increased from 2023-24 for the third consecutive year, and is expected to recover the peak before the pandemic in 2025-26, two years earlier than the forecast in November. This is mainly because the recovery from the situation of the trade shock is accelerated, and the ratio of the whole economy as a whole is high in the labor market in the short term. During the forecast period, RHDI per person increases about 1%from the prediction as of November. With a decrease in consumer prices, RHDI per capita rises 1. 3%from November. In accordance with the decline in inflation, the per capita income per person by 2028-29 will decrease by 0. 7%(the offset is not perfect due to the improvement of trade conditions). In addition, RHDI per capita increases 0. 6 % due to household benefits and tax predictions and policy changes. It is expected that the NIC headline tax rate will be reduced by 2 pounds, which was announced in this budget, will directly increase the real household income by 0. 5 %. This will be added to the same scale by reducing the NIC announced in the fall of 2023. These estimates do not take into account the behavioral reaction to the policy or the financial hinder due to the freezing of the tax standard.	0.3	2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) after adjustment of 41 will be maintained at 4 % or more for the time being, and will be reduced to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	2, 40 RHDI per capita has increased from 2023-24 for the third consecutive year, and is expected to recover the peak before the pandemic in 2025-26, two years earlier than the forecast in November. This is mainly because the recovery from the situation of the trade shock is accelerated, and the ratio of the whole economy as a whole is high in the labor market in the short term. During the forecast period, RHDI per person increases about 1%from the prediction as of November. With a decrease in consumer prices, RHDI per capita rises 1. 3%from November. In accordance with the decline in inflation, the per capita income per person by 2028-29 will decrease by 0. 7%(the offset is not perfect due to the improvement of trade conditions). In addition, RHDI per capita increases 0. 6 % due to household benefits and tax predictions and policy changes. It is expected that the NIC headline tax rate will be reduced by 2 pounds, which was announced in this budget, will directly increase the real household income by 0. 5 %. This will be added to the same scale by reducing the NIC announced in the fall of 2023. These estimates do not take into account the behavioral reaction to the policy or the financial hinder due to the freezing of the tax standard.	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. < SPAN> 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) will maintain 4 % or more for the time being, and will drop slightly to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.
2. 42 Mortgage interest rates are expected to rise to 4. 2 % in 2027. It rose to the minimum to 2%in the latter half of 2021, exceeding the average mortgage interest rate in 2010. However, the market forecast for bank interest rates has declined significantly by 0. 8 % than expected in November. However, there is a great risk in mortgage interest forecasts, which is clear from the fact that the bank interest rate forecast has fluctuated significantly since November. This also takes risks to household income, housing trading, and housing prices.	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) after adjustment of 41 will be maintained at 4 % or more for the time being, and will be reduced to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	2. 42 Mortgage interest rates are expected to rise to 4. 2 % in 2027. It rose to the minimum to 2%in the latter half of 2021, exceeding the average mortgage interest rate in 2010. However, the market forecast for bank interest rates has declined significantly by 0. 8 % than expected in November. However, there is a great risk in mortgage interest forecasts, which is clear from the fact that the bank interest rate forecast has fluctuated significantly since November. This also takes risks to household income, housing trading, and housing prices.	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November.	2. 44 Our central forecast now expects house prices to fall by around 2% in 2024, slightly less than half the 5% we expected in November. This is mainly due to lower mortgage rates. UK average house prices are expected to fall slightly in 2027 and 2028. This will result in nominal house prices surpassing their historic peak in the first quarter of 2027.	2. 45 The current account deficit narrowed from 3. 1% of GDP in 2022 to an estimated 2. 6% in 2023. This is because the trade deficit narrowed due to a recovery in the UK's terms of trade (prices of exports relative to imports). The terms of trade worsened in 2022 as imported energy prices rose following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The terms of trade recovered to early 2021 levels as energy prices fell and services export prices rose. Net investment income, which has been in surplus for the past two years, is estimated to turn into a deficit in 2023. This is due to an increase in arent income from overseas investors on UK investments compared to interest income from UK overseas investments. In 2025, the current account deficit is expected to widen slightly, driven by a further deterioration in net investment income. The deficit is then expected to gradually narrow, to about 2. 5% of GDP in 2028.	2. 46 Due to changes in income and savings rate forecasts, the household sector surplus is expected to reach 2. 3% of GDP in 2025. Over the remaining forecast period, the household sector will decline, with the surplus decreasing to about 1. 5 percent. We expect the corporate sector to turn from a surplus to a deficit in 2025, following a period of volatility due to the pandemic and the energy crisis. At the same time, we expect the budget deficit to decrease over the forecast period.
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
In terms of income, in the short term, the difference in nominal GDP is due to a decrease in corporate profits, and is partially offset by upward revision of labor income. This is because the recent profits and wages are expected to be fixed, as the company is expected to be squeezed due to a decrease in inflation rates. On the expected horizontal line, as companies recover their margin, the labor share and profits are on a lon g-term average. The decrease in labor income and the decline in corporate profits contribute to the difference between the name GDP up to 2028-29.	In terms of expenditure, shor t-term downward revisions of nominal GDP are largely due to a decrease in nominal consumption, which is an important driving force in revenue. In 2024-2025, the nominal GDP was 0. 8 % lower than expected in November due to a decrease in real consumption and a decrease in personal consumption default. By 2028-29, the growth potential of real consumption partially offsets the decrease in spending default, and the contribution to the name GDP due to nominal consumption decreases by about 0. 1 % from November. < SPAN> 2. 47 This central prediction is 0. 3 % lower than the forecast of 2028-29 as of November as of November (£ 11 billion), in conjunction with some modification of past data. Due to a high starting point of 0. 2 % in 2023-24, the name GDP growth rate in the next five years will be 17 %, down 0. 6 % from expected in November. The increase in the accumulated growth rate of the real GDP is offset by the slowdown in the GDP deflator growth. Analyzing these changes will be as follows:	In terms of income, in the short term, the difference in nominal GDP is due to a decrease in corporate profits, and is partially offset by upward revision of labor income. This is because the recent profits and wages are expected to be fixed, as the company is expected to be squeezed due to a decrease in inflation rates. On the expected horizontal line, as companies recover their margin, the labor share and profits are on a lon g-term average. The decrease in labor income and the decline in corporate profits contribute to the difference between the name GDP up to 2028-29.	In terms of expenditure, shor t-term downward revisions of nominal GDP are largely due to a decrease in nominal consumption, which is an important driving force in revenue. In 2024-2025, the nominal GDP was 0. 8 % lower than expected in November due to a decrease in real consumption and a decrease in personal consumption default. By 2028-29, the growth potential of real consumption partially offsets the decrease in spending default, and the contribution to the name GDP due to nominal consumption decreases by about 0. 1 % from November. 2. 47 This central prediction is 0. 3 % lower than the prediction of 2028-29 as of November (the difference of 11 billion pounds), along with some of the past data corrections. Due to a high starting point of 0. 2 % in 2023-24, the name GDP growth rate in the next five years will be 17 %, down 0. 6 % from expected in November. The increase in the accumulated growth rate of the real GDP is offset by the slowdown in the GDP deflator growth. Analyzing these changes will be as follows:	In terms of income, in the short term, the difference in nominal GDP is due to a decrease in corporate profits, and is partially offset by upward revision of labor income. This is because the recent profits and wages are expected to be fixed, as the company is expected to be squeezed due to a decrease in inflation rates. On the expected horizontal line, as companies recover their margin, the labor share and profits are on a lon g-term average. The decrease in labor income and the decline in corporate profits contribute to the difference between the name GDP up to 2028-29.	In terms of expenditure, shor t-term downward revisions of nominal GDP are largely due to a decrease in nominal consumption, which is an important driving force in revenue. In 2024-2025, the nominal GDP was 0. 8 % lower than expected in November due to a decrease in real consumption and a decrease in personal consumption default. By 2028-29, the growth potential of real consumption partially offsets the decrease in spending default, and the contribution to the name GDP due to nominal consumption decreases by about 0. 1 % from November.	2, 48 Our median forecast for real GDP growth from 2024 to 2028 is 0. 3 percentage points per year higher than the average of other meteologists. This difference is partly because other meteologists do not factor in the impact of the policy measures announced in the Budget, but reflects different assumptions about the underlying growth strength of the economy. The Bank of England's forecast also sees stronger growth in all years. For the forecasts to 2026, cumulative GDP growth is 2. 7 percentage points lower than the median forecast. This difference is likely due to a number of factors, including the Bank of England's productivity gap being projected to be negative at the end of the forecast period, more pessimistic assumptions about productivity growth, and differences in the population and labour market data underlying each forecast due to the timing of recent ONS publications.
2. 49 Compared to the average of external forecasts and the Bank of Japan's forecasts, our CPI inflation forecasts are lower in 2024 and significantly lower in 2025 and 2026. This likely reflects a number of factors, including differences in energy price incomes on which our forecasts are based, as well as the Bank of Japan's assumptions about interest rates and excess capacity. Our 2025 unemployment outlook is 0. 4 percentage points lower than the Bank of Japan's forecast. The World Bank also sees unemployment rising to 5% in 2026 as the output gap remains negative.	0.0	2. 35 We consider this evidence, and the broader evidence, to be consistent with some further easing of labor market conditions. We expect the unemployment rate to rise moderately and peak at 4. 5% in the final quarter of 2024. The unemployment rate peak would correspond to about 1. 6 million jobseekers, six months earlier but slightly lower than expected in November. The unemployment rate then rises to 4.	OBR (March 2024 forecast)	GDP growth	CPI inflation	Unemployment
Bank of England (February 2024)(1)	0.0	9.4	8.5	8.6	8.8	9.1
GDP growth(2)	0.0	3.1	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8
CPI inflation	0.0	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4
Unemployment	0.2	0.5	0.4	0.5	0.4	0.3
Independent averages (February 2024)	GDP growth	CPI inflation	Unemployment	1) Modal forecast based on market interest rates.	2) Excluding backcasting.	3. 1 In this chapter
This chapter describes the policy measures announced since the Budget and the Autumn Statement in November, how they have been factored into our forecasts, and the uncertainties surrounding them;	0.0	0.0	Information on past measures	Policy risks describe potential policies that have not yet affected our central forecast.	3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact of all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of November 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:
The 2 % point reduction of the NICS rate, which is applied from April 6 and applies to employees and sel f-employed people, is about 10. 5 billion pounds per year. This measure has an impact on our income, which increases total working hours by 0. 3 % and 98. 000 hours in ful l-time conversion. Box 3. 2 shows the main income tax announced in the past three years and the effects of NICS measures on labor supply.	0.0	Information on past measures	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of means of revenue increase in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	2, 40 RHDI per capita has increased from 2023-24 for the third consecutive year, and is expected to recover the peak before the pandemic in 2025-26, two years earlier than the forecast in November. This is mainly because the recovery from the situation of the trade shock is accelerated, and the ratio of the whole economy as a whole is high in the labor market in the short term. During the forecast period, RHDI per person increases about 1%from the prediction as of November. With a decrease in consumer prices, RHDI per capita rises 1. 3%from November. In accordance with the decline in inflation, the per capita income per person by 2028-29 will decrease by 0. 7%(the offset is not perfect due to the improvement of trade conditions). In addition, RHDI per capita increases 0. 6 % due to household benefits and tax predictions and policy changes. It is expected that the NIC headline tax rate will be reduced by 2 pounds, which was announced in this budget, will directly increase the real household income by 0. 5 %. This will be added to the same scale by reducing the NIC announced in the fall of 2023. These estimates do not take into account the behavioral reaction to the policy or the financial hinder due to the freezing of the tax standard.	2, 40 RHDI per capita has increased from 2023-24 for the third consecutive year, and is expected to recover the peak before the pandemic in 2025-26, two years earlier than the forecast in November. This is mainly because the recovery from the situation of the trade shock is accelerated, and the ratio of the whole economy as a whole is high in the labor market in the short term. During the forecast period, RHDI per person increases about 1%from the prediction as of November. With a decrease in consumer prices, RHDI per capita rises 1. 3%from November. In accordance with the decline in inflation, the per capita income per person by 2028-29 will decrease by 0. 7%(the offset is not perfect due to the improvement of trade conditions). In addition, RHDI per capita increases 0. 6 % due to household benefits and tax predictions and policy changes. It is expected that the NIC headline tax rate will be reduced by 2 pounds, which was announced in this budget, will directly increase the real household income by 0. 5 %. This will be added to the same scale by reducing the NIC announced in the fall of 2023. These estimates do not take into account the behavioral reaction to the policy or the financial hinder due to the freezing of the tax standard.	The two new tax revenues of E-liquid and carbon border regulation mechanism used at the time of release will increase the number of tax revenues by £ 700 million by 2028-29.
An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	2, 40 RHDI per capita has increased from 2023-24 for the third consecutive year, and is expected to recover the peak before the pandemic in 2025-26, two years earlier than the forecast in November. This is mainly because the recovery from the situation of the trade shock is accelerated, and the ratio of the whole economy as a whole is high in the labor market in the short term. During the forecast period, RHDI per person increases about 1%from the prediction as of November. With a decrease in consumer prices, RHDI per capita rises 1. 3%from November. In accordance with the decline in inflation, the per capita income per person by 2028-29 will decrease by 0. 7%(the offset is not perfect due to the improvement of trade conditions). In addition, RHDI per capita increases 0. 6 % due to household benefits and tax predictions and policy changes. It is expected that the NIC headline tax rate will be reduced by 2 pounds, which was announced in this budget, will directly increase the real household income by 0. 5 %. This will be added to the same scale by reducing the NIC announced in the fall of 2023. These estimates do not take into account the behavioral reaction to the policy or the financial hinder due to the freezing of the tax standard.
The 2 % point reduction of the NICS rate, which is applied from April 6 and applies to employees and sel f-employed people, is about 10. 5 billion pounds per year. This measure has an impact on our income, which increases total working hours by 0. 3 % and 98. 000 hours in ful l-time conversion. Box 3. 2 shows the main income tax announced in the past three years and the effects of NICS measures on labor supply.	0.0	0.0	0.0	Information on past measures	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of revenues in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. < SPAN> 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) will maintain 4 % or more for the time being, and will drop slightly to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.
With the extension of the energy consumption tax (Energy Confits Levy), it will increase £ 1. 2 billion in FY2028-29.	0.0	2024-2028 average growth rate	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of revenues in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:
The planned fuel tax hike was canceled (£ 310 billion in 2024-25, average of £ 800 billion), postponed the planned liquor tax (additional cost of £ 040 billion per year since 2025-26). Other smal l-scale tax cuts are £ 040 billion per year.	0.0	2024-2028 average growth rate	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:
Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction.	3. 5 The expenditure decision announced on a budget is almost offset in terms of budget. The government has reduced the average of £ 800 million per year to the current standards of the current ministries, assumed after 2024-2025. In three years from 2025-26 to 2027-28, the company allocated an additional £ 900 million pounds for a program in public sector focusing on NHS. The decision to expand the target of child benefits will increase the number of children's allowance by about 400 million pounds a year.	3. 6 The indirect effect of these policies leads to shor t-term demand and a permanent increase on the supply side. The former is mainly due to a shor t-term tax reduction of household income, such as freezing on the ongoing fuel tariffs and reducing NICs. The latter will boost labor supply by improving the motivation to work, along with child allowance measures. This is somewhat offset by additional liabilities expenses associated with the funding of this measure. As a whole, the indirect effect of the policy package reduces the average annual borrowing of £ 800 million.	3. 5 The expenditure decision announced on a budget is almost offset in terms of budget. The government has reduced the average of £ 800 million per year to the current standards of the current ministries, assumed after 2024-2025. In three years from 2025-26 to 2027-28, the company allocated an additional £ 900 million pounds for a program in public sector focusing on NHS. The decision to expand the target of child benefits will increase the number of children's allowance by about 400 million pounds a year.	Prospect	2023-24	GDP growth
2025-26	0.0	0.0	2026-27	2027-28	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.
0. 3	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.9	0.8	0.0
12. 7	0.0	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5
10. 4	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
5. 1	0.2	5. 2	home	8.5	6.8	6.3
Direct effects of tax decisions	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.0	2026-27	2027-28	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.

Indirect effect by government decisions
-1. 2

Box 3.1: Policy responses to revisions in the pre-measures forecast

-1. 3

Chart A: Cumulative size of fiscal policy packages, 2010 to 2024

-1. 2

-0, 7
Direct results due to government decisions
0. 1

Chart B: Policy responses to underlying fiscal forecast revisions

13. 9

10. 1

Reductions in employee and self-employed NICs

7. 7

6. 3
5. 9

home

Tax reduction measures

0. 2
14. 0
11. 9

12. 1

Table 3.2: Costing of the cuts in the main rates of employee and self-employed NICs

What is the driving force behind the growth of British service trade?
British service trade has continued to grow strongly, including the relationship with the EU, despite the increase in trade barriers after Brexit. Looking at the configuration by department, about tw o-thirds of the growth of trade services since 2019 are leading by the "Other Business Services" department, including management consultants, research and development, and advertising (Chart H). 。 In contrast, financial services and transportation exports have been delayed to other departments, and each has decreased by 5 and 9 %to 2, 0 %. These are the most susceptible sectors due to the effects of blepjit friction.
As a whole, our assumptions on the impact of Brexit seem to be as planned, and recently published research is generally consistent with these estimates. However, considering the challenges of the confusion due to the simultaneous impact of geopolitical trends that affect Braeggit, pandemic, and other global trade, it is still difficult to make a solid conclusion. Trade data is unstable, especially service trade is easily corrected. In addition, the complete implementation of the TCA will further increase the barrier of goods trade with the EU. It is expected that the impact of Bluejit will appear completely a few years after the complete implementation of these barriers. Until then, we will continue to consider Brexit projects.	(a) OBR, Brexit and the Obr's Brexit Forecast, Octom 2018. Detailed analysis of trade and productivity relevance is box 2.	b) See. Box 2. The economic impact of Brexit on investment and immigration is 4 in March 2023 for economic and tax prospects.	c) See. Box D: Briefing Agent on the Bank of England, February 2024, February 2024.	d) Resolution Foundation, Ending Stagnation: New economic strategy for the UK, December 2023.
11. 0	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November.	Fuel tax frozen	Frozen of liquor tax	Other tax cuts	Tax increase
0, 0
-0, 4	0.0	Information on past measures	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of revenues in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:
Abolition of no n-residential qualifications	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November.	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November.	-3. 6	H) Financial Times, UK, Consultation Nation, January 2024.	HMRC tax avoidance and compliance
-0, 2
-0, 9	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. < SPAN> 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) will maintain 4 % or more for the time being, and will drop slightly to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	-1. 2	-1. 2	-1. 2	-0, 4
-1. 2	New tax: steam tax and CBAM	-0, 2	-0, 6	-0, 7	Abolition of real estate tax reduction

Reform of the current regime for non-domiciled individuals

-0, 1

-0, 3

-0, 4
-0, 5
-0, 6
Other tax increase
-0, 1

-0, 3

-0, 4
-0, 5
-0, 5

Deciding on expenditure

Table 3.3: Costing of the reform to the current non-domicile regime

What is the driving force behind the growth of British service trade?
British service trade has continued to grow strongly, including the relationship with the EU, despite the increase in trade barriers after Brexit. Looking at the configuration by department, about tw o-thirds of the growth of trade services since 2019 are leading by the "Other Business Services" department, including management consultants, research and development, and advertising (Chart H). 。 In contrast, financial services and transportation exports have been delayed to other departments, and each has decreased by 5 and 9 %to 2, 0 %. These are the most susceptible sectors due to the effects of blepjit friction.
As a whole, our assumptions on the impact of Brexit seem to be as planned, and recently published research is generally consistent with these estimates. However, considering the challenges of the confusion due to the simultaneous impact of geopolitical trends that affect Braeggit, pandemic, and other global trade, it is still difficult to make a solid conclusion. Trade data is unstable, especially service trade is easily corrected. In addition, the complete implementation of the TCA will further increase the barrier of goods trade with the EU. It is expected that the impact of Bluejit will appear completely a few years after the complete implementation of these barriers. Until then, we will continue to consider Brexit projects.	(a) OBR, Brexit and the Obr's Brexit Forecast, Octom 2018. Detailed analysis of trade and productivity relevance is box 2.	b) See. Box 2. The economic impact of Brexit on investment and immigration is 4 in March 2023 for economic and tax prospects.	c) See. Box D: Briefing Agent on the Bank of England, February 2024, February 2024.	d) Resolution Foundation, Ending Stagnation: New economic strategy for the UK, December 2023.
11. 0	GDP growth	-0, 4	-0, 4	Productive capital expenditure	Children's allowance for hig h-income earners
Other expenditure decisions	GDP growth	f) Springford, J., Brexit, Four Years ON: Correspondence to two trade paradox, January 2024.	13. 9	11. 5	Direct effects of the legendary score card policy
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
-1. 4	0.0	0.0	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. < SPAN> 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) will maintain 4 % or more for the time being, and will drop slightly to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of revenues in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	0.3
-0, 4	0.0	0.2	1.6	2.1	2.1
1) Total scoring of the Ministry of Finance.	0.0	0.1	0.7	0.7	0.6
Note: The plus mark means an increase in borrowing. Our online supplements score cards include the breakdown of each indicator, along with subjective evaluations on the uncertainty of each cost.	GDP growth	Chart B shows how the policy decision after 2010 reacts to the predicted changes in the basic financial situation. Our forecasts rely on reported government policies, so asymmetric policy response to future shocks can cause bias. This graph is a plot of the total scale (vertical axis) of the discretionary policy package at each financial event for the basis for the scale and direction (horizontal axis).	If there was a good news about the basic financial situation, the policy response was at least spending a part of it (the upper left elephant). Generally, the spending was less than the basic financial improvement (most of the score of the upper left fou r-minute yen is below the 4 5-degree dashed line, which shows a change of on e-o n-one).	The reaction to the deterioration of the fundamental financial situation is more diverse, and some cases of fiscal tightening (the lower right quadril), tax deregulation (fourth minute on the upper right), and relatively neutral tax packages Is mixed. There is no case where the fiscal tightening is equal to or more than the deterioration of the outlook (there is no point below 45 degrees in the lower right 4th yen). < SPAN> 1) Total scoring of the Ministry of Finance.	Note: The plus mark means an increase in borrowing. Our online supplements score cards include the breakdown of each indicator, along with subjective evaluations on the uncertainty of each cost.

In this budget, the Prime Minister chose to ease 0. 3% of the GDP per year on average for the next five years, which corresponds that GDP improved by 0. 1% due to the basic (before measurement) of the same period. is. As shown by Figure A, this has continued the consistent patterns of the recent expanded fiscal policy packages announced. Since December 2014, financial policies have been expanded only two of the 20 financial events. The pattern can be explained by the government facing a series of shocks facing this period and supporting the economy with fiscal policy. It is in contrast to the sustainable tightening of fiscal policy from 2010 to 2014.

Chart B shows how the policy decision after 2010 reacts to the predicted changes in the basic financial situation. Our forecasts rely on reported government policies, so asymmetric policy response to future shocks can cause bias. This graph is a plot of the total scale (vertical axis) of the discretionary policy package at each financial event for the basis for the scale and direction (horizontal axis).

If there was a good news about the basic financial situation, the policy response was at least spending a part of it (the upper left elephant). Generally, the spending was less than the basic financial improvement (most of the score of the upper left fou r-minute yen is below the 4 5-degree dashed line, which shows a change of on e-o n-one).

The reaction to the deterioration of the fundamental financial situation is more diverse, and some cases of fiscal tightening (the lower right quadril), tax deregulation (fourth minute on the upper right), and relatively neutral tax packages Is mixed. There is no case where the fiscal tightening is equal to or more than the deterioration of the outlook (there is no point below 45 degrees in the lower right 4th yen). 1) Total scoring of the Ministry of Finance.

Note: The plus mark means an increase in borrowing. Our online supplements score cards include the breakdown of each indicator, along with subjective evaluations on the uncertainty of each cost.
In this budget, the Prime Minister chose to ease 0. 3% of the GDP per year on average for the next five years, which corresponds that GDP improved by 0. 1% due to the basic (before measurement) of the same period. is. As shown by Figure A, this has continued the consistent patterns of the recent expanded fiscal policy packages announced. Since December 2014, financial policies have been expanded only two of the 20 financial events. The pattern can be explained by the government facing a series of shocks facing this period and supporting the economy with fiscal policy. It is in contrast to the sustainable tightening of fiscal policy from 2010 to 2014.
Chart B shows how the policy decision after 2010 reacts to the predicted changes in the basic financial situation. Our forecasts rely on reported government policies, so asymmetric policy response to future shocks can cause bias. This graph is a plot of the total scale (vertical axis) of the discretionary policy package at each financial event for the basis for the scale and direction (horizontal axis).

High-income child benefit charge

The Budget is in the top left quadrant. This means that fiscal policy was loosened (0. 3% of GDP) in response to a 0. 1% improvement in the pre-measures fiscal position from the November forecast (0. 3% of GDP). .

α) Fiscal policy "loosening" is defined as when the five-year cumulative fiscal impact of the policy package increases borrowing. Fiscal policy "tightening" is the opposite. This analysis excludes cyclical elements included in the forecast revisions.

Table 3.4: Costing of the high-income child benefit charge

What is the driving force behind the growth of British service trade?
British service trade has continued to grow strongly, including the relationship with the EU, despite the increase in trade barriers after Brexit. Looking at the configuration by department, about tw o-thirds of the growth of trade services since 2019 are leading by the "Other Business Services" department, including management consultants, research and development, and advertising (Chart H). 。 In contrast, financial services and transportation exports have been delayed to other departments, and each has decreased by 5 and 9 %to 2, 0 %. These are the most susceptible sectors due to the effects of blepjit friction.
As a whole, our assumptions on the impact of Brexit seem to be as planned, and recently published research is generally consistent with these estimates. However, considering the challenges of the confusion due to the simultaneous impact of geopolitical trends that affect Braeggit, pandemic, and other global trade, it is still difficult to make a solid conclusion. Trade data is unstable, especially service trade is easily corrected. In addition, the complete implementation of the TCA will further increase the barrier of goods trade with the EU. It is expected that the impact of Bluejit will appear completely a few years after the complete implementation of these barriers. Until then, we will continue to consider Brexit projects.	(a) OBR, Brexit and the Obr's Brexit Forecast, Octom 2018. Detailed analysis of trade and productivity relevance is box 2.	b) See. Box 2. The economic impact of Brexit on investment and immigration is 4 in March 2023 for economic and tax prospects.	c) See. Box D: Briefing Agent on the Bank of England, February 2024, February 2024.	d) Resolution Foundation, Ending Stagnation: New economic strategy for the UK, December 2023.
11. 0	f) Springford, J., Brexit, Four Years ON: Correspondence to two trade paradox, January 2024.	f) Springford, J., Brexit, Four Years ON: Correspondence to two trade paradox, January 2024.	f) Springford, J., Brexit, Four Years ON: Correspondence to two trade paradox, January 2024.	f) Springford, J., Brexit, Four Years ON: Correspondence to two trade paradox, January 2024.	f) Springford, J., Brexit, Four Years ON: Correspondence to two trade paradox, January 2024.
0, 0
2026-27	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.4
Abolition of no n-residential qualifications	Prospect	Static cost calculation	Static cost calculation	Static cost calculation	10. 6
-0, 2
-0, 9	2024-2028 average growth rate	Information on past measures	Information on past measures	Information on past measures	Information on past measures
-1. 2	3. 6 The indirect effect of these policies leads to shor t-term demand and a permanent increase on the supply side. The former is mainly due to a shor t-term tax reduction of household income, such as freezing on the ongoing fuel tariffs and reducing NICs. The latter will boost labor supply by improving the motivation to work, along with child allowance measures. This is somewhat offset by additional liabilities expenses associated with the funding of this measure. As a whole, the indirect effect of the policy package reduces the average annual borrowing of £ 800 million.	3. 6 The indirect effect of these policies leads to shor t-term demand and a permanent increase on the supply side. The former is mainly due to a shor t-term tax reduction of household income, such as freezing on the ongoing fuel tariffs and reducing NICs. The latter will boost labor supply by improving the motivation to work, along with child allowance measures. This is somewhat offset by additional liabilities expenses associated with the funding of this measure. As a whole, the indirect effect of the policy package reduces the average annual borrowing of £ 800 million.	3. 6 The indirect effect of these policies leads to shor t-term demand and a permanent increase on the supply side. The former is mainly due to a shor t-term tax reduction of household income, such as freezing on the ongoing fuel tariffs and reducing NICs. The latter will boost labor supply by improving the motivation to work, along with child allowance measures. This is somewhat offset by additional liabilities expenses associated with the funding of this measure. As a whole, the indirect effect of the policy package reduces the average annual borrowing of £ 800 million.	3. 6 The indirect effect of these policies leads to shor t-term demand and a permanent increase on the supply side. The former is mainly due to a shor t-term tax reduction of household income, such as freezing on the ongoing fuel tariffs and reducing NICs. The latter will boost labor supply by improving the motivation to work, along with child allowance measures. This is somewhat offset by additional liabilities expenses associated with the funding of this measure. As a whole, the indirect effect of the policy package reduces the average annual borrowing of £ 800 million.	3. 6 The indirect effect of these policies leads to shor t-term demand and a permanent increase on the supply side. The former is mainly due to a shor t-term tax reduction of household income, such as freezing on the ongoing fuel tariffs and reducing NICs. The latter will boost labor supply by improving the motivation to work, along with child allowance measures. This is somewhat offset by additional liabilities expenses associated with the funding of this measure. As a whole, the indirect effect of the policy package reduces the average annual borrowing of £ 800 million.

A new duty on the e-liquids used for vaping

10. 7

Indirect behavior:

Increase in employment and working hours

-0, 7

-1. 6
-1. 6
-1. 6
-1, 7

Cost calculation after tacit action

The carbon border adjustment mechanism

9. 4

8. 5
8. 6
8. 8

9. 1

3. 11 The British Prime Minister has announced that since April 2025, the current "remittance standard" (RB) tax system for no n-British residents will be abolished and switched to a new system. In the current "remittance standard", no n-residents can pay British income and profits (FIG), in addition to British income and profits. [7] If you are a taxpayer, you can choose whether to be taxed on an R B-based or tax on a "generated base" that is taxed on the world's income and profits. [7] [7]

3. 12 The new system is for a smaller number of individuals, and its main features are as follows:

As with the current system, you have to choose a member, but you can only join after you have traveled in the UK after at least 10 years. Since the qualifications are determined by the residence of the UK, not the place of residence, the concept of "no n-residence" has virtually disappeared. The cost calculation assumes that about 10. 500 people will be subject to the new system in April 2025.
The new system will be applied only for four years from the first time when the individual first became a British tax resident, whether or not he is currently in the UK. [8] If this system is selected, the first four years of the British tax resident will be exempted from the British tax on income tax, including the income tax returning to the UK. This is a more generous measure than the current RB, where Fig is returned only when investing in a qualified British business.
Unlike RB, access to the new system does not require annual membership fees, but as in the current system, subscriber loses income ta x-exempt personal deductions and annual tax exemption from capital gain tax. [9]

HMRC debt collection

Overseas Working Day Relief: OWR is maintained, and those who have chosen a new system can be used by anyone for the first three years since living in the UK. Under the current OWR, individuals may only pay the British tax for the part of the number of working days in the UK among the salary income, and to effectively receive tax deduction for labor performed outside the UK. 。 Indirect behavior:

Chart 3.1: HMRC tax debt available for collection

Measures with highly uncertain costings

Increase in employment and working hours

Table 3.5: Costings of measures with high degrees of uncertainty

-0, 7
-1. 6	The powerful growth of the UK's "Other Business Services" may reflect several factors. First, the trade barrier with the EU may be lower than the strict regulations such as goods and banking businesses. In the second G, exports to the United States have shown a particularly powerful growth, which may have been supported by recent pounds and incorporate outsourcing operations on the U. S. company to the UK. H Finally, it is suggested that service companies may avoid trade barriers by selling through overseas subsidiaries.	As a whole, our assumptions on the impact of Brexit seem to be as planned, and recently published research is generally consistent with these estimates. However, considering the challenges of the confusion due to the simultaneous impact of geopolitical trends that affect Braeggit, pandemic, and other global trade, it is still difficult to make a solid conclusion. Trade data is unstable, especially service trade is easily corrected. In addition, the complete implementation of the TCA will further increase the barrier of goods trade with the EU. It is expected that the impact of Bluejit will appear completely a few years after the complete implementation of these barriers. Until then, we will continue to consider Brexit projects.	(a) OBR, Brexit and the Obr's Brexit Forecast, Octom 2018. Detailed analysis of trade and productivity relevance is box 2.	b) See. Box 2. The economic impact of Brexit on investment and immigration is 4 in March 2023 for economic and tax prospects.	c) See. Box D: Briefing Agent on the Bank of England, February 2024, February 2024.	d) Resolution Foundation, Ending Stagnation: New economic strategy for the UK, December 2023.	8. 6
8. 8	9. 1	0	0	3. 11 The British Prime Minister has announced that since April 2025, the current "remittance standard" (RB) tax system for no n-British residents will be abolished and switched to a new system. In the current "remittance standard", no n-residents can pay British income and profits (FIG), in addition to British income and profits. [7] If you are a taxpayer, you can choose whether to be taxed on an R B-based or tax on a "generated base" that is taxed on the world's income and profits. [7] [7]	3. 12 The new system is for a smaller number of individuals, and its main features are as follows:	As with the current system, you have to choose a member, but you can only join after you have traveled in the UK after at least 10 years. Since the qualifications are determined by the residence of the UK, not the place of residence, the concept of "no n-residence" has virtually disappeared. The cost calculation assumes that about 10. 500 people will be subject to the new system in April 2025.	The new system will be applied only for four years from the first time when the individual first became a British tax resident, whether or not he is currently in the UK. [8] If this system is selected, the first four years of the British tax resident will be exempted from the British tax on income tax, including the income tax returning to the UK. This is a more generous measure than the current RB, where Fig is returned only when investing in a qualified British business.	Unlike RB, access to the new system does not require annual membership fees, but as in the current system, subscriber loses income ta x-exempt personal deductions and annual tax exemption from capital gain tax. [9]
Overseas Working Day Relief: OWR is maintained, and those who have chosen a new system can be used by anyone for the first three years since living in the UK. Under the current OWR, individuals may only pay the British tax for the part of the number of working days in the UK among the salary income, and to effectively receive tax deduction for labor performed outside the UK. 。 Indirect behavior:	9. 1	0	0	0	0	-0, 7	-1. 6	-1. 6
-1. 6	9. 1	0	17	56	Cost calculation after tacit action	9. 4	8. 5	Unlike RB, access to the new system does not require annual membership fees, but as in the current system, subscriber loses income ta x-exempt personal deductions and annual tax exemption from capital gain tax. [9]
8. 8	9. 1	68	3. 11 The British Prime Minister has announced that since April 2025, the current "remittance standard" (RB) tax system for no n-British residents will be abolished and switched to a new system. In the current "remittance standard", no n-residents can pay British income and profits (FIG), in addition to British income and profits. [7] If you are a taxpayer, you can choose whether to be taxed on an R B-based or tax on a "generated base" that is taxed on the world's income and profits. [7] [7]	3. 12 The new system is for a smaller number of individuals, and its main features are as follows:	As with the current system, you have to choose a member, but you can only join after you have traveled in the UK after at least 10 years. Since the qualifications are determined by the residence of the UK, not the place of residence, the concept of "no n-residence" has virtually disappeared. The cost calculation assumes that about 10. 500 people will be subject to the new system in April 2025.	The new system will be applied only for four years from the first time when the individual first became a British tax resident, whether or not he is currently in the UK. [8] If this system is selected, the first four years of the British tax resident will be exempted from the British tax on income tax, including the income tax returning to the UK. This is a more generous measure than the current RB, where Fig is returned only when investing in a qualified British business.	-4	Unlike RB, access to the new system does not require annual membership fees, but as in the current system, subscriber loses income ta x-exempt personal deductions and annual tax exemption from capital gain tax. [9]
Overseas Working Day Relief: OWR is maintained, and those who have chosen a new system can be used by anyone for the first three years since living in the UK. Under the current OWR, individuals may only pay the British tax for the part of the number of working days in the UK among the salary income, and to effectively receive tax deduction for labor performed outside the UK. 。	Non-qualifying individuals will be subject to UK tax on all newly arising FIGs and will effectively be treated as UK resident. The cost calculation assumes that around 5, 500 people will be affected in April 2025.	0	0	81	190	277	320	-1. 6
Only 50% of foreign income earned in 2025-2026 will be taxable, whether by individuals or trusts.	9. 1	0	0	0	For two years, from 2025-26 to 2026-27, UK residents not subject to the new regime will be able to bring onshore FIGs previously held (or "stored") outside of trusts into the UK at a reduced rate of 12%. This allows individuals to transfer some or all of their offshore wealth to the UK at a lower rate during this period, instead of facing the complex process of periodically remitting smaller FIGs to the UK at marginal tax rates.	3. 14 The inclusion of the three "protections" results in an uneven profile of costs over the forecast period, increasing on average by £3. 1 billion per year from 2026-27 to 2028-29. A steady state is reached in 2030-31, when returns are around £3 billion per year.	GBP billion	-1. 6
2024-25	9. 1	0	1	10	2026-27	2027-28	2028-29	Unlike RB, access to the new system does not require annual membership fees, but as in the current system, subscriber loses income ta x-exempt personal deductions and annual tax exemption from capital gain tax. [9]
0, 0	9. 1	0	1	1	-4. 4	-5, 8	-5, 7	Unlike RB, access to the new system does not require annual membership fees, but as in the current system, subscriber loses income ta x-exempt personal deductions and annual tax exemption from capital gain tax. [9]

0, 0

Behavioural responses to tax policy

0. 3

1. 6
2. 1
2. 9
Of which

Chart 3.2: Scale of behavioural response for selected tax policy changes

Stacked window FIG

-0, 7
-0, 6
Migration and tax planning

Policy measures not on the Treasury scorecard

Other protection

Ex post behavioural costing
0, 0

-0, 2

Update on previous measures

-2. 8

Personal tax policies and their effects on fiscal drag

-3. 7

Table 3.6: Counterfactual and actual personal tax thresholds

£
-2. 7	Note: This includes gains from bringing offshore sheltered trusts into UK taxable range for certain deemed residential and non-residential properties not subject to the new regime.	The powerful growth of the UK's "Other Business Services" may reflect several factors. First, the trade barrier with the EU may be lower than the strict regulations such as goods and banking businesses. In the second G, exports to the United States have shown a particularly powerful growth, which may have been supported by recent pounds and incorporate outsourcing operations on the U. S. company to the UK. H Finally, it is suggested that service companies may avoid trade barriers by selling through overseas subsidiaries.	As a whole, our assumptions on the impact of Brexit seem to be as planned, and recently published research is generally consistent with these estimates. However, considering the challenges of the confusion due to the simultaneous impact of geopolitical trends that affect Braeggit, pandemic, and other global trade, it is still difficult to make a solid conclusion. Trade data is unstable, especially service trade is easily corrected. In addition, the complete implementation of the TCA will further increase the barrier of goods trade with the EU. It is expected that the impact of Bluejit will appear completely a few years after the complete implementation of these barriers. Until then, we will continue to consider Brexit projects.	(a) OBR, Brexit and the Obr's Brexit Forecast, Octom 2018. Detailed analysis of trade and productivity relevance is box 2.	b) See. Box 2. The economic impact of Brexit on investment and immigration is 4 in March 2023 for economic and tax prospects.	c) See. Box D: Briefing Agent on the Bank of England, February 2024, February 2024.	d) Resolution Foundation, Ending Stagnation: New economic strategy for the UK, December 2023.
Tax Planning: Evidence of the previous 2017 reform of this system suggests that the average tax payment has not changed significantly. This is a more restrictive measure, but has been offset by the protection of protection and alleviates the incentive of tax planning. Considering the tax planning, the collection tax besides the windows of the figure has been reduced by 30%. The 3. 15 taxation basis is an estimated 5. 500 person, which is not eligible for the new system, and will pay the UK tax for the income, regardless of whether or not to transfer to the UK. This will be offset by the process of protecting the progress of oversight from 2025 to 2019 and reconsidering foreign income from 2019. The taxes, RB fees, and OWR expansion for Ichijiku, which are currently paid by RB users, are small. The ta x-based estimate is very uncertain. Many of the no n-agricultural earners of RB enter and exit on a yearly basis, making it difficult to predict future trends. The tax basis is based on an international agreement on automatic exchange of information, which has further enhanced uncertainty. Since 2026-27, it is estimated that income tax, NICS, and CGT will be added by £ 5. 3 billion per year by static cost calculations.
3. 16 The actions of this measure reduce performance by 40%. This is because people who cannot be applied to the new system will have some highly uncertainties, such as how much planned tax will increase debt or migration. It is. In 2026-27 and 2027-28, CGT and income tax revenue increased, but later decreased.	3. 17 The most uncertain and important behavioral reaction is:	Tax Planning: Evidence of the previous 2017 reform of this system suggests that the average tax payment has not changed significantly. This is a more restrictive measure, but has been offset by the protection of protection and alleviates the incentive of tax planning. Considering the tax planning, the collection tax besides the windows of the figure has been reduced by 30%.	Immigration: Non-resident and/or high-net-worth individuals are already very fickle, with 90% leaving the UK after seven years (when remittance fees apply). However, qualitative research suggests that for high-net-worth individuals, tax is generally not a primary consideration in location decisions, and individuals are relatively “sticky” due to their personal and professional ties to the region. [10] This is supported by data from the 2017 reform, which suggests that the number of departures following the reform was very low. This is another area where the impact is likely to be limited by generous protections. We assume that 10% to 20% of current non-Dominicans who are not covered by the new regime will leave the UK. [11]	FIC window performance: There are no reliable estimates of the volume of clusters that will be transferred to the two-year window, which is a significant additional source of uncertainty.	3. 18 The High Income Child Benefit Tax (HICBC) is a tax that applies to families whose highest income (the "lead" income) exceeds a certain threshold, which has been set at £50. 000 since the HICBC effect was introduced in 2013. Once above the threshold, the family receives the same amount of child benefit, but the amount is reduced by bands, eventually reaching 100% of the child benefit at an income of £60. 000.	3. 19 In this Budget, the Chancellor announced that the HICBC income bands will be increased from £60 to £80 from April 2024. This means that families with incomes between £50. 000 and £60. 000 will no longer be subject to the HICBC and will effectively be able to keep their children's scholarships. Households earning between £60. 000 and £80. 000 will also gain, although by gradually decreasing amounts, as they will receive less than 100%.	Table 3. 4 shows three elements of cost calculation. Static costs are 300 million pounds a year, all due to the decrease in the Hicbc burden on households of 50 to £ 50 to £ 50. The direct action effect of this policy is an increase in the rate of child allowance. As a whole, this measure is expected to increase the number of registrants of child benefits and the number of paid paiders in the range of 50. 000 pounds to £ 80. 000. As a result, children's allowance in 2028-29 increased by 500 million pounds, but partly offers a 200 million pounds due to an increase in the amount received. In the case of £ 50, 000 to 60, 000 pounds, it is no longer needed to participate in the income tax sel f-report system to apply for child allowance, so most of the number of recipients increases £ 50, 000 to £ 60, 000. It is expected to occur in the layer.	3. 21 The second indirect behavioral reaction is related to the provision of labor [12]. [12] Hicbc changes affect personal labor incentive through the impact on the marginal tax rate and pure weekly, as defined in enclosure 3. 2. As a whole, the dynamic effect of labor supply increases £ 200 million tax revenues annually, reducing the overall cost of this measure to on e-third.
Hundreds of millions of pounds	3. 17 The most uncertain and important behavioral reaction is:	3. 17 The most uncertain and important behavioral reaction is:	3. 17 The most uncertain and important behavioral reaction is:	3. 17 The most uncertain and important behavioral reaction is:	3. 17 The most uncertain and important behavioral reaction is:	3. 17 The most uncertain and important behavioral reaction is:	3. 17 The most uncertain and important behavioral reaction is:	0. 3
0. 3	0. 3	0. 3	0. 3	Direct action behavior	Improvement of absorption rate	Pos t-action cost calculation	0, 5	0, 6
0, 6
3. 16 The actions of this measure reduce performance by 40%. This is because people who cannot be applied to the new system will have some highly uncertainties, such as how much planned tax will increase debt or migration. It is. In 2026-27 and 2027-28, CGT and income tax revenue increased, but later decreased.	0, 7	Indirect behavior	Increase in employment and working hours	-0, 1	-0, 2	-0, 2	-0, 2	-0, 2
Hundreds of millions of pounds	0, 7	0, 7	0, 7	0, 7	0, 7	0, 7	0, 7	Hundreds of millions of pounds
0. 3	0. 3	2025-26	2026-27	2027-28	2028-29	Static cost calculation	0. 3	0. 3
0. 3
0. 3	0. 3	0. 3	0. 3	0. 3	0. 3	0. 3	0. 3	0. 3
0, 7	0. 3	0. 3	-0, 1	-0, 1	-0, 1	-0, 1	-0, 1	Cost calculation after tacit action
0. 3	0. 3	0. 3	0. 4	0. 4	0. 4	0. 4	0. 4	Prospect
2024-25
3. 16 The actions of this measure reduce performance by 40%. This is because people who cannot be applied to the new system will have some highly uncertainties, such as how much planned tax will increase debt or migration. It is. In 2026-27 and 2027-28, CGT and income tax revenue increased, but later decreased.	2026-27	2027-28	2028-29	Static cost calculation	0. 3	0. 3	0. 3	0. 3
0. 3	2026-27	3. 17 The most uncertain and important behavioral reaction is:	3. 17 The most uncertain and important behavioral reaction is:	3. 17 The most uncertain and important behavioral reaction is:	3. 17 The most uncertain and important behavioral reaction is:	3. 17 The most uncertain and important behavioral reaction is:	3. 17 The most uncertain and important behavioral reaction is:	0. 3
0. 3	0. 3	-0, 1	-0, 2	-0, 2	-0, 2	-0, 2	Cost calculation after tacit action	0. 4
0. 4		3.1	0. 4	6.7	1.8	1.5	1.6	2.0

0. 4

Table 3.7: Effect of threshold freezes on additional taxpayers

The 3. 22 government has announced that it will prohibit new taxes to E-liquids used in VAPE (applicable from October 1, 2026) and disposable VAPE sales and supply as soon as possible. The new tax is applied to a certain amount of tariffs fixed to the specified amount of e-liquid, and is imposed on British manufacturers or importers. There are three types of tax rates depending on the amount of nicotine contained in the e-liquid.
British service trade has continued to grow strongly, including the relationship with the EU, despite the increase in trade barriers after Brexit. Looking at the configuration by department, about tw o-thirds of the growth of trade services since 2019 are leading by the "Other Business Services" department, including management consultants, research and development, and advertising (Chart H). 。 In contrast, financial services and transportation exports have been delayed to other departments, and each has decreased by 5 and 9 %to 2, 0 %. These are the most susceptible sectors due to the effects of blepjit friction.
The powerful growth of the UK's "Other Business Services" may reflect several factors. First, the trade barrier with the EU may be lower than the strict regulations such as goods and banking businesses. In the second G, exports to the United States have shown a particularly powerful growth, which may have been supported by recent pounds and incorporate outsourcing operations on the U. S. company to the UK. H Finally, it is suggested that service companies may avoid trade barriers by selling through overseas subsidiaries.	As a whole, our assumptions on the impact of Brexit seem to be as planned, and recently published research is generally consistent with these estimates. However, considering the challenges of the confusion due to the simultaneous impact of geopolitical trends that affect Braeggit, pandemic, and other global trade, it is still difficult to make a solid conclusion. Trade data is unstable, especially service trade is easily corrected. In addition, the complete implementation of the TCA will further increase the barrier of goods trade with the EU. It is expected that the impact of Bluejit will appear completely a few years after the complete implementation of these barriers. Until then, we will continue to consider Brexit projects.	(a) OBR, Brexit and the Obr's Brexit Forecast, Octom 2018. Detailed analysis of trade and productivity relevance is box 2.	b) See. Box 2. The economic impact of Brexit on investment and immigration is 4 in March 2023 for economic and tax prospects.	c) See. Box D: Briefing Agent on the Bank of England, February 2024, February 2024.	d) Resolution Foundation, Ending Stagnation: New economic strategy for the UK, December 2023.
3. 25 The second main factor in uncertainty in these costs is several potential behavioral reactions. These include the following:
3. 16 The actions of this measure reduce performance by 40%. This is because people who cannot be applied to the new system will have some highly uncertainties, such as how much planned tax will increase debt or migration. It is. In 2026-27 and 2027-28, CGT and income tax revenue increased, but later decreased.	Inventory disposal: Some companies increase existing stocks to avoid tariffs (but they can benefit because the price after tax is higher). The degree of advance is limited by the expiration date of the product (although e-liquid is relatively long) and available storage capacity.	Consumer Demand: We assume that 100%of new taxes will be passed on to the rise in retail prices, which will reduce consumption, "dow n-eded" to cheaper products and to cigarettes. It is thought that there will be those who switch and those who will stop completely. These effects are estimated by combining elasticity, sel f-prices and other evidence of other prices. The increase in the tobacco tax announced this time will alleviate a part of the switching to tobacco products. 3. 23 In other words, nicotine is classified into the highest category and currently retailed for £ 3. 00 (E-liquid 10 milliliters) with a £ 3. 00 tariff rate (2026-27), and the post-tax price is £ 6. 60. It rises (assuming that all tariffs are passed on to consumers). There are several uncertainties in the cost, but by 2028-29, 500 million pounds are expected.	3. 24 The taxation basis for this measure is the total amount of the consumed E-liquid and is divided according to three different interest rates. The estimate is one of the causes of uncertainty in this cost calculation. Since the data on the current number of British manufacturers and importers is incomplete, tax bases are estimated by combining survey data, HMRC information, and external data sources. Furthermore, although the degree of existing compliance violations is uncertain, the existing tax gap estimation values for tobacco products are estimated. [14] Finally, it is uncertain how much taxation base decreases due to the ban on single use. We assume that 40%of existing users will switch to alternatives that pay tariffs.	3. 25 The second main factor in uncertainty in these costs is several potential behavioral reactions. These include the following:	Reconstruction: Some producers may respond to new tariffs by reducing the nicotine content in the product and reducing the tariff rate.	Inventory disposal: Some companies increase existing stocks to avoid tariffs (but they can benefit because the price after tax is higher). The degree of advance is limited by the expiration date of the product (although e-liquid is relatively long) and available storage capacity.
Hundreds of millions of pounds	New compliance violations: As mentioned above, it is no wonder that the introduction of new taxes increases compliance violations because this field is a field with relatively many compliance violations in the current regulation system. To alleviate this, HMRC has received additional funds to support compliance in this field.	3. 26 Overall, we estimated that as a complex effect of these behavioral response, static declarations could be reduced by about 30%.	3. 27 The government announced on December 18, 2023 that it will introduce a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) on January 1, 2027. CBAM is a new tax on specific products imported into the UK. CBAM is paid when the carbon price of the country of origin is lower than the carbon price paid by British producers. The CBAM is to prevent carbon leakage across borders and follows the EU's CBAM scheme in January 2026. The specific policy elements are as follows:	CBAM is a tax for some of the carbon emissions (and equivalent carbon) in imported goods from aluminum, hydrogen, cement, fertilizer, ceramics, glass, and steel.	The responsibility is determined by the difference between the effective price of carbon in the country of origin and the effective price of carbon in the UK. [15] Calculated for £ per CO2.	CBAM's responsibility belongs to the importer after exceeding £ 10. 000 per year.
3. 28 In our central estate, the CBAM has raised £ 200 million by 2028-29, and most of them are brought from two categories, steel (mainly from China) and aluminum. This cost is based on the premise that the carbon price of the EU continues to exceed the British price, which is now zero from importing from the EU, the largest source of affected products. This is one of the factors of these costs because the coal prices in the UK are very unstable. It is estimated that if the British carbon price is about 16 pounds than the EU (the final observation is October 2022), an additional profit of £ 400 million will be increased from the EU importing the UK import. < SPAN> Increase in new compliance violations: As mentioned above, it is no wonder that the introduction of new taxes increases compliance violations because this field is a relatively highly compliant violation in the current regulatory system. To alleviate this, HMRC has received additional funds to support compliance in this field.	11. 5	3. 27 The government announced on December 18, 2023 that it will introduce a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) on January 1, 2027. CBAM is a new tax on specific products imported into the UK. CBAM is paid when the carbon price of the country of origin is lower than the carbon price paid by British producers. The CBAM is to prevent carbon leakage across borders and follows the EU's CBAM scheme in January 2026. The specific policy elements are as follows:	CBAM is a tax for some of the carbon emissions (and equivalent carbon) in imported goods from aluminum, hydrogen, cement, fertilizer, ceramics, glass, and steel.	The responsibility is determined by the difference between the effective price of carbon in the country of origin and the effective price of carbon in the UK. [15] Calculated for £ per CO2.	CBAM's responsibility belongs to the importer after exceeding £ 10. 000 per year.	3. 28 In our central estate, the CBAM has raised £ 200 million by 2028-29, and most of them are brought from two categories, steel (mainly from China) and aluminum. This cost is based on the premise that the carbon price of the EU continues to exceed the British price, which is now zero from importing from the EU, the largest source of affected products. This is one of the factors of these costs because the coal prices in the UK are very unstable. It is estimated that if the British carbon price is about 16 pounds than the EU (the final observation is October 2022), an additional profit of £ 400 million will be increased from the EU importing the UK import. New compliance violations: As mentioned above, it is no wonder that the introduction of new taxes increases compliance violations because this field is a field with relatively many compliance violations in the current regulation system. To alleviate this, HMRC has received additional funds to support compliance in this field.
3. 26 Overall, we estimated that as a complex effect of these behavioral response, static declarations could be reduced by about 30%.
3. 16 The actions of this measure reduce performance by 40%. This is because people who cannot be applied to the new system will have some highly uncertainties, such as how much planned tax will increase debt or migration. It is. In 2026-27 and 2027-28, CGT and income tax revenue increased, but later decreased.	4.6	4.3	4.3	4.4	4.5	4.6
Hundreds of millions of pounds	6.0	6.3	6.6	6.9	7.2	7.3
The responsibility is determined by the difference between the effective price of carbon in the country of origin and the effective price of carbon in the UK. [15] Calculated for £ per CO2.	CBAM's responsibility belongs to the importer after a year of £ 10. 000.	11. 5	3. 29 The size of the ta x-based tax, which is an affected sector from the UK, is also uncertain. Although the carbon original unit of the product is declining in line with the ambition of the Internet Zero in each country, the accurate path of the sector of the CBAM carbon original unit is uncertain.	3. 30 The third cause of this cost calculation is especially related to the size of the response behavior, especially because there is no observed evidence obtained from the existing CBAM system. There are many possible actions (reducing costs to about on e-third):	The policy is designed to give an active change in behavioral changes by producers, and it is difficult to predict how successful this will be.	The policy is designed to give an active change in behavioral changes by producers, and it is difficult to predict how successful this will be.
It is also unknown how other countries respond to CBAM. For example, some countries may introduce or increase their own carbon taxes to reduce domestic emissions or claim effective taxation rights.
0. 3	0.6	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.9
0, 7	0.9	1.1	1.2	1.2	1.3	1.4
£ m	f) Springford, J., Brexit, Four Years ON: Correspondence to two trade paradox, January 2024.	3. 6 The indirect effect of these policies leads to shor t-term demand and a permanent increase on the supply side. The former is mainly due to a shor t-term tax reduction of household income, such as freezing on the ongoing fuel tariffs and reducing NICs. The latter will boost labor supply by improving the motivation to work, along with child allowance measures. This is somewhat offset by additional liabilities expenses associated with the funding of this measure. As a whole, the indirect effect of the policy package reduces the average annual borrowing of £ 800 million.	3. 6 The indirect effect of these policies leads to shor t-term demand and a permanent increase on the supply side. The former is mainly due to a shor t-term tax reduction of household income, such as freezing on the ongoing fuel tariffs and reducing NICs. The latter will boost labor supply by improving the motivation to work, along with child allowance measures. This is somewhat offset by additional liabilities expenses associated with the funding of this measure. As a whole, the indirect effect of the policy package reduces the average annual borrowing of £ 800 million.	Prospect	Prospect	Static cost calculation
3. 30 The third cause of this cost calculation is especially related to the size of the response behavior, especially because there is no observed evidence obtained from the existing CBAM system. There are many possible actions (reducing costs to about on e-third):	The policy is designed to give an active change in behavioral changes by producers, and it is difficult to predict how successful this will be.	3. 30 The third cause of this cost calculation is especially related to the size of the response behavior, especially because there is no observed evidence obtained from the existing CBAM system. There are many possible actions (reducing costs to about on e-third):	The policy is designed to give an active change in behavioral changes by producers, and it is difficult to predict how successful this will be.	3. 31 The government has announced a series of measures for HMRC compliance and debt collection in this budget. The most proven steps are to leave HMRC tax debt to private debt collection agencies using additional funds of £ 14 billion, and will raise £ 4. 3 billion during the forecast period. [According to Fig. 3. 1, the flow of tax debt (bar graph) was relatively stable until the pandemic. Since then, it has risen rapidly to 2020-21, and has been a high level since then. The recovery debt (a line with flows to the initial stock) reached £ 156 billion in 2022-23, almost 2. 5 times the average before the pandemic. The inflow of new tax debt has been high in the highest level after the pandemic, which was 117 billion pounds in 2022-23.	3. 32 Instatable score was assigned to all certified contract prices. [17] Measures in which uncertainty evaluation is "high" or "very high" is as shown in Table 3.	3. 27 The government announced on December 18, 2023 that it will introduce a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) on January 1, 2027. CBAM is a new tax on specific products imported into the UK. CBAM is paid when the carbon price of the country of origin is lower than the carbon price paid by British producers. The CBAM is to prevent carbon leakage across borders and follows the EU's CBAM scheme in January 2026. The specific policy elements are as follows:

head

2023-24

2024-25
2025-26

2026-27

Table 3.8: Latest costings of personal tax measures

What is the driving force behind the growth of British service trade?
British service trade has continued to grow strongly, including the relationship with the EU, despite the increase in trade barriers after Brexit. Looking at the configuration by department, about tw o-thirds of the growth of trade services since 2019 are leading by the "Other Business Services" department, including management consultants, research and development, and advertising (Chart H). 。 In contrast, financial services and transportation exports have been delayed to other departments, and each has decreased by 5 and 9 %to 2, 0 %. These are the most susceptible sectors due to the effects of blepjit friction.
Note: This includes gains from bringing offshore sheltered trusts into UK taxable range for certain deemed residential and non-residential properties not subject to the new regime.	The powerful growth of the UK's "Other Business Services" may reflect several factors. First, the trade barrier with the EU may be lower than the strict regulations such as goods and banking businesses. In the second G, exports to the United States have shown a particularly powerful growth, which may have been supported by recent pounds and incorporate outsourcing operations on the U. S. company to the UK. H Finally, it is suggested that service companies may avoid trade barriers by selling through overseas subsidiaries.	As a whole, our assumptions on the impact of Brexit seem to be as planned, and recently published research is generally consistent with these estimates. However, considering the challenges of the confusion due to the simultaneous impact of geopolitical trends that affect Braeggit, pandemic, and other global trade, it is still difficult to make a solid conclusion. Trade data is unstable, especially service trade is easily corrected. In addition, the complete implementation of the TCA will further increase the barrier of goods trade with the EU. It is expected that the impact of Bluejit will appear completely a few years after the complete implementation of these barriers. Until then, we will continue to consider Brexit projects.	(a) OBR, Brexit and the Obr's Brexit Forecast, Octom 2018. Detailed analysis of trade and productivity relevance is box 2.	b) See. Box 2. The economic impact of Brexit on investment and immigration is 4 in March 2023 for economic and tax prospects.	c) See. Box D: Briefing Agent on the Bank of England, February 2024, February 2024.	d) Resolution Foundation, Ending Stagnation: New economic strategy for the UK, December 2023.
2023-24
2024-25	2025-26	2026-27	2027-28	2028-29	Uncertainty	Offsite reform	Tax
-186	2024-2028 average growth rate	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	2027-28	2027-28	2027-28	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of means of revenue increase in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of means of revenue increase in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:
-1. 175	6.6	5.4	3.0	2.3	2.4	2.5	2.5
High	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
Vape tax	0.0	Tax	-119	-379	-446	Very high	CGT property rate reduction
Tax	3. 28 In our central estate, the CBAM has raised £ 200 million by 2028-29, and most of them are brought from two categories, steel (mainly from China) and aluminum. This cost is based on the premise that the carbon price of the EU continues to exceed the British price, which is now zero from importing from the EU, the largest source of affected products. This is one of the factors of these costs because the coal prices in the UK are very unstable. It is estimated that if the British carbon price is about 16 pounds than the EU (the final observation is October 2022), an additional profit of £ 400 million will be increased from the EU importing the UK import. New compliance violations: As mentioned above, it is no wonder that the introduction of new taxes increases compliance violations because this field is a field with relatively many compliance violations in the current regulation system. To alleviate this, HMRC has received additional funds to support compliance in this field.	-349	-46	-49	Very high	Creative tax relief	Expenses
High
Tobacco tax	0.0	2.4	Tax	0. 4	2. 35 We consider this evidence, and the broader evidence, to be consistent with some further easing of labor market conditions. We expect the unemployment rate to rise moderately and peak at 4. 5% in the final quarter of 2024. The unemployment rate peak would correspond to about 1. 6 million jobseekers, six months earlier but slightly lower than expected in November. The unemployment rate then rises to 4.	-171	CPI inflation
CBAM	0.0	0.0	0. 4	0. 4	2. 35 We consider this evidence, and the broader evidence, to be consistent with some further easing of labor market conditions. We expect the unemployment rate to rise moderately and peak at 4. 5% in the final quarter of 2024. The unemployment rate peak would correspond to about 1. 6 million jobseekers, six months earlier but slightly lower than expected in November. The unemployment rate then rises to 4.	-171	CPI inflation
Tax	GDP growth	-34	-96	-73	Very high	Note: Positive sign means increased borrowing. For a breakdown of each cost by indicator, see the online supplementary scorecard. 33 Behavior is an important component of tax cost calculations, capturing how individuals and firms change their behavior in response to a policy, thereby changing the tax base to which the new tax applies. Figure 3. 2 shows the magnitude of the estimated behavioral response for selected taxes announced in the Budget. Figure 3. 2 shows the proportion of static costs remaining when behavioral responses are taken into account for the taxes announced in the Budget. This shows that some measures are expected to have proportionally small behavioral responses. For example, fuel demand is relatively inelastic to price, so the static cost of freezing fuel tax rates through an increase in fuel prices is small. Similarly, a reduction in NICs is strengthened by indirect behavioral responses (increased labor supply) but has relatively low direct behavioral responses (low tax breaks). The three excise taxes (alcohol tax, tobacco tax, and new vapour tax) have different characteristics, so the magnitude of their behavioral effects varies. The impact of tax reform on demand is measured by price elasticities, and each sector has a degree of product substitutability within it (measured by cross-price elasticities). However, alcohol is more difficult to avoid and has lower levels of non-compliance. The relatively high tariffs on tobacco, especially cigarettes, suggest that tobacco revenues may be at or beyond their maximum.	Reform of the current non-domicile regime and the new border adjustment mechanism for carbon emissions are detailed above. These costs would be reduced by roughly half and one-third, respectively, through response actions, although there are some highly uncertain aspects to any cost calculation.

Box 3.2: The labour supply impacts of personal tax policies

Reducing the high capital gain tax rate for the sale of housing from 28 % to 24 % increases tax revenues during the two routes. First, this tax rate reduction will "ban" real estate, and as a result, the sale is expected. Second, a reduction in tax rates is expected to have a small but permanent positive impact on the level of real estate transactions. Most additional taxation due to this measure is related to an increase in the amount of SDLT receipt. The decup ring of the first action effect means that the overall effect will be a small pure cost by 2028-29 (the year shown in Fig. 3. 2).

3. 34 Very uncertain measures that were not explained above are as follows:
From January 2026, the government has implemented a specific encryption service provider to report to HMRC for non-British residents (Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework). do. Several aspects of cost calculation, such as the size of the ta x-based basis, the increase in cryptographic participants, and how much this measure improves compliance, is uncertain. In particular, the deterrent effect of CARF is opaque.
The government extended the execution of energy gain to 2028-29 for another year. This cost has two uncertainty. The outing of future energy prices is unclear, and the impact of this measure on investment is somewhat ambiguous. Investment allowance works as incentives, but continuing the tax system is unstable.
The budget includes measures to increase creative tax cuts, and the costs are regularly exceeded expectations. The main unconventional factors are related to the impact on action, especially the scale of additional investments. There is also uncertainty about the level of compliance violations.
3. 35 Our forecasts include some policy decisions and relevant impacts that the Ministry of Finance did not show on the score card. These pure effects are shown in the "no n-scorer" line in Table 3. 1, which can be explained in almost two elements: [18]

In the 2023-24 supplementary estimate set in February 2024, the net effect is to reduce the expenditure of the year by £ 300 million.

Table A: Labour supply impacts of major personal tax policies

Updating the estimated expenditure level after the expenditure review period has reduced the average of £ 800 million per year.
3. 36 The remaining unassessed decisions relate to mainly budget-neutral measures, such as additional funding for the NHS in 2024-25, exemptions from the council tax referendum threshold to four councils, changes to council tax police safeguards and additional funding within local government settlements.	3. 37 We are not able to review and re-expense all past measures for each financial event, but we will consider those whose original (or revised) cost estimates appear to be under- or over-estimated, or where the cost estimates have been identified as being highly uncertain.		3. 38 Over the past three years, there have been a series of significant changes to the rates and limits of income tax and NICs (see Box 3 for policy details and the impact on labour supply). Freezing tax credits and thresholds, rather than raising them in line with inflation, increases tax revenues because rising nominal wages mean that more workers pay tax or higher rates than they would otherwise. This "fiscal drag" effect is especially pronounced when inflation is high, as it has been for the past three years. Table 3. 6 lists the real and unreal thresholds and the associated CPI inflation rates. 2021-22	2022-23
2023-24	2024-25	2024-25	2024-25	The Trade Cooperation Agreement (TCA) signed in December 2020 has set a trad e-i n-relationship condition after Breggitte between the UK and the EU. However, the TCA is still ongoing, and the UK will apply the actual test to imports from the EU from April 2024, and will impose further declarations from October 2024.
2028-29	Personal allowance	Adjusted	12. 570	12. 960	14. 270	15. 220
15. 510
15. 740	Personal allowance	16. 310	No surcharge	12. 570	12. 570	12. 570
12. 570	Personal allowance	12. 570	12. 820	Difference	Adjusted	-390
-1. 700	-2. 650	30	15	85	101	-2. 940
-3. 170	-3. 420	31	16	82	98	-2. 940
Highest rate threshold (HRT); Upper income limit (UEL) Upper income limit (UPL)	-3. 420	–	–	10	10	50. 270
51. 860	57. 170	61. 020	62. 210	63. 140	64. 190	65. 510
Without surcharge	50. 270	160	84	30	114	50. 270
50. 270	57. 170	50. 270	50. 270	51. 320	Difference	0

-1. 590

-6. 900

-10. 750
-11. 940
-12. 870

-13. 920

-14. 190

Additional Limit Price (ART)
Previous limit £150.

150. 000

Updates on other measures

150. 000

150. 000
150. 000
150. 000

Box 3.3: VAT Retail Export Scheme: review of the 2020 policy costing

150. 000

Alignment at tapered PA end

Table B: Comparing the original and revised estimates of the costing

150. 000
150. 000	125. 140	125. 140
11. 0	125. 140	125. 640	Difference
0	0	-24. 860	-24. 860
-24. 860	12	15	3
-24. 860	0	24	24
-24. 860	139	154	15
-24. 360	0	Primary threshold (PT)	Primary threshold (PT)
9. 568	3	4	0
9. 863	10. 858	11. 581	11. 795

11. 968

12. 157

12. 395
Aligned with personal allowance
9. 568
12. 570

12. 570

12. 820

Difference

2. 707

1. 712

Chart C: Number of visits to the UK by overseas residents

989

775

602

413

425

Note: CPI used to raise threshold

10. 1

Chart D: Per-visit spending levels of all UK visitors

Note: The basic fee rate and a higher rate of rates are assumed to be CPI inflation after March 2021. The "no index" is assumed that the standard amount from 2022-23 to 2027-28 will be frozen and will be index (in accordance with government policies) in 2028-29. There are some differences between the CPI used here and our final prediction.

3. 39 Table 3. 7 indicates the number of people whose income tax rate increases as a result of financial relocation to the hig h-taxation standard in the next five years. By 2028-29, about 3. 7 million taxpayers and 270 high-rate taxpayers, comparing all deductions and taxation standards to the inflation rate and maintained the additional tax rate of £ 150. 000. Everybody and taxpayers are expected to increase by 600, 000.

Millions of pounds

prediction

2023-24

2024-25

Table C: Revised costing of the abolition of VAT RES

-0, 7
2026-27	-2. 7	Note: This includes gains from bringing offshore sheltered trusts into UK taxable range for certain deemed residential and non-residential properties not subject to the new regime.	The powerful growth of the UK's "Other Business Services" may reflect several factors. First, the trade barrier with the EU may be lower than the strict regulations such as goods and banking businesses. In the second G, exports to the United States have shown a particularly powerful growth, which may have been supported by recent pounds and incorporate outsourcing operations on the U. S. company to the UK. H Finally, it is suggested that service companies may avoid trade barriers by selling through overseas subsidiaries.	As a whole, our assumptions on the impact of Brexit seem to be as planned, and recently published research is generally consistent with these estimates. However, considering the challenges of the confusion due to the simultaneous impact of geopolitical trends that affect Braeggit, pandemic, and other global trade, it is still difficult to make a solid conclusion. Trade data is unstable, especially service trade is easily corrected. In addition, the complete implementation of the TCA will further increase the barrier of goods trade with the EU. It is expected that the impact of Bluejit will appear completely a few years after the complete implementation of these barriers. Until then, we will continue to consider Brexit projects.	(a) OBR, Brexit and the Obr's Brexit Forecast, Octom 2018. Detailed analysis of trade and productivity relevance is box 2.
11. 0	34. 4	34. 8	35. 1	35. 4	No index	125. 640
0	37. 8	38. 4	38. 9	39. 1	Income tax	-24. 860
-24. 860	1	4	10	13	14	15
-24. 860	1	6	16	21	23	24
-24. 860	7	40	104	132	142	154
-24. 360	-2	3. 7	Hig h-rate taxpayer	Indexed	No slide	Primary threshold (PT)
9. 568	0	1	3	3	3	4
9. 863	twenty three	twenty five	2. 7	10. 858	Additional number of taxpayers	11. 581

Match the pa taper end

Additional band

0, 3

0, 4

0, 5

0, 6

... Bring higher added value

1. 7

twenty five

Policy risks

2. 7

3. 0

3. 3

3. 2
Note: The basic and hig h-ranking rates are "indexed", which is expected to rise in conjunction with the CPI inflation rate after March 2021. The "no index" is assumed that the number of floors is frozen from 2022-23 to 2027-28 and indexed in 2028-29 (in accordance with the government policy).
3. 40 The net fiscal impact due to the freezing of personal taxation standards announced in March 2021 and the NICS tax rate reduction has increased by 19. 7 billion yen by 2028-29. As shown in Table 3. 8, this includes the following:
Due to the change in the threshold, the sales will increase by £ 41. 1 billion by 2028-29. This is mainly due to an increase in income from March 2021 and 33. 6 billion pounds due to freezing of hig h-rate standards, and income due to CPI. This is due to the increase in inflation and sustainable rising, and the gap between the frozen standard and the tax rate that would have risen without this measure was expanded, and in the EFO in March 2023. There are more £ 8. 2 billion than expected.
The cost of £21. 4 billion from successive cuts in NICs rates announced in November and this Budget.
3. 41 In total, the personal tax cuts announced in the Autumn 2023 Statement and Spring 2024 Budget will eat up around half of the tax revenue gains from the 2028-29 freeze.
GBP billion
Forecast
2022-23

Chapter 4: Fiscal outlook

Introduction

2023-24

2024-25
2025-26
2026-27
2027-28
2028-29

Threshold changes

PA and HRT play

Classification and other statistical changes

-2. 9

Public sector receipts

Summary of the receipts forecast

-13. 5

-23. 2

Chart 4.1: National Accounts taxes as a share of GDP

-27. 0

-29. 4
-32. 3
-33. 6
Additional percentage limits: reduction
-0. 1

Chart 4.2: The rise in the tax-to-GDP ratio between 2019-20 and 2028-29

Change in receipts since our November 2023 forecast

-0. 4

-0, 8

Table 4.1: Public sector receipts: changes since November 2023

What is the driving force behind the growth of British service trade?
-0, 8	British service trade has continued to grow strongly, including the relationship with the EU, despite the increase in trade barriers after Brexit. Looking at the configuration by department, about tw o-thirds of the growth of trade services since 2019 are leading by the "Other Business Services" department, including management consultants, research and development, and advertising (Chart H). 。 In contrast, financial services and transportation exports have been delayed to other departments, and each has decreased by 5 and 9 %to 2, 0 %. These are the most susceptible sectors due to the effects of blepjit friction.
Note: This includes gains from bringing offshore sheltered trusts into UK taxable range for certain deemed residential and non-residential properties not subject to the new regime.	The powerful growth of the UK's "Other Business Services" may reflect several factors. First, the trade barrier with the EU may be lower than the strict regulations such as goods and banking businesses. In the second G, exports to the United States have shown a particularly powerful growth, which may have been supported by recent pounds and incorporate outsourcing operations on the U. S. company to the UK. H Finally, it is suggested that service companies may avoid trade barriers by selling through overseas subsidiaries.	As a whole, our assumptions on the impact of Brexit seem to be as planned, and recently published research is generally consistent with these estimates. However, considering the challenges of the confusion due to the simultaneous impact of geopolitical trends that affect Braeggit, pandemic, and other global trade, it is still difficult to make a solid conclusion. Trade data is unstable, especially service trade is easily corrected. In addition, the complete implementation of the TCA will further increase the barrier of goods trade with the EU. It is expected that the impact of Bluejit will appear completely a few years after the complete implementation of these barriers. Until then, we will continue to consider Brexit projects.	(a) OBR, Brexit and the Obr's Brexit Forecast, Octom 2018. Detailed analysis of trade and productivity relevance is box 2.	b) See. Box 2. The economic impact of Brexit on investment and immigration is 4 in March 2023 for economic and tax prospects.	c) See. Box D: Briefing Agent on the Bank of England, February 2024, February 2024.	d) Resolution Foundation, Ending Stagnation: New economic strategy for the UK, December 2023.
-7. 6		-8. 9	-9. 1	Total	3. 7	-11, 9	-26. 7	-32. 0
-35. 4		-39. 5	-41. 1	Interest rates	Autumn 2023 NICS declaration	10. 0	10. 1	10. 2
0. 3		10. 7	CBAM's responsibility belongs to the importer after exceeding £ 10. 000 per year.	10. 1	10. 1	10. 2	10. 4	10. 7
Total
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
2. 4		2027-28	20. 3	20. 4	20. 8	21. 4	Almost all basic allowances and thresholds for income tax and National Insurance Contributions (NICs) were frozen between March 2021 and November 2022, and inflation indexation, which is the default in almost all cases, was not implemented until 2027-28. The Chancellor will then announce personal tax cuts, which will offset around half of the impact on personal tax burdens by 2028-29. The main policy changes from March 2021 are as follows:
The Personal Allowance (PA) will be £12, 570 and the Higher Rate Threshold (HRT) will be £50, 270 from 2022-23 to 2027-28.		5.0	5.7	4.6	3.9	3.5	2.9
The Additional Rate Threshold (Art) will be reduced from £150, 000 to £125, 140 from April 2023 to align with the PA Taper.		Information on past measures	2026-27	The NICS upper income cap, lower income cap and secondary employer income cap will also be frozen for 2027-28.	November 2023 NICS reductions: the 2 percentage point reduction in the NICS base rate for employees announced in the Autumn Economic Review (effective from 6 January), the 1 percentage point reduction in the NICS base rate for self-employed people and the removal of the requirement to pay class 2 NICS (all effective from 6 April).	March 2024 NICS reductions: a further 2 percentage point reduction in the NICS base rate for both employees and the self-employed announced in the Budget (effective from 6 April).	Table A shows our estimates on the overall impact of these policy decisions, assuming high inflation from 2021-22 to 2028-29. Some of these impacts have already occurred, but other impacts continue during the forecast period. Policy has a labor incentive and a positive and negative impact. However, its net effect increases labor supply by about 79. 000 (0. 2 %). Almost all of this increase is due to the choice of an existing worker to work longer (78. 000 people FTE), while the net effects of additional employment are 1. 000 FTE. 。 Including the recent economic expansion and welfare reforms, the overall labor supply will increase by 2028-29 in full-time conversion in full-time conversion.
Impact from 2021-22 to 2028-29 (thousand people)		An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	0.0	0.8	2.3	2.3	2.0
Entrance of new workers
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
Total effects of labor supply		0.6	4.7	Employee	Fte	Fte	Fte	percent
Frozen threshold value, high inflation rate (1)		1.1	2026-27	-59	-30	Tax	-130	-59
home		0.0	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	Various	-33	-17	-55	-59
-0. 21		0.0	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of means of revenue increase in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	-33	-17	-14	-45	0.1
-59		0.0	0.3	-30	-1. 2	-14	0, 29	Spring 2024 NIC reduction
March 2024		3.1	5.0	5.6	4.5	3.9	3.6	2.9
0, 29		0.8	2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) after adjustment of 41 will be maintained at 4 % or more for the time being, and will be reduced to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	March 2024	0, 03	Total (personal tax decision)	0.0	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. < SPAN> 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) will maintain 4 % or more for the time being, and will drop slightly to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.
2		2.5	2, 40 RHDI per capita has increased from 2023-24 for the third consecutive year, and is expected to recover the peak before the pandemic in 2025-26, two years earlier than the forecast in November. This is mainly because the recovery from the situation of the trade shock is accelerated, and the ratio of the whole economy as a whole is high in the labor market in the short term. During the forecast period, RHDI per person increases about 1%from the prediction as of November. With a decrease in consumer prices, RHDI per capita rises 1. 3%from November. In accordance with the decline in inflation, the per capita income per person by 2028-29 will decrease by 0. 7%(the offset is not perfect due to the improvement of trade conditions). In addition, RHDI per capita increases 0. 6 % due to household benefits and tax predictions and policy changes. It is expected that the NIC headline tax rate will be reduced by 2 pounds, which was announced in this budget, will directly increase the real household income by 0. 5 %. This will be added to the same scale by reducing the NIC announced in the fall of 2023. These estimates do not take into account the behavioral reaction to the policy or the financial hinder due to the freezing of the tax standard.	78	79	0, 23	Welfare measures, etc. (2)	78

0, 33

Total (policy decision)

others

162

Chart 4.3: Current receipts as a share of GDP, successive OBR forecasts and outturn

Box 4.1: The fiscal implications of tax gaps

108

193
0, 56
1) Details of calculation of frozen reference values are described in footnote B. 2)) 推推税、、、、、、、、、、、、、、ける、けるける、、ける

Chart A: Tax gap as a share of GDP

Thinking about the impact of each policy of labor supply in order: Table a is a high inflation in the period from 2021-22 to 2028-29, and these policy decisions are motivated to work. It shows our estimates about the overall impact. Some of these impacts have already occurred, but other impacts continue during the forecast period. Policy has a labor incentive and a positive and negative impact. However, its net effect increases labor supply by about 79. 000 (0. 2 %). Almost all of this increase is due to the choice of an existing worker to work longer (78. 000 people FTE), while the net effects of additional employment are 1. 000 FTE. 。 Including the recent economic expansion and welfare reforms, the overall labor supply will increase by 2028-29 in full-time conversion in full-time conversion.

Impact from 2021-22 to 2028-29 (thousand people)

Financial event

Entrance of new workers

Additional working hours for existing workers

Tax-by-tax analysis

Income tax (excluding self-assessment) and NICs

Total effects of labor supply

Employee

Fte

Fte
Fte
percent
Frozen threshold value, high inflation rate (1)

Table 4.2: Non-SA income tax and NICs: changes since November 2023

What is the driving force behind the growth of British service trade?
-0, 8	British service trade has continued to grow strongly, including the relationship with the EU, despite the increase in trade barriers after Brexit. Looking at the configuration by department, about tw o-thirds of the growth of trade services since 2019 are leading by the "Other Business Services" department, including management consultants, research and development, and advertising (Chart H). 。 In contrast, financial services and transportation exports have been delayed to other departments, and each has decreased by 5 and 9 %to 2, 0 %. These are the most susceptible sectors due to the effects of blepjit friction.
Note: This includes gains from bringing offshore sheltered trusts into UK taxable range for certain deemed residential and non-residential properties not subject to the new regime.	The powerful growth of the UK's "Other Business Services" may reflect several factors. First, the trade barrier with the EU may be lower than the strict regulations such as goods and banking businesses. In the second G, exports to the United States have shown a particularly powerful growth, which may have been supported by recent pounds and incorporate outsourcing operations on the U. S. company to the UK. H Finally, it is suggested that service companies may avoid trade barriers by selling through overseas subsidiaries.	As a whole, our assumptions on the impact of Brexit seem to be as planned, and recently published research is generally consistent with these estimates. However, considering the challenges of the confusion due to the simultaneous impact of geopolitical trends that affect Braeggit, pandemic, and other global trade, it is still difficult to make a solid conclusion. Trade data is unstable, especially service trade is easily corrected. In addition, the complete implementation of the TCA will further increase the barrier of goods trade with the EU. It is expected that the impact of Bluejit will appear completely a few years after the complete implementation of these barriers. Until then, we will continue to consider Brexit projects.	(a) OBR, Brexit and the Obr's Brexit Forecast, Octom 2018. Detailed analysis of trade and productivity relevance is box 2.	b) See. Box 2. The economic impact of Brexit on investment and immigration is 4 in March 2023 for economic and tax prospects.	c) See. Box D: Briefing Agent on the Bank of England, February 2024, February 2024.	d) Resolution Foundation, Ending Stagnation: New economic strategy for the UK, December 2023.
-7. 6	-55	-72	-0. 21	to be decided	others	-27	-14
-35. 4	-59	-0. 17	2023 NIC reduction	2023 November	0, 29	Spring 2024 NIC reduction	March 2024
0. 3	Static cost calculation	March 2024	0, 03	Total (personal tax decision)	others	2	1
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
79		1.0	0.5	0.6	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	0, 29	From March 2023
0, 33		6.6	4.2	3.7	2.8	1.9	1.1
The Additional Rate Threshold (Art) will be reduced from £150, 000 to £125, 140 from April 2023 to align with the PA Taper.		0.0	others	162	85	85	193
Impact from 2021-22 to 2028-29 (thousand people)		0.0	0.3	0.6	1.0	0.8	0.8

Self-assessment (SA) income tax

1) Details of calculation of frozen reference values are described in footnote B. 2)) 推推税、、、、、、、、、、、、、、ける、けるける、、ける

In order to consider the impact of each policy of labor supply, Table A is an overall determination that these policy decisions will be motivated to work if high inflation is assumed during the period from 2021-22 to 2028-29. It shows our estimates about the impact. Some of these impacts have already occurred, but other impacts continue during the forecast period. Policy has a labor incentive and a positive and negative impact. However, its net effect increases labor supply by about 79. 000 (0. 2 %). Almost all of this increase is due to the choice of an existing worker to work longer (78. 000 people FTE), while the net effects of additional employment are 1. 000 FTE. 。 Including the recent economic expansion and welfare reforms, the overall labor supply will increase by 2028-29 in full-time conversion in full-time conversion.

Impact from 2021-22 to 2028-29 (thousand people)

VAT

Financial event

Entrance of new workers

Additional working hours for existing workers

Onshore corporation tax

Total effects of labor supply

Employee

Fte

Chart 4.4: Onshore corporation tax rates and receipts as a share of GDP

Fte

percent
Frozen threshold value, high inflation rate (1)

Table 4.3: Onshore corporation tax: changes since November 2023

What is the driving force behind the growth of British service trade?
-0, 8	British service trade has continued to grow strongly, including the relationship with the EU, despite the increase in trade barriers after Brexit. Looking at the configuration by department, about tw o-thirds of the growth of trade services since 2019 are leading by the "Other Business Services" department, including management consultants, research and development, and advertising (Chart H). 。 In contrast, financial services and transportation exports have been delayed to other departments, and each has decreased by 5 and 9 %to 2, 0 %. These are the most susceptible sectors due to the effects of blepjit friction.
Note: This includes gains from bringing offshore sheltered trusts into UK taxable range for certain deemed residential and non-residential properties not subject to the new regime.	The powerful growth of the UK's "Other Business Services" may reflect several factors. First, the trade barrier with the EU may be lower than the strict regulations such as goods and banking businesses. In the second G, exports to the United States have shown a particularly powerful growth, which may have been supported by recent pounds and incorporate outsourcing operations on the U. S. company to the UK. H Finally, it is suggested that service companies may avoid trade barriers by selling through overseas subsidiaries.	As a whole, our assumptions on the impact of Brexit seem to be as planned, and recently published research is generally consistent with these estimates. However, considering the challenges of the confusion due to the simultaneous impact of geopolitical trends that affect Braeggit, pandemic, and other global trade, it is still difficult to make a solid conclusion. Trade data is unstable, especially service trade is easily corrected. In addition, the complete implementation of the TCA will further increase the barrier of goods trade with the EU. It is expected that the impact of Bluejit will appear completely a few years after the complete implementation of these barriers. Until then, we will continue to consider Brexit projects.	(a) OBR, Brexit and the Obr's Brexit Forecast, Octom 2018. Detailed analysis of trade and productivity relevance is box 2.	b) See. Box 2. The economic impact of Brexit on investment and immigration is 4 in March 2023 for economic and tax prospects.	c) See. Box D: Briefing Agent on the Bank of England, February 2024, February 2024.	d) Resolution Foundation, Ending Stagnation: New economic strategy for the UK, December 2023.
-7. 6	-55	-72	-0. 21	to be decided	others	-27	-14
-35. 4	-59	-0. 17	2023 NIC reduction	2023 November	0, 29	Spring 2024 NIC reduction	March 2024
0. 3	Hicbc raised/ changed	March 2024	0, 03	Total (personal tax decision)	others	2	0, 03
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
79		-17	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	Tax	Fte	2025-26	-0, 4
162		0.8	0.1	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.6	0.3	0.0
The Additional Rate Threshold (Art) will be reduced from £150, 000 to £125, 140 from April 2023 to align with the PA Taper.		0.0	0.1	2024-2028 average growth rate	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of revenues in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of means of revenue increase in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:
Impact from 2021-22 to 2028-29 (thousand people)		0.0	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.2

Oil and gas receipts

Hicbc reforms have a huge impact on the marginal income after tax, but their subjects are relatively few individuals. The main beneficiary is 170. 000, and the main household income is £ 50. 000 to 60. 000 pounds. As mentioned above, this measure boosts labor supply on a FTE basis.

If you focus only on the latest tax reform (NIC reduction in November, NIC reduction with this budget, Hicbc change), the impact will lead to the next five years, and the remaining remaining due to freezing the tax criterion is further. The impact is that the net effects from the present to 2028-29 will be 150, 000 FTE.

Fuel duties

These estimates have a considerable uncertainty, as well as welfare, childcare, and other measures (explained in box 2. 1) announced in welfare, childcare, and the past two financial events that increase labor supply by 114. 000 people. 。 The following factors of these uncertainty include:

Different population statistical subgroup and personal reaction to the change in economic incentives. The reasonable alternative assumptions on the elasticity used in our modeling can have a significant impact on our estimates. Financial retreat due to the limit of freezing due to high inflation directly affects the willingness to work for 39 million taxpayers who have earned more than personal deduction by 2028-29. However, the impact is 7 million workers who have newly joined taxes, or as a result, as a result of increasing the number of lo w-cost tax rates than in other cases. It is due to the subset of. This will reduce the labor supply of about 130. 000 people on a FTE basis from 2028 to 29 compared to the case of the threshold from 2022 to 2023 according to the inflation rate according to the inflation rate. 。

The reduction of the NICS announced in this budget will change the willingness to work with 28 million workers and 2 million sel f-employed workers who are currently earning income between primary income and upper limit income / income threshold. As mentioned above, this acts as in November's announcement, and the effects on labor supply will be 98, 000 on FT E-based, and 199, 000 FTE when both indicators are combined. c

Chart 4.5: Fuel duty: forecasts versus outturn

Other receipts

Different population statistical subgroup and personal reaction to the change in economic incentives. The reasonable alternative assumptions on the elasticity used in our modeling can have a significant impact on our estimates. The retreat after the limit due to the high inflation is directly affected by 39 million taxpayers who have earned more than individual deductions by 2028-29. However, the impact is 7 million workers who have newly joined taxes, or as a result, as a result of increasing the number of lo w-cost tax rates than in other cases. It is due to the subset of. This will reduce the labor supply of about 130. 000 people on a FTE basis from 2028 to 29 compared to the case of the threshold from 2022 to 2023 according to the inflation rate according to the inflation rate. 。

Another factor in uncertainty is the basic economy. This forecast reflects the increase in labor population based on the latest labor population prediction. As a result, the impact of the NICS reduction in November 2023 94. 000. The deterioration of the economic situation is, for example, if the labor demand cannot keep up with the supply and the possible population has increased in the next few years. The prediction may be revised downward.

α) This was derived from the introduction of elasticity and unique assumptions for other parameters in the Ministry of Finance's labor supply model, and the change in personal tax policy was evaluated by the impact of the motivation to work. For more information on methodology, see below. OBR, the impact of the national insurance premiums in the fall of 2023, February 2024.

b) A delay CPI in the third quarter is used as close to the previous year's CPI where most standards are updated. For this reason, all the standard amounts shown in Table a are not raised according to the inflation rate, and some of the standard amounts set for a long time, such as personal deduction, are still frozen. However, it is substantially reflected. The additional tax threshold (ART), which was reduced from 150. 000 pounds to 125. 140 pounds in 2023-24, focuses on the influence of the threshold freezing (or in some cases, indirect decisions that remain freezing). In order to avoid the configuration of other modern policy changes, we have begun to assume the opposite divergence. A slight difference in policy raising in Scotland was removed, and simple scaling was adjusted to the U K-level change in unhole.

Public sector expenditure

Summary of the expenditure forecast

3. 42 In addition, the following measures were also considered:

The VAT Retail Export System was a system in which travelers other than the EU member of the UK returned to the VAT generated when purchasing a product from a participating retailer. It was abolished due to the withdrawal of the UK in January 2021. Box 3. 3 has revised the initial cost calculation. Another factor in uncertainty is the basic economy. This forecast reflects the increase in labor population based on the latest labor population prediction. As a result, the impact of the NICS reduction in November 2023 94. 000. The deterioration of the economic situation is, for example, if the labor demand cannot keep up with the supply and the possible population has increased in the next few years. The prediction may be revised downward.

Chart 4.6: Public expenditure as a share of GDP

Chart 4.7: Public spending as a share of GDP by category

Table 4.4: Total managed expenditure (TME) split between departmental expenditure limits (DEL) and annually managed expenditure (AME)

α) This was derived from the introduction of elasticity and unique assumptions for other parameters in the Ministry of Finance's labor supply model, and the change in personal tax policy was evaluated by the impact of the motivation to work. For more information on methodology, see below. OBR, the impact of the national insurance premiums in the fall of 2023, February 2024.
-0, 8	British service trade has continued to grow strongly, including the relationship with the EU, despite the increase in trade barriers after Brexit. Looking at the configuration by department, about tw o-thirds of the growth of trade services since 2019 are leading by the "Other Business Services" department, including management consultants, research and development, and advertising (Chart H). 。 In contrast, financial services and transportation exports have been delayed to other departments, and each has decreased by 5 and 9 %to 2, 0 %. These are the most susceptible sectors due to the effects of blepjit friction.
Note: This includes gains from bringing offshore sheltered trusts into UK taxable range for certain deemed residential and non-residential properties not subject to the new regime.	The powerful growth of the UK's "Other Business Services" may reflect several factors. First, the trade barrier with the EU may be lower than the strict regulations such as goods and banking businesses. In the second G, exports to the United States have shown a particularly powerful growth, which may have been supported by recent pounds and incorporate outsourcing operations on the U. S. company to the UK. H Finally, it is suggested that service companies may avoid trade barriers by selling through overseas subsidiaries.	As a whole, our assumptions on the impact of Brexit seem to be as planned, and recently published research is generally consistent with these estimates. However, considering the challenges of the confusion due to the simultaneous impact of geopolitical trends that affect Braeggit, pandemic, and other global trade, it is still difficult to make a solid conclusion. Trade data is unstable, especially service trade is easily corrected. In addition, the complete implementation of the TCA will further increase the barrier of goods trade with the EU. It is expected that the impact of Bluejit will appear completely a few years after the complete implementation of these barriers. Until then, we will continue to consider Brexit projects.	(a) OBR, Brexit and the Obr's Brexit Forecast, Octom 2018. Detailed analysis of trade and productivity relevance is box 2.	b) See. Box 2. The economic impact of Brexit on investment and immigration is 4 in March 2023 for economic and tax prospects.	c) See. Box D: Briefing Agent on the Bank of England, February 2024, February 2024.	d) Resolution Foundation, Ending Stagnation: New economic strategy for the UK, December 2023.
The tariff government of the electric vehicle (EVS) extends the current trade rules for the United Kingdom and the EU for three years, postponed the introduction of the origin of origin until January 1, 2027, and has 2 year old. It has been announced that it will reduce 100 million pounds. We had previously assumed that a trader would respond to this change by 2024, and that the United Nations trade with the EU would be virtually unrelated. We will reflect the tariffs that were supposed to be collected from traders that do not conform to the origin of the origin, and raise the same duties.	On August 8, 2023, E & Amp; Amp? A was also called "Form G" and was mandatory on August 8, 2023. As a result, the applicant needs to provide additional information about the company, agency, and e & amp; A. With the introduction of AFIF, it is estimated that the tax deduction requirements for small and mediu m-sized enterprises will be reduced by 33%, and as the agent is proficient in new requirements, the percentage will be reduced by 10%per year. As a result, E & Amp; AMP? A reduced £ 700 million in 2023-24, an average of £ 500 million. These formats have been operated only for several months, and these estimates are uncertain because they have returned complaints before the introduction. E & amp; amp? Α.	In November 2020, the government announced that the VAT retail export scheme (RES) will be closed from January 1, 2021 with the UK withdrawal from the UK. The scheme was able to claim VAT conditionally by travelers visiting the UK from outside the EU area when purchasing a specific product in the UK from a participating retailer. The conditions include purchasing products from British participation retailers, purchasers filling out and submitting them in paper, and exporting them from the EU within three months after purchase. In fact, most claims were processed when departing from the airport. The	The abolition of the regime brings non-EU tourists into line with EU tourists in terms of VAT treatment, in line with WTO non-discrimination rules. This review uses the latest available data and references the original costing in November 2020 to report revised estimates of the fiscal impact for 2025-26, the final year of the scorecard's costing. Table B provides a side-by-side comparison of the key costing data for 2020 pro forma and current view relevant to 2025-26. £ million 2025-26	Initial	Revised	Difference	Static costing
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
-685	-68	Behavioural and other effects	Behavioural and other effects	146	-9	Lower visitors: spending on goods that previously received VAT refunds	Lower visitors: spending on other goods
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
Remaining visitors: spending on goods that previously received VAT refunds	-51	-51	Lower air passenger tax collections	Final cost	-462	-539	-77
Notes: In this table, we use the convention that negative figures indicate lower borrowings, i. e. higher receipts.	3.5	3.5	3.6	3.4	3.3	3.2	3.0
Costing can be broken down into three main components:	Static costing is simply the fiscal savings from no longer incurring the cost of VAT refunds.	Some non-EU tourists will refrain from visiting the UK if the scheme is abolished. This direct behavioural effect is captured in the first cost calculation, and the post-VAT RES expenditure (and associated tax revenue) from this group is zero. The original cost calculation did not include the indirect behavioural effect, i. e. the further loss of non-VAT RES expenditure that would have been incurred by this group.	For RES VAT buyers who still visit the UK, the higher real prices will lead to less spending on these goods, reducing tax revenue. The direct behavioural effect from this group is included in the first cost calculation. In this case, previous VAT RES expenditure by this group will be diverted to non-VAT RES items, partially offsetting the effect of the reduction in VAT RES expenditure.	A further potential channel for indirect effects is the possibility that reduced external demand for RES goods will reduce employment and long-run potential output.	A further potential channel for indirect effects is the possibility that reduced external demand for RES goods will reduce employment and long-run potential output.	The tax base for this cost is at a level before measuring spending on VAT items by tourists from outside the EU. The static costing has been estimated using HMRC receipts from 2019 tax returns, suggesting that just over £520 million of VAT was refunded to 1. 2 million visitors that year, implying that spending on VAT Res items was around £2. 700 per refund claimant. c	The tax base for this cost is at a level before measuring spending on VAT items by tourists from outside the EU. The static costing has been estimated using HMRC receipts from 2019 tax returns, suggesting that just over £520 million of VAT was refunded to 1. 2 million visitors that year, implying that spending on VAT Res items was around £2. 700 per refund claimant. c
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
Considering the direct behavioural impacts of non-EU tourists no longer visiting the UK	2. 35 We consider this evidence, and the broader evidence, to be consistent with some further easing of labor market conditions. We expect the unemployment rate to rise moderately and peak at 4. 5% in the final quarter of 2024. The unemployment rate peak would correspond to about 1. 6 million jobseekers, six months earlier but slightly lower than expected in November. The unemployment rate then rises to 4.	This elasticity was based on the estimated value specialized in the UK tourism industry at the time, and its estimated value wa s-1, 28. G RES travelers are uncertain, but to recognize that the cost of visiting costs changes significantly and may be more sensitive to the price, but the elasticity increased by about 50 % -1, -1. 9 was 9. With the tax revenue from this group's expenditure to RES products, the savings of 2020 measures will decrease to £ 21 million in 2025-26.	In examining this direct action assumption, the trend of the actual number of visitors since the introduction of the policy was taken into account. In addition, the external estimation of the sensitivity to travel and sightseeing expenditures was also considered.	The number of travelers is determined by various factors, but the uncertainty at this time has grown even more depending on both the pandemic and the British withdrawal. The overall number of visitors to the United Kingdom has now recovered to the pr e-pandemic level, and the percentage of visitor from EU and no n-EU countries has increased (Fig. C (left panel)). )). In some other European countries, the recovery of the number of visitors from the United States is relatively large (Fig. C right panel). However, the overall difference is not large, and there is no significant change in the composition ratio of British visitors (between the country or the reason for travel). < SPAN> This elasticity was based on the estimated value specialized in the UK tourism industry at the time, and its estimated value wa s-1, 28. G RES travelers are uncertain, but to recognize that the cost of visiting costs changes significantly and may be more sensitive to the price, but the elasticity increased by about 50 % -1, -1. 9 was 9. With the tax revenue from this group's expenditure to RES products, the savings of 2020 measures will decrease to £ 125-26 in 2025-26.	The number of travelers is determined by various factors, but the uncertainty at this time has grown even more depending on both the pandemic and the British withdrawal. The overall number of visitors to the United Kingdom has now recovered to the pr e-pandemic level, and the percentage of visitor from EU and no n-EU countries has increased (Fig. C (left panel)). )). In some other European countries, the recovery of the number of visitors from the United States is relatively large (Fig. C right panel). However, the overall difference is not large, and there is no significant change in the composition ratio of British visitors (between the country or the reason for travel). < SPAN> This elasticity was based on the estimated value specialized in the UK tourism industry at the time, and its estimated value wa s-1, 28. G RES travelers are uncertain, but to recognize that the cost of visiting costs changes significantly and may be more sensitive to the price, but the elasticity increased by about 50 % -1, -1. 9 was 9. With the tax revenue from this group's expenditure to RES products, the savings of 2020 measures will decrease to £ 125-26 in 2025-26.	In examining this direct action assumption, the trend of the actual number of visitors since the introduction of the policy was taken into account. In addition, the external estimation of the sensitivity to travel and sightseeing expenditures was also considered.	In examining this direct action assumption, the trend of the actual number of visitors since the introduction of the policy was taken into account. In addition, the external estimation of the sensitivity to travel and sightseeing expenditures was also considered.
The number of travelers is determined by various factors, but the uncertainty at this time has grown even more depending on both the pandemic and the British withdrawal. The overall number of visitors to the United Kingdom has now recovered to the pr e-pandemic level, and the percentage of visitor from EU and no n-EU countries has increased (Fig. C (left panel)). )). In some other European countries, the recovery of the number of visitors from the United States is relatively large (Fig. C right panel). However, the overall difference is not large, and there is no significant change in the composition ratio of British visitors (between the country or the reason for travel).	4.4	3.8	3.2	3.1	3.2	3.3	3.4
As a result of examining external estimates regarding the degree of price sensitivity of overseas travelers, the elasticity used in 2020 cost calculation was the highest in this range, as the result was in the range o f-2, 1-0, 4. 。 h We have made some adjustments, although we mainly answered that we were traveling for reasons other than vacation, we could take the VAT paid RES purchase. Therefore, our policy states that this policy has reduced the number of RES VAT claimers by 2025-26 by 34, 000, and in 2025-2026, 3 million pounds more than 2020 cost calculation. Will decrease. The number of RES VAT travelers is particularly uncertain because the cost of visiting costs increases in proportion to travelers from other countries. Therefore, the data did not overturn the original assumption, but this has a great uncertainties, and the number of deteriorated travelers may be higher and less. As a result, in order to offset static policy savings in government behavior, the reaction of this group must be much higher than any data we surveyed.	In examining this direct action assumption, the trend of the actual number of visitors since the introduction of the policy was taken into account. In addition, the external estimation of the sensitivity to travel and sightseeing expenditures was also considered.	Without VAT, there are tax losses that would have been collected when a deterrent visitor would be expanded to RES goods and services. The prediction as of November 2020 does not explicitly consider the impact of this indirect policy on the finances. However, as is the case with any prediction, the impact of the entire policy package (including the abolition of added value tax) on the total demand is (through the framework of the fiscal board discussed in box 2. 1). It should have been grasped. Usually, the indirect impact on the demand of such measures, which is relatively small in the UK economy, has been performed to explain the size of this review. < SPAN> As a result of examining external estimates regarding the degree of price sensitivity of overseas travelers, the elasticity used in 2020 cost calculation was the highest in this range. It was. h We have made some adjustments, although we mainly answered that we were traveling for reasons other than vacation, we could take the VAT paid RES purchase. Therefore, our policy states that this policy has reduced the number of RES VAT claimers by 2025-26 by 34, 000, and in 2025-2026, 3 million pounds more than 2020 cost calculation. Will decrease. The number of RES VAT travelers is particularly uncertain because the cost of visiting costs increases in proportion to travelers from other countries. Therefore, the data did not overturn the original assumption, but this has a great uncertainty, and the number of deteriorated travelers may be higher and less. As a result, in order to offset static policy savings in government behavior, the reaction of this group must be much higher than any data we surveyed.	GDP growth	OBR (March 2024 forecast)	2. 35 We consider this evidence, and the broader evidence, to be consistent with some further easing of labor market conditions. We expect the unemployment rate to rise moderately and peak at 4. 5% in the final quarter of 2024. The unemployment rate peak would correspond to about 1. 6 million jobseekers, six months earlier but slightly lower than expected in November. The unemployment rate then rises to 4.	9.9	9.8

Without VAT, there are tax losses that would have been collected when a deterrent visitors would be expanded to RES goods and services. The prediction as of November 2020 does not explicitly consider the impact of this indirect policy on the finances. However, as is the case with any prediction, the impact of the entire policy package (including the abolition of added value tax) on the total demand is in our economic forecasts (through the framework of the fiscal multiplier discussed in box 2. 1). It should have been grasped. Normally, the indirect impact on the demand of such measures, which is relatively small in the UK economy, has been done individually to explain the size of this review.

Therefore, on average, suppressed tourists travel with the companions, assuming that spending on items other than VAT RES was about £ 1. 750 per person (however, (although the average number of items other than VAT RES)). This estimation is very uncertain). If these are added to the CPI inflation rate and the number of passengers during the predictive period, in 2025-2026, it will have 24 million pounds by suppressing tourists to non-VAT RES products. It is estimated that tax revenues decrease.

Verify the impact of travelers from outside the EU to the UK by reducing expenditures
This policy increases the real price of RES products, including added value tax (VAT), for travelers visiting the UK from outside the EU. The cost calculation in 2020 anticipated that the group would respond by reducing the expenditure to these products. In this estimation method, the VAT expenditure of RES by this group decreased by 29 % (about 785 pounds per person in 2019), approaching visitors from the EU (but still it is it. It is assumed that it exceeds). As a result, in 2025-2026, the income was reduced by 139 million pounds. Fig. D shows that the spending ratio of no n-EU and EU has certainly declined since 2021, but this is not due to other factors, but to some extent from the data. Can't judge.
Demand price elastic approach is an appropriate method to estimate this behavior. The reaction of RES demand against the (inhibition) group to VAT should reflect more accurately change in the price of tourism products rather than the total travel expenses. Based on available documents, the elasticity of the intensive margin, 1. 8, which means 29 % of spending reductions, is definitely high. However, this literature does not clearly consider luxury purchasers who are expected to be relatively sensitive to prices. In addition, due to the increase in polic y-led prices, some buyers will switch from added value tax to RE spending without added value tax (this effect is not explicitly considered in 2020 cost calculation). Therefore, on average, suppressed tourists travel with the companions, assuming that spending on items other than VAT RES was about £ 1. 750 per person based on the 2019 data. (However, this estimation is very uncertain). If these are added to the CPI inflation rate and the number of passengers during the predictive period, in 2025-2026, it will have 24 million pounds by suppressing tourists to non-VAT RES products. It is estimated that tax revenues decrease.
Verify the impact of travelers from outside the EU to the UK by reducing expenditures

Chart 4.8: The rise in the spending-to-GDP ratio between 2019-20 and 2028-29

Changes in spending since our November 2023 forecast

This policy increases the real price of RES products, including added value tax (VAT), for travelers visiting the UK from outside the EU. The cost calculation in 2020 anticipated that the group would respond by reducing the expenditure to these products. In this estimation method, the VAT expenditure of RES by this group decreased by 29 % (about 785 pounds per person in 2019), approaching visitors from the EU (but still it is it. It is assumed that it exceeds). As a result, in 2025-2026, the income was reduced by 139 million pounds. Fig. D shows that the spending ratio of no n-EU and EU has certainly declined since 2021, but this is not due to other factors, but to some extent from the data. Can't judge.

Demand price elastic approach is an appropriate method to estimate this behavior. The reaction of RES demand against the (inhibition) group to VAT should reflect more accurately change in the price of tourism products rather than the total travel expenses. Based on available documents, the elasticity of the intensive margin, 1. 8, which means 29 % of spending reductions, is definitely high. However, this literature does not clearly consider luxury purchasers who are expected to be relatively sensitive to prices. In addition, due to the increase in polic y-led prices, some buyers will switch from added value tax to RE spending without added value tax (this effect is not explicitly considered in 2020 cost calculation). Therefore, on average, suppressed tourists travel with the companions, assuming that spending on items other than VAT RES was about £ 1. 750 per person (however, (although the average number of items other than VAT RES)). This estimation is very uncertain). If these are added to the CPI inflation rate and the number of passengers during the predictive period, in 2025-2026, it will have 24 million pounds by suppressing tourists to non-VAT RES products. It is estimated that tax revenues decrease.

Table 4.5: Public sector expenditure: changes since November 2023

What is the driving force behind the growth of British service trade?
-0, 8	British service trade has continued to grow strongly, including the relationship with the EU, despite the increase in trade barriers after Brexit. Looking at the configuration by department, about tw o-thirds of the growth of trade services since 2019 are leading by the "Other Business Services" department, including management consultants, research and development, and advertising (Chart H). 。 In contrast, financial services and transportation exports have been delayed to other departments, and each has decreased by 5 and 9 %to 2, 0 %. These are the most susceptible sectors due to the effects of blepjit friction.
Note: This includes gains from bringing offshore sheltered trusts into UK taxable range for certain deemed residential and non-residential properties not subject to the new regime.	The powerful growth of the UK's "Other Business Services" may reflect several factors. First, the trade barrier with the EU may be lower than the strict regulations such as goods and banking businesses. In the second G, exports to the United States have shown a particularly powerful growth, which may have been supported by recent pounds and incorporate outsourcing operations on the U. S. company to the UK. H Finally, it is suggested that service companies may avoid trade barriers by selling through overseas subsidiaries.	As a whole, our assumptions on the impact of Brexit seem to be as planned, and recently published research is generally consistent with these estimates. However, considering the challenges of the confusion due to the simultaneous impact of geopolitical trends that affect Braeggit, pandemic, and other global trade, it is still difficult to make a solid conclusion. Trade data is unstable, especially service trade is easily corrected. In addition, the complete implementation of the TCA will further increase the barrier of goods trade with the EU. It is expected that the impact of Bluejit will appear completely a few years after the complete implementation of these barriers. Until then, we will continue to consider Brexit projects.	(a) OBR, Brexit and the Obr's Brexit Forecast, Octom 2018. Detailed analysis of trade and productivity relevance is box 2.	b) See. Box 2. The economic impact of Brexit on investment and immigration is 4 in March 2023 for economic and tax prospects.	c) See. Box D: Briefing Agent on the Bank of England, February 2024, February 2024.	d) Resolution Foundation, Ending Stagnation: New economic strategy for the UK, December 2023.
-7. 6		It is assumed that the change in fiscal policy has a permanent impact on the level of real potential GDP on the supplier of the economy, suggesting that it has a large impact on added value in the UK, sustainable, and additional. Only for strong evidence. The J unemployment rate has been almost at the same level as the estimated value of neutral unemployment, and the recruitment ratio is high, so it is highly likely that this measure has redistributed employment and activity between the departments.	10. 0	In review, our methodology about 2020 seems to be still reasonable, and cost calculation was a central estimate (although it was a fairly uncertain estimate). We have updated it to take into account the impact of tourists on renewable energy spending other than the added value tax, but we continue to believe that this measure is unlikely to have a significant impact on economic production capabilities. There are few empirical evidence to determine the percentage of this expenditure. However, many luxury goods have been judged that only on e-third of the 29 % decrease in RES spending is diverted to on e-third of the RES expenditures, because many of the luxury goods are consumed. For this reason, the elasticity i s-1. 2, which is considered to be more central. As a whole, we have revised the total income loss of travelers from outside the EU in 2025-26 to 100 million pounds, lowering 36 million pounds than the cost in 2020. This is because the expenditure shifts to a no n-VAT RES sector.	Possibility of widespread indirect behavior impact on the demand side and the supply side	It is clear that this measure had a significant impact on gross profit of affected companies. As mentioned above, the economic forecast in November 2020 used a "fiscal car" was used to evaluate a wider impact on policy measures. This is due to shor t-term demand changes (like this), as the exchange rate, monetary policy, and real wages are adjusted to return the production to potential levels and return inflation to the target level. It is assumed that it will be zero. In addition, in order to fully consider the fact that the change in the total sales of the affected companies is transmitted to a widespread economy, it is necessary to adjust that the import ratio of many luxury goods is high, which is pure. It will significantly reduce the impact on external demand.	It is assumed that the change in fiscal policy has a permanent impact on the level of real potential GDP on the supplier of the economy, suggesting that it has a large impact on added value in the UK, sustainable, and additional. Only for strong evidence. The J unemployment rate has been almost at the same level as the estimated value of neutral unemployment, and the recruitment ratio is high, so it is highly likely that this measure has redistributed employment and activity between the departments.	Synopsis
-35. 4		Due to high financial costs, we focused on VAT renewable energy, not purchasing at the airport. According to our own evaluation and answers obtained from external stakeholders, the uncertainty of vat renewable energy behavior is more important for our predictions than the uncertainty about purchasing at the airport. However, since both measures are carried out on similar routes, our main analysis conclusions are likely to be related to the o n-air market.	Millions of pounds	2020-21	2021-22	2022-23	2023-24	2024-25
0. 3		Static cost calculation	-31	-179	-463	-586	-633	-685
Total
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
2. 4			99	125	135	146	Reduction of visitor: Expenditure to products that have received VAT refunds in the past	Reduction of visitors: Expenditure to other products
Remaining visitor: Expenditure to products that have received VAT refunds in the past			5.0	5.7	4.6	3.9	3.5	2.9
The Additional Rate Threshold (Art) will be reduced from £150, 000 to £125, 140 from April 2023 to align with the PA Taper.			2024-2028 average growth rate	0.4	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.5	0.8	0.0
Impact from 2021-22 to 2028-29 (thousand people)			0.0	2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) after adjustment of 41 will be maintained at 4 % or more for the time being, and will be reduced to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.3
-51
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
Final cost calculation			-twenty four	-141	-364	-462	-498	-539
Considering the direct behavioural impacts of non-EU tourists no longer visiting the UK			0.5	2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) after adjustment of 41 will be maintained at 4 % or more for the time being, and will be reduced to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	b) For more information about insurance premium settings, see Briefing Paper No. 6 "Insurance Premiums and Our Expectives" (March 2014).	Employee	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	-1. 2
F) Based on the assumption that the higher the VAT RES rate, the more the cost will be transferred, the more profitable companies that perform the VAT refund procedure will request the service fee. In the cost calculation, this is recorded using the net actual price increase. Not all participating retailers apply administrative fees.			3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of revenues in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	0.7	2026-27	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of revenues in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	0.2
3. 43 Parliament requires that our forecasts reflect only current government policy. Therefore, when the government sets out its "policy ambition" or "intention", we ask the Treasury to make sure that it is a stable policy. We use this information to decide what should be reflected in our forecasts. If policy is not yet stable, we flag it as a risk to the central forecast. A full database of risks to this forecast and changes since the last update is available on our website. Here we summarise the risks that have changed significantly since our outlook in March and new risks that have emerged.			0.5	1.7	1.8	1.7	1.1	0.0
3. 44 Among the risks that have emerged since the last outlook are the two new taxes on vaping and CBAM mentioned above. The third is Investment Zones (IZs), where the government announced in this Budget that tax concessions and business rates will remain unchanged in eight IZs across England. We have not yet factored in the fiscal impact of IZs outside England.			5.0	5.7	4.6	4.0	3.6	2.9
3. 45 Policy risks that have developed or emerged since November include:			Further compensation for victims of the Post Office Horizon scandal announced by the government. According to the government's announcement, to date, approximately £160 million has been paid to more than 2, 700 claimants through three compensation schemes. The government has also introduced legislation to exonerate people who were wrongly convicted based on Horizon evidence. The final cost of compensation payments will depend on the circumstances outlined in each individual claim, so we will include the impact of this in our forecasts once it is determined.	Compensation payments for contaminated blood In July 2017, the government announced an inquiry into the use of contaminated blood products used for transfusions in the 1970s and 1980s. In August 2022, the government accepted the recommendations of the inquiry's interim report and decided to provide an interim compensation payment of £100, 000 to people currently receiving support from one of the four support programs. The final report is due to be published in May 2024, and we will incorporate the impact of further recommendations into our forecasts when we have sufficient confidence.	The government has expressed his intention to sell some retails of nut wests, following the support of the market and achieving value for money. At this stage, the details such as the time of sale are inadequate, so it cannot be incorporated into this forecast.	In the current no n-resident system reform, the handling of inheritance taxes was not clarified, but the government has shown intention of shifting to a residenc e-based system after consultation. The results will be published later.	The British Prime Minister has plans to introduce the British ISA (in addition to the existing ISA limit of £ 20. 000), which can invest up to £ 5. 000 per year in British companies. The design is under discussion.	In March 2023, the UK participated in a comprehensive and advanced agreement (CPTPP) on the Pacific Partnership, and became the first new member country since its establishment in 2018 and became the first European member of the European. 。 But at this time, there is no sufficient policy to evaluate the impact of this agreement on our predictions. The government estimates that the agreement will "increase the British lon g-term GDP by about 2 billion pounds every year" [19] and has been replaced with estimates in the EFO in November.

Abusive administrative policy announced on February 8, 2024 that the Minister of Directors 1 would increase the minimum amount of alcohol in Scotland from 50 to 65 as the current regulation expired at the end of April. The Scottish government and the Wales government have decided to follow the British government on the ban on single use. The impact of these decisions on the finances will be reflected in the next prediction.

Spending within departmental expenditure limits

The government has selected the best small module furnace (SMR) technology, and has announced a bid to provide funds if it is proven that the technology is executable. As part of this, the government is considering purchasing land available for SMR and nuclear power plants. The bid is currently ongoing and has not made a final decision. The government has also announced a roadmap to increase nuclear power to 2050, which includes up to £ 300 million. We plan to reflect the effects of these initiatives in the prediction when a rational confirmation is obtained and the timetable is confirmed. The government has expressed his intention to sell some retails in the nut waist, following the support of the market conditions and the achievement of Value for Money. At this stage, the details such as the time of sale are inadequate, so it cannot be incorporated into this forecast.

In the current no n-resident system reform, the handling of inheritance taxes was not clarified, but the government has shown intention of shifting to a residenc e-based system after consultation. The results will be published later.
The British Prime Minister has plans to introduce the British ISA (in addition to the existing ISA limit of £ 20. 000), which can invest up to £ 5. 000 per year in British companies. The design is under discussion.

In March 2023, the UK participated in a comprehensive and advanced agreement (CPTPP) on the Pacific Partnership, and became the first new member country since its establishment in 2018 and became the first European member of the European. 。 But at this time, there is no sufficient policy to evaluate the impact of this agreement on our predictions. The government estimates that the agreement will "increase the British lon g-term GDP by about 2 billion pounds every year" [19] and has been replaced with estimates in the EFO in November.

Chart 4.9: Breakdown of total departmental spending in the forecast

Departmental spending in 2023-24 and 2024-25

The government has selected the best small module furnace (SMR) technology, and has announced a bid to provide funds if it is proven that the technology is executable. As part of this, the government is considering purchasing land available for SMR and nuclear power plants. The bid is currently ongoing and has not made a final decision. The government has also announced a roadmap to increase nuclear power to 2050, which includes up to £ 300 million. We plan to reflect the effects of these initiatives in the prediction when a rational confirmation is obtained and the timetable is confirmed. The government has expressed his intention to sell some retails of nut wests, following the support of the market and achieving value for money. At this stage, the details such as the time of sale are inadequate, so it cannot be incorporated into this forecast.

Departmental spending from 2025-26 onwards

In the current no n-resident system reform, the handling of inheritance taxes was not clarified, but the government has shown intention of shifting to a residenc e-based system after consultation. The results will be published later.

The British Prime Minister has plans to introduce the British ISA (in addition to the existing ISA limit of £ 20. 000), which can invest up to £ 5. 000 per year in British companies. The design is under discussion.
In March 2023, the UK participated in a comprehensive and advanced agreement (CPTPP) on the Pacific Partnership, and became the first new member country since its establishment in 2018 and became the first European member of the European. 。 But at this time, there is no sufficient policy to evaluate the impact of this agreement on our predictions. The government estimates that the agreement will "increase the British lon g-term GDP by about 2 billion pounds every year" [19] and has been replaced with estimates in the EFO in November.

Table 4.6: Departmental resource spending: changes since November 2023

Abusive administrative policy announced on February 8, 2024 that the Minister of Directors 1 would increase the minimum amount of alcohol in Scotland from 50 to 65 as the current regulation expired at the end of April. The Scottish government and the Wales government have decided to follow the British government on the ban on single use. The impact of these decisions on the finances will be reflected in the next prediction.
-0, 8	British service trade has continued to grow strongly, including the relationship with the EU, despite the increase in trade barriers after Brexit. Looking at the configuration by department, about tw o-thirds of the growth of trade services since 2019 are leading by the "Other Business Services" department, including management consultants, research and development, and advertising (Chart H). 。 In contrast, financial services and transportation exports have been delayed to other departments, and each has decreased by 5 and 9 %to 2, 0 %. These are the most susceptible sectors due to the effects of blepjit friction.
Note: This includes gains from bringing offshore sheltered trusts into UK taxable range for certain deemed residential and non-residential properties not subject to the new regime.	The powerful growth of the UK's "Other Business Services" may reflect several factors. First, the trade barrier with the EU may be lower than the strict regulations such as goods and banking businesses. In the second G, exports to the United States have shown a particularly powerful growth, which may have been supported by recent pounds and incorporate outsourcing operations on the U. S. company to the UK. H Finally, it is suggested that service companies may avoid trade barriers by selling through overseas subsidiaries.	As a whole, our assumptions on the impact of Brexit seem to be as planned, and recently published research is generally consistent with these estimates. However, considering the challenges of the confusion due to the simultaneous impact of geopolitical trends that affect Braeggit, pandemic, and other global trade, it is still difficult to make a solid conclusion. Trade data is unstable, especially service trade is easily corrected. In addition, the complete implementation of the TCA will further increase the barrier of goods trade with the EU. It is expected that the impact of Bluejit will appear completely a few years after the complete implementation of these barriers. Until then, we will continue to consider Brexit projects.	(a) OBR, Brexit and the Obr's Brexit Forecast, Octom 2018. Detailed analysis of trade and productivity relevance is box 2.	b) See. Box 2. The economic impact of Brexit on investment and immigration is 4 in March 2023 for economic and tax prospects.	c) See. Box D: Briefing Agent on the Bank of England, February 2024, February 2024.	d) Resolution Foundation, Ending Stagnation: New economic strategy for the UK, December 2023.
4. 3 Looking at the recent EFO S, this outlook is quite uncertain, reflecting unstable external environments, especially in Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the Middle East. Important elements in financial outlooks, such as inflation rate and interest rates, are still uncertain, as immigration, no n-activity, and productivity on growth and labor. Through this chapter, we discuss how the changes in these factors have affected predictions. Chapter 5 also evaluates the impact of some of the main factors of these uncertainty on finances. < SPAN> This budget continues the pattern of the Prime Minister who does not move the policies stated by raising the fuel tax and alcohol tax. The cumulative cost of fuel tax from 2010-11 to 2024-25 is estimated to be around £ 90 billion compared to the fuel tax increase according to the RPI inflation rate. This includes the "provisional" 5P price reduction, which was introduced on the budget for the spring of 2022 and extended in this budget for the third year.
4. 1 Chapter	This chapter: Note the classification problems that affect the prediction (from paragraph 4. 4).	Overall the outlook for revenue in the public sector (from paragraph 4. 5) and the outlook of the public sector (from paragraph 4. 44).	Outlook for borrowing and other deficit (paragraph 4. 67), including the total balance, permanent balance, and basic financial balance indicators (from paragraph 4. 67).	Explains financial transactions, balance sheets, and prospects for government borrowing in the private sector (from paragraph 4. 72).	This chapter summarizes the main uncertainty and risks for budget outlook (Paragraph 4. 81).	4. The prediction of chapter 2 has begun by estimating the 2022-23 data published in the Public Sector Finance published by the National Statistics Bureau (ONS) on January 23. Next, we estimate from 2023-24 to use ONS Outturn data from April 2023 to December 2023 and administrative data on HMRC tax revenue in January 2024. Finally, the forecast from 2024-25 to 2028-29 is shown. In this chapter, we will compare with the prediction of the latest economic and financial outlook (EFO) published in November 2023.	4. 3 Looking at the recent EFO S, this outlook is quite uncertain, reflecting unstable external environments, especially in Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the Middle East. Important elements in financial outlooks, such as inflation rate and interest rates, are still uncertain, as immigration, no n-activity, and productivity on growth and labor. Through this chapter, we discuss how the changes in these factors have affected predictions. Chapter 5 also evaluates the impact of some of the main factors of these uncertainty on finances. The budget continues to continue the pattern of the Prime Minister who does not move the policy stated that the fuel tax and liquor tax will be raised. The cumulative cost of fuel tax from 2010-11 to 2024-25 is estimated to be around £ 90 billion compared to the fuel tax increase according to the RPI inflation rate. This includes the "provisional" 5P price reduction, which was introduced on the budget for the spring of 2022 and extended in this budget for the third year.
4. 1 Chapter	This chapter: Note the classification problems that affect the prediction (from paragraph 4. 4).	2025-26	2025-26	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Explains financial transactions, balance sheets, and prospects for government borrowing in the private sector (from paragraph 4. 72).	This chapter summarizes the main uncertainty and risks for budget outlook (Paragraph 4. 81).	4. The prediction of chapter 2 has begun by estimating the 2022-23 data published in the Public Sector Finance published by the National Statistics Bureau (ONS) on January 23. Next, the estimation of 2023-24 will be conducted using the ONS Outturn data from April 2023 to December 2023 and the administrative data on the HMRC tax revenue in January 2024. Finally, the forecast from 2024-25 to 2028-29 is shown. In this chapter, we will compare with the prediction of the latest economic and financial outlook (EFO) published in November 2023.	4. 3 Looking at the recent EFO S, this outlook is quite uncertain, reflecting unstable external environments, especially in Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the Middle East. Important elements in financial outlooks, such as inflation rate and interest rates, are still uncertain, as immigration, no n-activity, and productivity on growth and labor. Through this chapter, we discuss how these changes in these factors have affected predictions. Chapter 5 also evaluates the impact of some of the main factors of these uncertainty on finance.	Explains financial transactions, balance sheets, and prospects for government borrowing in the private sector (from paragraph 4. 72).	This chapter summarizes the main uncertainty and risks for budget outlook (Paragraph 4. 81).	4. The prediction of chapter 2 has begun by estimating the 2022-23 data published in the Public Sector Finance published by the National Statistics Bureau (ONS) on January 23. Next, we estimate from 2023-24 to use ONS Outturn data from April 2023 to December 2023 and administrative data on HMRC tax revenue in January 2024. Finally, the forecast from 2024-25 to 2028-29 is shown. In this chapter, we will compare with the prediction of the latest economic and financial outlook (EFO) published in November 2023.	4. 3 Looking at the recent EFO S, this outlook is quite uncertain, reflecting unstable external environments, especially in Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the Middle East. Important elements in financial outlooks, such as inflation rate and interest rates, are still uncertain, as immigration, no n-activity, and productivity on growth and labor. Through this chapter, we discuss how the changes in these factors have affected predictions. Chapter 5 also evaluates the impact of some of the main factors of these uncertainty on finances. The budget continues to continue the pattern of the Prime Minister who does not move the policy stated that the fuel tax and liquor tax will be raised. The cumulative cost of fuel tax from 2010-11 to 2024-25 is estimated to be around £ 90 billion compared to the fuel tax increase according to the RPI inflation rate. This includes the "provisional" 5P price reduction, which was introduced on the budget for the spring of 2022 and extended in this budget for the third year.
The tax system before the pandemic will increase the tax of 0. 7%of GDP.		2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) after adjustment of 41 will be maintained at 4 % or more for the time being, and will be reduced to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	0.4	0.5	1.0	1.1	1.0
This includes an income tax and a tax increase of 1, 3 % of the NIC's standard freezing, and an increase in GDP by raising the corporate tax rate from 19 % to 25 %.
4. 1 Chapter	This chapter summarizes the main uncertainty and risks for budget outlook (Paragraph 4. 81).	Compared to the outlook as of November 4. 8, the total revenue of the public sector increased by 3. 8 billion pounds in 2023-24, including the impact of fiscal measures, and an average of 131 average between 2024-25 and 2028-29. It is expected to decrease by hundreds of millions. Except for the budget neutral items offset by expenditures, the income will be revised down 1. 2 billion pounds this year, and an average of £ 17. 2 billion per year between 2024-25 and 2028-29. Changes in predictions excluding a budget neutral value are shor t-term, in which the total receipt of this year is slightly lower than the forecast, in the medium term, the prospects for the inflation rate are weak, and in the basics tax basis. Other nominal factors, especially nominal income and decrease in consumption, are brought about. < SPAN> Basic changes in predictions, excluding the direct impact of policy measures, the tax increase of 1. 9 % of GDP. Prior to GDP before being affected by policy: Income tax revenue is increasing due to an increase in labor distribution rates in GDP and increasing profits in the highe r-level income distribution. Lan d-based corporate tax revenue increased due to solid profits in the hig h-payment department. In addition, the tax revenue of the added value tax has increased due to the shrinking of the added value gap. [twenty one]	This includes an income tax and a tax increase of 1, 3 % of the NIC's standard freezing, and an increase in GDP by raising the corporate tax rate from 19 % to 25 %.	The direct impact of large tax reductions is 0. 9%of GDP, and individual tax cuts in the form of lowering the main tax rates (NICS) of employees and sel f-employed employees announced in this budget in November 2023. Tax 0. 7%of GDP. Overpayment announced in March 2021, full expenditure announced in March 2023, corporate tax reduction in the form of permanent full expenditure announced in November 2023, in addition to GDP. Reduce the tax burden of 0. 2 %.	The direct impact of all other tax measures announced after March 2020 will increase the tax burden of GDP by 0. 4%. This includes the city tax hike, the second pillar reform of the corporate tax, the introduction of energy gain taxation, and the increase in tax increase, etc. I am offset.	Compared to the outlook as of November 4. 8, the total revenue of the public sector increased by 3. 8 billion pounds in 2023-24, including the impact of fiscal measures, and an average of 131 average between 2024-25 and 2028-29. It is expected to decrease by hundreds of millions. Except for the budget neutral items offset by expenditures, the income will be revised down 1. 2 billion pounds this year, and an average of £ 17. 2 billion per year between 2024-25 and 2028-29. Changes in predictions excluding a budget neutral value are shor t-term, in which the total receipt of this year is slightly lower than the forecast, in the medium term, the prospects for the inflation rate are weak, and in the basics tax basis. Other nominal factors, especially nominal income and decrease in consumption, are brought about. The basic change of predictions, excluding the direct impact of policy measures, is a 1. 9 % tax increase in GDP. Prior to GDP before being affected by policy: Income tax revenue is increasing due to an increase in labor distribution rates in GDP and increasing profits in the highe r-level income distribution. Lan d-based corporate tax revenue increased due to solid profits in the hig h-payment department. In addition, the tax revenue of the added value tax has increased due to the shrinking of the added value gap. [twenty one]	This includes an income tax and a tax increase of 1, 3 % of the NIC's standard freezing, and an increase in GDP by raising the corporate tax rate from 19 % to 25 %.
4. 1 Chapter	0.0	The direct impact of all other tax measures announced after March 2020 will increase the tax burden of GDP by 0. 4%. This includes the city tax hike, the second pillar reform of the corporate tax, the introduction of energy gain taxation, and the increase in tax increase, etc. I am offset.	2025-26	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Explains financial transactions, balance sheets, and prospects for government borrowing in the private sector (from paragraph 4. 72).	This chapter summarizes the main uncertainty and risks for budget outlook (Paragraph 4. 81).	afternoon	prediction	The direct impact of large tax reductions is 0. 9%of GDP, and individual tax cuts in the form of lowering the main tax rates (NICS) of employees and sel f-employed employees announced in this budget in November 2023. Tax 0. 7%of GDP. Overpayment announced in March 2021, full expenditure announced in March 2023, corporate tax reduction in the form of permanent full expenditure announced in November 2023, in addition to GDP. Reduce the tax burden of 0. 2 %.	The direct impact of all other tax measures announced after March 2020 will increase the tax burden of GDP by 0. 4%. This includes the city tax hike, the second pillar reform of the corporate tax, the introduction of energy gain taxation, and the increase in tax increase, etc. I am offset.	Compared to the outlook as of November 4. 8, the total revenue of the public sector increased by 3. 8 billion pounds in 2023-24, including the impact of fiscal measures, and an average of 131 average between 2024-25 and 2028-29. It is expected to decrease by hundreds of millions. Except for the budget neutral items offset by expenditures, the income will be revised down 1. 2 billion pounds this year, and an average of £ 17. 2 billion per year between 2024-25 and 2028-29. Changes in predictions excluding a budget neutral value are shor t-term, in which the total receipt of this year is slightly lower than the forecast, in the medium term, the prospects for the inflation rate are weak, and in the basics tax basis. Other nominal factors, especially nominal income and decrease in consumption, are brought about. The basic change of predictions, excluding the direct impact of policy measures, is a 1. 9 % tax increase in GDP. Prior to GDP before being affected by policy: Income tax revenue is increasing due to an increase in labor distribution rates in GDP and increasing profits in the highe r-level income distribution. Lan d-based corporate tax revenue increased due to solid profits in the hig h-payment department. In addition, the tax revenue of the added value tax has increased due to the shrinking of the added value gap. [twenty one]	This includes an income tax and a tax increase of 1, 3 % of the NIC's standard freezing, and an increase in GDP by raising the corporate tax rate from 19 % to 25 %.
The tax system before the pandemic will increase the tax of 0. 7%of GDP.	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0	1.0
0. 3
4. 1 Chapter		-14	20. 3	20. 3	Fte	1. 233	1. 285
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
March 2024 forecast		3.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
1. 029		0.0	0.0	Total (personal tax decision)	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of means of revenue increase in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of revenues in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of revenues in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:
1. 272		1. 322	difference	5. 6	Fte	5. 6	-13. 5
-11, 3		0.0	Information on past measures	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
4. 1 Chapter		-14	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Explains financial transactions, balance sheets, and prospects for government borrowing in the private sector (from paragraph 4. 72).		3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact of all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of November 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	-0, 8	20. 3	Fte	1. 233	1. 285

Table 4.7: Departmental capital spending: changes since November 2023

Abusive administrative policy announced on February 8, 2024 that the Minister of Directors 1 would increase the minimum amount of alcohol in Scotland from 50 to 65 as the current regulation expired at the end of April. The Scottish government and the Wales government have decided to follow the British government on the ban on single use. The impact of these decisions on the finances will be reflected in the next prediction.
-0, 8	British service trade has continued to grow strongly, including the relationship with the EU, despite the increase in trade barriers after Brexit. Looking at the configuration by department, about tw o-thirds of the growth of trade services since 2019 are leading by the "Other Business Services" department, including management consultants, research and development, and advertising (Chart H). 。 In contrast, financial services and transportation exports have been delayed to other departments, and each has decreased by 5 and 9 %to 2, 0 %. These are the most susceptible sectors due to the effects of blepjit friction.
Note: This includes gains from bringing offshore sheltered trusts into UK taxable range for certain deemed residential and non-residential properties not subject to the new regime.	The powerful growth of the UK's "Other Business Services" may reflect several factors. First, the trade barrier with the EU may be lower than the strict regulations such as goods and banking businesses. In the second G, exports to the United States have shown a particularly powerful growth, which may have been supported by recent pounds and incorporate outsourcing operations on the U. S. company to the UK. H Finally, it is suggested that service companies may avoid trade barriers by selling through overseas subsidiaries.	As a whole, our assumptions on the impact of Brexit seem to be as planned, and recently published research is generally consistent with these estimates. However, considering the challenges of the confusion due to the simultaneous impact of geopolitical trends that affect Braeggit, pandemic, and other global trade, it is still difficult to make a solid conclusion. Trade data is unstable, especially service trade is easily corrected. In addition, the complete implementation of the TCA will further increase the barrier of goods trade with the EU. It is expected that the impact of Bluejit will appear completely a few years after the complete implementation of these barriers. Until then, we will continue to consider Brexit projects.	(a) OBR, Brexit and the Obr's Brexit Forecast, Octom 2018. Detailed analysis of trade and productivity relevance is box 2.	b) See. Box 2. The economic impact of Brexit on investment and immigration is 4 in March 2023 for economic and tax prospects.	c) See. Box D: Briefing Agent on the Bank of England, February 2024, February 2024.	d) Resolution Foundation, Ending Stagnation: New economic strategy for the UK, December 2023.
4. 3 Looking at the recent EFO S, this outlook is quite uncertain, reflecting unstable external environments, especially in Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the Middle East. Important elements in financial outlooks, such as inflation rate and interest rates, are still uncertain, as immigration, no n-activity, and productivity on growth and labor. Through this chapter, we discuss how the changes in these factors have affected predictions. Chapter 5 also evaluates the impact of some of the main factors of these uncertainty on finances. < SPAN> This budget continues the pattern of the Prime Minister who does not move the policies stated by raising the fuel tax and alcohol tax. The cumulative cost of fuel tax from 2010-11 to 2024-25 is estimated to be around £ 90 billion compared to the fuel tax increase according to the RPI inflation rate. This includes the "provisional" 5P price reduction, which was introduced on the budget for the spring of 2022 and extended in this budget for the third year.
4. 1 Chapter	home	Income tax and NIC	-3. 4	-3. 8	-4. 6	-7. 0	-10. 8
4. 1 Chapter	0.0	Very high	-twenty five	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Explains financial transactions, balance sheets, and prospects for government borrowing in the private sector (from paragraph 4. 72).	home	-3. 0	-twenty five	-3. 8	-4. 6	-7. 0	-10. 8
The tax system before the pandemic will increase the tax of 0. 7%of GDP.	0.8	1.6	3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact of all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of November 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) after adjustment of 41 will be maintained at 4 % or more for the time being, and will be reduced to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	-0, 4	-0. 9
This includes an income tax and a tax increase of 1, 3 % of the NIC's standard freezing, and an increase in GDP by raising the corporate tax rate from 19 % to 25 %.
4. 1 Chapter	home	-1. 1	-3. 4	-3. 5	-1, 6	-1, 6	-10. 8
4. 1 Chapter	0.0	Neutral evidence of PSNB	-twenty five	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Explains financial transactions, balance sheets, and prospects for government borrowing in the private sector (from paragraph 4. 72).	home	-3. 7	-twenty five	-3. 5	-1, 6	-1, 6	-10. 8
The tax system before the pandemic will increase the tax of 0. 7%of GDP.	2024-2028 average growth rate	3.0	-59	2026-27	-14	2025-26
0. 3
4. 1 Chapter		-30	0.0	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.0
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
The VAT gap decreased from 0. 8%of GDP in 2005-06 to 0. 3%in 2021-22 (equivalent to reduced from 14. 0%to 5. 4%of tax liabilities), and the total tax gap is reduced. Occupies. Most of this decline has occurred since 2013-14. HMRC has recently introduced several measures to fill the VAT gap, and it seems that it has also contributed to the decrease in cash use after pandemic. < SPAN> 4. 11 In 2010, revenue income was generally lower than expected, but the main cause was that economic outlook was overrated to growth in productivity. [22] Recently, in the prediction that is ahead of pandemic (global trends), the mediu m-term revenue ant i-GDP ratio is generally modest. This is mainly due to unexpected effects after the high inflational elasticity in the name income, which is mainly combined with the policy decision of raising tax rates and freezing personal taxation standards. This shows some of the major risks facing our predictions in this term, related to the growth of productivity, inflation, and future policy decisions, which are further discussed in this chapter and Chapter 5. There is.		0.0	0.0	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.0
March 2024 forecast		-30	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
-11, 3		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
4. 1 Chapter		3.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Explains financial transactions, balance sheets, and prospects for government borrowing in the private sector (from paragraph 4. 72).		Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	0.0	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.0

The tax gap related to individual income tax has decreased from 0. 7 % of GDP in 2005-06 to 0. 5 % of GDP (equivalent to 4. 5 % of tax liabilities and 3. 0 %) in 2021-22. It seems to reflect the compliance improvement activities for HMRC's corporate salary. The gap between the goods tax reduced from 0. 3 % of GDP in 2005-06 to 0. 1 % in 2021-22 (equivalent to reduced from 8. 3 % of tax debt to 6. 1 %).

The corporate tax gap increased to 0. 4%in 2021-22 in 2021-22, which increased from 0. 2%of GDP in 2011-12, but this is 8. 8%to 2021 of tax debt in 2011-12. This is becaus e-2022 increased to 29. 3%. In 2021-2022, tax gaps (over all taxes) due to small and medium-sized enterprises increased to 56%of the total tax gap. To deal with this, HMRC introduced a new medium and mediu m-sized enterprise support activities, and in March 2023 announced guidance and format for small and mediu m-sized enterprises.

Comparison with other countries is difficult because the available data is limited and the methodology is different, but if it is available, the UK is generally compared. The National Tax Audians report on the United States, Canada, Australia, and Italy from 2011 to 2016 said that the British tax gap at the same time was 5. 5 % to 7. 0 %. It was 19 %. b
The base line prediction assumes that tax gaps account for tax debt. This is almost the same as the stable tendency seen after 2017-18. This assumption has a swing risk and a lowering risk. Factors, such as the progress of the tax collection system digitalization and the further decrease in cash use in the economy, may reduce the tax disparity. On the other hand, the downturn in economic growth and the compression of living expenses can lead to a more extensive violation of compliance. We are adjusting the base line forecast, taking into account specific measures that directly aim at reducing the tax gap. For example, some individuals and companies take action, such as finding another method to avoid compliance with new measures. Taxes related to individual income tax decreased from 0. 7 % of GDP in 2005-06 to 0. 5 % of GDP (equivalent to 4. 5 % of tax liabilities and 3. 0 %). This seems to reflect the compliance improvement activities on HMRC's corporate salary. The gap between the goods tax reduced from 0. 3 % of GDP in 2005-06 to 0. 1 % in 2021-22 (equivalent to reduced from 8. 3 % of tax debt to 6. 1 %).
The corporate tax gap increased to 0. 4%in 2021-22 in 2021-22, which increased from 0. 2%of GDP in 2011-12, but this is 8. 8%to 2021 of tax debt in 2011-12. This is becaus e-2022 increased to 29. 3%. In 2021-2022, tax gaps (over all taxes) due to small and medium-sized enterprises increased to 56%of the total tax gap. To deal with this, HMRC introduced a new medium and mediu m-sized enterprise support activities, and in March 2023 announced guidance and format for small and mediu m-sized enterprises.
Comparison with other countries is difficult because the available data is limited and the methodology is different, but if it is available, the UK is generally compared. The National Tax Audians report on the United States, Canada, Australia, and Italy from 2011 to 2016 said that the British tax gap at the same time was 5. 5 % to 7. 0 %. It was 19 %. b

Chart 4.10: Real departmental spending per person (2023-24 prices)

Box 4.2: The Government’s post-Spending Review departmental spending plans

The base line prediction assumes that tax gaps account for tax debt. This is almost the same as the stable tendency seen after 2017-18. This assumption has a swing risk and a lowering risk. Factors, such as the progress of the tax collection system digitalization and the further decrease in cash use in the economy, may reduce the tax disparity. On the other hand, the downturn in economic growth and the compression of living expenses can lead to a more extensive violation of compliance. We are adjusting the base line forecast, taking into account specific measures that directly aim at reducing the tax gap. For example, some individuals and companies take action, such as finding another method to avoid compliance with new measures. The tax gap related to individual income tax has decreased from 0. 7 % of GDP in 2005-06 to 0. 5 % of GDP (equivalent to 4. 5 % of tax liabilities and 3. 0 %) in 2021-22. It seems to reflect the compliance improvement activities for HMRC's corporate salary. The gap between the goods tax reduced from 0. 3 % of GDP in 2005-06 to 0. 1 % in 2021-22 (equivalent to reduced from 8. 3 % of tax debt to 6. 1 %).

Chart B: Months covered by departmental spending plans

Comparison with other countries is difficult because the available data is limited and the methodology is different, but if it is available, the UK is generally compared. The National Tax Audians report on the United States, Canada, Australia, and Italy from 2011 to 2016 said that the British tax gap at the same time was 5. 5 % to 7. 0 %. It was 19 %. b

The base line prediction assumes that tax gaps account for tax debt. This is almost the same as the stable tendency seen after 2017-18. This assumption has a swing risk and a lowering risk. Factors, such as the progress of the tax collection system digitalization and the further decrease in cash use in the economy, may reduce the tax disparity. On the other hand, the downturn in economic growth and the compression of living expenses can lead to a more extensive violation of compliance. We are adjusting the base line forecast, taking into account specific measures that directly aim at reducing the tax gap. For example, some individuals and companies take action, such as finding another method to avoid compliance with new measures.
As an example of the risk of this prediction, if the tax gap in GDP decreases by 0. 3 %, which is about half the decrease in four years from 2013-14 to 2017-18, an average of £ 8. 4 billion per year. Tax revenue increases.
The estimation of the tax gap is for tax managed by HMRC, so taxes and tariffs managed in other places such as city tax, business tax rate, automobile tax tax, and traffic congestion tax are excluded.
(b) NAO keeps the tax gap that NAO cannot be directly compared because the measurement method and tax system differ.
4. 12 Paye (Pay as You Earn) Income tax and NICS are expected to reach £ 421 billion in 2022-24 in 2023-24, with the solid growth and freezing of taxation standards. It will be done. It is partly offset by the lower NICS tax rate (origin in January) announced in November, and the NICS income ratio in 2022-23 is expected to decrease from 2022-23.
4. From 13 2024-25, it will increase by 3. 1%per year on average, and at the end of the prediction period, it will reach £ 490. 3 billion (15. 3%of GDP). [23] This mainly reflects that the accumulated growth rate of nominal income during the expected period will be 12. 6%, and that the continuous freezing of the income tax is continuous freezing, which is well carried over. (See Table 3. 6). The effective tax rate (ETR) of the income tax excluding the sel f-assessment (SA) and the NICS will increase by 0. 8%by the end of the prediction period, and will slow down in the last fiscal year when the tax standard will be r e-enhanced by inflation.

4. In the relationship with the outlook as of November 14, the amount of no n-SA income and the NICS receipt were prospected and revised the whole. This is mainly due to the reduction of NICS announced in this budget, and although it was partially offset by the strong performance data of the previous fiscal year, it has gradually decreased due to weakness of nominal income. As shown in Table 4. 2, the main causes of these changes are as follows:

Chart C: Implied post-SR21 breakdown of real RDEL spending and share of RDEL

The average of wage and salary income has been revised 0. 1%per year, mainly reflecting the weakness of nominal income growth. As an example of the risk of this prediction, if the tax gap in GDP decreases by 0. 3 %, which is about half the decrease in the four-year decrease from 2013-14 to 2017-18, an average annual average 84. Increased tax revenue of pounds.

Chart D: Change in real RDEL envelope growth rate at Spending Reviews

The estimation of the tax gap is for tax managed by HMRC, so taxes and tariffs managed in other places such as city tax, business tax rate, automobile tax tax, and traffic congestion tax are excluded.

(b) NAO keeps the tax gap that NAO cannot be directly compared because the measurement method and tax system differ.

4. 12 Paye (Pay as You Earn) Income tax and NICS are expected to reach £ 421 billion in 2022-24 in 2023-24, with the solid growth and freezing of taxation standards. It will be done. It is partly offset by the lower NICS tax rate (origin in January) announced in November, and the NICS income ratio in 2022-23 is expected to decrease from 2022-23.

4. From 13 2024-25, it will increase by 3. 1%per year on average, and at the end of the prediction period, it will reach £ 490. 3 billion (15. 3%of GDP). [23] This mainly reflects that the accumulated growth rate of nominal income during the expected period will be 12. 6%, and that the continuous freezing of the income tax is continuous freezing, which is well carried over. (See Table 3. 6). The effective tax rate (ETR) of the income tax excluding the sel f-assessment (SA) and the NICS will increase by 0. 8%by the end of the prediction period, and will slow down in the last fiscal year when the tax standard will be r e-enhanced by inflation.

The average of wage and salary income has been revised 0. 1%per year, mainly reflecting the weakness of nominal income growth. As an example of the risk of this prediction, if the tax gap in GDP decreases by 0. 3 %, which is about half the decrease in four years from 2013-14 to 2017-18, an average of £ 8. 4 billion per year. Tax revenue increases.

Welfare spending

(b) NAO keeps the tax gap that NAO cannot be directly compared because the measurement method and tax system differ.

Table 4.8: Total welfare spending

Abusive administrative policy announced on February 8, 2024 that the Minister of Directors 1 would increase the minimum amount of alcohol in Scotland from 50 to 65 as the current regulation expired at the end of April. The Scottish government and the Wales government have decided to follow the British government on the ban on single use. The impact of these decisions on the finances will be reflected in the next prediction.
-0, 8	British service trade has continued to grow strongly, including the relationship with the EU, despite the increase in trade barriers after Brexit. Looking at the configuration by department, about tw o-thirds of the growth of trade services since 2019 are leading by the "Other Business Services" department, including management consultants, research and development, and advertising (Chart H). 。 In contrast, financial services and transportation exports have been delayed to other departments, and each has decreased by 5 and 9 %to 2, 0 %. These are the most susceptible sectors due to the effects of blepjit friction.
Note: This includes gains from bringing offshore sheltered trusts into UK taxable range for certain deemed residential and non-residential properties not subject to the new regime.	The powerful growth of the UK's "Other Business Services" may reflect several factors. First, the trade barrier with the EU may be lower than the strict regulations such as goods and banking businesses. In the second G, exports to the United States have shown a particularly powerful growth, which may have been supported by recent pounds and incorporate outsourcing operations on the U. S. company to the UK. H Finally, it is suggested that service companies may avoid trade barriers by selling through overseas subsidiaries.	As a whole, our assumptions on the impact of Brexit seem to be as planned, and recently published research is generally consistent with these estimates. However, considering the challenges of the confusion due to the simultaneous impact of geopolitical trends that affect Braeggit, pandemic, and other global trade, it is still difficult to make a solid conclusion. Trade data is unstable, especially service trade is easily corrected. In addition, the complete implementation of the TCA will further increase the barrier of goods trade with the EU. It is expected that the impact of Bluejit will appear completely a few years after the complete implementation of these barriers. Until then, we will continue to consider Brexit projects.	(a) OBR, Brexit and the Obr's Brexit Forecast, Octom 2018. Detailed analysis of trade and productivity relevance is box 2.	b) See. Box 2. The economic impact of Brexit on investment and immigration is 4 in March 2023 for economic and tax prospects.	c) See. Box D: Briefing Agent on the Bank of England, February 2024, February 2024.	d) Resolution Foundation, Ending Stagnation: New economic strategy for the UK, December 2023.
2022-23	2023-24	2024-25	2025-26	2026-27	2027-28	2028-29	2023 November forecast
384. 1	408. 3	420, 7	435. 7	454. 0	474. 9	493. 7	March 2024 forecast
384. 7	415. 9	415. 4	430. 9	447. 8	466. 1	482. 8	difference
0, 6	7. 6	-5. 3	2. 34 From a post-pandemic low of 3. 6% in the August 2022 quarter, it rose to 4. 3% in the July 2023 quarter. According to new weighted ADR data, the unemployment rate has since fallen, to 3. 8% in the fourth quarter of 2023. In contrast, the number of recipients, which indicates the number of people receiving unemployment benefits, has remained stable in recent months, and the layoff rate has shown a gradual upward trend since mid-2022. The number of vacancies per unemployed person has also fallen further compared to last year, and recent surveys suggest that hiring and retention are now less of an issue for businesses.	2. 34 From a post-pandemic low of 3. 6% in the August 2022 quarter, it rose to 4. 3% in the July 2023 quarter. According to new weighted ADR data, the unemployment rate has since fallen, to 3. 8% in the fourth quarter of 2023. In contrast, the number of recipients, which indicates the number of people receiving unemployment benefits, has remained stable in recent months, and the layoff rate has shown a gradual upward trend since mid-2022. The number of vacancies per unemployed person has also fallen further compared to last year, and recent surveys suggest that hiring and retention are now less of an issue for businesses.	2. 34 From a post-pandemic low of 3. 6% in the August 2022 quarter, it rose to 4. 3% in the July 2023 quarter. According to new weighted ADR data, the unemployment rate has since fallen, to 3. 8% in the fourth quarter of 2023. In contrast, the number of recipients, which indicates the number of people receiving unemployment benefits, has remained stable in recent months, and the layoff rate has shown a gradual upward trend since mid-2022. The number of vacancies per unemployed person has also fallen further compared to last year, and recent surveys suggest that hiring and retention are now less of an issue for businesses.	2. 34 From a post-pandemic low of 3. 6% in the August 2022 quarter, it rose to 4. 3% in the July 2023 quarter. According to new weighted ADR data, the unemployment rate has since fallen, to 3. 8% in the fourth quarter of 2023. In contrast, the number of recipients, which indicates the number of people receiving unemployment benefits, has remained stable in recent months, and the layoff rate has shown a gradual upward trend since mid-2022. The number of vacancies per unemployed person has also fallen further compared to last year, and recent surveys suggest that hiring and retention are now less of an issue for businesses.	2. 34 From a post-pandemic low of 3. 6% in the August 2022 quarter, it rose to 4. 3% in the July 2023 quarter. According to new weighted ADR data, the unemployment rate has since fallen, to 3. 8% in the fourth quarter of 2023. In contrast, the number of recipients, which indicates the number of people receiving unemployment benefits, has remained stable in recent months, and the layoff rate has shown a gradual upward trend since mid-2022. The number of vacancies per unemployed person has also fallen further compared to last year, and recent surveys suggest that hiring and retention are now less of an issue for businesses.
Changes in income and employment forecasts	-0. 4	-2. 0	-3. 1	Effective tax rate before tax	Direct impact of policy	-10. 3	-9. 8
-9. 5	-9. 5	-9. 7	Indirect impact of policy	4. 15. 0%of income tax revenues, which were convinced that it would reach 42. 5 billion pounds in 2023-24, fell by 1. 0%last year. This year is less than expected as of November. However, most of the shortage of payments in FY2023-24 is expected to be compensated for the taxpayer next year, when the taxpayer will make a final payment in January 2025. This is the explanation of the forecast that the amount received in 2024-25 will increase rapidly. This is also due to an increase in savings income due to an increase in interest rates in 2023-24, and a reduction in additional interest rates from April 2023, all of which were received in 2024-25. It affects to.	4. 16 In relation to the outlook as of November, we have revised the average per year of £ 1. 3 billion. Although it has decreased since 2026, an average of £ 400 million has been added in each year of prediction. The upward revision of sel f-employment income in the early years of predictions is gradually and partially offset due to a decrease in savings income in the last three years of prediction due to a decrease in bank forecast interest rates.	4. The policy announced on the 17 budgets has increased the average amount from 2025-2026 to the end of the forecast period. These measures include the following: Tax reduction in the NIC category 4 add £ 400 million to the SA income tax revenue by 2028-2929 (mainly due to the reduction of corporate establishment incentives). With the reform of the non-missile system, the self-reported income tax has been added £ 1. 3 billion since 2026-27, and the HMRC debt collection measures have been added by 400 million pounds since 2025-26.	4. 18 In 2023-24, the amount of added value tax is expected to increase by 5. 3 % to £ 170. 7 billion. This increase rate is slightly lower than this year's expected increase rate of 5. 9 % of the total name consumption. This relative weakness is 1, 6 % of the ratio of the standard tax rate, because the price increase in the price of these items has increased, and the price increase in these items has increased due to the standard tax rate. It was 48, 3 % of points decrease. As the inflation becomes gentle, the standard name share, which accounts for household expenditures, will recover to the past level and reach 49. 6%in 2028-29. From 2024 to 25 years, it is expected that the income of the added value tax will increase by 3. 8 % each year, and the average consumption is 3. 7 % each year.
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
4. The policy announced on the 17 budgets has increased the average amount from 2025-2026 to the end of the forecast period. These measures include the following: Tax reduction in the NIC category 4 add £ 400 million to the SA income tax revenue by 2028-2929 (mainly due to the reduction of corporate establishment incentives). With the reform of the non-missile system, the self-reported income tax has been added £ 1. 3 billion since 2026-27, and the HMRC debt collection measures have been added by 400 million pounds since 2025-26.	4. 18 In 2023-24, the amount of added value tax is expected to increase by 5. 3 % to £ 170. 7 billion. This increase rate is slightly lower than this year's expected increase rate of 5. 9 % of the total name consumption. This relative weakness is 1, 6 % of the ratio of the standard tax rate, because the price increase in the price of these items has increased, and the price increase in these items has increased due to the standard tax rate. It was 48, 3 % of points decrease. As the inflation becomes gentle, the standard name share, which accounts for household expenditures, will recover to the past level and reach 49. 6%in 2028-29. From 2024 to 25 years, it is expected that the income of the added value tax will increase by 3. 8 % each year, and the average consumption is 3. 7 % each year.	4. 19 Compared to the forecast as of November 2023, it was revised down 2. 6 billion pounds (1. 5%) in 2023-2024. In the subsequent fiscal year, this low start was mainly revised by an average of £ 2. 9 billion (1. 5%). 4. 16 In relation to the outlook as of November, we have revised the average per year of £ 1. 3 billion. Although it has decreased since 2026, an average of £ 400 million has been added in each year of prediction. The upward revision of sel f-employment income in the early years of predictions is gradually and partially offset due to a decrease in savings income in the last three years of prediction due to a decrease in bank forecast interest rates.	4. The policy announced on the 17 budgets has increased the average amount from 2025-2026 to the end of the forecast period. These measures include the following: Tax reduction in the NIC category 4 add £ 400 million to the SA income tax revenue by 2028-2929 (mainly due to the reduction of corporate establishment incentives). With the reform of the non-missile system, the self-reported income tax has been added £ 1. 3 billion since 2026-27, and the HMRC debt collection measures have been added by 400 million pounds since 2025-26.	4. 18 In 2023-24, the amount of added value tax is expected to increase by 5. 3 % to £ 170. 7 billion. This increase rate is slightly lower than this year's expected increase rate of 5. 9 % of the total name consumption. This relative weakness is 1, 6 % of the ratio of the standard tax rate, because the price increase in the price of these items has increased, and the price increase in these items has increased due to the standard tax rate. It was 48, 3 % of points decrease. As the inflation becomes gentle, the standard name share, which accounts for household expenditures, will recover to the past level and reach 49. 6%in 2028-29. From 2024 to 25 years, it is expected that the income of the added value tax will increase by 3. 8 % each year, and the average consumption is 3. 7 % each year.	2027-28	4. 20 Our forecasts are sensitive to the prediction of the regular consumption share and the VAT gap. As of 2011, standard ta x-rates consumption share is from 47. 9 % in 2020 to 50. 1 % in 2011. Assuming the consumption share of 47, 9 % standard tax rate households every year after 2024-25, the predictions decrease by about 3. 1 billion pounds a year, assuming a share of 50, 01 %, the prediction increases by about 300 billion pm per year. do. As shown in the box 4. 1, the VAT gap is an indicator of compliance violations and estimates the difference between the VAT actually collected and the theoretical VAT burden. This fell from 14 % in 2005-06 to 5. 4 % in 2021-2022 in the theoretical VAT debt. It is assumed that it will reflect the decrease in marginal revenue due to ta x-gap reduction activities, and will remain around the current level during the prediction period.	4, 21 Land-based corporate tax revenue in 2023-24 is expected to reach £ 92. 2 billion, an increase of almost 25 % since last year. The increase in receipt is a strong revenue growth in the finance and no n-financial sector (11 %, 5 %, 5 % increase in 2023), and the corporate tax rate from April 2023 is 19 %. It reflects that it was raised to 25 %. In particular, the growth of financial sector revenue was large, and retail banks benefited from the increase in net pearls.
4. 22 2024-2025 The growth rate is expected to slow down to 6. 7%, which is largely due to the company that applies the highest corporate tax rate over the year. In contrast to 2023, in 2024, both financial and no n-financial companies are expected to decrease by 0. 6%and 1. 8%. With the decline in inflation, wage payments are stable, so it is highly likely that no n-financial companies will shrink, but the small reduction in bank networks will affect the interests of the financial sector. Probably. < SPAN> 4. 20 Our predictions are sensitive to regular consumption share and VAT gap. As of 2011, standard ta x-rates consumption share is from 47. 9 % in 2020 to 50. 1 % in 2011. Assuming the consumption share of 47, 9 % standard tax rate households every year after 2024-25, the predictions decrease by about 3. 1 billion pounds a year, assuming a share of 50, 01 %, the prediction increases by about 300 billion pm per year. do. As shown in the box 4. 1, the VAT gap is an indicator of compliance violations and estimates the difference between the VAT actually collected and the theoretical VAT burden. This fell from 14 % in 2005-06 to 5. 4 % in 2021-2022 in the theoretical VAT debt. It is assumed that it will reflect the decrease in marginal revenue due to ta x-gap reduction activities, and will remain around the current level during the prediction period.	4, 21 Land-based corporate tax revenue in 2023-24 is expected to reach £ 92. 2 billion, an increase of almost 25 % since last year. The increase in receipt is a strong revenue growth in the finance and no n-financial sector (11 %, 5 %, 5 % increase in 2023), and the corporate tax rate from April 2023 is 19 %. It reflects that it was raised to 25 %. In particular, the growth of financial sector revenue was large, and retail banks benefited from the increase in net pearls.	4. 22 2024-2025 The growth rate is expected to slow down to 6. 7%, which is largely due to the company that applies the highest corporate tax rate over the year. In contrast to 2023, in 2024, both financial and no n-financial companies are expected to decrease by 0. 6%and 1. 8%. With the decline in inflation, wage payments are stable, so it is highly likely that no n-financial companies will shrink, but the small reduction in bank networks will affect the interests of the financial sector. Probably. 4. 20 Our forecasts are sensitive to the prediction of the regular consumption share and the VAT gap. As of 2011, standard ta x-rates consumption share is from 47. 9 % in 2020 to 50. 1 % in 2011. Assuming the consumption share of 47, 9 % standard tax rate households every year after 2024-25, the predictions decrease by about 3. 1 billion pounds a year, assuming a share of 50, 01 %, the prediction increases by about 300 billion pm per year. do. As shown in the box 4. 1, the VAT gap is an indicator of compliance violations and estimates the difference between the VAT actually collected and the theoretical VAT burden. This fell from 14 % in 2005-06 to 5. 4 % in 2021-2022 in the theoretical VAT debt. It is assumed that it will reflect the decrease in marginal revenue due to ta x-gap reduction activities, and will remain around the current level during the prediction period.	4, 21 Land-based corporate tax revenue in 2023-24 is expected to reach £ 92. 2 billion, an increase of almost 25 % since last year. The increase in receipt is a strong revenue growth in the finance and no n-financial sector (11 %, 5 %, 5 % increase in 2023), and the corporate tax rate from April 2023 is 19 %. It reflects that it was raised to 25 %. In particular, the growth of financial sector revenue was large, and retail banks benefited from the increase in net pearls.	4. 22 2024-2025 The growth rate is expected to slow down to 6. 7%, which is largely due to the company that applies the highest corporate tax rate over the year. In contrast to 2023, in 2024, both financial and no n-financial companies are expected to decrease by 0. 6%and 1. 8%. With the decline in inflation, wage payments are stable, so it is highly likely that no n-financial companies will shrink, but the small reduction in bank networks will affect the interests of the financial sector. Probably.	4. 23 Tax revenue of onshore Corporation has been raised many times in recent years. While proven that the revenue is more solid than expected, the effective tax rate for the revenue (deducted with the rise in interest rates) has risen. The rise in effective tax rates is widely expanded to departments that have historically paid a lot of corporate taxes, such as financial services, retail, and specialized service. We assume that most of the power received for profits will be maintained through forecasts.	4. 24 In addition to these factors, the track and field tax is 2. 5 % of 2. 5 % of GDP in 2020-21, due to raising the corporate tax rate (more generous capital system is partially offset). It is estimated to be 3. 4 % of GDP in 2023-24. According to 4. 4, it is predicted that the land corporation tax will be stable at 3. 5 % of GDP since 2024-25, which is the highest level since the introduction of corporate tax in 1965.	4. 25 Compared to the forecast as of November 2023, the onshore corporate tax was revised up to £ 2. 5 billion per year before the policy measures announced in this budget (Table 4. 3).
Lo w-profits and no n-financial corporations receive average tax revenue of £ 2. 7 billion per year. No n-financial revenue will decelerate earlier than expected in late 2023, and will remain weaker in the next two years than in November.	2. 35 We consider this evidence, and the broader evidence, to be consistent with some further easing of labor market conditions. We expect the unemployment rate to rise moderately and peak at 4. 5% in the final quarter of 2024. The unemployment rate peak would correspond to about 1. 6 million jobseekers, six months earlier but slightly lower than expected in November. The unemployment rate then rises to 4.	This elasticity was based on the estimated value specialized in the UK tourism industry at the time, and its estimated value wa s-1, 28. G RES travelers are uncertain, but to recognize that the cost of visiting costs changes significantly and may be more sensitive to the price, but the elasticity increased by about 50 % -1, -1. 9 was 9. With the tax revenue from this group's expenditure to RES products, the savings of 2020 measures will decrease to £ 21 million in 2025-26.	In examining this direct action assumption, the trend of the actual number of visitors since the introduction of the policy was taken into account. In addition, the external estimation of the sensitivity to travel and sightseeing expenditures was also considered.	The number of travelers is determined by various factors, but the uncertainty at this time has grown even more depending on both the pandemic and the British withdrawal. The overall number of visitors to the United Kingdom has now recovered to the pr e-pandemic level, and the percentage of visitor from EU and no n-EU countries has increased (Fig. C (left panel)). )). In some other European countries, the recovery of the number of visitors from the United States is relatively large (Fig. C right panel). However, the overall difference is not large, and there is no significant change in the composition ratio of British visitors (between the country or the reason for travel). < SPAN> This elasticity was based on the estimated value specialized in the UK tourism industry at the time, and its estimated value wa s-1, 28. G RES travelers are uncertain, but to recognize that the cost of visiting costs changes significantly and may be more sensitive to the price, but the elasticity increased by about 50 % -1, -1. 9 was 9. With the tax revenue from this group's expenditure to RES products, the savings of 2020 measures will decrease to £ 125-26 in 2025-26.	The number of travelers is determined by various factors, but the uncertainty at this time has grown even more depending on both the pandemic and the British withdrawal. The overall number of visitors to the United Kingdom has now recovered to the pr e-pandemic level, and the percentage of visitor from EU and no n-EU countries has increased (Fig. C (left panel)). )). In some other European countries, the recovery of the number of visitors from the United States is relatively large (Fig. C right panel). However, the overall difference is not large, and there is no significant change in the composition ratio of British visitors (between the country or the reason for travel). < SPAN> This elasticity was based on the estimated value specialized in the UK tourism industry at the time, and its estimated value wa s-1, 28. G RES travelers are uncertain, but to recognize that the cost of visiting costs changes significantly and may be more sensitive to the price, but the elasticity increased by about 50 % -1, -1. 9 was 9. With the tax revenue from this group's expenditure to RES products, the savings of 2020 measures will decrease to £ 125-26 in 2025-26.	In examining this direct action assumption, the trend of the actual number of visitors since the introduction of the policy was taken into account. In addition, the external estimation of the sensitivity to travel and sightseeing expenditures was also considered.	In examining this direct action assumption, the trend of the actual number of visitors since the introduction of the policy was taken into account. In addition, the external estimation of the sensitivity to travel and sightseeing expenditures was also considered.

2025-26

2026-27

2027-28

2028-29

Chart 4.11: Welfare spending as a share of GDP

2023 November forecast

72. 8
93. 6
100, 9
103. 2

Table 4.9: Welfare spending: changes since November 2023

What is the driving force behind the growth of British service trade?
-0, 8	British service trade has continued to grow strongly, including the relationship with the EU, despite the increase in trade barriers after Brexit. Looking at the configuration by department, about tw o-thirds of the growth of trade services since 2019 are leading by the "Other Business Services" department, including management consultants, research and development, and advertising (Chart H). 。 In contrast, financial services and transportation exports have been delayed to other departments, and each has decreased by 5 and 9 %to 2, 0 %. These are the most susceptible sectors due to the effects of blepjit friction.
Note: This includes gains from bringing offshore sheltered trusts into UK taxable range for certain deemed residential and non-residential properties not subject to the new regime.	The powerful growth of the UK's "Other Business Services" may reflect several factors. First, the trade barrier with the EU may be lower than the strict regulations such as goods and banking businesses. In the second G, exports to the United States have shown a particularly powerful growth, which may have been supported by recent pounds and incorporate outsourcing operations on the U. S. company to the UK. H Finally, it is suggested that service companies may avoid trade barriers by selling through overseas subsidiaries.	As a whole, our assumptions on the impact of Brexit seem to be as planned, and recently published research is generally consistent with these estimates. However, considering the challenges of the confusion due to the simultaneous impact of geopolitical trends that affect Braeggit, pandemic, and other global trade, it is still difficult to make a solid conclusion. Trade data is unstable, especially service trade is easily corrected. In addition, the complete implementation of the TCA will further increase the barrier of goods trade with the EU. It is expected that the impact of Bluejit will appear completely a few years after the complete implementation of these barriers. Until then, we will continue to consider Brexit projects.	(a) OBR, Brexit and the Obr's Brexit Forecast, Octom 2018. Detailed analysis of trade and productivity relevance is box 2.	b) See. Box 2. The economic impact of Brexit on investment and immigration is 4 in March 2023 for economic and tax prospects.	c) See. Box D: Briefing Agent on the Bank of England, February 2024, February 2024.	d) Resolution Foundation, Ending Stagnation: New economic strategy for the UK, December 2023.
-7. 6	Difference	1. 1	-1. 4	-twenty five	-3. 5	-3. 3	-3. 0
-35. 4	Difference	Profit	-twenty two	-2. 6	-3. 3	-3. 8	-2. 9
0. 3	GDP growth	Prospect	Direct impact of policy	1) Modal forecast based on market interest rates.	-0. 3	-0, 6	Unemployment
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
-0. 1		0.0	2024-2028 average growth rate	4. 27 We have revised our average receipts by £1. 7 billion between 2024-25 and 2028-29 in relation to our November forecasts. This is mainly due to lower gas prices. The one-year extension of the EPL to 2028-29 has increased this by £2 billion from the last November forecast. Conflict in the Middle East, including shipping disruptions in the Red Sea, has had little impact on oil and gas prices so far, but remains a source of uncertainty in the forecast, as noted in Box 2. 2.	-33	2025-26	-59
4. 27 We have revised our average receipts by £1. 7 billion between 2024-25 and 2028-29 in relation to our November forecasts. This is mainly due to lower gas prices. The one-year extension of the EPL to 2028-29 has increased this by £2 billion from the last November forecast. Conflict in the Middle East, including shipping disruptions in the Red Sea, has had little impact on oil and gas prices so far, but remains a source of uncertainty in the forecast, as noted in Box 2. 2.		An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	2025-26	From March 2023	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	Spring 2024 NIC reduction	-0. 9
34 Alcohol receipts are expected to increase by £200 million to £12. 6 billion this year compared to last year, due to a 10. 1% increase in tax rates in August 2023, partially offsetting lower consumption. [27] Receipts are expected to increase by an average of 4. 9% over the forecast period, reaching £16 billion in 2028-29. Compared to the November forecast, receipts will be reduced by £300 million in 2023-24 due to lower than expected returns, and will be reduced by an average of £1 billion throughout the remaining forecast period. This is mainly due to the lower RPI forecast and the duty rate freeze announced in this Budget.		0.3	0.6	0.8	1.0	1.2	1.5
4. 35 Tobacco revenue is forecast to increase by £8. 8 billion this year, down from £0. 6 billion (6. 5%) in 2022-23. This is as a large decline in consumption offsets higher interest rates. Tobacco revenue is expected to fall in each year of the forecast period, reaching £8. 2 billion in 2028-29. This is due to a decline in tobacco consumption, which more than offsets the increases in duty rates announced in this Budget, including the additional duty increase in October 2026. Compared to November, the outlook has decreased by an average of £0. 5 billion per year, mainly due to a downward revision of tobacco consumption assumptions.		0.1	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8
-11, 3		0.4	0.5	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	0.7	0.5	0.7
4. 38 Generator Levy (EGL) collections are expected to be £1. 3 billion this year. Estimates have been revised by an average of £300 million since November as wholesale electricity prices have fallen below expectations. Based on current expected prices, EGL revenues are expected to be zero in 2027-28 as generator sales price forecasts are below the benchmark.		0.0	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1

4. 39 Revenues from various environmental taxes are expected to be £9. 9 billion this year. This is an upward revision of £600 million on average per year from the November forecast.[30] This is mainly due to contracts for difference, which allow lower wholesale electricity prices to increase subsidies paid to generators and higher revenues to be collected from suppliers to cover those subsidies. These levies, except for the green gas levy, are fully offset in the expenditure forecast and are therefore neutral to net public sector borrowing.

Locally financed expenditure and public corporations’ expenditure

4, 40 Value Added Tax refunds are expected to be £27. 6 billion this year. They will then rise as expected in line with government consumption, reaching £30. 9 billion in 2028-2029. Compared to November, this has been revised downwards by an average of £800 million per year due to the lower outlook for government consumption. Like environmental taxes, Value Added Tax refunds are offset by expenditure and are therefore neutral to net public sector borrowing.

4. 41 Interest and dividend income includes income from general government financial assets. These are expected to raise £41. 1 billion this year. The sharp increase in receipts from 2023 to 2024 reflects both the impact of rising interest rates on interest-sensitive assets such as government bank deposits and foreign exchange reserves, and the impact of rising RPI inflation on accrued interest on student loans. Market expectations suggest that interest rates will start to fall, while RPI inflation has already fallen from its recent peak, resulting in lower interest and dividend receipts in 2025-26 and 2026-27. Compared to November, receipts will increase by an average of £600 million per year from 2024-25 onwards. Model changes have offset the effects of lower interest rates and RPI inflation.
The 4th, 42 business tax rate is expected to rise by £ 29. 5 billion this year, and it is expected to rise 9 % in 2024-25 and 10 % in 2025-26. The business tax rate is calculated by multiplying the name price of a no n-residential real estate with a multiplier (consumer price index after inflation adjustment). In 2024-25, in England, real estate claims affected by standard multiplier rose by 6, 7 %, and the transitional reduction measures due to the re-evaluation of 2023-24 became increasingly increased. It is pushed up. In 2025-2026, it is assumed that the reduction of £ 2. 5 billion in England's retail, customer service, and leisure division will be completed, and transitional measures will be taken again. After that, the average growth rate is expected to be less than 2 % per year during the remaining period of this prediction. In comparison with predictions as of November 2023, it is expected that the business tax rate after 2024-25 will decrease by £ 700 million, mainly due to a decrease in CPI inflation. Although the business tax rate system for the movie studio is more generous, the financial policy measures are hardly affected as a whole because they are offset by asset consolidation reform.

4. 43 Total Sales (GOS) is expected to be £ 73. 5 billion this year. This was revised up to £ 3. 9 billion per year from 2024-25 to 2028-29, compared to November. This is due to the rise in the underestimation of the general government, and the increase in the profit margin of the capital reserve has increased understood in 2022-23 and fueled forecasts. The depreciation cost of the public sector, which accounts for most of the GOS, is offset by expenditure, and is neutral for pure borrowing in public sector.

4. In the pandemic (global epidemic) of 44 2020-21, the total public expenditure decreases to about 44. 5 % in 2023-24 (Figure 4. 6 (Figure 4. 6 , 4. 7, Table 4. 4). It is expected that the decline in government bonds will decrease in the next two years, as the decline in government bonds pays for the increase in welfare expenditures. After 2025-26, the growth of category spending (resource, capital, or DEL category expenditure limit) is slower than the economy, and it is expected that the ratio of welfare expenditures in GDP will gradually decrease. And further decrease is expected due to the decrease in other elements of annual management expenditures (AME), such as unbrown civil servant pensions, environmental taxes, and student loans.

Table 4.10: Locally financed and public corporations’ expenditure: changes since November 2023

Abusive administrative policy announced on February 8, 2024 that the Minister of Directors 1 would increase the minimum amount of alcohol in Scotland from 50 to 65 as the current regulation expired at the end of April. The Scottish government and the Wales government have decided to follow the British government on the ban on single use. The impact of these decisions on the finances will be reflected in the next prediction.
-0, 8	British service trade has continued to grow strongly, including the relationship with the EU, despite the increase in trade barriers after Brexit. Looking at the configuration by department, about tw o-thirds of the growth of trade services since 2019 are leading by the "Other Business Services" department, including management consultants, research and development, and advertising (Chart H). 。 In contrast, financial services and transportation exports have been delayed to other departments, and each has decreased by 5 and 9 %to 2, 0 %. These are the most susceptible sectors due to the effects of blepjit friction.
Note: This includes gains from bringing offshore sheltered trusts into UK taxable range for certain deemed residential and non-residential properties not subject to the new regime.	The powerful growth of the UK's "Other Business Services" may reflect several factors. First, the trade barrier with the EU may be lower than the strict regulations such as goods and banking businesses. In the second G, exports to the United States have shown a particularly powerful growth, which may have been supported by recent pounds and incorporate outsourcing operations on the U. S. company to the UK. H Finally, it is suggested that service companies may avoid trade barriers by selling through overseas subsidiaries.	As a whole, our assumptions on the impact of Brexit seem to be as planned, and recently published research is generally consistent with these estimates. However, considering the challenges of the confusion due to the simultaneous impact of geopolitical trends that affect Braeggit, pandemic, and other global trade, it is still difficult to make a solid conclusion. Trade data is unstable, especially service trade is easily corrected. In addition, the complete implementation of the TCA will further increase the barrier of goods trade with the EU. It is expected that the impact of Bluejit will appear completely a few years after the complete implementation of these barriers. Until then, we will continue to consider Brexit projects.	(a) OBR, Brexit and the Obr's Brexit Forecast, Octom 2018. Detailed analysis of trade and productivity relevance is box 2.	b) See. Box 2. The economic impact of Brexit on investment and immigration is 4 in March 2023 for economic and tax prospects.	c) See. Box D: Briefing Agent on the Bank of England, February 2024, February 2024.	d) Resolution Foundation, Ending Stagnation: New economic strategy for the UK, December 2023.
Total expenditure management
-7. 6	44. 5	44. 0	43. 5	43. 2	42. 8	42. 5	Of which
-35. 4	19, 5	19. 0	19. 0	18. 7	42. 8	18. 2	18. 0
Of which	From March 2023	2.3	1.9	3.0	2.2	2.5
0. 3	Chart B shows how the policy decision after 2010 reacts to the predicted changes in the basic financial situation. Our forecasts rely on reported government policies, so asymmetric policy response to future shocks can cause bias. This graph is a plot of the total scale (vertical axis) of the discretionary policy package at each financial event for the basis for the scale and direction (horizontal axis).	3. 5 The expenditure decision announced on a budget is almost offset in terms of budget. The government has reduced the average of £ 800 million per year to the current standards of the current ministries, assumed after 2024-2025. In three years from 2025-26 to 2027-28, the company allocated an additional £ 900 million pounds for a program in public sector focusing on NHS. The decision to expand the target of child benefits will increase the number of children's allowance by about 400 million pounds a year.	f) Springford, J., Brexit, Four Years ON: Correspondence to two trade paradox, January 2024.	3. 5 The expenditure decision announced on a budget is almost offset in terms of budget. The government has reduced the average of £ 800 million per year to the current standards of the current ministries, assumed after 2024-2025. In three years from 2025-26 to 2027-28, the company allocated an additional £ 900 million pounds for a program in public sector focusing on NHS. The decision to expand the target of child benefits will increase the number of children's allowance by about 400 million pounds a year.	GDP growth	GDP growth	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) after adjustment of 41 will be maintained at 4 % or more for the time being, and will be reduced to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.
Annual expenditure management	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.3	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.0	0.0	0.1
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
24. 8		An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
-11, 3		0.1	0.3	Information on past measures	2024-2028 average growth rate	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.0
10. 8		0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
11. 3
-7. 6	11, 4	11. 3	11. 2	Interest on borrowings (net of APF)	Interest on borrowings (net of APF)	11. 3	10. 9
-35. 4	10. 3	10. 2	10. 2	4. 46 Government expenditure as a share of GDP in 2028-29 is projected to be 2. 9% higher than in 2019-20, pre-pandemic (Figure 4. 8). This reflects both existing trends and subsequent policy changes:	10. 9	10. 9	Discretionary spending increases announced in March 2020 and spring 2022 increased spending as a percentage of GDP by 1. 4 percentage points, mainly due to increases in sectoral spending in the March 2020 budget and the October 2021 spending revision.
Of which	4. Compared to the prospects as of November 47, cash spending has been corrected in each year of prospect (Table 4. 5). This is explained by a decrease in debt expenditure due to a decrease in basic outlook, especially due to a decrease in interest rates and inflation. This is slightly offset by the increase in neutral PSNB expenditures (mainly increased depreciation expenses), but is only offset by an increase in receipt.	The two new tax revenues of E-liquid and carbon border regulation mechanism used at the time of release will increase the number of tax revenues by £ 700 million by 2028-29.	Hundreds of millions of pounds	1.4	-1. 2	2, 40 RHDI per capita has increased from 2023-24 for the third consecutive year, and is expected to recover the peak before the pandemic in 2025-26, two years earlier than the forecast in November. This is mainly because the recovery from the situation of the trade shock is accelerated, and the ratio of the whole economy as a whole is high in the labor market in the short term. During the forecast period, RHDI per person increases about 1%from the prediction as of November. With a decrease in consumer prices, RHDI per capita rises 1. 3%from November. In accordance with the decline in inflation, the per capita income per person by 2028-29 will decrease by 0. 7%(the offset is not perfect due to the improvement of trade conditions). In addition, RHDI per capita increases 0. 6 % due to household benefits and tax predictions and policy changes. It is expected that the NIC headline tax rate will be reduced by 2 pounds, which was announced in this budget, will directly increase the real household income by 0. 5 %. This will be added to the same scale by reducing the NIC announced in the fall of 2023. These estimates do not take into account the behavioral reaction to the policy or the financial hinder due to the freezing of the tax standard.
0. 3	3. 29 The size of the ta x-based tax, which is an affected sector from the UK, is also uncertain. Although the carbon original unit of the product is declining in line with the ambition of the Internet Zero in each country, the accurate path of the sector of the CBAM carbon original unit is uncertain.	Hicbc raised/ changed	10. 6	2026-27	f) Springford, J., Brexit, Four Years ON: Correspondence to two trade paradox, January 2024.	In terms of expenditure, shor t-term downward revisions of nominal GDP are largely due to a decrease in nominal consumption, which is an important driving force in revenue. In 2024-2025, the nominal GDP was 0. 8 % lower than expected in November due to a decrease in real consumption and a decrease in personal consumption default. By 2028-29, the growth potential of real consumption partially offsets the decrease in spending default, and the contribution to the name GDP due to nominal consumption decreases by about 0. 1 % from November. < SPAN> 2. 47 This central prediction is 0. 3 % lower than the forecast of 2028-29 as of November as of November (£ 11 billion), in conjunction with some modification of past data. Due to a high starting point of 0. 2 % in 2023-24, the name GDP growth rate in the next five years will be 17 %, down 0. 6 % from expected in November. The increase in the accumulated growth rate of the real GDP is offset by the slowdown in the GDP deflator growth. Analyzing these changes will be as follows:	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) after adjustment of 41 will be maintained at 4 % or more for the time being, and will be reduced to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.
Annual expenditure management	1.1	0.7	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	0.3	0.2	0.1
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
1. 265		An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.
-11, 3		1.3	1.1	0.1	0.7	0.6	0.5
10. 8		0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0

Debt interest spending

1. 290

1. 323

Chart 4.12: Debt interest spending relative to GDP and revenues

Box 4.3: The sensitivity and volatility of debt interest spending

1. 362

Chart E: Successive OBR debt interest spending forecasts

difference

6. 0

-6. 1

Chart F: Changes in maturity of UK debt stock

-10. 4

-12. 9

-11, 1
-10. 5
-11, 4
Policy / outlook difference

Table 4.11: Central government debt interest (net of APF): changes since November 2023

What is the driving force behind the growth of British service trade?
-0, 8	British service trade has continued to grow strongly, including the relationship with the EU, despite the increase in trade barriers after Brexit. Looking at the configuration by department, about tw o-thirds of the growth of trade services since 2019 are leading by the "Other Business Services" department, including management consultants, research and development, and advertising (Chart H). 。 In contrast, financial services and transportation exports have been delayed to other departments, and each has decreased by 5 and 9 %to 2, 0 %. These are the most susceptible sectors due to the effects of blepjit friction.
Note: This includes gains from bringing offshore sheltered trusts into UK taxable range for certain deemed residential and non-residential properties not subject to the new regime.	The powerful growth of the UK's "Other Business Services" may reflect several factors. First, the trade barrier with the EU may be lower than the strict regulations such as goods and banking businesses. In the second G, exports to the United States have shown a particularly powerful growth, which may have been supported by recent pounds and incorporate outsourcing operations on the U. S. company to the UK. H Finally, it is suggested that service companies may avoid trade barriers by selling through overseas subsidiaries.	As a whole, our assumptions on the impact of Brexit seem to be as planned, and recently published research is generally consistent with these estimates. However, considering the challenges of the confusion due to the simultaneous impact of geopolitical trends that affect Braeggit, pandemic, and other global trade, it is still difficult to make a solid conclusion. Trade data is unstable, especially service trade is easily corrected. In addition, the complete implementation of the TCA will further increase the barrier of goods trade with the EU. It is expected that the impact of Bluejit will appear completely a few years after the complete implementation of these barriers. Until then, we will continue to consider Brexit projects.	(a) OBR, Brexit and the Obr's Brexit Forecast, Octom 2018. Detailed analysis of trade and productivity relevance is box 2.	b) See. Box 2. The economic impact of Brexit on investment and immigration is 4 in March 2023 for economic and tax prospects.	c) See. Box D: Briefing Agent on the Bank of England, February 2024, February 2024.	d) Resolution Foundation, Ending Stagnation: New economic strategy for the UK, December 2023.
-7. 6	-0. 1	Indirect impact of policy	-1. 3	From expenditure	home	Debt interest	-11, 5
-35. 4	-13. 0	Top	-12. 1	-12. 8	Welfare expenses	-1. 3	-4. 9
0. 3	f) Springford, J., Brexit, Four Years ON: Correspondence to two trade paradox, January 2024.	-1, 6	Other ordinary spending	-0, 6	-1. 4	-0, 6	-0, 5
Capital expenditure
PSNB neutral expenditure (1)		Note EX PSNB Neutral expenditure	162	-17	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. < SPAN> 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) will maintain 4 % or more for the time being, and will drop slightly to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of revenues in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) after adjustment of 41 will be maintained at 4 % or more for the time being, and will be reduced to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.
Golden yield		-45	-119	The latter projections (Tables 4. 7 and 4. 8) reflect the impact of the detailed departmental plans for 2023-24 and 2024-25 published in the October 2021 Spending Review, the latest Supplementary Estimates for 2023-24 set by Treasury in February 2024,[32] and policy announcements since then. Over the past few years, the government has set departmental funding plans and implemented strict expenditure restraints, which have been broadly adhered to.	The Government’s spending assumptions following the Spending Review from 2025-26 onwards set out two overall expenditure totals (total DEL resources and total DEL capital) but do not provide detailed plans for how they will be allocated across Government departments and agencies. As we approach the end of the 2021 Spending Review period, this overall spending framework covers four of the five years in our forecast. As noted in Box 4. 2, these expenditure totals have historically undergone significant upward revisions before or at the end of the Spending Review process in which these funds are allocated across departments and agencies.	4. 50 Compared to the November outlook, departmental resource spending has decreased by an average of £4. 8 billion over the forecast period. This reflects the reclassification of some business rate relief to AME (offset by an increase in AME spending) and a cash reduction in the Government’s RDEL plans following the Spending Review due to lower inflation from 2025-26 onwards. The Department’s capital spending is on average £600 million higher than expected, reflecting the Government’s Public Sector Productivity Programme, which is mainly focused on the NHS. More detail below. 4. 49 Spending subject to departmental expenditure limits (DELs) represents just over 40% of total public spending. In this section, “RDEL spending” refers to departmental resources or day-to-day spending, and “CDEL spending” refers to departmental funds or investments.[31] Our latter forecasts (Tables 4. 7 and 4. 8) reflect this:	-13. 5
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
4. 50 Compared to the November outlook, departmental resource spending has fallen by an average of £4. 8 billion over the forecast period. This reflects the reclassification of some business rate relief to AME (offset by an increase in AME spending), and cash reductions in the Government's RDEL scheme following the Spending Review due to lower inflation from 2025-26 onwards. The Department's capital spending is on average £600 million higher than expected, reflecting the Government's Public Sector Productivity Programme, primarily focused on the NHS. More detail is provided below. 4. 49 Spending subject to departmental expenditure limits (DELs) accounts for just over 40% of all public spending. In this section, "RDEL spending" refers to departmental funding or day-to-day spending, and "CDEL spending" refers to departmental funding or investment.[31] [31] Our latter projections (tables 4. 7 and 4. 8) reflect this:		2024-2028 average growth rate	Total (personal tax decision)	-55	-59	-17	March 2024
4. 53 After 2025-26, the Ministry of Finance will be published by the Ministry of Finance for the entire envelope of RDEL and CDEL. In this spring budget, these assumptions are as follows:		The two new tax revenues of E-liquid and carbon border regulation mechanism used at the time of release will increase the number of tax revenues by £ 700 million by 2028-29.	Various	4. 50 Compared to the November outlook, departmental resource spending has decreased by an average of £4. 8 billion over the forecast period. This reflects the reclassification of some business rate relief to AME (offset by an increase in AME spending) and a cash reduction in the Government’s RDEL plans following the Spending Review due to lower inflation from 2025-26 onwards. The Department’s capital spending is on average £600 million higher than expected, reflecting the Government’s Public Sector Productivity Programme, which is mainly focused on the NHS. More detail below. 4. 49 Spending subject to departmental expenditure limits (DELs) represents just over 40% of total public spending. In this section, “RDEL spending” refers to departmental resources or day-to-day spending, and “CDEL spending” refers to departmental funds or investments.[31] Our latter forecasts (Tables 4. 7 and 4. 8) reflect this:	Forecast	-33	0, 29
2024-25		2024-2028 average growth rate	The two new tax revenues of E-liquid and carbon border regulation mechanism used at the time of release will increase the number of tax revenues by £ 700 million by 2028-29.	Spring 2024 NIC reduction	This chapter: Note the classification problems that affect the prediction (from paragraph 4. 4).	b) For more information about insurance premium settings, see Briefing Paper No. 6 "Insurance Premiums and Our Expectives" (March 2014).	Limit
411. 5		The two new tax revenues of E-liquid and carbon border regulation mechanism used at the time of release will increase the number of tax revenues by £ 700 million by 2028-29.	2027-28	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of revenues in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	-45	2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) after adjustment of 41 will be maintained at 4 % or more for the time being, and will be reduced to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	2026-27

Other annually managed expenditure

Sub-level of doubt

-4. 1
-2. 9
-2. 9
Actual spending

Deficit aggregates

Borrowing

407. 5

Chart 4.13: Public sector net borrowing

426. 5

Chart 4.14: Contributions to the fall in borrowing relative to 2023-24

435. 5

445. 3
456. 9
469. 9
483. 6

Chart 4.15: Public sector net borrowing: changes since November 2023

Table 4.12: Public sector net borrowing: changes since November 2023

What is the driving force behind the growth of British service trade?
-0, 8	British service trade has continued to grow strongly, including the relationship with the EU, despite the increase in trade barriers after Brexit. Looking at the configuration by department, about tw o-thirds of the growth of trade services since 2019 are leading by the "Other Business Services" department, including management consultants, research and development, and advertising (Chart H). 。 In contrast, financial services and transportation exports have been delayed to other departments, and each has decreased by 5 and 9 %to 2, 0 %. These are the most susceptible sectors due to the effects of blepjit friction.
Note: This includes gains from bringing offshore sheltered trusts into UK taxable range for certain deemed residential and non-residential properties not subject to the new regime.	The powerful growth of the UK's "Other Business Services" may reflect several factors. First, the trade barrier with the EU may be lower than the strict regulations such as goods and banking businesses. In the second G, exports to the United States have shown a particularly powerful growth, which may have been supported by recent pounds and incorporate outsourcing operations on the U. S. company to the UK. H Finally, it is suggested that service companies may avoid trade barriers by selling through overseas subsidiaries.	As a whole, our assumptions on the impact of Brexit seem to be as planned, and recently published research is generally consistent with these estimates. However, considering the challenges of the confusion due to the simultaneous impact of geopolitical trends that affect Braeggit, pandemic, and other global trade, it is still difficult to make a solid conclusion. Trade data is unstable, especially service trade is easily corrected. In addition, the complete implementation of the TCA will further increase the barrier of goods trade with the EU. It is expected that the impact of Bluejit will appear completely a few years after the complete implementation of these barriers. Until then, we will continue to consider Brexit projects.	(a) OBR, Brexit and the Obr's Brexit Forecast, Octom 2018. Detailed analysis of trade and productivity relevance is box 2.	b) See. Box 2. The economic impact of Brexit on investment and immigration is 4 in March 2023 for economic and tax prospects.	c) See. Box D: Briefing Agent on the Bank of England, February 2024, February 2024.	d) Resolution Foundation, Ending Stagnation: New economic strategy for the UK, December 2023.
-7. 6	Assumed sub-level	-4. 7	-2. 9	Actual expenditure	407. 5	422. 9	430. 2
-35. 4	452. 3	465. 6	479. 2	408. 3	-2. 6	Difference	Marginal
0. 3	3. 6 The indirect effect of these policies leads to shor t-term demand and a permanent increase on the supply side. The former is mainly due to a shor t-term tax reduction of household income, such as freezing on the ongoing fuel tariffs and reducing NICs. The latter will boost labor supply by improving the motivation to work, along with child allowance measures. This is somewhat offset by additional liabilities expenses associated with the funding of this measure. As a whole, the indirect effect of the policy package reduces the average annual borrowing of £ 800 million.	-5. 2	The policy is designed to give an active change in behavioral changes by producers, and it is difficult to predict how successful this will be.	Static cost calculation	f) Springford, J., Brexit, Four Years ON: Correspondence to two trade paradox, January 2024.	Of which	Supplementary estimate
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
-1, 5		-0. 9	-0, 6	-0, 6	others	-5. 0	-5. 1
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
-3. 8		0.8	5.2	8.7	-171	-4. 0	Other
-0. 2		99	125	135	146	Reduction of visitor: Expenditure to products that have received VAT refunds in the past	Reduction of visitors: Expenditure to other products
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
-4. 4		-twenty four	In billions of GBP unless otherwise stated	PM	Forecast	2022-23	2023-24
Considering the direct behavioural impacts of non-EU tourists no longer visiting the UK		0.5	2026-27	Fte	Tax	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	Total (personal tax decision)
Limit		0.1	2.3	0.8	0.6	0.0	0.2
89. 8		2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) after adjustment of 41 will be maintained at 4 % or more for the time being, and will be reduced to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	2. 42 Mortgage interest rates are expected to rise to 4. 2 % in 2027. It rose to the minimum to 2%in the latter half of 2021, exceeding the average mortgage interest rate in 2010. However, the market forecast for bank interest rates has declined significantly by 0. 8 % than expected in November. However, there is a great risk in mortgage interest forecasts, which is clear from the fact that the bank interest rate forecast has fluctuated significantly since November. This also takes risks to household income, housing trading, and housing prices.	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November.	2. 44 Our central forecast now expects house prices to fall by around 2% in 2024, slightly less than half the 5% we expected in November. This is mainly due to lower mortgage rates. UK average house prices are expected to fall slightly in 2027 and 2028. This will result in nominal house prices surpassing their historic peak in the first quarter of 2027.	2. 45 The current account deficit narrowed from 3. 1% of GDP in 2022 to an estimated 2. 6% in 2023. This is because the trade deficit narrowed due to a recovery in the UK's terms of trade (prices of exports relative to imports). The terms of trade worsened in 2022 as imported energy prices rose following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The terms of trade recovered to early 2021 levels as energy prices fell and services export prices rose. Net investment income, which has been in surplus for the past two years, is estimated to turn into a deficit in 2023. This is due to an increase in arent income from overseas investors on UK investments compared to interest income from UK overseas investments. In 2025, the current account deficit is expected to widen slightly, driven by a further deterioration in net investment income. The deficit is then expected to gradually narrow, to about 2. 5% of GDP in 2028.	2. 46 Due to changes in income and savings rate forecasts, the household sector surplus is expected to reach 2. 3% of GDP in 2025. Over the remaining forecast period, the household sector will decline, with the surplus decreasing to about 1. 5 percent. We expect the corporate sector to turn from a surplus to a deficit in 2025, following a period of volatility due to the pandemic and the energy crisis. At the same time, we expect the budget deficit to decrease over the forecast period.
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
-8. 9		0.0	2. 35 We consider this evidence, and the broader evidence, to be consistent with some further easing of labor market conditions. We expect the unemployment rate to rise moderately and peak at 4. 5% in the final quarter of 2024. The unemployment rate peak would correspond to about 1. 6 million jobseekers, six months earlier but slightly lower than expected in November. The unemployment rate then rises to 4.	OBR (March 2024 forecast)	GDP growth	CPI inflation	Unemployment
97. 2		0.0	0.0	Information on past measures	Policy risks describe potential policies that have not yet affected our central forecast.	3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact of all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of November 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:
-3. 6		0.2	3.3	0.1	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	-1. 2	-59
March 2024 forecast		2024-2028 average growth rate	0.4	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.5	0.8	0.0
101. 4		f) Springford, J., Brexit, Four Years ON: Correspondence to two trade paradox, January 2024.	98. 1	f) Springford, J., Brexit, Four Years ON: Correspondence to two trade paradox, January 2024.	Direct impact of policy	98. 1	Assumed sublevel
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
-4. 4		0.0	The two new tax revenues of E-liquid and carbon border regulation mechanism used at the time of release will increase the number of tax revenues by £ 700 million by 2028-29.	1.7	1.2	1.2	1.3
89. 8		0.3	Information on past measures	2026-27	-55	-55	-0. 9

97. 4

Other deficit aggregates

Real growth rate (%)

-0. 1

-2. 5
-1. 4
-1. 8

Financial transactions

-2. 9

Difference

Limit
-3. 5
Of which
Productivity package CDEL
Supplementary estimate

-3. 5

Table 4.13: Drivers of changes in PSND ex BoE

What is the driving force behind the growth of British service trade?
British service trade has continued to grow strongly, including the relationship with the EU, despite the increase in trade barriers after Brexit. Looking at the configuration by department, about tw o-thirds of the growth of trade services since 2019 are leading by the "Other Business Services" department, including management consultants, research and development, and advertising (Chart H). 。 In contrast, financial services and transportation exports have been delayed to other departments, and each has decreased by 5 and 9 %to 2, 0 %. These are the most susceptible sectors due to the effects of blepjit friction.
The powerful growth of the UK's "Other Business Services" may reflect several factors. First, the trade barrier with the EU may be lower than the strict regulations such as goods and banking businesses. In the second G, exports to the United States have shown a particularly powerful growth, which may have been supported by recent pounds and incorporate outsourcing operations on the U. S. company to the UK. H Finally, it is suggested that service companies may avoid trade barriers by selling through overseas subsidiaries.	As a whole, our assumptions on the impact of Brexit seem to be as planned, and recently published research is generally consistent with these estimates. However, considering the challenges of the confusion due to the simultaneous impact of geopolitical trends that affect Braeggit, pandemic, and other global trade, it is still difficult to make a solid conclusion. Trade data is unstable, especially service trade is easily corrected. In addition, the complete implementation of the TCA will further increase the barrier of goods trade with the EU. It is expected that the impact of Bluejit will appear completely a few years after the complete implementation of these barriers. Until then, we will continue to consider Brexit projects.	(a) OBR, Brexit and the Obr's Brexit Forecast, Octom 2018. Detailed analysis of trade and productivity relevance is box 2.	b) See. Box 2. The economic impact of Brexit on investment and immigration is 4 in March 2023 for economic and tax prospects.	c) See. Box D: Briefing Agent on the Bank of England, February 2024, February 2024.	d) Resolution Foundation, Ending Stagnation: New economic strategy for the UK, December 2023.
Due to the increase in population (purple line), the real expenditure forecast per person in 2026-2027 decreases by 160 pounds (2 %).	As a result, the latest forecasts will not increase the number of real spending per capita for public services in the next five years.	The government's planning for the department expenditure (DEL) launched by the government in October 2021 (SR21) was until the end of 2024-2025. In other words, the government currently only has a detailed department spending plan that covers one year of the fiv e-year financial outlook for more than 40 % of public spending in DEL. In this way, the narrowing of the department's financial plan, Horizon, to less than one year has been a characteristic of the UK public expenditure since 2007.	In the absence of detailed departmental expenditure plans beyond 2024-25, departmental expenditure follows two overall envelopes set by the government: daily expenditure (RDEL) grows at an average annual rate of 1. 0% in real terms, and capital expenditure (CDEL) remains roughly flat in cash terms. Overall, these assumptions suggest an overall decline of 1. 0 percentage points in the share of DEL in GDP over the final four years of the forecast, but DEL in 2028-29 is 1. 1 percentage points above the pre-fixed share of GDP).	While these expenditure envelopes have not yet been released to departments and agencies, we can explore their implications by looking at what existing input targets and commitments in certain spending areas mean for increased spending in areas not covered by such targets (often referred to as “windfall” spending). Looking at day-to-day spending by departments, we assume the following (Figure C):	NHS spending in England grows at 3. 6% per annum in real terms, using the IFS central scenario for the Government’s long-term NHS Workforce Plan A. This is higher than real growth in recent years, but in line with the long-run average real growth rate (1949-50 to 2022-23) of UK health spending. The Government’s Public Sector Productivity Improvement Package will improve NHS productivity and potentially partially offset the increases in spending required to deliver the NHS Workforce Plan.	Defence spending remains stable as a percentage of GDP, in line with the Government’s commitment to remain at or above the NATO minimum standard of 2% of GDP. Achieving the Government’s ambition to raise defence spending to 2. 5% of GDP will increase pressure on unprotected spending.
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
Basic school spending is stable per pupil in real terms, reflecting the Government's statement that SR21 spending per pupil is at 2010 levels in real terms. c	465. 6	479. 2	408. 3	-2. 6	Difference	Marginal
c) 2021 Autumn budget / expenditure review speech.	-10. 3	(e) The impact on Government Institute, Performance Tracker 2023, Octom 2023. < SPAN> NHS and the school expenditure case will be grasped using a barnet type.	8.8	According to the RDEL exemption of the RDEL expenditure after SR21 presented by the Ministry of Finance, these cases have been reduced by 2 to 3 % every year from 2025-26 (one-third of everyday expenditures (one-third of everyday expenditures). ) Will be left without being protected. If national defense expenses and ODA expenditures increase in accordance with the abov e-mentioned government's ambitions, unprotected expenditures need to decrease by 3. 6 % per year. It is difficult to reduce daily expenditures by 2 to 3 %. In addition, there is a possibility that the need to increase the amount of assistance to Ukraine and reduce the tightness of local governments in each country. As mentioned in the financial risk and sustainable report, there is also pressure on lon g-term fiscal expenditures due to climate change and aging.	Therefore, applying these assumptions to the spending of each department is still a great risk for our prediction. For the tw o-time expenditure review in November 2015 and October 2021, the government completed an average of 39 billion pounds and 32 billion pounds. Such an increase is the main cause of the difference between the previous borrowing and the forecast, and explains about half of the average difference between 2011-12 and 2021-22.	11, 4
B) Specifically, "The financial forecasting room of the independent budget liability bureau is stated that the UK does not borrow money to cover daily expenditures, and that the number of basic debt decreases on a sustainable base."	7.7	9.4	This elasticity was based on the estimated value specialized in the UK tourism industry at the time, and its estimated value wa s-1, 28. G RES travelers are uncertain, but to recognize that the cost of visiting costs changes significantly and may be more sensitive to the price, but the elasticity increased by about 50 % -1, -1. 9 was 9. With the tax revenue from this group's expenditure to RES products, the savings of 2020 measures will decrease to £ 21 million in 2025-26.	d) Since these goals are for the DEL set, it is assumed that when calculating the impact of RDEL, it will increase in proportion to the distribution of RDEL and CDEL in 2024-25.	-4. 0	According to the RDEL exemption of the RDEL expenditure after SR21 presented by the Ministry of Finance, these cases have been reduced by 2 to 3 % every year from 2025-26 (one-third of everyday expenditures (one-third of everyday expenditures). ) Will be left without being protected. If national defense expenses and ODA expenditures increase in accordance with the abov e-mentioned government's ambitions, unprotected expenditures need to decrease by 3. 6 % per year. It is difficult to reduce daily expenditures by 2 to 3 %. In addition, there is a possibility that the need to increase the amount of assistance to Ukraine and reduce the tightness of local governments in each country. As mentioned in the financial risk and sustainable report, there is also pressure on lon g-term fiscal expenditures due to climate change and aging.
Therefore, applying these assumptions to the spending of each department is still a great risk for our prediction. For the tw o-time review of November 2015 and October 2021, the government completed an average of £ 39 billion and 32 billion pounds. Such an increase is the main cause of the difference between the previous borrowing and the forecast, and explains about half of the average difference between 2011-12 and 2021-22.	α) Institute for Fiscal Studies, IMPLICATIONS OF THE NHS WORKFORCE PLAN, AUGUST 2023.	B) Specifically, "The financial forecasting room of the independent budget liability bureau is stated that the UK does not borrow money to cover daily expenditures, and that the number of basic debt decreases on a sustainable base."	11, 4	d) Since these goals are for the DEL set, it is assumed that when calculating the impact of RDEL, it will increase in proportion to the distribution of RDEL and CDEL in 2024-25.	(E) Government Institute, Performance Tracker 2023, Octom	(f) Half the forecast difference for the following three years. See Atkins, G and Lanskey, L, Working paper No. 19: The OBR's forecast performance, August 2023.
4. Total welfare spending in this forecast refers to AME spending on social security and tax credits, about half of which is subject to the government's "welfare cap", excluding state pensions and payments that are sensitive to the business cycle (we discuss performance against the cap in Chapter 5). Our forecasts for welfare spending are based on the determinants of our latest forecasts for the economy (mainly population, unemployment, income and inflation), and are informed by the latest Department for Work and Pensions historical data and models.	1.7	3.3	2.6	5.7	5.4	5.6
4. 57 Welfare spending is forecast to increase significantly this year (£34. 4 billion, 13. 1%) and next year (£19. 3 billion, 6. 5%) as most benefits are indexed to CPI inflation. Benefits are expected to increase by 10. 1% in April 2023 and by 6. 7% in April 2024, the rate of CPI inflation for September 2023. Welfare spending is then forecast to increase by an average of £11. 2 billion (3. 4%) per year for the remainder of the forecast period. This increase is mainly due to increases in pensioner spending due to ageing and the triple lock, and increases in health and disability benefit caseloads. Spending on these items explains more than nine-tenths of the increase in total welfare spending between 2024-25 and 2028-29. In billions of pounds unless otherwise stated	11. 3	4.7	2.5	2.0	1.9	2.3
Forecast
Due to the increase in population (purple line), the real expenditure forecast per person in 2026-2027 decreases by 160 pounds (2 %).	-1. 4	2024-25	Static cost calculation	Note: The plus mark means an increase in borrowing. Our online supplements score cards include the breakdown of each indicator, along with subjective evaluations on the uncertainty of each cost.	13. 9	2028-29
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
Basic school spending is stable per pupil in real terms, reflecting the Government's statement that SR21 spending per pupil is at 2010 levels in real terms. c	162	2.7	0.6	0.3	1.5	4.4
c) 2021 Autumn budget / expenditure review speech.	0.4	-33	Total (personal tax decision)	Tax	From March 2023	4. 27 We have revised our average receipts by £1. 7 billion between 2024-25 and 2028-29 in relation to our November forecasts. This is mainly due to lower gas prices. The one-year extension of the EPL to 2028-29 has increased this by £2 billion from the last November forecast. Conflict in the Middle East, including shipping disruptions in the Red Sea, has had little impact on oil and gas prices so far, but remains a source of uncertainty in the forecast, as noted in Box 2. 2.
B) Specifically, "The financial forecasting room of the independent budget liability bureau is stated that the UK does not borrow money to cover daily expenditures, and that the number of basic debt decreases on a sustainable base."	0.4	0.3	0.2	0.0	0.4	0.5
Therefore, applying these assumptions to the spending of each department is still a great risk for our prediction. For the tw o-time review of November 2015 and October 2021, the government completed an average of £ 39 billion and 32 billion pounds. Such an increase is the main cause of the difference between the previous borrowing and the forecast, and explains about half of the average difference between 2011-12 and 2021-22.	1. 285	2026-27	1.0	2027-28	1.0	0.7
4. Total welfare spending in this forecast refers to AME spending on social security and tax credits, about half of which is subject to the government's "welfare cap", excluding state pensions and payments that are sensitive to the business cycle (we discuss performance against the cap in Chapter 5). Our forecasts for welfare spending are based on the determinants of our latest forecasts for the economy (mainly population, unemployment, income and inflation), and are informed by the latest Department for Work and Pensions historical data and models.	0.5	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	0.4	1.2	1.5
4. 57 Welfare spending is forecast to increase significantly this year (£34. 4 billion, 13. 1%) and next year (£19. 3 billion, 6. 5%) as most benefits are indexed to CPI inflation. Benefits are expected to increase by 10. 1% in April 2023 and by 6. 7% in April 2024, the rate of CPI inflation for September 2023. Welfare spending is then forecast to increase by an average of £11. 2 billion (3. 4%) per year for the remainder of the forecast period. This increase is mainly due to increases in pensioner spending due to ageing and the triple lock, and increases in health and disability benefit caseloads. Spending on these items explains more than nine-tenths of the increase in total welfare spending between 2024-25 and 2028-29. In billions of pounds unless otherwise stated	0.4	3.3	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.6

36. 1

40. 3

43. 3

Box 4.4: The sensitivity of the Asset Purchase Facility to market conditions

46. 2

49. 3

52. 2
Child benefit

Chart G: Forecast of quarterly and cumulative flows to and from the APF

11. 6

Financing requirement

12. 5

Chart 4.16: UK gilt issuance and change in private sector holdings of gilts

Debt and other balance sheet aggregates

13. 5

Chart 4.17: Public sector net debt (excluding Bank of England)

Table 4.14: Public sector net debt (excluding Bank of England): changes since November 2023

α) This was derived from the introduction of elasticity and unique assumptions for other parameters in the Ministry of Finance's labor supply model, and the change in personal tax policy was evaluated by the impact of the motivation to work. For more information on methodology, see below. OBR, the impact of the national insurance premiums in the fall of 2023, February 2024.
-0, 8	British service trade has continued to grow strongly, including the relationship with the EU, despite the increase in trade barriers after Brexit. Looking at the configuration by department, about tw o-thirds of the growth of trade services since 2019 are leading by the "Other Business Services" department, including management consultants, research and development, and advertising (Chart H). 。 In contrast, financial services and transportation exports have been delayed to other departments, and each has decreased by 5 and 9 %to 2, 0 %. These are the most susceptible sectors due to the effects of blepjit friction.
Note: This includes gains from bringing offshore sheltered trusts into UK taxable range for certain deemed residential and non-residential properties not subject to the new regime.	The powerful growth of the UK's "Other Business Services" may reflect several factors. First, the trade barrier with the EU may be lower than the strict regulations such as goods and banking businesses. In the second G, exports to the United States have shown a particularly powerful growth, which may have been supported by recent pounds and incorporate outsourcing operations on the U. S. company to the UK. H Finally, it is suggested that service companies may avoid trade barriers by selling through overseas subsidiaries.	As a whole, our assumptions on the impact of Brexit seem to be as planned, and recently published research is generally consistent with these estimates. However, considering the challenges of the confusion due to the simultaneous impact of geopolitical trends that affect Braeggit, pandemic, and other global trade, it is still difficult to make a solid conclusion. Trade data is unstable, especially service trade is easily corrected. In addition, the complete implementation of the TCA will further increase the barrier of goods trade with the EU. It is expected that the impact of Bluejit will appear completely a few years after the complete implementation of these barriers. Until then, we will continue to consider Brexit projects.	(a) OBR, Brexit and the Obr's Brexit Forecast, Octom 2018. Detailed analysis of trade and productivity relevance is box 2.	b) See. Box 2. The economic impact of Brexit on investment and immigration is 4 in March 2023 for economic and tax prospects.	c) See. Box D: Briefing Agent on the Bank of England, February 2024, February 2024.	d) Resolution Foundation, Ending Stagnation: New economic strategy for the UK, December 2023.
-7. 6	21. 9	-12. 1	261, 5	295, 8	315. 1	315. 1	339, 7
-35. 4	21. 9	Of which	Internal wellness cap	339, 7	315. 1	315. 1	159, 3
0. 3	3. 5 The expenditure decision announced on a budget is almost offset in terms of budget. The government has reduced the average of £ 800 million per year to the current standards of the current ministries, assumed after 2024-2025. In three years from 2025-26 to 2027-28, the company allocated an additional £ 900 million pounds for a program in public sector focusing on NHS. The decision to expand the target of child benefits will increase the number of children's allowance by about 400 million pounds a year.	2026-27	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) after adjustment of 41 will be maintained at 4 % or more for the time being, and will be reduced to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	GDP growth	3. 5 The expenditure decision announced on a budget is almost offset in terms of budget. The government has reduced the average of £ 800 million per year to the current standards of the current ministries, assumed after 2024-2025. In three years from 2025-26 to 2027-28, the company allocated an additional £ 900 million pounds for a program in public sector focusing on NHS. The decision to expand the target of child benefits will increase the number of children's allowance by about 400 million pounds a year.	GDP growth	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) after adjustment of 41 will be maintained at 4 % or more for the time being, and will be reduced to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
177, 9	0.1	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3
182, 9	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	Information on past measures
11. 3	11. 2	-7. 0	2) For UC and legacy, personal tax deduction, housing allowance (excluding retired people), disability allowance (employment / support allowance, incom e-based support, severe disabled personnel allowance, and disability allowance) ) Includes income support, incom e-based and contributed job allowance.	3) Disability allowance includes life allowance for persons with disabilities, personal independent allowance, and attendance allowance.	4) Other costs include social security expenses in North Ireland.	4, 58 Compared to the prediction in November 2023, welfare expenditures are expected to decrease slightly to £ 2. 8 billion on average. According to Table 4. 9, this correction is based on:	The upgrade dropped due to inflation and decreased income forecast (average in 2025-2026 to £ 2. 9 billion). Inflation is not binding to triple locks in any predictive year, so most of the lower pressure due to a decrease in inflation ratio will be child allowance and active generation benefits.
Expenditures decreased to universal credit portions during employment (average decrease by £ 2. 6 billion each year). The percentage of tax credit claimers who discontinued the claim without shifting to UC was higher than expected, so the number of cases was revised down. In addition, the growth of the UC applicant's income was higher than expected, and the decrease in arbitrage income increased.
-7. 6	Policy measures in the spring budget increase the average expectation of £ 100 million. The biggest cost is additional expenditures for child allowance by raising the threshold for hig h-income child allowance (HICBC), which exceeds the prediction by £ 400 million. This is a decrease in universal credit expenditure due to long working hours of claimants due to a 2 % point reduction of NICS, and a decrease in PIP expenditure with additional funds to support the increase in the number of disability benefits. Partly offset in (100 million pounds).	Hundreds of millions of pounds	Achievements	Prospect	2022-23	2023-24	2024-25
-35. 4	2026-27 < SPAN> 2) For UC and legacy equivalent, personal tax deduction, housing allowance (excluding retired people), disability allowance (employment / support allowance, income supported persons with disabilities, severe disabilities. , Includes the provisions of persons with disabilities), income support, incom e-based, and contributed job job allowances.	3) Disability allowance includes life allowance for persons with disabilities, personal independent allowance, and attendance allowance.	4) Other costs include social security expenses in North Ireland.	4, 58 Compared to the prediction in November 2023, welfare expenditures are expected to decrease slightly to £ 2. 8 billion on average. According to Table 4. 9, this correction is based on:	The upgrade dropped due to inflation and decreased income forecast (average in 2025-2026 to £ 2. 9 billion). Inflation is not binding to triple locks in any predictive year, so most of the lower pressure due to a decrease in inflation ratio will be child allowance and active generation benefits.	Expenditures decreased to universal credit portions during employment (average decrease by £ 2. 6 billion each year). The percentage of tax credit claimers who discontinued the claim without shifting to UC was higher than expected, so the number of cases was revised down. In addition, the growth of the UC applicant's income was higher than expected, and the decrease in arbitrage income increased.	Other changes include an increase in public pensions and disability cases (average per year), which mainly decreases death cases in public pension predictions and the percentage of personal independence payments. It is based on the assumption.
0. 3	Hundreds of millions of pounds	10. 2	Prospect	2022-23	2023-24	2024-25	Children's allowance for hig h-income earners
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
3) Disability allowance includes life allowance for persons with disabilities, personal independent allowance, and attendance allowance.	4) Other costs include social security expenses in North Ireland.	4, 58 Compared to the prediction in November 2023, welfare expenditures are expected to decrease slightly to £ 2. 8 billion on average. According to Table 4. 9, this correction is based on:	The upgrade dropped due to inflation and decreased income forecast (average in 2025-2026 to £ 2. 9 billion). Inflation is not binding to triple locks in any predictive year, so most of the lower pressure due to a decrease in inflation ratio will be child allowance and active generation benefits.	Expenditures decreased to universal credit portions during employment (average decrease by £ 2. 6 billion each year). The percentage of tax credit claimers who discontinued the claim without shifting to UC was higher than expected, so the number of cases was revised down. In addition, the growth of the UC applicant's income was higher than expected, and the decrease in arbitrage income increased.	Other changes include an increase in public pensions and disability cases (average per year), which mainly decreases death cases in public pension predictions and the percentage of personal independence payments. It is based on the assumption.	Policy measures in the spring budget increase the average expectation of £ 100 million. The biggest cost is additional expenditures for child allowance by raising the threshold for hig h-income child allowance (HICBC), which exceeds the prediction by £ 400 million. This is a decrease in universal credit expenditure due to long working hours of claimants due to a 2 % point reduction of NICS, and a decrease in PIP expenditure with additional funds to support the increase in the number of disability benefits. Partly offset in (100 million pounds).
Hundreds of millions of pounds	0.4	Achievements	Prospect	415. 9	Reconstruction: Some producers may respond to new tariffs by reducing the nicotine content in the product and reducing the tariff rate.	2024-25
2025-26	Total (personal tax decision)	-130	-33	Limit	261, 5	March 2024 NICS reductions: a further 2 percentage point reduction in the NICS base rate for both employees and the self-employed announced in the Budget (effective from 6 April).
11. 3	333, 9	343, 2	350, 9	361, 7	March 2024 forecast	261, 5	295, 8

315. 1

329, 0

339, 7

Chart 4.18: Four measures of the public sector balance sheet

Risks and uncertainties

348, 2

360. 1

difference
0, 0
0, 5
-1. 3

-4, 9

-3. 4
-2. 6

Box 4.5: The impact of migration on the fiscal forecast

-1. 6

home
Upgrade
-0, 1
-2. 8

-3. 2

-2, 9
-twenty five
Universal credit spending while working
-0, 3
-2, 9

-3. 1

-2. 6

-twenty three

-twenty one

Chart H: Borrowing and PSND ex BoE in the migration scenarios

Examples of burden on people with disabilities and pensioners

Universal credit fraud and errors

Chapter 5: Performance against the Government’s fiscal targets

Introduction

others

-0, 4
As a result of government decisions

The fiscal targets

4. 59 Volatility in inflation and income prediction is an important factor in our welfare forecast, considering the impact on the upgrade. Compared to the past four forecasts, the annual average annual fluctuation of welfare expenditures due to changes in uplting was £ 8. 4 billion. If the inflation rate and income prospects for next year rise by 1 %, the upgrade cost will increase by 3. 1 billion pounds by 2025-26.

4. 60 Ordinary expenditures with local financial resources will increase from 62. 1 billion pounds in 2023-24 to 2028-29 in 2028-29, as the rural income sources are steadily increasing by an average of 2. 7 billion pounds (4. 3 %) per year. I expect it. [36] Compared to the outlook as of November 2023, ordinary expenditures due to local finances are almost flat (Table 4. 10):
Normal reserves have been revised down by £ 300 million, to £ 1. 2 billion in FY2023-24. With the fiscal tightness of local governments, it is assumed that the expenditure review period will be over £ 600 million in FY2024-25.
Predicted tax revenues have increased by 100 million pounds annually due to additional city tax flexibility announced in the 2024-25 local government payments for Birmingham, Slock, Slau, and Walking and the increase in the permissions of police and crime commissioners. 。

4. 61 Capital spending invested by local governments is expected to decrease from £ 1022-23 to £ 8. 2 billion in 2028-29. [37] This is expected to decrease the borrowing of local governments for capital spending, decreasing to 6. 6 billion pounds in 2028-29 in 2028-29 in 2019-20. This reflects the rise in borrowing rates from the Public Works Loans Board, which is the main source of funding for local governments, and new restrictions on commercial borrowing. Corporate capital spending is expected to increase from 11. 2 billion pounds in 2023-24 to 11. 7 billion pounds in 2028-29. These predictions are almost the same as November.

4. 62 Wide pressure on economic municipalities is risking this forecast. Since the previous prediction, the Nottingham City Council issued a "Article 114" warning and has been added to 11 warnings that have already been issued since 2018. [38] These warnings have shown that the authorities forecasts are inadequate to satisfy the forecast expenditure next year. Since 2010-11, local government spending will decrease from 7. 4 % of GDP to 5. 1 % in 2022-23, and in our predictions to 4. 7 % of GDP in 2028-29. Considering the provision of various services that are likely to grow in the future, such as the legal obligations of local governments, such as adult welfare and child welfare, the pressure on local governments will continue to continue in the future.
1 billion pounds unless otherwise stated

The implications of our central forecast

afternoon

Prospect
2022-23
2023-24

2024-25

2025-26

Table 5.1: Performance against the Government’s fiscal targets

α) This was derived from the introduction of elasticity and unique assumptions for other parameters in the Ministry of Finance's labor supply model, and the change in personal tax policy was evaluated by the impact of the motivation to work. For more information on methodology, see below. OBR, the impact of the national insurance premiums in the fall of 2023, February 2024.		What is the driving force behind the growth of British service trade?		The Trade Cooperation Agreement (TCA) signed in December 2020 has set a trad e-i n-relationship condition after Breggitte between the UK and the EU. However, the TCA is still ongoing, and the UK will apply the actual test to imports from the EU from April 2024, and will impose further declarations from October 2024.
British service trade has continued to grow strongly, including the relationship with the EU, despite the increase in trade barriers after Brexit. Looking at the configuration by department, about tw o-thirds of the growth of trade services since 2019 are leading by the "Other Business Services" department, including management consultants, research and development, and advertising (Chart H). 。 In contrast, financial services and transportation exports have been delayed to other departments, and each has decreased by 5 and 9 %to 2, 0 %. These are the most susceptible sectors due to the effects of blepjit friction.	2023 November forecast	British service trade has continued to grow strongly, including the relationship with the EU, despite the increase in trade barriers after Brexit. Looking at the configuration by department, about tw o-thirds of the growth of trade services since 2019 are leading by the "Other Business Services" department, including management consultants, research and development, and advertising (Chart H). 。 In contrast, financial services and transportation exports have been delayed to other departments, and each has decreased by 5 and 9 %to 2, 0 %. These are the most susceptible sectors due to the effects of blepjit friction.	2023 November forecast	63. 8
66. 3
-7. 6	72. 1	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	0.4	Achievements	56
60. 1	72. 1	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	0.4	66. 1	55
-35. 4	72. 1	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	0.3	8.9	54
March 2024 Real growth rate (%)	72. 1	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.1	4.5
-0. 2
-7. 6	72. 1	1.1	1.9	422. 9	0, 0	78
60. 1	72. 1	1.1	1.9	Basic forecast	-0. 1	73
-35. 4	72. 1	1.2	1.8	Marginal	-0. 3	72
March 2024 Real growth rate (%)	72. 1	1.4	1.6	-0. 2	-0. 1
-0. 1
-7. 6	Expenditure of local capital and public enterprises	2023 November forecast	20. 1
-35. 4	Expenditure of local capital and public enterprises	4. The policy announced on the 17 budgets has increased the average amount from 2025-2026 to the end of the forecast period. These measures include the following: Tax reduction in the NIC category 4 add £ 400 million to the SA income tax revenue by 2028-2929 (mainly due to the reduction of corporate establishment incentives). With the reform of the non-missile system, the self-reported income tax has been added £ 1. 3 billion since 2026-27, and the HMRC debt collection measures have been added by 400 million pounds since 2025-26.	19, 5

Change in headroom against fiscal targets

Debt falling and borrowing targets

19. 6

19, 8
March 2024 forecast
22. 4

Chart 5.1: Fiscal target headrooms changes since November

Changes in the debt-stabilising primary balance over time

20. 0

Chart 5.2: Debt-stabilising primary balance since 2010

Box 5.1: The evolution of public sector net debt (excluding the Bank of England) since 2000

19. 2

19, 8
19, 8
19. 9

Chart A: Public sector net debt (ex Bank of England) since 2000

March 2024 Real growth rate (%)

-16. 0
-1. 0
-5. 5
-1, 6

Chart B: Contributions to changes in the debt-to-GDP ratio (ex Bank of England)

-1. 2

difference
twenty three
1. 1

0, 7

-0. 3

Headroom against successive fiscal mandates

0, 3

Chart 5.3: Successive forecasts for headroom against fiscal targets

Welfare cap

0, 2

0, 1

Basic forecast

Table 5.2: The welfare cap and margin

What is the driving force behind the growth of British service trade?
-0, 8	British service trade has continued to grow strongly, including the relationship with the EU, despite the increase in trade barriers after Brexit. Looking at the configuration by department, about tw o-thirds of the growth of trade services since 2019 are leading by the "Other Business Services" department, including management consultants, research and development, and advertising (Chart H). 。 In contrast, financial services and transportation exports have been delayed to other departments, and each has decreased by 5 and 9 %to 2, 0 %. These are the most susceptible sectors due to the effects of blepjit friction.
Note: This includes gains from bringing offshore sheltered trusts into UK taxable range for certain deemed residential and non-residential properties not subject to the new regime.	The powerful growth of the UK's "Other Business Services" may reflect several factors. First, the trade barrier with the EU may be lower than the strict regulations such as goods and banking businesses. In the second G, exports to the United States have shown a particularly powerful growth, which may have been supported by recent pounds and incorporate outsourcing operations on the U. S. company to the UK. H Finally, it is suggested that service companies may avoid trade barriers by selling through overseas subsidiaries.	As a whole, our assumptions on the impact of Brexit seem to be as planned, and recently published research is generally consistent with these estimates. However, considering the challenges of the confusion due to the simultaneous impact of geopolitical trends that affect Braeggit, pandemic, and other global trade, it is still difficult to make a solid conclusion. Trade data is unstable, especially service trade is easily corrected. In addition, the complete implementation of the TCA will further increase the barrier of goods trade with the EU. It is expected that the impact of Bluejit will appear completely a few years after the complete implementation of these barriers. Until then, we will continue to consider Brexit projects.
-0. 4	-0. 4
-0. 4	others	Direct effect of policy
4. 63 Interest payments for debts are 4, 4 %of the GDP in 2022-23, which was the highest after the war, to 2025-26, mainly due to reduced RPI inflation due to decrease in predictions of RPI inflation. It is predicted that the year will decrease to 3, 1 %of GDP. It is expected that the increase in debt stock will increase to 3, 4 %of GDP and 8, 3 %of the total income in 2028-29.	1.0	1.5	2.0
2023 November forecast	1.3	2.0	2.7
For 10 years before the pandemic, the interest rate cost of debt was extremely stable, about £ 40 billion per year. The interest rate cost is often the source of the financial outlook, "Use" surprise, and as a result, it has been found that interest rates are usually lower than our forecasts derived from market expectations (Chart E). As a result, the real cost of debt interest rates is about £ 27 billion due to the financial savings by the quantitative easing of England (QE) (QE) operating (exchanged relatively high yields with bank reserves with lower yields). I did it.	The rapid rise in global interest rates in the past two years means soaring interest rates, which means that market forecasts for future interest rates have become more unstable, and their expectations have been greatly revised both up and down. Bank interest rates and gilt yield yield rates have soared to high levels in 15 years, and RPI inflation reaches the highest level in 2022-23 for the first time in 40 years. It has reached the highest level of 10. 8 % of government revenue. Such an increase in deb t-payments worsened due to the increase in debt stock, the redemption period, and the spread of inde x-linked debt in British public debt.	Debt stock is expected to continue to exceed 90 % of GDP, and if interest rate expectations will continue to fluctuate, interest expenditures are likely to continue to be an important risk factor in financial outlook. As an example, according to the outlook for debt rate payments from 2027-28, when interest rates rise from March 2023 to 18. 7 billion pounds, the expectation of interest rates increased, but this outlook is 128. The hundreds of millions have decreased. In each case, this fluctuation of interest payments is larger than the margin that the Prime Minister secured for financial obligations. < SPAN> In the 10 years before the pandemic, debt interest rates were extremely stable, about £ 40 billion per year. The interest rate cost is often the source of the financial outlook, "Use" surprise, and as a result, it has been found that interest rates are usually lower than our forecasts derived from market expectations (Chart E). As a result, the real cost of debt interest rates is about £ 27 billion due to the financial savings by the quantitative easing of England (QE) (QE) operating (exchanged relatively high yields with bank reserves with lower yields). I did it.	The rapid rise in global interest rates in the past two years means soaring interest rates, which means that market forecasts for future interest rates have become more unstable, and their expectations have been greatly revised both up and down. Bank interest rates and gilt yield yield rates have soared to high levels in 15 years, and RPI inflation reaches the highest level in 2022-23 for the first time in 40 years. It has reached the highest level of 10. 8 % of government revenue. Such an increase in deb t-payments worsened due to the increase in debt stock, the redemption period, and the spread of inde x-linked debt in British public debt.
Debt stock is expected to continue to exceed 90 % of GDP, and if interest rate expectations will continue to fluctuate, interest expenditures are likely to continue to be an important risk factor in financial outlook. As an example, according to the outlook for debt rate payments from 2027-28, when interest rates rise from March 2023 to 18. 7 billion pounds, the expectation of interest rates increased, but this outlook is 128. The hundreds of millions have decreased. In each case, this fluctuation of interest payments is larger than the margin that the Prime Minister secured for financial obligations. For 10 years before the pandemic, the interest rate cost of debt was extremely stable, about £ 40 billion per year. The interest rate cost is often the source of the financial outlook, "Use" surprise, and as a result, it has been found that interest rates are usually lower than our forecasts derived from market expectations (Chart E). As a result, the real cost of debt interest rates is about £ 27 billion due to the financial savings by the quantitative easing of England (QE) (QE) operating (exchanged relatively high yields with bank reserves with lower yields). I did it.
-35. 4	4. 18 In 2023-24, the amount of added value tax is expected to increase by 5. 3 % to £ 170. 7 billion. This increase rate is slightly lower than this year's expected increase rate of 5. 9 % of the total name consumption. This relative weakness is 1, 6 % of the ratio of the standard tax rate, because the price increase in the price of these items has increased, and the price increase in these items has increased due to the standard tax rate. It was 48, 3 % of points decrease. As the inflation becomes gentle, the standard name share, which accounts for household expenditures, will recover to the past level and reach 49. 6%in 2028-29. From 2024 to 25 years, it is expected that the income of the added value tax will increase by 3. 8 % each year, and the average consumption is 3. 7 % each year.	4. 19 Compared to the forecast as of November 2023, it was revised down 2. 6 billion pounds (1. 5%) in 2023-2024. In the subsequent fiscal year, this low start was mainly revised by an average of £ 2. 9 billion (1. 5%). 4. 16 In relation to the outlook as of November, we have revised the average per year of £ 1. 3 billion. Although it has decreased since 2026, an average of £ 400 million has been added in each year of prediction. The upward revision of sel f-employment income in the early years of predictions is gradually and partially offset due to a decrease in savings income in the last three years of prediction due to a decrease in bank forecast interest rates.	4. The policy announced on the 17 budgets has increased the average amount from 2025-2026 to the end of the forecast period. These measures include the following: Tax reduction in the NIC category 4 add £ 400 million to the SA income tax revenue by 2028-2929 (mainly due to the reduction of corporate establishment incentives). With the reform of the non-missile system, the self-reported income tax has been added £ 1. 3 billion since 2026-27, and the HMRC debt collection measures have been added by 400 million pounds since 2025-26.
In the short term, RPI inflation will drive the downward revisions, reducing expenditure by an average of £9. 6 billion over the first two years. Thereafter, as inflation converges to the November forecast, the RPI impact will decrease to an average of £1. 2 billion over the last four years.	0.0	20. 1	Expenditure has been reduced year on year due to lower interest rates (average of 0. 5 percentage points per year), and accounts for an increasing proportion of the downward revision as the impact of lower inflation and lower Bank Rates recede.
Net necessary funds are reduced, reducing the average of £ 1 billion and up to £ 1. 4 billion in the predicted Horizon.	3.7	4.4	5.2
Hundreds of millions of pounds	Achievements	Prospect	2022-23
2023-24
2024-25	5.3	0. 4	0. 4
2027-28	2028-29	2023 November forecast	111. 2
116. 2	2, 40 RHDI per capita has increased from 2023-24 for the third consecutive year, and is expected to recover the peak before the pandemic in 2025-26, two years earlier than the forecast in November. This is mainly because the recovery from the situation of the trade shock is accelerated, and the ratio of the whole economy as a whole is high in the labor market in the short term. During the forecast period, RHDI per person increases about 1%from the prediction as of November. With a decrease in consumer prices, RHDI per capita rises 1. 3%from November. In accordance with the decline in inflation, the per capita income per person by 2028-29 will decrease by 0. 7%(the offset is not perfect due to the improvement of trade conditions). In addition, RHDI per capita increases 0. 6 % due to household benefits and tax predictions and policy changes. It is expected that the NIC headline tax rate will be reduced by 2 pounds, which was announced in this budget, will directly increase the real household income by 0. 5 %. This will be added to the same scale by reducing the NIC announced in the fall of 2023. These estimates do not take into account the behavioral reaction to the policy or the financial hinder due to the freezing of the tax standard.	4.6	101, 9
108, 8

Broader fiscal indicators

115. 2

122, 5

March 2024 forecast

111, 5
104, 7

Table 5.3: Dashboard of balance sheet and fiscal affordability indicators

89, 0	The powerful growth of the UK's "Other Business Services" may reflect several factors. First, the trade barrier with the EU may be lower than the strict regulations such as goods and banking businesses. In the second G, exports to the United States have shown a particularly powerful growth, which may have been supported by recent pounds and incorporate outsourcing operations on the U. S. company to the UK. H Finally, it is suggested that service companies may avoid trade barriers by selling through overseas subsidiaries.	As a whole, our assumptions on the impact of Brexit seem to be as planned, and recently published research is generally consistent with these estimates. However, considering the challenges of the confusion due to the simultaneous impact of geopolitical trends that affect Braeggit, pandemic, and other global trade, it is still difficult to make a solid conclusion. Trade data is unstable, especially service trade is easily corrected. In addition, the complete implementation of the TCA will further increase the barrier of goods trade with the EU. It is expected that the impact of Bluejit will appear completely a few years after the complete implementation of these barriers. Until then, we will continue to consider Brexit projects.	(a) OBR, Brexit and the Obr's Brexit Forecast, Octom 2018. Detailed analysis of trade and productivity relevance is box 2.	b) See. Box 2. The economic impact of Brexit on investment and immigration is 4 in March 2023 for economic and tax prospects.	c) See. Box D: Briefing Agent on the Bank of England, February 2024, February 2024.	d) Resolution Foundation, Ending Stagnation: New economic strategy for the UK, December 2023.
89, 0	-11, 5
-17. 2
-13, 0	-12. 6	-7. 0	2) For UC and legacy, personal tax deduction, housing allowance (excluding retired people), disability allowance (employment / support allowance, incom e-based support, severe disabled personnel allowance, and disability allowance) ) Includes income support, incom e-based and contributed job allowance.	3) Disability allowance includes life allowance for persons with disabilities, personal independent allowance, and attendance allowance.	4) Other costs include social security expenses in North Ireland.	4, 58 Compared to the prediction in November 2023, welfare expenditures are expected to decrease slightly to £ 2. 8 billion on average. According to Table 4. 9, this correction is based on:	The upgrade dropped due to inflation and decreased income forecast (average in 2025-2026 to £ 2. 9 billion). Inflation is not binding to triple locks in any predictive year, so most of the lower pressure due to a decrease in inflation ratio will be child allowance and active generation benefits.
-twenty two	-0, 7	Of which	Internal wellness cap	339, 7	315. 1	315. 1	159, 3
-6, 8	-5. 4	-4, 0	home	Central government	-0, 1	-1, 5	-2.
-twenty five	-twenty two	-1, 9	APF	-1, 9	-4. 2	-5. 4	-4. 3
-3. 2
-2, 0	2.8	3.0	2.3	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.8
Ratio of gold	7.9	7.5	5.7	6.0	6.5	6.7	6.9
-0, 1
-17. 2
-13, 0	2026-27	1.9	1.2	-55	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of means of revenue increase in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	2027-28
-twenty two	2026-27	3.9	2.9	1.1	0.4	0.0	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.
-6, 8	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	1.4	0.7	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	The two new tax revenues of E-liquid and carbon border regulation mechanism used at the time of release will increase the number of tax revenues by £ 700 million by 2028-29.	Total (personal tax decision)	March 2024
-twenty five	0.5	Information on past measures	0.7	2027-28	-1. 2	March 2024	0, 29
-3. 2
-2, 0	2024-2028 average growth rate	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of means of revenue increase in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. < SPAN> 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) will maintain 4 % or more for the time being, and will drop slightly to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.1
Ratio of gold	Information on past measures	-0. 9	-14	0.4	0.5	0.1	0.2
2027-28

Recognising uncertainty

2028-29

2023 November forecast

128. 3
123. 9
84. 6

Fan charts

76. 8

68. 4

Chart 5.4: Fan charts for PSND (excluding Bank of England) and PSNB

Sensitivities

49. 1

The change in the debt-to-GDP ratio

35. 0

March 2024 forecast
128. 7
114. 1
87. 2

Chart 5.5: Sensitivities

Scenarios

77. 5

68. 7
50. 6

Energy price shock scenario

39. 4

difference

0, 4
-9. 8
2. 7

0, 6

0, 3

Chart 5.6: Borrowing and debt (ex BoE) in the energy price shock scenario

Annex A: Detailed tables

1. 5

4. 4
home
Basic difference
-10. 1
-10. 0

Table A.1: Economy forecast

-9. 7
-0, 8	British service trade has continued to grow strongly, including the relationship with the EU, despite the increase in trade barriers after Brexit. Looking at the configuration by department, about tw o-thirds of the growth of trade services since 2019 are leading by the "Other Business Services" department, including management consultants, research and development, and advertising (Chart H). 。 In contrast, financial services and transportation exports have been delayed to other departments, and each has decreased by 5 and 9 %to 2, 0 %. These are the most susceptible sectors due to the effects of blepjit friction.
2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028
-0, 8
home	4.3	0.3	0.8	1.9	2.0	1.8	1.7
Evidence	3.4	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. < SPAN> 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) will maintain 4 % or more for the time being, and will drop slightly to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	2024-2028 average growth rate	1.2	1.5	1.3	1.2
14. 8	Expenditure	From expenditure	-15. 2	-18. 4	-16, 5	-15. 9	-15. 5
3. 190	9.7	7.9	2.3	3.1	3.7	3.7	3.7
Debt expenditure	1.4	0.1	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. < SPAN> 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) will maintain 4 % or more for the time being, and will drop slightly to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of revenues in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	Information on past measures	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.0
-13. 3
-14. 2	4.8	0.3	0.8	1.6	1.9	1.8	1.7
Welfare expenses	5.0	0.5	0.7	2.0	2.1	2.0	1.9
-1. 4	2.3	0.7	4.2	1.8	1.5	1.5	1.6
-4. 6	8.0	1.8	1. 285	0.4	2.0	1.8	1.2
-2. 6	9.6	4.8	difference	1.4	2.5	2.0	1.2
Other expenditures	0.9	5.9	Total (personal tax decision)	-55	0, 29	0, 29	-130
6. 3	9.5	-379	-0, 8	0.2	3.5	3.7	3.5
National insurance premium reduction	1.0	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of means of revenue increase in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
10. 3	9.0	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	-45	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.7
11. 0	Regime reform	2026-27	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. < SPAN> 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) will maintain 4 % or more for the time being, and will drop slightly to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	Information on past measures	0.2	0.6	0.8
-2. 6
α) This was derived from the introduction of elasticity and unique assumptions for other parameters in the Ministry of Finance's labor supply model, and the change in personal tax policy was evaluated by the impact of the motivation to work. For more information on methodology, see below. OBR, the impact of the national insurance premiums in the fall of 2023, February 2024.	From March 2023	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	4. 27 We have revised our average receipts by £1. 7 billion between 2024-25 and 2028-29 in relation to our November forecasts. This is mainly due to lower gas prices. The one-year extension of the EPL to 2028-29 has increased this by £2 billion from the last November forecast. Conflict in the Middle East, including shipping disruptions in the Red Sea, has had little impact on oil and gas prices so far, but remains a source of uncertainty in the forecast, as noted in Box 2. 2.	-130	4. 27 We have revised our average receipts by £1. 7 billion between 2024-25 and 2028-29 in relation to our November forecasts. This is mainly due to lower gas prices. The one-year extension of the EPL to 2028-29 has increased this by £2 billion from the last November forecast. Conflict in the Middle East, including shipping disruptions in the Red Sea, has had little impact on oil and gas prices so far, but remains a source of uncertainty in the forecast, as noted in Box 2. 2.	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	-59
0, 3
-1. 2	9.1	7.3	2.2	1.5	1.6	1.9	2.0
0, 3	7. 6	9.7	3.1	2.0	2.5	3.0	2.9
-1. 2	5.1	7.6	1.5	1.2	1.7	1.9	1.9
-0. 7
home	Debt expenditure	-1. 0	Other economic impacts	-0. 2	-1. 4	Inventory disposal: Some companies increase existing stocks to avoid tariffs (but they can benefit because the price after tax is higher). The degree of advance is limited by the expiration date of the product (although e-liquid is relatively long) and available storage capacity.	-twenty four
-twenty one	0.4	0.2	0.3	0.8	1.1	1.1	1.2
Note In this table, the negative value means a decrease in PSNB, that is, an increase in the amount of receipt or a decrease in expenditure is used in the custom of negative effects on the PSNB. It does not include the changes in the basic outlook on most environmental taxes, added value tax returns, and depreciation expenses.	7.4	7.3	3.9	2.8	2.7	2.9	3.1
4. 70 In addition to the PSNB, a number of deficit measures provide information about the state of the public finances. The primary deficit, excluding net interest expenditure, is a useful indicator of how much of the discretionary expenditure is being financed by revenues and is sometimes referred to as a measure of "fiscal effort". The current account deficit, excluding net investment expenditure, is a useful indicator of how much of the expenditure that primarily benefits current people is being financed by current taxes. All of the deficit measures can also be expressed in cyclical terms, corrected for an estimate of the position in the business cycle, which gives a rough indication of the primary or structural deficit.	5.8	6.8	3.6	2.1	2.0	2.3	2.6
4. 71 In this outlook, these alternative deficit measures indicate that:	3.9	4.1	4.4	4.4	4.2	4.2	4.1
The primary deficit will be 1. 2% of GDP this year and will remain in deficit until 2026-2027, when it will turn into a surplus. At the projected horizon, the deficit will reach a surplus of 1. 6% of GDP, which would be the largest primary surplus since 2000-01.	1.3	1.4	1.5	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.5
The current account deficit is estimated to narrow from 1. 7% of GDP this year to a surplus of 0. 2% of GDP in 2027-2028, rising to 0. 4% of GDP in 2028-29. This would be the largest current account surplus since 2001-02.
The cyclically adjusted deficit will be roughly the same as the unadjusted deficit in 2023-24, but will decline slightly each year until 2028-29. This reflects an estimated path of increased excess capacity in the economy until 2024-25, causing the output gap to widen slightly initially, then decline, and narrow by 2028-29.	2026-27	1.4	1.0	2.4	1.3	1.4	1.8
4. Public pure debt (PSND EX Boe), excluding England Bank, will increase in cash every year since 2023-24. The upper row of Table 4. 13 is a decomposition of the annual change in PSND EX BoE into a change in public sector borrowing, net borrowing from England Bank, financial transactions, and evaluation effects. It indicates the following:	8.4	9.1	9.2	9.4	8.7	8.1	7.9
Net borrowing in public sector decreases year by year and increases debt. In 2023-24, borrowing was added 114. 1 billion pounds, accounting for three-fifths of debt fluctuations, and in 2028-29, a decrease of £ 39. 4 billion, a fifth of the increase in debt.	9.7	0.6	Spring 2024 NIC reduction	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	2.2	3.4	3.7
Вые раты потов уаДол на 30, 6 мов сод3-24 воДах 7, 9 мд фов сов восдющ годы. Эотажае рдса, иые поцы поцо сайам.
Поч фаноые уац уаю в са 4, 1 мд фов соД подя рд фов сов в 2023-24 годωах, но в дал, вот Д8-29 год8-29 год8-29 год8-29 уа Дола сае. эот поф полос оде ооном (отатой пой) ковом ыыпый уа 17 5 мД ов вод3-24 годωах, но сае, посолагаг, чо со вав н Долом (DMO) в к к вып ных gilts по ц, бой комал. [41]	3.3	3.1	3.1	3.2	3.2	3.1	3.1

4. According to the 74 Table 4. 13, it is expected that PSND EX BoE in 2023-24 will be 12. 6 billion pounds compared to November, but more than that, most years have been higher. I will. The downward revision in 2023-24 reflects the decrease in borrowing in addition to the decrease in contribution to debt due to the timing effect of cash flow. Subsequent small fixes are mainly due to the increase in borrowing, but are partially offset each year due to the decrease in BOE net borrowing due to the sale of APFs that reflect the rise in gold prices and the decrease in loss associated with the acquisition. 。

Hundreds of millions of pounds

prediction

2023-24

Table A.2: Economy forecast: changes since November

2024-25
-0, 8	British service trade has continued to grow strongly, including the relationship with the EU, despite the increase in trade barriers after Brexit. Looking at the configuration by department, about tw o-thirds of the growth of trade services since 2019 are leading by the "Other Business Services" department, including management consultants, research and development, and advertising (Chart H). 。 In contrast, financial services and transportation exports have been delayed to other departments, and each has decreased by 5 and 9 %to 2, 0 %. These are the most susceptible sectors due to the effects of blepjit friction.
2022	2023	2024	2025	2026	2027	2028
-0, 8
home	0.0	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	0.0	0.5	0.0	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.0
Evidence	0.1	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	Information on past measures	0.3	2024-2028 average growth rate	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	Information on past measures
Psnb	0.0	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.1
3. 190	0.0	0.3	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. < SPAN> 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) will maintain 4 % or more for the time being, and will drop slightly to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0
Debt expenditure	Information on past measures	Information on past measures	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.0
-13. 3
-14. 2	0.1	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.1	0.6	0.1	0.0	0.0
20. 1	Information on past measures	0.0	0.2	0.9	0.4	2024-2028 average growth rate	2024-2028 average growth rate
-1. 4	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	0.0	0.2	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.0	0.0
-4. 6	0.1	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of revenues in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	0.2	0.8	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	0.5	0.3
-2. 6	0.0	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of revenues in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	0.6	0.2	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of means of revenue increase in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	1.1	0.8
Other expenditures	0.2	-0. 9	-1. 2	3.2	1.0	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of revenues in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. < SPAN> 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) will maintain 4 % or more for the time being, and will drop slightly to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.
1. 2	0.0	0.5	0.7	0.2	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.1	Information on past measures
1. 6	0.1	0.1	2024-2028 average growth rate	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.0	0.0	0.0
10. 3	0.4	0.7	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.1
11. 0	0.5	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.1	0.6	0.4	0.5	0.2
-2. 6
α) This was derived from the introduction of elasticity and unique assumptions for other parameters in the Ministry of Finance's labor supply model, and the change in personal tax policy was evaluated by the impact of the motivation to work. For more information on methodology, see below. OBR, the impact of the national insurance premiums in the fall of 2023, February 2024.	0.0	1.1	1.0	0.2	0.1	0.0	2024-2028 average growth rate
0, 3
-1. 2	0.0	Information on past measures	2026-27	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	0.2	0.2	0.0
0, 3	0.0	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	0, 29	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of revenues in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	0.0	0.1	0.0
-1. 2	0.0	0.6	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. < SPAN> 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) will maintain 4 % or more for the time being, and will drop slightly to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	0.0	0.1	0.1
-0. 7
home	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3
-twenty one	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	0.3	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1
Note In this table, the negative value means a decrease in PSNB, that is, an increase in the amount of receipt or a decrease in expenditure is used in the custom of negative effects on the PSNB. It does not include the changes in the basic outlook on most environmental taxes, added value tax returns, and depreciation expenses.	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	2024-2028 average growth rate	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.
This is not comprehensively evaluated the overall impact of economic, asset prices, and quantitative easing measures that supported the financial market through various stress situations over the past 15 years. When comprehensively evaluating the impact of quantitative easing, the broad economic and financial benefits of such interventions should be taken into account.	Information on past measures	0.1	Information on past measures	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.0	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	Information on past measures
4. 71 In this outlook, these alternative deficit measures indicate that:	0.1	2024-2028 average growth rate	2024-2028 average growth rate	Information on past measures	Information on past measures	0.0	0.0
The primary deficit will be 1. 2% of GDP this year and will remain in deficit until 2026-2027, when it will turn into a surplus. At the projected horizon, the deficit will reach a surplus of 1. 6% of GDP, which would be the largest primary surplus since 2000-01.	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
The current account deficit is estimated to narrow from 1. 7% of GDP this year to a surplus of 0. 2% of GDP in 2027-2028, rising to 0. 4% of GDP in 2028-29. This would be the largest current account surplus since 2001-02.
2025-26	0.1	0.9	1.8	0.5	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. < SPAN> 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) will maintain 4 % or more for the time being, and will drop slightly to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	2024-2028 average growth rate
Forecast for November 2023	0.2	0.7	2.0	1.5	0.7	0.2	0.1
Net borrowing in public sector decreases year by year and increases debt. In 2023-24, borrowing was added 114. 1 billion pounds, accounting for three-fifths of debt fluctuations, and in 2028-29, a decrease of £ 39. 4 billion, a fifth of the increase in debt.	2024-2028 average growth rate	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	2.4	0.2	2, 40 RHDI per capita has increased from 2023-24 for the third consecutive year, and is expected to recover the peak before the pandemic in 2025-26, two years earlier than the forecast in November. This is mainly because the recovery from the situation of the trade shock is accelerated, and the ratio of the whole economy as a whole is high in the labor market in the short term. During the forecast period, RHDI per person increases about 1%from the prediction as of November. With a decrease in consumer prices, RHDI per capita rises 1. 3%from November. In accordance with the decline in inflation, the per capita income per person by 2028-29 will decrease by 0. 7%(the offset is not perfect due to the improvement of trade conditions). In addition, RHDI per capita increases 0. 6 % due to household benefits and tax predictions and policy changes. It is expected that the NIC headline tax rate will be reduced by 2 pounds, which was announced in this budget, will directly increase the real household income by 0. 5 %. This will be added to the same scale by reducing the NIC announced in the fall of 2023. These estimates do not take into account the behavioral reaction to the policy or the financial hinder due to the freezing of the tax standard.	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	2024-2028 average growth rate
Вые раты потов уаДол на 30, 6 мов сод3-24 воДах 7, 9 мд фов сов восдющ годы. Эотажае рдса, иые поцы поцо сайам.
Поч фаноые уац уаю в са 4, 1 мд фов соД подя рд фов сов в 2023-24 годωах, но в дал, вот Д8-29 год8-29 год8-29 год8-29 уа Дола сае. эот поф полос оде ооном (отатой пой) ковом ыыпый уа 17 5 мД ов вод3-24 годωах, но сае, посолагаг, чо со вав н Долом (DMO) в к к вып ных gilts по ц, бой комал. [41]	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0

84. 9

88. 8

91. 7

92. 8

93. 2

Table A.3: Determinants of the fiscal forecast

93. 2							92. 9
-0, 8	British service trade has continued to grow strongly, including the relationship with the EU, despite the increase in trade barriers after Brexit. Looking at the configuration by department, about tw o-thirds of the growth of trade services since 2019 are leading by the "Other Business Services" department, including management consultants, research and development, and advertising (Chart H). 。 In contrast, financial services and transportation exports have been delayed to other departments, and each has decreased by 5 and 9 %to 2, 0 %. These are the most susceptible sectors due to the effects of blepjit friction.
Note: This includes gains from bringing offshore sheltered trusts into UK taxable range for certain deemed residential and non-residential properties not subject to the new regime.	The powerful growth of the UK's "Other Business Services" may reflect several factors. First, the trade barrier with the EU may be lower than the strict regulations such as goods and banking businesses. In the second G, exports to the United States have shown a particularly powerful growth, which may have been supported by recent pounds and incorporate outsourcing operations on the U. S. company to the UK. H Finally, it is suggested that service companies may avoid trade barriers by selling through overseas subsidiaries.	As a whole, our assumptions on the impact of Brexit seem to be as planned, and recently published research is generally consistent with these estimates. However, considering the challenges of the confusion due to the simultaneous impact of geopolitical trends that affect Braeggit, pandemic, and other global trade, it is still difficult to make a solid conclusion. Trade data is unstable, especially service trade is easily corrected. In addition, the complete implementation of the TCA will further increase the barrier of goods trade with the EU. It is expected that the impact of Bluejit will appear completely a few years after the complete implementation of these barriers. Until then, we will continue to consider Brexit projects.	(a) OBR, Brexit and the Obr's Brexit Forecast, Octom 2018. Detailed analysis of trade and productivity relevance is box 2.	b) See. Box 2. The economic impact of Brexit on investment and immigration is 4 in March 2023 for economic and tax prospects.	c) See. Box D: Briefing Agent on the Bank of England, February 2024, February 2024.	d) Resolution Foundation, Ending Stagnation: New economic strategy for the UK, December 2023.
Difference in nominal GDP (1)
Real GDP per capita	1.7	0.2	1.2	1.9	2.0	1.8	1.7	9.1
-0. 4	8.1	7.0	2.0	3.2	3.8	3.7	3.7	-0. 4
-0. 3	-0. 4	-0. 3	-0. 2	Note: Including Bank of England PSND	95. 7	97. 6	98. 8	655
96. 4	95. 5	95. 1	94. 3	Billion GBP	Forecast for November 2023	2. 251	2. 458	611
2. 603	7.1	6.7	3.6	2.6	2.8	2.9	3.1	2. 724
2. 845	9.6	5.0	-14	3.2	4.3	4.7	4.9	3. 039
Forecast for March 2024	2. 252	7.5	2.9	3.6	3.8	3.9	4.0	2. 447
2. 593
2. 715	6.8	6.5	0.8	1.3	1.7	1.9	1.9	-539
0, 3	3. 033	7.5	2.4	2.2	2.6	3.0	2.9	B) Specifically, "The financial forecasting room of the independent budget liability bureau is stated that the UK does not borrow money to cover daily expenditures, and that the number of basic debt decreases on a sustainable base."
-1. 2	Tax	5.7	1.6	1.6	1.7	2.0	2.0	Final cost
-9. 6	5.7	6.5	3.1	1.9	2.1	2.3	2.6	Discretionary spending increases announced in March 2020 and spring 2022 increased spending as a percentage of GDP by 1. 4 percentage points, mainly due to increases in sectoral spending in the March 2020 budget and the October 2021 spending revision.
-10. 6	0. 4	8.5	3.7	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.6	Of which
Basic PSNB forecast revisions
home	-20. 2	-1. 0	-36. 1	-39. 7	-40. 4	Basic forecast	3. 24 The taxation basis for this measure is the total amount of the consumed E-liquid and is divided according to three different interest rates. The estimate is one of the causes of uncertainty in this cost calculation. Since the data on the current number of British manufacturers and importers is incomplete, tax bases are estimated by combining survey data, HMRC information, and external data sources. Furthermore, although the degree of existing compliance violations is uncertain, the existing tax gap estimation values for tobacco products are estimated. [14] Finally, it is uncertain how much taxation base decreases due to the ban on single use. We assume that 40%of existing users will switch to alternatives that pay tariffs.	1.4
Debt expenditure	1.0	Information on past measures	2027-28	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	Information on past measures	0.0	0.0	The two new tax revenues of E-liquid and carbon border regulation mechanism used at the time of release will increase the number of tax revenues by £ 700 million by 2028-29.
-3. 0
-3. 2	-6. 2	-6. 1	-5. 6	Note: PSND including Bank of England	2. 540	2. 691	2. 793	740
2. 820	9.9	home	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of revenues in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	1.1	2024-2028 average growth rate	2.4	1.8	1) Unregulated GDP as of end-March.
4. 79 The PSND plateau peaks at 98. 8% of GDP in 2024-25, then declines to 94. 3% of GDP by the projection period (Figure 4. 18). The main differences between the PSND and PSND ex BOE reflect the funding period (TFS) and gilt valuation effects under the APF.[42] These differences narrow over the projection period as TFS repayments are made and the APF is unwound, with the overall gap narrowing to 1. 4 percentage points by 2028-29.	8.4	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. < SPAN> 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) will maintain 4 % or more for the time being, and will drop slightly to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	-55	0.5	2.6	3.5	3.7	7.3
4. 82 Main economic uncertainty in this forecast includes the following:	Changes in bank interest rates and interest rates since the previous forecasts are generally convenient for finances, reducing debt spending every year. This is a part of the outlook as of November, which has a significant increase in debt costs. In Box 4. 3, we see more in detail the impact of interest rate fluctuations on finances. If bank interest rates and girt yield yields rise by 1 % in total forecasts, debt costs in 2028-29 will increase by about 14. 5 billion pounds, and the loss of English Bank (APF) will increase by 52. 7 billion pounds (see BOX 4. 4). < SPAN> 80 Chart 4-18 also indicates the prediction of net financial debt (PSNFL) in the public sector and the net assets of the public sector (PSNW). These indicators peaked in 2024-25, and then decreased along the predictable horizon. Basic debt increases by 4. 2 % in GDP between 2023-24 and 2028-29, whereas PSNFL decreases by 4. 2 %. This reflects the costs of assets such as student loans added to debts, while both assets and liabilities are recorded in PSNFL. (Reversal) PSNW is decreasing rapidly, and predicted has decreased by 5 or 6 % of GDP. In addition to a 4. 2%decrease in PSNFL GDP, this reflects the increase of no n-financial assets GDP by 0. 6%and the decrease by 0. 5%of the GDP of unbrown pension debt.	993	4. In recent years, major economic turmoil and aftermath have often revised the economic and financial outlook. Therefore, we will continue to emphasize the uncertainty surrounding our predictions, in light of the rapidly changing economic situation and the possibility that one of our main judgments is extremely optimistic or pessimistic. 。	4. 82 Main economic uncertainty in this forecast includes the following:	Autumn 2023 NICS declaration	4. In recent years, major economic turmoil and aftermath have often revised the economic and financial outlook. Therefore, we will continue to emphasize the uncertainty surrounding our predictions, in light of the rapidly changing economic situation and the possibility that one of our main judgments is extremely optimistic or pessimistic. 。	4. 82 Main economic uncertainty in this forecast includes the following:	198
Changes in bank interest rates and interest rates since the previous forecasts are generally convenient for finances, reducing debt spending every year. This is a part of the outlook as of November, which has a significant increase in debt costs. In box 4. 3, we see more in detail the impact of interest rate fluctuations on finances. If bank interest rates and girt yield yields rise by 1 % in total forecasts, debt costs in 2028-29 will increase by about 14. 5 billion pounds, and the loss of English Bank (APF) will increase by 52. 7 billion pounds (see BOX 4. 4).	-13. 5	Limit	2.0	1.0	1.6	1.8	1.9	1.8
The most major changes to the prediction after November are the updated pure immigration predictions and the LFS data of ONS. In particular, based on the changes in the policy announced after November, the level of immigration in the future is extremely uncertain and difficult to predict. The following box 4. 5 explains how changes in pure immigrants affect financial predictions and explore the effects of alternative scenarios against finances.	-0, 4	1. 285	1.1	1.3	1.7	1.9	1.9	3.4
The expansion of dispute in the Middle East has a significant risk not only on the elasticity of the supply chain but also to the trends in energy prices. Box 2. 2 and Chapter 5 showed a lowering scenario that the dispute expanded, the quarterly inflation rate was around 7%, and interest rates rise. In this case, it is estimated that the average annual borrowing of £ 23. 1 billion will increase, and the ratio of basic debt to GDP may increase by 0. 8 % from the expected horizon.
The most major changes to the prediction after November are the updated pure immigration predictions and the LFS data of ONS. In particular, based on the changes in the policy announced after November, the level of immigration in the future is extremely uncertain and difficult to predict. The following box 4. 5 explains how changes in pure immigrants affect financial predictions and explore the effects of alternative scenarios against finances.	4. 83 Financial forecast also has a polic y-related risk that can have a significant impact on the available tax bundles:	Financial forecasts assume that by 2028-29, the tax vs. GDP ratio increased by 1. 1 % from the current level and reached the highest after the war, 37. 1 %. About tw o-thirds of this increase are due to freezing of personal income tax deductions announced after March 2021, which will bring about £ 7 billion of pounds in each year of freezing. In addition, one-seventh is due to the rare implementation of the fuel master, which will bring about 4. 8 billion pounds by 2028-29. If the tax and GDP ratio reached the level of 2023-24, the tax revenue for 2028-29 will decrease by £ 34. 3 billion. Productivity growth is the center of economic forecasts that support our fiscal forecasts as the main propulsion of medium- to lon g-term economic growth. The growth of productivity exceeding our forecast (average 0. 9%) has been observed in many periods (about 0. 5%) after the financial crisis, but is still below the 2%trend before the financial crisis. There is. According to the EFO scenario analysis in November 2023, if the productivity is higher or lower than the central prediction, the borrowing will be estimated by 46 billion pm or an increase of 42. 2 billion pounds by the end of the prediction. I'm doing it.	The expansion of dispute in the Middle East has a significant risk not only on the elasticity of the supply chain but also to the trends in energy prices. Box 2. 2 and Chapter 5 showed a lowering scenario that the dispute expanded, the quarterly inflation rate was around 7%, and interest rates rise. In this case, it is estimated that the average annual borrowing of £ 23. 1 billion will increase, and the ratio of basic debt to GDP may increase by 0. 8 % from the expected horizon.	The most major changes to the prediction after November are the updated pure immigration predictions and the LFS data of ONS. In particular, based on the changes in the policy announced after November, the level of immigration in the future is extremely uncertain and difficult to predict. The following box 4. 5 explains how changes in pure immigrants affect financial predictions and explore the effects of alternative scenarios against finances.	4. 83 Financial forecast also has a polic y-related risk that can have a significant impact on the available tax bundles:	Financial forecasts assume that by 2028-29, the tax and GDP ratio will increase by 1. 1 % from the current level and will be 37. 1 % after the war. About tw o-thirds of this increase are due to freezing of personal income tax deductions announced after March 2021, which will bring about £ 7 billion of pounds in each year of freezing. In addition, one-seventh is due to the rare implementation of the fuel master, which will bring about 4. 8 billion pounds by 2028-29. If the tax and GDP ratio reached the level of 2023-24, the tax revenue for 2028-29 will decrease by £ 34. 3 billion.	There are no detailed departmental spending plans beyond the current Spending Review period, which ends in 2024-25. Our forecasts assume that departmental spending over the next four years will follow two overall envelopes set by the government. These will result in no real increase in departmental spending per capita over the next five years. As shown in Box 4. 2, achieving existing commitments on health, defence, schools, childcare and overseas spending will require real annual cuts of 2. 3% in all other departmental budgets from 2025-26 onwards. Recent history shows that when it comes time to allocate departmental total spending budgets in spending reviews, governments tend to fill them. For the two Spending Reviews in November 2015 and October 2021, the government completed RDEL envelopes averaging £39 billion and £32 billion per year, respectively. In our five-year projections, the impact of additional immigration on fiscal projections is a function of four factors:	These costs and the payments immigrants make to enter the country. Most immigrants, except asylum seekers and those under the EU settlement system, pay both the application fee and the Immigration Health Premium (IHS) related to their visa category. The average immigrant will pay around £1, 900 in visa fees and around £2, 600 in IHS, plus an additional £800 per immigrant in employer-sponsored immigration skills charges. Total revenue from these sources amounts to £4. 1 billion per year under current projections.
General taxes paid by immigrants as workers, consumers and residents after they enter the country. As noted in Box 2. 3, immigrants are estimated to have a slightly higher participation rate than residents, as younger immigrants are concentrated in early old age. Furthermore, assuming that new immigrants have similar employment, consumption and settlement patterns as residents and therefore pay the same broad-based taxes, their per capita contributions would be close to the average for UK adults, at around £19, 500 per year, above our projections. There are no detailed departmental spending plans beyond the current Spending Review period, which ends in 2024-25. Our projections assume that departmental spending over the next four years will follow two overall envelopes set by the government. These will result in no real increase in departmental spending per capita over the next five years. As shown in Box 4. 2, achieving existing commitments on health, defence, schools, childcare and overseas spending would require real annual cuts of 2. 3% in all other departmental budgets from 2025-26 onwards. Recent history shows that when it comes time to allocate departmental total spending budgets in the Spending Review, governments tend to fill them. For the two Spending Reviews in November 2015 and October 2021, the Government has completed RDEL envelopes of £39 billion and £32 billion per year respectively.	In our five-year forecasts, the impact of additional immigration on fiscal projections is a function of four factors:	These costs and the migrants pay to enter the country. Most migrants, except asylum seekers and those under the EU settlement system, pay both an application fee and the Immigration Health Premium (IHS) related to their visa category. The average migrant will pay around £1, 900 in visa fees and around £2, 600 in IHS, plus an additional £800 per migrant in employer-sponsored immigration skills charges. Total revenue from these sources amounts to £4. 1 billion per year under current forecasts.	General taxes that migrants pay as workers, consumers and residents once they enter the country. As noted in Box 2. 3, immigrants are estimated to have slightly higher participation rates than residents, as young immigrants are concentrated in early old age. Furthermore, new immigrants have similar employment, consumption and settlement patterns as residents, so if we assume that they pay the same broad-based taxes, their per capita contributions would be close to the average for UK adults, at around £19, 500 per year, which is higher than our projections. There are no detailed departmental spending plans beyond the current Spending Review period, which ends in 2024-25. Our projections assume that departmental spending over the next four years will follow two overall envelopes set by the government. These will result in no real increase in departmental spending per capita over the next five years. As shown in Box 4. 2, achieving existing commitments on health, defence, schools, childcare and overseas spending will require real annual cuts of 2. 3% in all other departmental budgets from 2025-26 onwards. Recent history shows that when it comes time to allocate departmental total spending allowances in the Spending Review, governments tend to fill them. For the two Spending Reviews in November 2015 and October 2021, the Government has completed RDEL envelopes of £39 billion and £32 billion per year respectively.	In our five-year forecasts, the impact of additional immigration on fiscal projections is a function of four factors:	These costs and the migrants pay to enter the country. Most migrants, except asylum seekers and those under the EU settlement system, pay both an application fee and the Immigration Health Premium (IHS) related to their visa category. The average migrant will pay around £1, 900 in visa fees and around £2, 600 in IHS, plus an additional £800 per migrant in employer-sponsored immigration skills charges. Total revenue from these sources amounts to £4. 1 billion per year under current forecasts.	General taxes that migrants pay as workers, consumers and residents once they enter the country. As noted in Box 2. 3, immigrants are estimated to have slightly higher participation rates than residents because younger immigrants are concentrated in early old age. Furthermore, assuming that new immigrants have similar employment, consumption and settlement patterns as residents and pay similar levels of broad-based taxes, their per capita contributions would be close to the average for UK adults, about £19, 500 per year, higher than our estimate.	The welfare allowance that immigrants can receive are limited to at least five years after entering the country. Most new immigrants cannot be initially benefited, except for the return to the United Kingdom and Ireland or who have entered the country on humanitarian routes. The qualification of the public pension requires that the payment of national insurance premiums for at least 10 years has been approved, so almost all new immigrants are not initially eligible. Therefore, the impact of new immigrants on welfare expenditures in five years of prediction is very small.	Immigrants use public services such as education, medical care, and transportation, but have no direct relationship between the population size and the funds assigned to the public service category. At present, the expenditure limit (DELS) of each major public service (DELS) is set by the government by the government until the end of the 2024-25 expenditure review period. After that, the government will provide us a prerequisite for the total growth of ordinary and capital spending, but will not provide detailed plans for each department. As mentioned in Paragraph 4. 54, the government has not adjusted these standard values and assumptions toward the population increase, so since the plan was created in October 2021, actual public services per capita. Is suggested that it is decreasing.
Therefore, in our central predictions in the fall, the impact on pure finances when pure immigrants increase by 350. 000 (about 300. 000 adults) are as follows:	From 2028 to 29, specific fees and fees paid by these additional immigrants will increase by £ 300 million.	Increase the general tax revenue paid by these additional immigrants in 2028-2029;	Since only 2028-29 new immigrants are eligible, welfare expenditures will be kept in a large width.	Expenditures for public services are almost unchanged, but in 2028-29, DEL expenditures per capita are reduced by 40 pounds and pressure on these services increases. and	As a result, in consideration of a decrease in debt-payment expenditures, the reduction in borrowing of about £ 7. 4 billion by 2028-29 will be achieved.	Since only 2028-29 new immigrants are eligible, welfare expenditures will be kept in a large width.	Immigrants use public services such as education, medical care, and transportation, but have no direct relationship between the population size and the funds assigned to the public service category. At present, the expenditure limit (DELS) of each major public service (DELS) is set by the government by the government until the end of the 2024-25 expenditure review period. After that, the government will provide us a prerequisite for the total growth of ordinary and capital spending, but will not provide detailed plans for each department. As mentioned in Paragraph 4. 54, the government has not adjusted these standard values and assumptions toward the population increase, so since the plan was created in October 2021, actual public services per capita. Is suggested that it is decreasing.	Therefore, in our central predictions in the fall, the impact on pure finances when pure immigrants increase by 350. 000 (about 300. 000 adults) are as follows:
From 2028 to 29, specific fees and fees paid by these additional immigrants will increase by £ 300 million.	Increase the general tax revenue paid by these additional immigrants in 2028-2029;	Since only 2028-29 new immigrants are eligible, welfare expenditures will be kept in a large width.	Expenditures for public services are almost unchanged, but in 2028-29, DEL expenditures per capita are reduced by 40 pounds and pressure on these services increases. and	As a result, in consideration of a decrease in debt-payment expenditures, the reduction in borrowing of about £ 7. 4 billion by 2028-29 will be achieved.	Welfare allowances that can be received by the impact on the fiscal resources of alternative immigration scenarios are limited to at least five years after entering the country for most immigrants. Most new immigrants cannot be initially benefited, except for the return to the United Kingdom and Ireland or who have entered the country on humanitarian routes. The qualification of the public pension requires that the payment of national insurance premiums for at least 10 years has been approved, so almost all new immigrants are not initially eligible. Therefore, the impact of new immigrants on welfare expenditures in five years of prediction is very small.	Immigrants use public services such as education, medical care, and transportation, but have no direct relationship between the population size and the funds assigned to the public service category. At present, the expenditure limit (DELS) of each major public service (DELS) is set by the government by the government until the end of the 2024-25 expenditure review period. After that, the government will provide us a prerequisite for the total growth of ordinary and capital spending, but will not provide detailed plans for each department. As mentioned in Paragraph 4. 54, the government has not adjusted these standard values and assumptions toward the population increase, so since the plan was created in October 2021, actual public services per capita. Is suggested that it is decreasing.	Therefore, in our central predictions in the fall, the impact on pure finances when pure immigrants increase by 350. 000 (about 300. 000 adults) are as follows:	-498
Increase the general tax revenue paid by these additional immigrants in 2028-2029;	3. 033	7. 6	As a result, in consideration of a decrease in debt-payment expenditures, the reduction in borrowing of about £ 7. 4 billion by 2028-29 will be achieved.	9.6	8.6	7.7	6.8	261, 5
To explore the fiscal impact of uncertainty about future immigration levels, we use the increasing and decreasing immigration scenarios described in Box 2. 3, in which net immigration is 200, 000 more or less per year than the central forecast. These scenarios assume that additional immigrants have the same levels of participation and productivity per hour as assumed in the central forecast. We then make different assumptions about how spending on public services responds to the level of net immigration.
No adjustment in service expenditure (DEL): In the highest immigration scenario, revenues increase by £18 billion above the forecast horizon, with contributions from both the immigration special charge (£0. 5 billion) and general taxes (£17. 5 billion). Assuming that immigrants do not receive welfare and that DEL spending is not adjusted to reflect population growth, the only impact on spending is a reduction in debt expenditure of £1. 9 billion due to a reduction in the debt stock. Overall, we estimate that the debt stock will fall by £19. 9 billion in 2028-29, a 3. 1% decrease in the debt stock as a percentage of GDP. The opposite scenario is a reduced immigration scenario, with lower revenues and spending resulting in an increase in borrowing of £19 billion in 2028-29, and an increase in debt of 3. 1% of GDP.	2.3	5.0	4.4	3.5	3.2	3.2	3.2	0.9
Adjusted public service sector expenditure (DEL): In the increased immigration scenario, if the government responded to the increase in immigration by keeping sector expenditure per capita the same as the central forecast, it would require around £8. 1 billion in extra spending by 2028-29. This may overestimate spending pressures as new immigrants tend to be of working age, with fewer children and older people relative to the population. This reduces per capita pressures on services such as schools and hospitals. Adjusting for this, an extra £6. 1 billion in 2028-29 would be required to provide equivalent services for the additional immigration in the high scenario. Given this, in our scenario immigration still improves public finances as some of the higher evidence generated by additional immigration is offset by higher spending, but the effect is smaller than in the unadjusted Dell scenario, reducing borrowing by £13. 1 billion and reducing debt by 2. 5% of GDP by 2028-29. The reduced immigration scenario has the opposite effect, increasing borrowing and debt by £13. 1 billion and 2. 5% of GDP.	3.1	4.2	3.9	3.9	4.0	4.2	4.4	1.3
These scenarios are simplified and highly uncertain. It is sensitive to the assumption of immigration, such as immigration age, ability, and average income. It also depends on the level of expenditures of each ministry and agency set by the government to respond to the elderly population. In addition, only the economic and financial impacts during the fiv e-year prediction period are considered. The overall lon g-term impact of immigrants to the finances is more uncertain. The financial impact of immigrants reflects that at least five years later, the immigration may apply for indefinite residue, resulting in the possibility that the welfare benefits may be eligible, and the benefits of time are small over time. There is a high possibility. If immigrants are older, if they stay in the UK, the pressure on pensions and medical expenditures will increase and tax revenues will decrease as they retire.	A) As time passes, some new immigrants change their residence to "indefinite residual permission" and get the right to receive welfare. Currently, the minimum living period required to shift to an indefinite residual permit is not included in the forecast period because it is more than 5 years. However, the withdrawal data, which is the starting point of the prediction, includes claims from immigrants from the previous group, which is currently claiming welfare, so the cost is captured.	A) As time passes, some new immigrants change their residence to "indefinite residual permission" and get the right to receive welfare. Currently, the minimum living period required to shift to an indefinite residual permit is not included in the forecast period because it is more than 5 years. However, the withdrawal data, which is the starting point of the prediction, includes claims from immigrants from the previous group, which is currently claiming welfare, so the cost is captured.	A) As time passes, some new immigrants change their residence to "indefinite residual permission" and get the right to receive welfare. Currently, the minimum living period required to shift to an indefinite residual permit is not included in the forecast period because it is more than 5 years. However, the withdrawal data, which is the starting point of the prediction, includes claims from immigrants from the previous group, which is currently claiming welfare, so the cost is captured.	A) As time passes, some new immigrants change their residence to "indefinite residual permission" and get the right to receive welfare. Currently, the minimum living period required to shift to an indefinite residual permit is not included in the forecast period because it is more than 5 years. However, the withdrawal data, which is the starting point of the prediction, includes claims from immigrants from the previous group, which is currently claiming welfare, so the cost is captured.	A) As time passes, some new immigrants change their residence to "indefinite residual permission" and get the right to receive welfare. Currently, the minimum living period required to shift to an indefinite residual permit is not included in the forecast period because it is more than 5 years. However, the withdrawal data, which is the starting point of the prediction, includes claims from immigrants from the previous group, which is currently claiming welfare, so the cost is captured.	A) As time passes, some new immigrants change their residence to "indefinite residual permission" and get the right to receive welfare. Currently, the minimum living period required to shift to an indefinite residual permit is not included in the forecast period because it is more than 5 years. However, the withdrawal data, which is the starting point of the prediction, includes claims from immigrants from the previous group, which is currently claiming welfare, so the cost is captured.	A) As time passes, some new immigrants change their residence to "indefinite residual permission" and get the right to receive welfare. Currently, the minimum living period required to shift to an indefinite residual permit is not included in the forecast period because it is more than 5 years. However, the withdrawal data, which is the starting point of the prediction, includes claims from immigrants from the previous group, which is currently claiming welfare, so the cost is captured.	5. 1 Chapter

In this chapter, the government's financial goals are determined and the possibility that the current policy will be achieved in accordance with our central prediction (from paragraph 5. 2).

Under various types of shock patterns, fluctuations of major macroeconomics and financial decisions, alternative scenarios for major predictions, the risks related to fiscal predictions and risks to achieve the financial goal Consider (from paragraph 5. 16).

5. 2 The Budget Liability Charter calls OBR determines whether the government has more than 50 % of the possibility that the government will achieve fiscal goals under the current policy. The first charter was set in 2011 and has been updated six times with the revision of the government's fiscal goals. The latest version was approved by the Diet on February 6, 2023 and set three fiscal goals:

"Financial obligation" is obliged to reduce the pure GDP ratio of pure debt in the public sector except England from the fifth year (now 2028-29). These scenarios are simplified and highly uncertain. It is sensitive to the assumption of immigration, such as immigration age, ability, and average income. It also depends on the level of expenditures of each ministry and agency set by the government to respond to the elderly population. In addition, only the economic and financial impacts during the fiv e-year prediction period are considered. The overall lon g-term impact of immigrants to the finances is more uncertain. The financial impact of immigrants reflects that at least five years later, the immigration may apply for indefinite residue, resulting in the possibility that the welfare benefits may be eligible, and the benefits of time are small over time. There is a high possibility. If immigrants are older, if they stay in the UK, the pressure on pensions and medical expenditures will increase and tax revenues will decrease as they retire.

A) As time passes, some new immigrants change their residence to "indefinite residual permission" and get the right to receive welfare. Currently, the minimum living period required to shift to an indefinite residual permit is not included in the forecast period because it is more than 5 years. However, the withdrawal data, which is the starting point of the prediction, includes claims from immigrants from the previous group, which is currently claiming welfare, so the cost is captured.

5. 1 Chapter

In this chapter, the government's financial goals are determined and the possibility that the current policy will be achieved in accordance with our central prediction (from paragraph 5. 2).

"Financial obligation" is obliged to reduce the pure GDP ratio of pure debt in the public sector except England from the fifth year (now 2028-29).

Table A.4: Determinants of the fiscal forecast: changes since November

2024-25
-0, 8	British service trade has continued to grow strongly, including the relationship with the EU, despite the increase in trade barriers after Brexit. Looking at the configuration by department, about tw o-thirds of the growth of trade services since 2019 are leading by the "Other Business Services" department, including management consultants, research and development, and advertising (Chart H). 。 In contrast, financial services and transportation exports have been delayed to other departments, and each has decreased by 5 and 9 %to 2, 0 %. These are the most susceptible sectors due to the effects of blepjit friction.
Note: This includes gains from bringing offshore sheltered trusts into UK taxable range for certain deemed residential and non-residential properties not subject to the new regime.	The powerful growth of the UK's "Other Business Services" may reflect several factors. First, the trade barrier with the EU may be lower than the strict regulations such as goods and banking businesses. In the second G, exports to the United States have shown a particularly powerful growth, which may have been supported by recent pounds and incorporate outsourcing operations on the U. S. company to the UK. H Finally, it is suggested that service companies may avoid trade barriers by selling through overseas subsidiaries.	As a whole, our assumptions on the impact of Brexit seem to be as planned, and recently published research is generally consistent with these estimates. However, considering the challenges of the confusion due to the simultaneous impact of geopolitical trends that affect Braeggit, pandemic, and other global trade, it is still difficult to make a solid conclusion. Trade data is unstable, especially service trade is easily corrected. In addition, the complete implementation of the TCA will further increase the barrier of goods trade with the EU. It is expected that the impact of Bluejit will appear completely a few years after the complete implementation of these barriers. Until then, we will continue to consider Brexit projects.	(a) OBR, Brexit and the Obr's Brexit Forecast, Octom 2018. Detailed analysis of trade and productivity relevance is box 2.	b) See. Box 2. The economic impact of Brexit on investment and immigration is 4 in March 2023 for economic and tax prospects.	c) See. Box D: Briefing Agent on the Bank of England, February 2024, February 2024.	d) Resolution Foundation, Ending Stagnation: New economic strategy for the UK, December 2023.
Difference in nominal GDP (1)
Real GDP per capita	0.0	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	0.3	0.4	2024-2028 average growth rate	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.0
-0. 4	0.0	0.2	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of revenues in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0
-0. 3	1	5	probability	probability	2023 November forecast	wrap	wrap
96. 4	3	-4	12. 820	wrap	2023 November forecast	wrap	2023 November forecast
2. 603	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.1	Information on past measures	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	Information on past measures
2. 845	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of revenues in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	Employee	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of revenues in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	0.8	1.1	1.6
Forecast for March 2024	Information on past measures	2024-2028 average growth rate	-45	0.6	0.6	0.0	0.0
2. 593
2. 715	0.1	0.4	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of means of revenue increase in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	0.1	0.1	0.1
0, 3	0.0	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. < SPAN> 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) will maintain 4 % or more for the time being, and will drop slightly to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	March 2024	Information on past measures	0.0	0.1	0.0
-1. 2	0.0	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	Total (personal tax decision)	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.0
-9. 6	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	0.2	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	0.0	2024-2028 average growth rate	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	Information on past measures
-10. 6	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	Information on past measures
Basic PSNB forecast revisions
home	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.3	0.3
Debt expenditure	Information on past measures	Information on past measures	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.0
-3. 0
-3. 2	0	2023 November forecast	No surcharge	5. 8 The purpose of the government's legislation is that the ratio of basic debt (excluding England Bank) to GDP will decline from 2028-29, which is the fifth year and final year of the prediction. Based on the current predictions on the current market environment and financial transactions, to stabilize the debt balance vs. GDP ratio, a basic budget deficit with a 1. 2 % GDP ratio (government borrowing excluding net paid) until 2028-29. It is necessary to switch to a basic finance surplus of 1. 3 % GDP. According to this prediction, the government achieved a 1. 6 % GDP-rated basic surplus in 2028-29, and as a result, the basic debt vs. GDP ratio decreased by 0. 3. As mentioned in Chapter 4, this is achieved by combining the expenditure reduction of the economy through the forecast period and the tax increase through the forecast period and the tax increase in order to make the basic budget surplus be more than the stable stabilization level.	3. 7	5. 8 The purpose of the government's legislation is that the ratio of basic debt (excluding England Bank) to GDP will decline from 2028-29, which is the fifth year and final year of the prediction. Based on the current predictions on the current market environment and financial transactions, to stabilize the debt balance vs. GDP ratio, a basic budget deficit with a 1. 2 % GDP ratio (government borrowing excluding net paid) until 2028-29. It is necessary to switch to a basic finance surplus of 1. 3 % GDP. According to this prediction, the government achieved a 1. 6 % GDP-rated basic surplus in 2028-29, and as a result, the basic debt vs. GDP ratio decreased by 0. 3. As mentioned in Chapter 4, this is achieved by combining the expenditure reduction of the economy through the forecast period and the tax increase through the forecast period and the tax increase in order to make the basic budget surplus be more than the stable stabilization level.	12. 820
2. 820	2.9	1.5	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of revenues in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact of all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of November 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. < SPAN> 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) will maintain 4 % or more for the time being, and will drop slightly to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.
4. 79 The PSND plateau peaks at 98. 8% of GDP in 2024-25, then declines to 94. 3% of GDP by the projection period (Figure 4. 18). The main differences between the PSND and PSND ex BOE reflect the funding period (TFS) and gilt valuation effects under the APF.[42] These differences narrow over the projection period as TFS repayments are made and the APF is unwound, with the overall gap narrowing to 1. 4 percentage points by 2028-29.	Information on past measures	0.2	2.5	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. < SPAN> 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) will maintain 4 % or more for the time being, and will drop slightly to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	The two new tax revenues of E-liquid and carbon border regulation mechanism used at the time of release will increase the number of tax revenues by £ 700 million by 2028-29.	Information on past measures	0.0
4. 82 Main economic uncertainty in this forecast includes the following:	0	26	146	22	47	45	36
Changes in bank interest rates and interest rates since the previous forecasts are generally convenient for finances, reducing debt spending every year. This is a part of the outlook as of November, which has a significant increase in debt costs. In box 4. 3, we see more in detail the impact of interest rate fluctuations on finances. If bank interest rates and girt yield yields rise by 1 % in total forecasts, debt costs in 2028-29 will increase by about 14. 5 billion pounds, and the loss of English Bank (APF) will increase by 52. 7 billion pounds (see BOX 4. 4).	0.0	1. 322	3.2	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. < SPAN> 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) will maintain 4 % or more for the time being, and will drop slightly to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	0.0	0.0	0.0
The most major changes to the prediction after November are the updated pure immigration predictions and the LFS data of ONS. In particular, based on the changes in the policy announced after November, the level of immigration in the future is extremely uncertain and difficult to predict. The following box 4. 5 explains how changes in pure immigrants affect financial predictions and explore the effects of alternative scenarios against finances.	0.0	3.6	2.4	From 2008 to 2010, the financial crisis increased debt to nearly 35 % of GDP. This reflects the rapid shrinking of nominal GDP, reflecting that the cash value of the expenditure has risen to the GDP ratio and the basic budget deficit has increased rapidly, but tax revenues have decreased further than GDP. 。 The policy response to the government's crisis in the form of purchasing bank stocks, purchasing bankruptcy banks, and compensation for deposits means that financial transactions and evaluation effects have increased their debt.	3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact of all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of November 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	0.0	0.2
The expansion of dispute in the Middle East has a significant risk not only on the elasticity of the supply chain but also to the trends in energy prices. Box 2. 2 and Chapter 5 showed a lowering scenario that the dispute expanded, the quarterly inflation rate was around 7%, and interest rates rise. In this case, it is estimated that the average annual borrowing of £ 23. 1 billion will increase, and the ratio of basic debt to GDP may increase by 0. 8 % from the expected horizon.
The most major changes to the prediction after November are the updated pure immigration predictions and the LFS data of ONS. In particular, based on the changes in the policy announced after November, the level of immigration in the future is extremely uncertain and difficult to predict. The following box 4. 5 explains how changes in pure immigrants affect financial predictions and explore the effects of alternative scenarios against finances.	With a financial transaction and evaluation effect, 1. 9 % of GDP's debt increases on average during the predictive period. These are partially acquired during the QE period, due to interes t-related factors due to losses and redemption of pockets held by England Bank's assets. Increasing pure student loan costs also increase debt. < SPAN> From 2008 to 2010, the financial crisis increased debt to nearly 35 % of GDP. This reflects the rapid shrinking of nominal GDP, reflecting that the cash value of the expenditure has risen to the GDP ratio and the basic budget deficit has increased rapidly, but tax revenues have decreased further than GDP. 。 The policy response to the government's crisis in the form of purchasing bank stocks, purchasing bankruptcy banks, and compensation for deposits means that financial transactions and evaluation effects have increased their debt.	From 2011 to 2019, the debt balance vs. GDP rose first, then remained flat, and fell in the last year of this period. During this period, the government steadily reduced the basic budget deficit for the purpose of reduction in debt, and most of this period was supported by interest rates after the advantageous growth adjustment. Debt decreased by 1. 7 % of the yea r-o n-year due to the effects of financial transactions and rating (including the quantitative easing of England or the disposal of financial assets acquired through the quantitative ペ and the financial crisis intervention).	From late 2019 to 2023, pandemic and energy price shocks overlapped, increasing their GDP by 12. 6 %. The basic budget deficit reached a peak of 13. 2 % of the GDP in 2020-21, mainly due to a large policy support package for Cobid. At first, the growth rate at the start of pandemic, the rate of growing rates, raised the debt rapidly after adjusting the growth, but further reversed when the growth rate was recovered and the interest rate decreased.	According to the central prediction, the debt balance vs. GDP ratio (excluding England Bank) will increase by 3. 9 % this year and will increase GDP from 2023-24 to 2027-28. In the last year, the number of GDPs decreased by 0. 3 %. This reflects the following net effect:	With a financial transaction and evaluation effect, 1. 9 % of GDP's debt increases on average during the predictive period. These are partially acquired during the QE period, due to interes t-related factors due to losses and redemption of pockets held by England Bank's assets. Increasing pure student loan costs also increase debt. From 2008 to 2010, the financial crisis increased debt to nearly 35 % of GDP. This reflects the rapid shrinking of nominal GDP, reflecting that the cash value of the expenditure has risen to the GDP ratio and the basic budget deficit has increased rapidly, but tax revenues have decreased further than GDP. 。 The policy response to the government's crisis in the form of purchasing bank stocks, purchasing bankruptcy banks, and compensation for deposits means that financial transactions and evaluation effects have increased their debt.	From 2011 to 2019, the debt balance vs. GDP rose first, then remained flat, and fell in the last year of this period. During this period, the government steadily reduced the basic budget deficit for the purpose of reduction in debt, and most of this period was supported by interest rates after the advantageous growth adjustment. Debt decreased by 1. 7 % of the yea r-o n-year due to the effects of financial transactions and rating (including the quantitative easing of England or the disposal of financial assets acquired through the quantitative ペ and the financial crisis intervention).	From late 2019 to 2023, pandemic and energy price shocks overlapped, increasing their GDP by 12. 6 %. The basic budget deficit peaked at 13. 2 % of the GDP in 2020-21, mainly due to a large policy support package for Cobid. At first, the growth rate at the start of pandemic, the rate of growing rates, raised the debt rapidly after adjusting the growth, but further reversed when the growth rate was recovered and the interest rate decreased.
General taxes paid by immigrants as workers, consumers and residents after they enter the country. As noted in Box 2. 3, immigrants are estimated to have a slightly higher participation rate than residents, as younger immigrants are concentrated in early old age. Furthermore, assuming that new immigrants have similar employment, consumption and settlement patterns as residents and therefore pay the same broad-based taxes, their per capita contributions would be close to the average for UK adults, at around £19, 500 per year, above our projections. There are no detailed departmental spending plans beyond the current Spending Review period, which ends in 2024-25. Our projections assume that departmental spending over the next four years will follow two overall envelopes set by the government. These will result in no real increase in departmental spending per capita over the next five years. As shown in Box 4. 2, achieving existing commitments on health, defence, schools, childcare and overseas spending would require real annual cuts of 2. 3% in all other departmental budgets from 2025-26 onwards. Recent history shows that when it comes time to allocate departmental total spending budgets in the Spending Review, governments tend to fill them. For the two Spending Reviews in November 2015 and October 2021, the Government has completed RDEL envelopes of £39 billion and £32 billion per year respectively.	With a financial transaction and evaluation effect, 1. 9 % of GDP's debt increases on average during the predictive period. These are partially acquired during the QE period, due to interes t-related factors due to losses and redemption of pockets held by England Bank's assets. Increasing pure student loan costs also increase debt.	The interest rate after growth adjusts reduces debt during the predictive period o f-0. 4 % annual GDP. This growth adjustment rate is less financially effective than the period before the pandemic from 2011 to 2019 (average GD P-0. 7 %).	The basic financial balance turns from a deficit of 1, 2 % in 2023-24 to a 1, 6 % GDP in 2028-29. If this is realized, it will be the biggest basic surplus since this century.	α) In this framework, in order to consistently disassemble debt, a basic budget deficit is used using a GDP centered on March, and the financial transaction and evaluation effect are expressed in the GDP ratio.	b) In addition to the increase in net spending, the undergraduate student loan payment schedule has been changed from "Plan 2" and "Plan 5", so it is covered by financial transactions and evaluation effects instead of basic budget deficits. The percentage is larger.	5. 10 pounds for financial obligations in the forecasts of this one are only 7. 9 billion pounds after 2010, after 7. 1 billion pounds (6. 5 billion pounds per year) based on the current standards set up by Prime Minister Hunt on March 2023. The margin to the goal is second (excluding the pandemic period). Since the establishment of OBR, the government has set six different financial goals. Figure 5. 3 shows a margin for these mandates in successive predictions. In most cases, the Prime Minister has £ 15 billion to £ 30 billion, and has an average of £ 26. 1 billion (displayed in the current GDP). Also, as we examined in BOX 3. 1., the Prime Minister tends to improve the headroom, but if the basic outlook worsens, it tends to not offset it.	5. 11 The upper limit of welfare is to set the upper limit of the amount that the government can spend on a specific social security benefit and tax deduction in the final year of the Diet (currently in 2024-25). This was first introduced in 2014, and has been revised several times since then, reflecting significant revisions and neutral changes in budget neutral spending category.
5. 12 The upper limit of welfare and margin (allowance that exceeds the upper limit by 2. 0 % to prepare for the pressure and fluctuation of restricted social expenditures) is to lose £ 7. 4 billion in the latest prospects (Table 5. 2). The welfare cap target was revised down £ 1. 1 billion from the prediction as of November.	5. 1 Chapter	Hundreds of millions of pounds	afternoon	Prospect	2022-23	2023-24	2023-24
From 2028 to 29, specific fees and fees paid by these additional immigrants will increase by £ 300 million.	0.0	-0, 4	Policy risks describe potential policies that have not yet affected our central forecast.	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	-55	Spring 2024 NIC reduction	-0. 9
Increase the general tax revenue paid by these additional immigrants in 2028-2029;	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.4	0.3
To explore the fiscal impact of uncertainty about future immigration levels, we use the increasing and decreasing immigration scenarios described in Box 2. 3, in which net immigration is 200, 000 more or less per year than the central forecast. These scenarios assume that additional immigrants have the same levels of participation and productivity per hour as assumed in the central forecast. We then make different assumptions about how spending on public services responds to the level of net immigration.
No adjustment in service expenditure (DEL): In the highest immigration scenario, revenues increase by £18 billion above the forecast horizon, with contributions from both the immigration special charge (£0. 5 billion) and general taxes (£17. 5 billion). Assuming that immigrants do not receive welfare and that DEL spending is not adjusted to reflect population growth, the only impact on spending is a reduction in debt expenditure of £1. 9 billion due to a reduction in the debt stock. Overall, we estimate that the debt stock will fall by £19. 9 billion in 2028-29, a 3. 1% decrease in the debt stock as a percentage of GDP. The opposite scenario is a reduced immigration scenario, with lower revenues and spending resulting in an increase in borrowing of £19 billion in 2028-29, and an increase in debt of 3. 1% of GDP.	0.0	2024-2028 average growth rate	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of revenues in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	The two new tax revenues of E-liquid and carbon border regulation mechanism used at the time of release will increase the number of tax revenues by £ 700 million by 2028-29.	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of means of revenue increase in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	2027-28	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. < SPAN> 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) will maintain 4 % or more for the time being, and will drop slightly to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.
Adjusted public service sector expenditure (DEL): In the increased immigration scenario, if the government responded to the increase in immigration by keeping sector expenditure per capita the same as the central forecast, it would require around £8. 1 billion in extra spending by 2028-29. This may overestimate spending pressures as new immigrants tend to be of working age, with fewer children and older people relative to the population. This reduces per capita pressures on services such as schools and hospitals. Adjusting for this, an extra £6. 1 billion in 2028-29 would be required to provide equivalent services for the additional immigration in the high scenario. Given this, in our scenario immigration still improves public finances as some of the higher evidence generated by additional immigration is offset by higher spending, but the effect is smaller than in the unadjusted Dell scenario, reducing borrowing by £13. 1 billion and reducing debt by 2. 5% of GDP by 2028-29. The reduced immigration scenario has the opposite effect, increasing borrowing and debt by £13. 1 billion and 2. 5% of GDP.	0.0	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. < SPAN> 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) will maintain 4 % or more for the time being, and will drop slightly to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of revenues in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of revenues in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:
These scenarios are simplified and highly uncertain. It is sensitive to the assumption of immigration, such as immigration age, ability, and average income. It also depends on the level of expenditures of each ministry and agency set by the government to respond to the elderly population. In addition, only the economic and financial impacts during the fiv e-year prediction period are considered. The overall lon g-term impact of immigrants to the finances is more uncertain. The financial impact of immigrants reflects that at least five years later, the immigration may apply for indefinite residue, resulting in the possibility that the welfare benefits may be eligible, and the benefits of time are small over time. There is a high possibility. If immigrants are older, if they stay in the UK, the pressure on pensions and medical expenditures will increase and tax revenues will decrease as they retire.	5. 1 Chapter	5. 1 Chapter	5. 1 Chapter	5. 1 Chapter	5. 1 Chapter	5. 1 Chapter	5. 1 Chapter

In this chapter, the government's financial goals are determined and the possibility that the current policy will be achieved in accordance with our central prediction (from paragraph 5. 2).

5. 1 Chapter

In this chapter, the government's financial goals are determined and the possibility that the current policy will be achieved in accordance with our central prediction (from paragraph 5. 2).

"Financial obligation" is obliged to reduce the pure GDP ratio of pure debt in the public sector except England from the fifth year (now 2028-29).

Table A.5: Current receipts

What is the driving force behind the growth of British service trade?
-0, 8	British service trade has continued to grow strongly, including the relationship with the EU, despite the increase in trade barriers after Brexit. Looking at the configuration by department, about tw o-thirds of the growth of trade services since 2019 are leading by the "Other Business Services" department, including management consultants, research and development, and advertising (Chart H). 。 In contrast, financial services and transportation exports have been delayed to other departments, and each has decreased by 5 and 9 %to 2, 0 %. These are the most susceptible sectors due to the effects of blepjit friction.
Note: This includes gains from bringing offshore sheltered trusts into UK taxable range for certain deemed residential and non-residential properties not subject to the new regime.	The powerful growth of the UK's "Other Business Services" may reflect several factors. First, the trade barrier with the EU may be lower than the strict regulations such as goods and banking businesses. In the second G, exports to the United States have shown a particularly powerful growth, which may have been supported by recent pounds and incorporate outsourcing operations on the U. S. company to the UK. H Finally, it is suggested that service companies may avoid trade barriers by selling through overseas subsidiaries.	As a whole, our assumptions on the impact of Brexit seem to be as planned, and recently published research is generally consistent with these estimates. However, considering the challenges of the confusion due to the simultaneous impact of geopolitical trends that affect Braeggit, pandemic, and other global trade, it is still difficult to make a solid conclusion. Trade data is unstable, especially service trade is easily corrected. In addition, the complete implementation of the TCA will further increase the barrier of goods trade with the EU. It is expected that the impact of Bluejit will appear completely a few years after the complete implementation of these barriers. Until then, we will continue to consider Brexit projects.	(a) OBR, Brexit and the Obr's Brexit Forecast, Octom 2018. Detailed analysis of trade and productivity relevance is box 2.	b) See. Box 2. The economic impact of Brexit on investment and immigration is 4 in March 2023 for economic and tax prospects.	c) See. Box D: Briefing Agent on the Bank of England, February 2024, February 2024.	d) Resolution Foundation, Ending Stagnation: New economic strategy for the UK, December 2023.
130. 4	133. 5	137. 4	Latest forecast and latest results for CAP and passway	March 2024 forecast	130. 6	145. 8	155. 4
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
-8, 6	-15. 7	Adjustment of welfare block subsidies	Predicted after adjustment in March 2024	134. 3	141. 6	144. 9	The difference:
Cap & trail	10. 1	10. 1	Cap & trail + margin	4. 0	Real GDP	-2. 6	Note 2021 September (3rd quarter) from the forecast of October (3rd quarter) Cumulative code change rate
-1. 2	Neutral evidence of PSNB	difference	Fte	November 2023 NICS reductions: the 2 percentage point reduction in the NICS base rate for employees announced in the Autumn Economic Review (effective from 6 January), the 1 percentage point reduction in the NICS base rate for self-employed people and the removal of the requirement to pay class 2 NICS (all effective from 6 April).	19, 5	Prospect	2022-23
2023-24	4, 21 Land-based corporate tax revenue in 2023-24 is expected to reach £ 92. 2 billion, an increase of almost 25 % since last year. The increase in receipt is a strong revenue growth in the finance and no n-financial sector (11 %, 5 %, 5 % increase in 2023), and the corporate tax rate from April 2023 is 19 %. It reflects that it was raised to 25 %. In particular, the growth of financial sector revenue was large, and retail banks benefited from the increase in net pearls.	prosperity	134. 7	course	129. 1	131. 5	margin
margin	Welfare cover and path margin	130. 4	133. 5	137. 4	Latest forecast and latest results for CAP and passway	March 2024 forecast	130. 6
145. 8	155. 4	Inflation adjustment	-8, 6	-15. 2	Adjustment of welfare block subsidies	Predicted after adjustment in March 2024	134. 3
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
144. 9	-59	Cap & trail	10. 1	10. 1	Cap & trail + margin	4. 0	465. 6
7. 4	5.8	2.6	1.8	1.6	1.3	1.2	0.9
Note 2021 September (3rd quarter) from the forecast of October (3rd quarter) Cumulative code change rate	Information on past measures	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	Information on past measures	Information on past measures	Information on past measures	2024-2028 average growth rate	2024-2028 average growth rate
-59	Before 2007	2023-24	2024-25	2025-26	2026-27	2027-28	2028-29
Level (ant i-GDP, as long as there is no particular refusal)	2028-29	PSND	36. 3	Inventory disposal: Some companies increase existing stocks to avoid tariffs (but they can benefit because the price after tax is higher). The degree of advance is limited by the expiration date of the product (although e-liquid is relatively long) and available storage capacity.	-12. 6	96. 4	95, 5
95. 1	94. 3	PSND EX Boe	36. 6	482. 8	91, 7	92. 8	93. 2
93. 2	92. 9	2026-27	31. 6	2. 447	83. 6	83. 2	82. 1
80, 6	(f) Half the forecast difference for the following three years. See Atkins, G and Lanskey, L, Working paper No. 19: The OBR's forecast performance, August 2023.	Other	-462	(E) Government Institute, Performance Tracker 2023, Octom	70. 2	69, 5	Prospect
66. 0	7.1	7.6	7.5	7.7	8.2	9.0	9.7
63. 9	Debt measurement cost	Net interest spending	Net interest rate (percentage of revenue)	Annual change rate (ant i-GDP ratio)	Measurement of balance sheet	11. 3	-1. 4
-twenty four	3.8	3.2	3.7	4.0	4.1	4.3	4.4
-0. 9	9.4	8.8	8.8	8.6	8.4	8.3	8.2
-0. 4	-0, 8	PSND EX Boe	Net interest spending	2. 34 From a post-pandemic low of 3. 6% in the August 2022 quarter, it rose to 4. 3% in the July 2023 quarter. According to new weighted ADR data, the unemployment rate has since fallen, to 3. 8% in the fourth quarter of 2023. In contrast, the number of recipients, which indicates the number of people receiving unemployment benefits, has remained stable in recent months, and the layoff rate has shown a gradual upward trend since mid-2022. The number of vacancies per unemployed person has also fallen further compared to last year, and recent surveys suggest that hiring and retention are now less of an issue for businesses.	PSNFL	-462	-51
-1. 0	3.3	3.8	4.5	4.9	5.2	5.5	5.9
-1, 5	7.5	8.2	8.2	8.4	8.5	8.7	8.8
-1. 9	2.1	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.9	1.8
PSNW (inverted)	1.3	1.6	1.4	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.3
-0. 2	2.5	1.5	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1	1.1
-0, 8	3.6	3.9	4.0	4.1	4.3	4.4	4.6
-1, 6	0.6	0.7	0.8	0.8	0.9	1.0	1.0
-1. 9	As a result, in consideration of a decrease in debt-payment expenditures, the reduction in borrowing of about £ 7. 4 billion by 2028-29 will be achieved.	2. 35 We consider this evidence, and the broader evidence, to be consistent with some further easing of labor market conditions. We expect the unemployment rate to rise moderately and peak at 4. 5% in the final quarter of 2024. The unemployment rate peak would correspond to about 1. 6 million jobseekers, six months earlier but slightly lower than expected in November. The unemployment rate then rises to 4.	0. 4	-171	This elasticity was based on the estimated value specialized in the UK tourism industry at the time, and its estimated value wa s-1, 28. G RES travelers are uncertain, but to recognize that the cost of visiting costs changes significantly and may be more sensitive to the price, but the elasticity increased by about 50 % -1, -1. 9 was 9. With the tax revenue from this group's expenditure to RES products, the savings of 2020 measures will decrease to £ 21 million in 2025-26.	home	Net paid interest (ant i-selling high)
-0. 2	7.3	8.0	8.3	8.8	9.3	9.9	-171
-1. 8	3.7	3.7	3.9	4.0	4.0	4.0	4.1
Note: Pre-2007 medians are from 1967-68 to 2006-07. Year-on-year changes are from 1968-69 medians. Values are colour coded by pre-crisis decile. PSNW is inverted to facilitate comparison with the other three measures.	6.6	9.9	home	101, 9	d) Since these goals are for the DEL set, it is assumed that when calculating the impact of RDEL, it will increase in proportion to the distribution of RDEL and CDEL in 2024-25.	home	Without VAT, there are tax losses that would have been collected when a deterrent visitor would be expanded to RES goods and services. The prediction as of November 2020 does not explicitly consider the impact of this indirect policy on the finances. However, as is the case with any prediction, the impact of the entire policy package (including the abolition of added value tax) on the total demand is (through the framework of the fiscal board discussed in box 2. 1). It should have been grasped. Usually, the indirect impact on the demand of such measures, which is relatively small in the UK economy, has been performed to explain the size of this review. < SPAN> As a result of examining external estimates regarding the degree of price sensitivity of overseas travelers, the elasticity used in 2020 cost calculation was the highest in this range. It was. h We have made some adjustments, although we mainly answered that we were traveling for reasons other than vacation, we could take the VAT paid RES purchase. Therefore, our policy states that this policy has reduced the number of RES VAT claimers by 2025-26 by 34, 000, and in 2025-2026, 3 million pounds more than 2020 cost calculation. Will decrease. The number of RES VAT travelers is particularly uncertain because the cost of visiting costs increases in proportion to travelers from other countries. Therefore, the data did not overturn the original assumption, but this has a great uncertainty, and the number of deteriorated travelers may be higher and less. As a result, in order to offset static policy savings in government behavior, the reaction of this group must be much higher than any data we surveyed.
5. 19 Our fan charts are based on stochastic simulations and allow us to assess the likelihood of the government meeting its fiscal targets. Figure 5. 4 shows the probability distribution around the PSND forecast (excluding the Bank of England) and the PSNB forecast, and suggests that under current government policies, there is a 54% probability that primary debt will fall as a percentage of GDP in 2028-29, and a 72% probability that it will be below 3% of GDP in 2028-29. Compared to the November forecast, the probability of debt falling has fallen slightly from 56% and the probability of borrowing targets being met has also fallen from 78%.	5.8	6.1	3.6	2.4	2.0	1.9	1.6
The 5. 20 predictions adjusted the calculation method of the probability of achieving budget goals, and emphasized the shocks for the past 25 years. This is based on a view that the number of shocks and seriousness in predictions is more likely to resemble the recent history, rather than the overall sample period dating back to 1955, which was used for stochastic simulation. In recent years, borrowing and debt have been greatly varied, and the expected results of the fan tables have a larger variation. This does not affect the estimation of duty fulfillment.	4.2	3.1	2.2	2.1	1.9	1.8	1.4
5. In the sensitivity analysis, we estimate what to do with major predicted parameters and shocks in order to eliminate the capital margin for different goals ("Test to Failure" or "Reverse Extra Test"). 。 The current rules take into account the sensitivity of the real tax rate of the entire economy, the real interest rate of government debt, the name GDP growth rate, and the change in the inflation ratio. The government has omitted the sensitivity analysis of this goal because the supplementary goal of reducing the borrowing to 3 % or less of GDP is a relatively large width (1, 8 % of GDP).	0.3	1.3	1.6	0.8	0.3	0.0	0.0
5. 22 to calibrate several potential disadvantages to our central prediction, which is sufficient to cancel the decline in debt of 0. 3 % annual GDP in 2028-29 (excluding England Bank). , Use the calculation of financial preparation. [49] In the following cases, the debt balance may be zero:	-171	d) Since these goals are for the DEL set, it is assumed that when calculating the impact of RDEL, it will increase in proportion to the distribution of RDEL and CDEL in 2024-25.	The actual central government debt rate rose 0. 3 % in 2028-29 to 3. 4 %, as shown in the red diamond shaped in the lower left panel of the figure 5. 5. < SPAN> 5. 20 predictions have adjusted the calculation method of the probability of achieving budget targets, and more emphasized the shocks for the past 25 years. This is based on a view that the number of shocks and seriousness in predictions is more likely to resemble the recent history, rather than the overall sample period dating back to 1955, which was used for stochastic simulation. In recent years, borrowing and debt have been greatly varied, and the expected results of the fan tables have a larger variation. This does not affect the estimation of duty fulfillment.	d) Since these goals are for the DEL set, it is assumed that when calculating the impact of RDEL, it will increase in proportion to the distribution of RDEL and CDEL in 2024-25.	7. 6	7. 6	The effective tax rate in 2028-29 dropped by 0. 3 % as shown in the red diamond-shaped in the upper right corner of the figure 5. 5. This is equivalent to the cost of reducing 2 % points of national insurance premiums in this forecast.
The actual central government debt rate rose 0. 3 % in 2028-29 to 3. 4 %, as shown in the red diamond shaped in the lower left panel of the figure 5. 5. The 5. 20 forecasts adjusted the calculation method of the probability of achieving budget goals and more emphasized the shocks for the past 25 years. This is based on a view that the number of shocks and seriousness in predictions is more likely to resemble the recent history, rather than the overall sample period dating back to 1955, which was used for stochastic simulation. In recent years, borrowing and debt have been greatly varied, and the expected results of the fan tables have a larger variation. This does not affect the estimation of duty fulfillment.	5. In the sensitivity analysis, we estimate what to do with major predicted parameters and shocks in order to eliminate the capital margin for different goals ("Test to Failure" or "Reverse Extra Test"). 。 The current rules take into account the sensitivity of the real tax rate of the entire economy, the real interest rate of government debt, the name GDP growth rate, and the change in the inflation ratio. The government has omitted the sensitivity analysis of this goal because the supplementary goal of reducing the borrowing to 3 % or less of GDP is a relatively large width (1, 8 % of GDP).	5. 22 to calibrate several potential disadvantages to our central prediction, which is sufficient to cancel the decline in debt of 0. 3 % annual GDP in 2028-29 (excluding England Bank). , Use the calculation of financial preparation. [49] In the following cases, the debt balance may be zero:	The name GDP growth rate in 2028-29 dropped by 0. 3 % (as shown in the red diamond in the upper left of Chart 5. 5). This is the same as the GDP growth rate decreased from the forecast in November 2023.	The effective tax rate in 2028-29 dropped by 0. 3 % as shown in the red diamond-shaped in the upper right corner of the figure 5. 5. This is equivalent to the cost of reducing 2 % points of national insurance premiums in this forecast.	The actual central government debt rate rose 0. 3 % in 2028-29 to 3. 4 %, as shown in the red diamond shaped in the lower left panel of the figure 5. 5.	The RPI inflation rate in 2028-29 rose by 1. 3 %, indicated by the red diamond of the lower right panel in Fig. 5. 5. This is an RPI rise shock of one-tenth of the inflation shock experienced in 2022-23.	5. 23 Chapter 2 outlines various global and domestic risks that can deviate from the orbit. These include risks related to productivity, inflation, immigration, and energy prices. The EFO evaluated the impact on finances about immigrants and energy prices.
Box 4. 5 shows the impact of the increase or decrease in immigrants on finances. According to the five years, immigrants are more likely to work positively for finances, but their benefits are sensitive to the age of immigrants, profiles of skills, and the reactivity of government expenditures.	In this section, we will consider the rising energy prices and the impact of the supply chain shock on the finances based on economic premise over the possibility of further unstable the Middle East situation in box 2. 2.	5. 24 Chart 2. 2 examined the effects of the more widespread trade in the Middle East and the interruption of trade via the Middle East, which were expected to be expected in the central prediction. In this scenario, petroleum, gas, and electricity prices are 75% higher than central predictions for one year. After returning to the top of the pandemic, the confusion of the supply chain of the product retreats. As a result, the CPI inflation rate rises to about 7%in early 2025, then decreased, and during the remaining period of the scenario, it will be lower than the central prediction. The name GDP rises in the short term due to the rise in the deflator, but in 2025-26, the fall of the GDP will retreat to the central prediction. On the predictive horizontal line, the real GDP recovers, but the deflation rate rises by 2. 2%by 2028-29, as the deflation rate rises permanently.	As shown in the yellow solid line of Fig. 5. 25 5. 6, the economy shock leads to a significant deterioration of finances. In the fiv e-year prediction period, borrowing increased by £ 23. 1 billion per year, but the gap shrunk at the end of the period. The debt balance increased by 2. 9%compared to the central prediction, and after peaking, decreased to 0. 8%compared to the GDP at the end of the fiscal year. This is due to the following factors:	CBAM is a tax for some of the carbon emissions (and equivalent carbon) in imported goods from aluminum, hydrogen, cement, fertilizer, ceramics, glass, and steel.	3. 27 The government announced on December 18, 2023 that it will introduce a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) on January 1, 2027. CBAM is a new tax on specific products imported into the UK. CBAM is paid when the carbon price of the country of origin is lower than the carbon price paid by British producers. The CBAM is to prevent carbon leakage across borders and follows the EU's CBAM scheme in January 2026. The specific policy elements are as follows:	2024-25	5. 26 These results do not assume a departmental expenditure (DEL) profile. If the sectoral budgets were adjusted to maintain actual spending power, this would result in an additional borrowing increase of £20. 4 billion above the forecast horizon, as shown by the yellow dotted line. Debt stocks would peak at 4. 6% of GDP above the central forecast, and fall to 3. 5% above GDP at the end of the period.
5. 27 In any case, despite higher borrowing and debt, the fiscal mandate would still be met as debt would fall as a share of GDP at the end of the period. This is due to the assumption that in this scenario the energy price shock is temporary and that nominal GDP growth would then be faster above the forecast horizon as real GDP recovers from the shock.	A. 1 This annex contains summary tables providing a detailed breakdown of the economic and fiscal outlook set out in this Economic and Fiscal Outlook. It also includes changes from the November 2023 Economic and Fiscal Outlook. These tables include:	A detailed summary of the key determinants of the economic and fiscal outlook.	Current public sector revenues and personal taxes	Contribution to total expenditure administered	Main tax collections and	Annual drivers of change in net public sector debt.	Year-on-year percentage changes unless otherwise stated.
0, 29	2.2	2.3	2.5	2.7	2.7	2.9	2.8
Outlook	UK economy	Gross domestic product (GDP)	GDP per capita	-0. 7	-0. 1	GDP level (2019=100)	101. 6
101. 9	9.8	5.2	3.8	3.5	3.0	2.9	2.2

102. 7
104. 6
106. 7
108. 6
110. 5

Table A.6: Current receipts: changes since November

What is the driving force behind the growth of British service trade?
-0, 8	British service trade has continued to grow strongly, including the relationship with the EU, despite the increase in trade barriers after Brexit. Looking at the configuration by department, about tw o-thirds of the growth of trade services since 2019 are leading by the "Other Business Services" department, including management consultants, research and development, and advertising (Chart H). 。 In contrast, financial services and transportation exports have been delayed to other departments, and each has decreased by 5 and 9 %to 2, 0 %. These are the most susceptible sectors due to the effects of blepjit friction.
Note: This includes gains from bringing offshore sheltered trusts into UK taxable range for certain deemed residential and non-residential properties not subject to the new regime.	The powerful growth of the UK's "Other Business Services" may reflect several factors. First, the trade barrier with the EU may be lower than the strict regulations such as goods and banking businesses. In the second G, exports to the United States have shown a particularly powerful growth, which may have been supported by recent pounds and incorporate outsourcing operations on the U. S. company to the UK. H Finally, it is suggested that service companies may avoid trade barriers by selling through overseas subsidiaries.	As a whole, our assumptions on the impact of Brexit seem to be as planned, and recently published research is generally consistent with these estimates. However, considering the challenges of the confusion due to the simultaneous impact of geopolitical trends that affect Braeggit, pandemic, and other global trade, it is still difficult to make a solid conclusion. Trade data is unstable, especially service trade is easily corrected. In addition, the complete implementation of the TCA will further increase the barrier of goods trade with the EU. It is expected that the impact of Bluejit will appear completely a few years after the complete implementation of these barriers. Until then, we will continue to consider Brexit projects.	(a) OBR, Brexit and the Obr's Brexit Forecast, Octom 2018. Detailed analysis of trade and productivity relevance is box 2.	b) See. Box 2. The economic impact of Brexit on investment and immigration is 4 in March 2023 for economic and tax prospects.	c) See. Box D: Briefing Agent on the Bank of England, February 2024, February 2024.	d) Resolution Foundation, Ending Stagnation: New economic strategy for the UK, December 2023.
130. 4	0.3	2.0	4.7	3.9	3.7	2.5	2024-2028 average growth rate
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
-8, 6	1.3	3.9	3.1	3.4	2.5	1.1	0.0
Cap & trail	0.0	2025-26	1.9	1.0	1.6	1.8	0.1
-1. 2	The two new tax revenues of E-liquid and carbon border regulation mechanism used at the time of release will increase the number of tax revenues by £ 700 million by 2028-29.	0.9	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.
2023-24	0.2	2.7	-0. 9	Prospect	-0. 5	85	Imports of goods and services
margin	0.0	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	Various	-33	-17	-55	-59
145. 8	1.1	0, 29	This chapter: Note the classification problems that affect the prediction (from paragraph 4. 4).	1. 285	1. 233	-13. 5	Employee
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
144. 9	1.1	Total (personal tax decision)	Spring 2024 NIC reduction	Tax	Tax	-130	-59
7. 4	0.0	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	-14	2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) after adjustment of 41 will be maintained at 4 % or more for the time being, and will be reduced to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	-45	The two new tax revenues of E-liquid and carbon border regulation mechanism used at the time of release will increase the number of tax revenues by £ 700 million by 2028-29.	The two new tax revenues of E-liquid and carbon border regulation mechanism used at the time of release will increase the number of tax revenues by £ 700 million by 2028-29.
Note 2021 September (3rd quarter) from the forecast of October (3rd quarter) Cumulative code change rate	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
-59	0.0	0.3	-30	-1. 2	-14	0, 29	Spring 2024 NIC reduction
Level (ant i-GDP, as long as there is no particular refusal)	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.0	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	2027-28	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. < SPAN> 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) will maintain 4 % or more for the time being, and will drop slightly to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. < SPAN> 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) will maintain 4 % or more for the time being, and will drop slightly to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. < SPAN> 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) will maintain 4 % or more for the time being, and will drop slightly to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.
95. 1	0.0	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1
93. 2	0.0	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. < SPAN> 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) will maintain 4 % or more for the time being, and will drop slightly to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. < SPAN> 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) will maintain 4 % or more for the time being, and will drop slightly to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	2027-28	2027-28	The two new tax revenues of E-liquid and carbon border regulation mechanism used at the time of release will increase the number of tax revenues by £ 700 million by 2028-29.
80, 6	0.0	-0, 4	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of revenues in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	0.1	1.3	1.5	1.0
66. 0	0.0	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
63. 9	0.0	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	1.3	0.7	0.2	0.1	0.0
-twenty four	0.0	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
-0. 9	0.0	2024-2028 average growth rate	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. < SPAN> 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) will maintain 4 % or more for the time being, and will drop slightly to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of revenues in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:
-0. 4	0.0	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	2027-28	The two new tax revenues of E-liquid and carbon border regulation mechanism used at the time of release will increase the number of tax revenues by £ 700 million by 2028-29.	The two new tax revenues of E-liquid and carbon border regulation mechanism used at the time of release will increase the number of tax revenues by £ 700 million by 2028-29.	The two new tax revenues of E-liquid and carbon border regulation mechanism used at the time of release will increase the number of tax revenues by £ 700 million by 2028-29.	-45
-1. 0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	Information on past measures	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.
-1, 5	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1
-1. 9	0.0	0.0	0.0	2024-2028 average growth rate	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.0	2024-2028 average growth rate
PSNW (inverted)	0.0	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1
-0. 2	0.0	2024-2028 average growth rate	2024-2028 average growth rate	2024-2028 average growth rate	Information on past measures	Information on past measures	Information on past measures
-0, 8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
-1, 6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
-1. 9	0.0	2024-2028 average growth rate	Information on past measures	0.0	0.1	0.6	0.7
-0. 2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
-1. 8	0.0	2024-2028 average growth rate	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Note: Pre-2007 medians are from 1967-68 to 2006-07. Year-on-year changes are from 1968-69 medians. Values are colour coded by pre-crisis decile. PSNW is inverted to facilitate comparison with the other three measures.	0.0	0.3	1.1	0.7	0.6	0.5	0.2
-0. 1	0.0	2024-2028 average growth rate	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of means of revenue increase in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.
The 5. 20 predictions adjusted the calculation method of the probability of achieving budget goals, and emphasized the shocks for the past 25 years. This is based on a view that the number of shocks and seriousness in predictions is more likely to resemble the recent history, rather than the overall sample period dating back to 1955, which was used for stochastic simulation. In recent years, borrowing and debt have been greatly varied, and the expected results of the fan tables have a larger variation. This does not affect the estimation of duty fulfillment.	0.0	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	2026-27	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of means of revenue increase in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. < SPAN> 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) will maintain 4 % or more for the time being, and will drop slightly to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	2024-2028 average growth rate	1.1
5. In the sensitivity analysis, we estimate what to do with major predicted parameters and shocks in order to eliminate the capital margin for different goals ("Test to Failure" or "Reverse Extra Test"). 。 The current rules take into account the sensitivity of the real tax rate of the entire economy, the real interest rate of government debt, the name GDP growth rate, and the change in the inflation ratio. The government has omitted the sensitivity analysis of this goal because the supplementary goal of reducing the borrowing to 3 % or less of GDP is a relatively large width (1, 8 % of GDP).	2024-2028 average growth rate	2024-2028 average growth rate	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	2024-2028 average growth rate
5. 22 to calibrate several potential disadvantages to our central prediction, which is sufficient to cancel the decline in debt of 0. 3 % annual GDP in 2028-29 (excluding England Bank). , Use the calculation of financial preparation. [49] In the following cases, the debt balance may be zero:	0.4	2027-28	The two new tax revenues of E-liquid and carbon border regulation mechanism used at the time of release will increase the number of tax revenues by £ 700 million by 2028-29.	2027-28	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:
The actual central government debt rate rose 0. 3 % in 2028-29 to 3. 4 %, as shown in the red diamond shaped in the lower left panel of the figure 5. 5. The 5. 20 forecasts adjusted the calculation method of the probability of achieving budget goals and more emphasized the shocks for the past 25 years. This is based on a view that the number of shocks and seriousness in predictions is more likely to resemble the recent history, rather than the overall sample period dating back to 1955, which was used for stochastic simulation. In recent years, borrowing and debt have been greatly varied, and the expected results of the fan tables have a larger variation. This does not affect the estimation of duty fulfillment.	-0. 1	-0. 3	-0. 2	Other ordinary spending	Number of unemployed (millions)	Other ordinary spending	Real household disposable income (2)
Box 4. 5 shows the impact of the increase or decrease in immigrants on finances. According to the five years, immigrants are more likely to work positively for finances, but their benefits are sensitive to the age of immigrants, profiles of skills, and the reactivity of government expenditures.	0.4	1.9	1.4	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. < SPAN> 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) will maintain 4 % or more for the time being, and will drop slightly to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	0.3	1.2	0.8
5. 27 In any case, despite higher borrowing and debt, the fiscal mandate would still be met as debt would fall as a share of GDP at the end of the period. This is due to the assumption that in this scenario the energy price shock is temporary and that nominal GDP growth would then be faster above the forecast horizon as real GDP recovers from the shock.	3.1	5.0	4.8	4.0	3.7	3.6	3.4
0, 29	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.4	0.5
Outlook	10. 7	CBAM's responsibility belongs to the importer after exceeding £ 10. 000 per year.	10. 1	10. 1	10. 2	10. 4	10. 7
101. 9	0.0	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of means of revenue increase in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	-33	-17	-14	-45	0.1

102. 7

104. 6

106. 7

2022-23

110. 5

Table A.7: Total managed expenditure

What is the driving force behind the growth of British service trade?
-0, 8	British service trade has continued to grow strongly, including the relationship with the EU, despite the increase in trade barriers after Brexit. Looking at the configuration by department, about tw o-thirds of the growth of trade services since 2019 are leading by the "Other Business Services" department, including management consultants, research and development, and advertising (Chart H). 。 In contrast, financial services and transportation exports have been delayed to other departments, and each has decreased by 5 and 9 %to 2, 0 %. These are the most susceptible sectors due to the effects of blepjit friction.
Note: This includes gains from bringing offshore sheltered trusts into UK taxable range for certain deemed residential and non-residential properties not subject to the new regime.	The powerful growth of the UK's "Other Business Services" may reflect several factors. First, the trade barrier with the EU may be lower than the strict regulations such as goods and banking businesses. In the second G, exports to the United States have shown a particularly powerful growth, which may have been supported by recent pounds and incorporate outsourcing operations on the U. S. company to the UK. H Finally, it is suggested that service companies may avoid trade barriers by selling through overseas subsidiaries.	As a whole, our assumptions on the impact of Brexit seem to be as planned, and recently published research is generally consistent with these estimates. However, considering the challenges of the confusion due to the simultaneous impact of geopolitical trends that affect Braeggit, pandemic, and other global trade, it is still difficult to make a solid conclusion. Trade data is unstable, especially service trade is easily corrected. In addition, the complete implementation of the TCA will further increase the barrier of goods trade with the EU. It is expected that the impact of Bluejit will appear completely a few years after the complete implementation of these barriers. Until then, we will continue to consider Brexit projects.	(a) OBR, Brexit and the Obr's Brexit Forecast, Octom 2018. Detailed analysis of trade and productivity relevance is box 2.	b) See. Box 2. The economic impact of Brexit on investment and immigration is 4 in March 2023 for economic and tax prospects.	c) See. Box D: Briefing Agent on the Bank of England, February 2024, February 2024.	d) Resolution Foundation, Ending Stagnation: New economic strategy for the UK, December 2023.
2. 553
2. 731	This chapter summarizes the main uncertainty and risks for budget outlook (Paragraph 4. 81).	afternoon	prediction	The direct impact of large tax reductions is 0. 9%of GDP, and individual tax cuts in the form of lowering the main tax rates (NICS) of employees and sel f-employed employees announced in this budget in November 2023. Tax 0. 7%of GDP. Overpayment announced in March 2021, full expenditure announced in March 2023, corporate tax reduction in the form of permanent full expenditure announced in November 2023, in addition to GDP. Reduce the tax burden of 0. 2 %.	The direct impact of all other tax measures announced after March 2020 will increase the tax burden of GDP by 0. 4%. This includes the city tax hike, the second pillar reform of the corporate tax, the introduction of energy gain taxation, and the increase in tax increase, etc. I am offset.	Compared to the outlook as of November 4. 8, the total revenue of the public sector increased by 3. 8 billion pounds in 2023-24, including the impact of fiscal measures, and an average of 131 average between 2024-25 and 2028-29. It is expected to decrease by hundreds of millions. Except for the budget neutral items offset by expenditures, the income will be revised down 1. 2 billion pounds this year, and an average of £ 17. 2 billion per year between 2024-25 and 2028-29. Changes in predictions excluding a budget neutral value are shor t-term, in which the total receipt of this year is slightly lower than the forecast, in the medium term, the prospects for the inflation rate are weak, and in the basics tax basis. Other nominal factors, especially nominal income and decrease in consumption, are brought about. The basic change of predictions, excluding the direct impact of policy measures, is a 1. 9 % tax increase in GDP. Prior to GDP before being affected by policy: Income tax revenue is increasing due to an increase in labor distribution rates in GDP and increasing profits in the highe r-level income distribution. Lan d-based corporate tax revenue increased due to solid profits in the hig h-payment department. In addition, the tax revenue of the added value tax has increased due to the shrinking of the added value gap. [twenty one]	This includes an income tax and a tax increase of 1, 3 % of the NIC's standard freezing, and an increase in GDP by raising the corporate tax rate from 19 % to 25 %.
2. 757	2. 827	2. 927	3. 040	3. 151	3. 264	Salary / wage (4)	23. 7
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
Considering the direct behavioural impacts of non-EU tourists no longer visiting the UK	Difference	Profit	-twenty two	-2. 6	-3. 3	-3. 8	-2. 9
RPI	19, 5	19. 0	19. 0	18. 7	42. 8	18. 2	18. 0
Triple lock warranty (September)	-13. 0	Top	-12. 1	-12. 8	Welfare expenses	-1. 3	-4. 9
33. 6	33. 9	34. 2	34. 4	Production gap (potential production height)	-0. 2	-0, 8	422. 9
-0. 2	8.8	7.8	1.1	1.1	0.5	0.2	0.5
-1. 0	3.6	4.6	3.4	4.2	3.1	2.2	0.6
Economic / Real Estate Sector	9.2	9.4	9.7	2. 35 We consider this evidence, and the broader evidence, to be consistent with some further easing of labor market conditions. We expect the unemployment rate to rise moderately and peak at 4. 5% in the final quarter of 2024. The unemployment rate peak would correspond to about 1. 6 million jobseekers, six months earlier but slightly lower than expected in November. The unemployment rate then rises to 4.	As a result, in consideration of a decrease in debt-payment expenditures, the reduction in borrowing of about £ 7. 4 billion by 2028-29 will be achieved.	Unemployment	The number of travelers is determined by various factors, but the uncertainty at this time has grown even more depending on both the pandemic and the British withdrawal. The overall number of visitors to the United Kingdom has now recovered to the pr e-pandemic level, and the percentage of visitor from EU and no n-EU countries has increased (Fig. C (left panel)). )). In some other European countries, the recovery of the number of visitors from the United States is relatively large (Fig. C right panel). However, the overall difference is not large, and there is no significant change in the composition ratio of British visitors (between the country or the reason for travel). < SPAN> This elasticity was based on the estimated value specialized in the UK tourism industry at the time, and its estimated value wa s-1, 28. G RES travelers are uncertain, but to recognize that the cost of visiting costs changes significantly and may be more sensitive to the price, but the elasticity increased by about 50 % -1, -1. 9 was 9. With the tax revenue from this group's expenditure to RES products, the savings of 2020 measures will decrease to £ 125-26 in 2025-26.
4. 329	4.2	4.2	4.3	4.1	4.3	4.4	4.4
4. 492	1.3	1.2	1.4	1.4	1.3	1.2	1.2
4. 658	3.4	1.7	1.8	1.8	1.9	1.9	2.0
4. 828	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
HMRC Financial Division Profit (1, 7)	7.5	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
11, 5	-0, 6	3.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
-0. 1	16. 8	Housing price (8)	-0. 7	4. 46 Government expenditure as a share of GDP in 2028-29 is projected to be 2. 9% higher than in 2019-20, pre-pandemic (Figure 4. 8). This reflects both existing trends and subsequent policy changes:	11, 4	1. 209	1. 081
1. 035	1. 174	1. 298	44. 0	-4. 3	-4. 0	-6. 2	Commercial real estate trading (9)
-1. 7	3. 039	Oil / gas	Immigrants use public services such as education, medical care, and transportation, but have no direct relationship between the population size and the funds assigned to the public service category. At present, the expenditure limit (DELS) of each major public service (DELS) is set by the government by the government until the end of the 2024-25 expenditure review period. After that, the government will provide us a prerequisite for the total growth of ordinary and capital spending, but will not provide detailed plans for each department. As mentioned in Paragraph 4. 54, the government has not adjusted these standard values and assumptions toward the population increase, so since the plan was created in October 2021, actual public services per capita. Is suggested that it is decreasing.	99. 08	82. 29	77. 03	As a result, in consideration of a decrease in debt-payment expenditures, the reduction in borrowing of about £ 7. 4 billion by 2028-29 will be achieved.
Note: Pre-2007 medians are from 1967-68 to 2006-07. Year-on-year changes are from 1968-69 medians. Values are colour coded by pre-crisis decile. PSNW is inverted to facilitate comparison with the other three measures.	8.4	71. 54	Net interest spending	-26. 11	-539	According to the RDEL exemption of the RDEL expenditure after SR21 presented by the Ministry of Finance, these cases have been reduced by 2 to 3 % every year from 2025-26 (one-third of everyday expenditures (one-third of everyday expenditures). ) Will be left without being protected. If national defense expenses and ODA expenditures increase in accordance with the abov e-mentioned government's ambitions, unprotected expenditures need to decrease by 3. 6 % per year. It is difficult to reduce daily expenditures by 2 to 3 %. In addition, there is a possibility that the need to increase the amount of assistance to Ukraine and reduce the tightness of local governments in each country. As mentioned in the financial risk and sustainable report, there is also pressure on lon g-term fiscal expenditures due to climate change and aging.	66. 1
60. 68	home	8.4	7.8	5.6	5.5	5.6	5.7
56. 21	2027-28	0.9	0.1	Information on past measures	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. < SPAN> 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) will maintain 4 % or more for the time being, and will drop slightly to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.
1. 00	0, 76	0, 84	0, 79	0, 76	0, 78	-1. 34	Oil production (million tons) (5)
34. 9
31. 2	home	-3. 7	-twenty five	-3. 5	-1, 6	-1, 6	-10. 8
12. 9	11, 6	3. 27 The government announced on December 18, 2023 that it will introduce a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) on January 1, 2027. CBAM is a new tax on specific products imported into the UK. CBAM is paid when the carbon price of the country of origin is lower than the carbon price paid by British producers. The CBAM is to prevent carbon leakage across borders and follows the EU's CBAM scheme in January 2026. The specific policy elements are as follows:	-6. 1	Consumer Demand: We assume that 100%of new taxes will be passed on to the rise in retail prices, which will reduce consumption, "dow n-eded" to cheaper products and to cigarettes. It is thought that there will be those who switch and those who will stop completely. These effects are estimated by combining elasticity, sel f-prices and other evidence of other prices. The increase in the tobacco tax announced this time will alleviate a part of the switching to tobacco products. 3. 23 In other words, nicotine is classified into the highest category and currently retailed for £ 3. 00 (E-liquid 10 milliliters) with a £ 3. 00 tariff rate (2026-27), and the post-tax price is £ 6. 60. It rises (assuming that all tariffs are passed on to consumers). There are several uncertainties in the cost, but by 2028-29, 500 million pounds are expected.	-40. 4	Gold rate (10 %) (10)	Other economic impacts
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
1. 16	This elasticity was based on the estimated value specialized in the UK tourism industry at the time, and its estimated value wa s-1, 28. G RES travelers are uncertain, but to recognize that the cost of visiting costs changes significantly and may be more sensitive to the price, but the elasticity increased by about 50 % -1, -1. 9 was 9. With the tax revenue from this group's expenditure to RES products, the savings of 2020 measures will decrease to £ 21 million in 2025-26.	8.8	8.3	7.5	8.1	8.1	8.2
1. 16	7. 6	In examining this direct action assumption, the trend of the actual number of visitors since the introduction of the policy was taken into account. In addition, the external estimation of the sensitivity to travel and sightseeing expenditures was also considered.	d) Since these goals are for the DEL set, it is assumed that when calculating the impact of RDEL, it will increase in proportion to the distribution of RDEL and CDEL in 2024-25.	7. 6	7. 6	d) Since these goals are for the DEL set, it is assumed that when calculating the impact of RDEL, it will increase in proportion to the distribution of RDEL and CDEL in 2024-25.	d) Since these goals are for the DEL set, it is assumed that when calculating the impact of RDEL, it will increase in proportion to the distribution of RDEL and CDEL in 2024-25.
4) Name.	0.5	9.8	9.0	8.1	7.5	7.2	7.1
-0. 1	b) For more information about insurance premium settings, see Briefing Paper No. 6 "Insurance Premiums and Our Expectives" (March 2014).	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7
7) HMRC Gross Case 1 Trading Profits.	4.6	5.7	5.5	5.2	5.2	5.2	5.1
8) Transfer data from the ONS housing price index.	0.0	0.8	1.2	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6
9) Data extracted from HMRC information about land stamp tax.	0.4	1.2	0.9	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.5
56. 21	-twenty five	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. < SPAN> 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) will maintain 4 % or more for the time being, and will drop slightly to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. < SPAN> 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) will maintain 4 % or more for the time being, and will drop slightly to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	2027-28	2027-28
2026-27	2027-28	2028-29	GDP and its components	Real GDP	-0. 4	-0. 1	-0. 1
Name GDP (1)	-0, 6	Nominal GDP (1 billion pounds) (1, 2)	-12	-12	10	-11	-11
Name GDP (Central March 100 million) (1, 3)	-14	-11	10	-11	10	Salary / wage (4)	-0. 2
The tariff government of the electric vehicle (EVS) extends the current trade rules for the United Kingdom and the EU for three years, postponed the introduction of the origin of origin until January 1, 2027, and has 2 year old. It has been announced that it will reduce 100 million pounds. We had previously assumed that a trader would respond to this change by 2024, and that the United Nations trade with the EU would be virtually unrelated. We will reflect the tariffs that were supposed to be collected from traders that do not conform to the origin of the origin, and raise the same duties.	-0. 2	PNFC no n-oil profit (4, 5)	-0, 6	-3. 4	-0. 4	-0, 6	Personal consumption (4, 5)

-0. 2

Table A.8: Total managed expenditure: changes since November

What is the driving force behind the growth of British service trade?
-0, 8	British service trade has continued to grow strongly, including the relationship with the EU, despite the increase in trade barriers after Brexit. Looking at the configuration by department, about tw o-thirds of the growth of trade services since 2019 are leading by the "Other Business Services" department, including management consultants, research and development, and advertising (Chart H). 。 In contrast, financial services and transportation exports have been delayed to other departments, and each has decreased by 5 and 9 %to 2, 0 %. These are the most susceptible sectors due to the effects of blepjit friction.
Note: This includes gains from bringing offshore sheltered trusts into UK taxable range for certain deemed residential and non-residential properties not subject to the new regime.	The powerful growth of the UK's "Other Business Services" may reflect several factors. First, the trade barrier with the EU may be lower than the strict regulations such as goods and banking businesses. In the second G, exports to the United States have shown a particularly powerful growth, which may have been supported by recent pounds and incorporate outsourcing operations on the U. S. company to the UK. H Finally, it is suggested that service companies may avoid trade barriers by selling through overseas subsidiaries.	As a whole, our assumptions on the impact of Brexit seem to be as planned, and recently published research is generally consistent with these estimates. However, considering the challenges of the confusion due to the simultaneous impact of geopolitical trends that affect Braeggit, pandemic, and other global trade, it is still difficult to make a solid conclusion. Trade data is unstable, especially service trade is easily corrected. In addition, the complete implementation of the TCA will further increase the barrier of goods trade with the EU. It is expected that the impact of Bluejit will appear completely a few years after the complete implementation of these barriers. Until then, we will continue to consider Brexit projects.	(a) OBR, Brexit and the Obr's Brexit Forecast, Octom 2018. Detailed analysis of trade and productivity relevance is box 2.	b) See. Box 2. The economic impact of Brexit on investment and immigration is 4 in March 2023 for economic and tax prospects.	c) See. Box D: Briefing Agent on the Bank of England, February 2024, February 2024.	d) Resolution Foundation, Ending Stagnation: New economic strategy for the UK, December 2023.
2. 553
2. 731	This chapter: Note the classification problems that affect the prediction (from paragraph 4. 4).	3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact of all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of November 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	-0, 8	20. 3	Fte	1. 233	1. 285
2. 757	8.6	-130	Main tax decision factors	Note EX PSNB Neutral expenditure	-0. 9	-0. 2	Main tax decision factors
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
Considering the direct behavioural impacts of non-EU tourists no longer visiting the UK	0.0	0.5	2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) after adjustment of 41 will be maintained at 4 % or more for the time being, and will be reduced to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	b) For more information about insurance premium settings, see Briefing Paper No. 6 "Insurance Premiums and Our Expectives" (March 2014).	Employee	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	-1. 2
RPI	Information on past measures	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.3	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.0	0.0	0.1
Triple lock warranty (September)	0.3	-twenty four	-141	-364	-462	-498	-539
33. 6	0.0	0.6	0.9	0.2	0.4	0.0	0.3
-0. 2	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.3	0.1	Information on past measures	Information on past measures
-1. 0	0.0	The two new tax revenues of E-liquid and carbon border regulation mechanism used at the time of release will increase the number of tax revenues by £ 700 million by 2028-29.	0.3	0.0	Information on past measures	2024-2028 average growth rate	Information on past measures
Economic / Real Estate Sector	0.0	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. < SPAN> 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) will maintain 4 % or more for the time being, and will drop slightly to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. < SPAN> 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) will maintain 4 % or more for the time being, and will drop slightly to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.0	0.2
4. 329	0.0	0.0	0.0	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.
4. 492	0.0	2024-2028 average growth rate	Information on past measures	Information on past measures	Information on past measures	Information on past measures	Information on past measures
4. 658	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
4. 828	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
HMRC Financial Division Profit (1, 7)	0.8	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
11, 5	0.1	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
-0. 1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
1. 035	2.8	4.6	4.7	4.1	3.7	3.6	3.4
-1. 7	0.0	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of revenues in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:
Note: Pre-2007 medians are from 1967-68 to 2006-07. Year-on-year changes are from 1968-69 medians. Values are colour coded by pre-crisis decile. PSNW is inverted to facilitate comparison with the other three measures.	0.0	0.3	1.2	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.4
60. 68	4.4	5.3	5.4	4.3	4.4	4.5	4.6
56. 21	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.1
1. 00	-0, 6	3. 1 In this chapter	2023-24	-0, 8	-0. 7	Ratio of gold (10 %) (10)	-685
34. 9
31. 2	0.0	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	0.0	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.0
12. 9	1.4	0.9	1.7	0.9	0.8	0.4	0.0
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
1. 16	1.9	0.8	0.5	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.6	0.6	0.5
0, 00	0.3	0.2	0.2	Information on past measures	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.
4) Name.	0.0	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of revenues in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	Information on past measures	0.2	0.3	0.1	2024-2028 average growth rate
-0. 1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
7) HMRC Gross Case 1 Trading Profits.	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.0
8) Transfer data from the ONS housing price index.	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
9) Data extracted from HMRC information about land stamp tax.	0.0	Information on past measures	2024-2028 average growth rate	2024-2028 average growth rate	2024-2028 average growth rate	2024-2028 average growth rate	2024-2028 average growth rate
56. 21	2027-28	0.3	1.1	1.1	0.3	0.2	0.1
2026-27	CBAM's responsibility belongs to the importer after a year of £ 10. 000.	Prospect	The policy is designed to give an active change in behavioral changes by producers, and it is difficult to predict how successful this will be.	2028-29	The policy is designed to give an active change in behavioral changes by producers, and it is difficult to predict how successful this will be.	Hicbc raised/ changed	GDP growth
Name GDP (1)	3.1	5.0	5.1	4.5	4.1	3.9	3.7
Name GDP (Central March 100 million) (1, 3)	-0, 4	1. 285	Tax	Policy risks describe potential policies that have not yet affected our central forecast.	-59	4. 27 We have revised our average receipts by £1. 7 billion between 2024-25 and 2028-29 in relation to our November forecasts. This is mainly due to lower gas prices. The one-year extension of the EPL to 2028-29 has increased this by £2 billion from the last November forecast. Conflict in the Middle East, including shipping disruptions in the Red Sea, has had little impact on oil and gas prices so far, but remains a source of uncertainty in the forecast, as noted in Box 2. 2.	0, 03
The tariff government of the electric vehicle (EVS) extends the current trade rules for the United Kingdom and the EU for three years, postponed the introduction of the origin of origin until January 1, 2027, and has 2 year old. It has been announced that it will reduce 100 million pounds. We had previously assumed that a trader would respond to this change by 2024, and that the United Nations trade with the EU would be virtually unrelated. We will reflect the tariffs that were supposed to be collected from traders that do not conform to the origin of the origin, and raise the same duties.	Static cost calculation	-31	-179	-463	-586	-633	-685

-0. 2

Table A.9: Fiscal aggregates

α) This was derived from the introduction of elasticity and unique assumptions for other parameters in the Ministry of Finance's labor supply model, and the change in personal tax policy was evaluated by the impact of the motivation to work. For more information on methodology, see below. OBR, the impact of the national insurance premiums in the fall of 2023, February 2024.
-0, 8	British service trade has continued to grow strongly, including the relationship with the EU, despite the increase in trade barriers after Brexit. Looking at the configuration by department, about tw o-thirds of the growth of trade services since 2019 are leading by the "Other Business Services" department, including management consultants, research and development, and advertising (Chart H). 。 In contrast, financial services and transportation exports have been delayed to other departments, and each has decreased by 5 and 9 %to 2, 0 %. These are the most susceptible sectors due to the effects of blepjit friction.
Note: This includes gains from bringing offshore sheltered trusts into UK taxable range for certain deemed residential and non-residential properties not subject to the new regime.	The powerful growth of the UK's "Other Business Services" may reflect several factors. First, the trade barrier with the EU may be lower than the strict regulations such as goods and banking businesses. In the second G, exports to the United States have shown a particularly powerful growth, which may have been supported by recent pounds and incorporate outsourcing operations on the U. S. company to the UK. H Finally, it is suggested that service companies may avoid trade barriers by selling through overseas subsidiaries.	As a whole, our assumptions on the impact of Brexit seem to be as planned, and recently published research is generally consistent with these estimates. However, considering the challenges of the confusion due to the simultaneous impact of geopolitical trends that affect Braeggit, pandemic, and other global trade, it is still difficult to make a solid conclusion. Trade data is unstable, especially service trade is easily corrected. In addition, the complete implementation of the TCA will further increase the barrier of goods trade with the EU. It is expected that the impact of Bluejit will appear completely a few years after the complete implementation of these barriers. Until then, we will continue to consider Brexit projects.	(a) OBR, Brexit and the Obr's Brexit Forecast, Octom 2018. Detailed analysis of trade and productivity relevance is box 2.	b) See. Box 2. The economic impact of Brexit on investment and immigration is 4 in March 2023 for economic and tax prospects.	c) See. Box D: Briefing Agent on the Bank of England, February 2024, February 2024.	d) Resolution Foundation, Ending Stagnation: New economic strategy for the UK, December 2023.
-7. 7
-8. 0	430. 9	2024-25	179. 2	168. 1	179. 2	5. 24 Chart 2. 2 examined the effects of the more widespread trade in the Middle East and the interruption of trade via the Middle East, which were expected to be expected in the central prediction. In this scenario, petroleum, gas, and electricity prices are 75% higher than central predictions for one year. After returning to the top of the pandemic, the confusion of the supply chain of the product retreats. As a result, the CPI inflation rate rises to about 7%in early 2025, then decreased, and during the remaining period of the scenario, it will be lower than the central prediction. The name GDP rises in the short term due to the rise in the deflator, but in 2025-26, the fall of the GDP will retreat to the central prediction. On the predictive horizontal line, the real GDP recovers, but the deflation rate rises by 2. 2%by 2028-29, as the deflation rate rises permanently.	186. 1
192. 1	-12. 6	415. 4	170. 7	96. 4	182. 1	189, 6	197. 8
206. 0	Corporate tax (2)	79, 7	94. 9	101. 3	102. 7	106. 3	10. 1
115. 0	186. 1	33. 9	CBAM's responsibility belongs to the importer after exceeding £ 10. 000 per year.	The responsibility is determined by the difference between the effective price of carbon in the country of origin and the effective price of carbon in the UK. [15] Calculated for £ per CO2.	99, 5	101. 1	CBAM is a tax for some of the carbon emissions (and equivalent carbon) in imported goods from aluminum, hydrogen, cement, fertilizer, ceramics, glass, and steel.
108. 9	1.8	2.5	2.4	2.1	2.0	1.8	1.7
114. 1	2.4	2.4	2.5	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.4
Close to land
Oil revenue tax	21. 9	Of which	Internal wellness cap	339, 7	315. 1	315. 1	159, 3
Fuel tax	5.0	4.2	3.1	2.7	2.3	1.6	1.2
25. 1
24. 6	3.2	1.7	0.7	0.6	0.3	Information on past measures	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.
27. 6	5.9	4.3	2.7	2.3	2.1	1.6	1.2
28. 0	4.1	1.8	0.3	0.2	0.1	Information on past measures	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.
28. 2	1.2	1.2	0.8	0.2	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	-45	-1. 2
36. 3	2.0	1.3	0.4	Information on past measures	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of revenues in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	2, 40 RHDI per capita has increased from 2023-24 for the third consecutive year, and is expected to recover the peak before the pandemic in 2025-26, two years earlier than the forecast in November. This is mainly because the recovery from the situation of the trade shock is accelerated, and the ratio of the whole economy as a whole is high in the labor market in the short term. During the forecast period, RHDI per person increases about 1%from the prediction as of November. With a decrease in consumer prices, RHDI per capita rises 1. 3%from November. In accordance with the decline in inflation, the per capita income per person by 2028-29 will decrease by 0. 7%(the offset is not perfect due to the improvement of trade conditions). In addition, RHDI per capita increases 0. 6 % due to household benefits and tax predictions and policy changes. It is expected that the NIC headline tax rate will be reduced by 2 pounds, which was announced in this budget, will directly increase the real household income by 0. 5 %. This will be added to the same scale by reducing the NIC announced in the fall of 2023. These estimates do not take into account the behavioral reaction to the policy or the financial hinder due to the freezing of the tax standard.	-1. 2
44. 6
46. 9	4.4	5.5	5.1	3.9	3.3	3.1	3.0
49. 3	1.3	4.2	4.1	0.9	2.5	3.2	3.0
51, 9
54. 6	11. 2	-7. 0	2) For UC and legacy, personal tax deduction, housing allowance (excluding retired people), disability allowance (employment / support allowance, incom e-based support, severe disabled personnel allowance, and disability allowance) ) Includes income support, incom e-based and contributed job allowance.	3) Disability allowance includes life allowance for persons with disabilities, personal independent allowance, and attendance allowance.	4) Other costs include social security expenses in North Ireland.	4, 58 Compared to the prediction in November 2023, welfare expenditures are expected to decrease slightly to £ 2. 8 billion on average. According to Table 4. 9, this correction is based on:	The upgrade dropped due to inflation and decreased income forecast (average in 2025-2026 to £ 2. 9 billion). Inflation is not binding to triple locks in any predictive year, so most of the lower pressure due to a decrease in inflation ratio will be child allowance and active generation benefits.
30. 1	30. 9	-1, 9	APF	-1, 9	-4. 2	-5. 4	-4. 3
21. 3	23. 5	-4, 0	home	Central government	-0, 1	-1, 5	-2.
17. 2
19. 6	5.5	5.2	4.3	3.3	3.0	2.4	2.0
22. 1	6.5	5.5	3.9	2.9	2.7	2.4	2.0
Stock stamp tax	Cigarette tax	Liquor tax	From expenditure	Level in 2028 (BN Pound)	12. 7	0, 29	14. 3
Expenditures decreased to universal credit portions during employment (average decrease by £ 2. 6 billion each year). The percentage of tax credit claimers who discontinued the claim without shifting to UC was higher than expected, so the number of cases was revised down. In addition, the growth of the UC applicant's income was higher than expected, and the decrease in arbitrage income increased.
16. 0	Air passenger tax	36. 6	Climate change countermeasures tax	11, 6	9.5	Neutral evidence of PSNB	Technical training tax
Name GDP (Central March 100 million) (1, 3)	-14	-11	10	-11	10	Salary / wage (4)	-0. 2
11. 9	452. 3	465. 6	479. 2	408. 3	-2. 6	Difference	Marginal
27. 6	10. 9	Exhaust transaction system	Energy profit levy	Power generator levy	2024 growth rate	10. 4	CBAM's responsibility belongs to the importer after exceeding £ 10. 000 per year.
28. 0	Cap & trail + margin	11. 6	8.9	4.5	3.7	-446	11. 8
Taxes for national economic calculation	333, 9	343, 2	350, 9	361, 7	March 2024 forecast	261, 5	295, 8
Interest and dividends	2026-27 < SPAN> 2) For UC and legacy equivalent, personal tax deduction, housing allowance (excluding retired people), disability allowance (employment / support allowance, income supported persons with disabilities, severe disabilities. , Includes the provisions of persons with disabilities), income support, incom e-based, and contributed job job allowances.	3) Disability allowance includes life allowance for persons with disabilities, personal independent allowance, and attendance allowance.	4) Other costs include social security expenses in North Ireland.	4, 58 Compared to the prediction in November 2023, welfare expenditures are expected to decrease slightly to £ 2. 8 billion on average. According to Table 4. 9, this correction is based on:	The upgrade dropped due to inflation and decreased income forecast (average in 2025-2026 to £ 2. 9 billion). Inflation is not binding to triple locks in any predictive year, so most of the lower pressure due to a decrease in inflation ratio will be child allowance and active generation benefits.	Expenditures decreased to universal credit portions during employment (average decrease by £ 2. 6 billion each year). The percentage of tax credit claimers who discontinued the claim without shifting to UC was higher than expected, so the number of cases was revised down. In addition, the growth of the UC applicant's income was higher than expected, and the decrease in arbitrage income increased.	Other changes include an increase in public pensions and disability cases (average per year), which mainly decreases death cases in public pension predictions and the percentage of personal independence payments. It is based on the assumption.
Total surplus	2) For UC and legacy, personal tax deduction, housing allowance (excluding retired people), disability allowance (employment / support allowance, incom e-based support, severe disabled personnel allowance, and disability allowance) ) Includes income support, incom e-based and contributed job allowance.	73, 5	76, 7	78, 5	80, 8	83. 4	85, 9
Other evidence	997	Current evidence	1. 029	1. 102	1. 139	1. 174	1. 222
1. 272	1.0	Information on past measures	2027-28	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	Information on past measures	0.0	0.0

3) Includes stamp tax, real estate transfer tax, and siege annual tax.

4) Reclaimed territory tax (excluding distributed type), aggregate tax, gambling tax, tariff, profitable tax, soft drink industrial tax, housing development tax, carbon border adjustment mechanism, VAPE tax, plastic wrapping tax.

Table A.10: Fiscal aggregates: changes since November

α) This was derived from the introduction of elasticity and unique assumptions for other parameters in the Ministry of Finance's labor supply model, and the change in personal tax policy was evaluated by the impact of the motivation to work. For more information on methodology, see below. OBR, the impact of the national insurance premiums in the fall of 2023, February 2024.
-0, 8	British service trade has continued to grow strongly, including the relationship with the EU, despite the increase in trade barriers after Brexit. Looking at the configuration by department, about tw o-thirds of the growth of trade services since 2019 are leading by the "Other Business Services" department, including management consultants, research and development, and advertising (Chart H). 。 In contrast, financial services and transportation exports have been delayed to other departments, and each has decreased by 5 and 9 %to 2, 0 %. These are the most susceptible sectors due to the effects of blepjit friction.
Note: This includes gains from bringing offshore sheltered trusts into UK taxable range for certain deemed residential and non-residential properties not subject to the new regime.	The powerful growth of the UK's "Other Business Services" may reflect several factors. First, the trade barrier with the EU may be lower than the strict regulations such as goods and banking businesses. In the second G, exports to the United States have shown a particularly powerful growth, which may have been supported by recent pounds and incorporate outsourcing operations on the U. S. company to the UK. H Finally, it is suggested that service companies may avoid trade barriers by selling through overseas subsidiaries.	As a whole, our assumptions on the impact of Brexit seem to be as planned, and recently published research is generally consistent with these estimates. However, considering the challenges of the confusion due to the simultaneous impact of geopolitical trends that affect Braeggit, pandemic, and other global trade, it is still difficult to make a solid conclusion. Trade data is unstable, especially service trade is easily corrected. In addition, the complete implementation of the TCA will further increase the barrier of goods trade with the EU. It is expected that the impact of Bluejit will appear completely a few years after the complete implementation of these barriers. Until then, we will continue to consider Brexit projects.	(a) OBR, Brexit and the Obr's Brexit Forecast, Octom 2018. Detailed analysis of trade and productivity relevance is box 2.	b) See. Box 2. The economic impact of Brexit on investment and immigration is 4 in March 2023 for economic and tax prospects.	c) See. Box D: Briefing Agent on the Bank of England, February 2024, February 2024.	d) Resolution Foundation, Ending Stagnation: New economic strategy for the UK, December 2023.
-7. 7
-8. 0	0.2	0.1	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	Information on past measures	Information on past measures	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.
192. 1	0.1	Information on past measures	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:
206. 0	0.2	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	Information on past measures	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	Information on past measures	Information on past measures	Information on past measures
115. 0	0.2	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	Information on past measures	Information on past measures
108. 9	2024-2028 average growth rate	Information on past measures	2024-2028 average growth rate	2024-2028 average growth rate	2024-2028 average growth rate	2024-2028 average growth rate	2024-2028 average growth rate
114. 1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1
Close to land
Oil revenue tax	2024-2028 average growth rate	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	0.1	0.0	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.0	0.1
Fuel tax	0.0	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1
25. 1
24. 6	0.1	Information on past measures	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.3
27. 6	2024-2028 average growth rate	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2
28. 0	0.0	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3
28. 2	0.0	0.1	0.8	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.6
36. 3	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.0	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.5	0.6
44. 6
46. 9	0.3	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.2	0.1	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.0	0.1
49. 3	-1. 2	Information on past measures	0.3	0.0	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.0	0.1
51, 9
54. 6	2024-2028 average growth rate	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.2
30. 1	0.0	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	1.0	1.7	2.4	3.1	3.9
21. 3	2024-2028 average growth rate	Information on past measures	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.4	0.5
17. 2
19. 6	0.0	Information on past measures	0.0	0.0	2024-2028 average growth rate	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.0
22. 1	2024-2028 average growth rate	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1
Stock stamp tax	0.0	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of revenues in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1
Expenditures decreased to universal credit portions during employment (average decrease by £ 2. 6 billion each year). The percentage of tax credit claimers who discontinued the claim without shifting to UC was higher than expected, so the number of cases was revised down. In addition, the growth of the UC applicant's income was higher than expected, and the decrease in arbitrage income increased.
16. 0	2.1	-0, 8	6.0	3.3	2.7	4.3	8.2
Name GDP (Central March 100 million) (1, 3)	-0, 4	1. 285	Tax	Policy risks describe potential policies that have not yet affected our central forecast.	-59	4. 27 We have revised our average receipts by £1. 7 billion between 2024-25 and 2028-29 in relation to our November forecasts. This is mainly due to lower gas prices. The one-year extension of the EPL to 2028-29 has increased this by £2 billion from the last November forecast. Conflict in the Middle East, including shipping disruptions in the Red Sea, has had little impact on oil and gas prices so far, but remains a source of uncertainty in the forecast, as noted in Box 2. 2.	0, 03
11. 9	0.4	162	2.7	0.6	0.3	1.5	4.4
27. 6	-17	Insurance tax	1.3	4.4	4.8	3.6	4.9
28. 0	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	Note EX PSNB Neutral expenditure	4.6	7.1	7.2	6.4	8.6
Taxes for national economic calculation	1.4	-twenty four	CGT property rate reduction	20. 1	percent	-0, 1	Tax
Interest and dividends	1.3	-0, 2	The NICS upper income cap, lower income cap and secondary employer income cap will also be frozen for 2027-28.	Digital Services Tax	Other HMRC Taxes (4)	-0, 1	-119
Total surplus	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	-0, 1	-0, 1	21. 4	Emissions Trading Scheme	2022-23	Forecast
Other evidence	5.2	1.9	-0, 5	-539	-0, 3	Energy Benefits Levy	-0, 5
1. 272	Information on past measures	Information on past measures	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.0

3) Includes stamp tax, real estate transfer tax, and siege annual tax.

Table A.11: Sources of year-on-year changes in public sector net debt

What is the driving force behind the growth of British service trade?
British service trade has continued to grow strongly, including the relationship with the EU, despite the increase in trade barriers after Brexit. Looking at the configuration by department, about tw o-thirds of the growth of trade services since 2019 are leading by the "Other Business Services" department, including management consultants, research and development, and advertising (Chart H). 。 In contrast, financial services and transportation exports have been delayed to other departments, and each has decreased by 5 and 9 %to 2, 0 %. These are the most susceptible sectors due to the effects of blepjit friction.
The powerful growth of the UK's "Other Business Services" may reflect several factors. First, the trade barrier with the EU may be lower than the strict regulations such as goods and banking businesses. In the second G, exports to the United States have shown a particularly powerful growth, which may have been supported by recent pounds and incorporate outsourcing operations on the U. S. company to the UK. H Finally, it is suggested that service companies may avoid trade barriers by selling through overseas subsidiaries.	As a whole, our assumptions on the impact of Brexit seem to be as planned, and recently published research is generally consistent with these estimates. However, considering the challenges of the confusion due to the simultaneous impact of geopolitical trends that affect Braeggit, pandemic, and other global trade, it is still difficult to make a solid conclusion. Trade data is unstable, especially service trade is easily corrected. In addition, the complete implementation of the TCA will further increase the barrier of goods trade with the EU. It is expected that the impact of Bluejit will appear completely a few years after the complete implementation of these barriers. Until then, we will continue to consider Brexit projects.	(a) OBR, Brexit and the Obr's Brexit Forecast, Octom 2018. Detailed analysis of trade and productivity relevance is box 2.	b) See. Box 2. The economic impact of Brexit on investment and immigration is 4 in March 2023 for economic and tax prospects.	c) See. Box D: Briefing Agent on the Bank of England, February 2024, February 2024.	d) Resolution Foundation, Ending Stagnation: New economic strategy for the UK, December 2023.
-0, 8	-1, 0	-0, 8	-0, 5	-0, 5	-0, 5	Taxes on National Accounts
1. 9	-3. 4	-19. 6	-17. 2	-15. 7	-17. 2	-20. 5
Interest and dividends	2024-2028 average growth rate	Total operating surplus	Other income	5.2	Current income	93. 2
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
-13. 1	2024-25	-11. 3	3. 30 The third cause of this cost calculation is especially related to the size of the response behavior, especially because there is no observed evidence obtained from the existing CBAM system. There are many possible actions (reducing costs to about on e-third):	3. 30 The third cause of this cost calculation is especially related to the size of the response behavior, especially because there is no observed evidence obtained from the existing CBAM system. There are many possible actions (reducing costs to about on e-third):	3. 30 The third cause of this cost calculation is especially related to the size of the response behavior, especially because there is no observed evidence obtained from the existing CBAM system. There are many possible actions (reducing costs to about on e-third):	3. 30 The third cause of this cost calculation is especially related to the size of the response behavior, especially because there is no observed evidence obtained from the existing CBAM system. There are many possible actions (reducing costs to about on e-third):
-3. 2	0.0
-2. 2	2.2	3.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
-1. 8	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5
-1. 1	The two new tax revenues of E-liquid and carbon border regulation mechanism used at the time of release will increase the number of tax revenues by £ 700 million by 2028-29.	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
3) Includes stamp duty, transfer duty and annual tax on vacant dwellings.	4) Landfill tax (except decentralised), aggregates tax, gambling tax, customs duty, profit diversion tax, soft drinks industry tax, residential property development tax, carbon border adjustment mechanism, vape tax, plastic packaging tax.	5) Consists of offshore corporate tax, petroleum revenue tax and energy profits tax.	2. 42 Mortgage interest rates are expected to rise to 4. 2 % in 2027. It rose to the minimum to 2%in the latter half of 2021, exceeding the average mortgage interest rate in 2010. However, the market forecast for bank interest rates has declined significantly by 0. 8 % than expected in November. However, there is a great risk in mortgage interest forecasts, which is clear from the fact that the bank interest rate forecast has fluctuated significantly since November. This also takes risks to household income, housing trading, and housing prices.	Actual	Forecast	2022-23
2023-24	-0, 8	Regime reform	11, 6	2027-28	2028-29	Public Sector Current Expenditure (PSCE)
PSCE in RDEL	The direct impact of all other tax measures announced after March 2020 will increase the tax burden of GDP by 0. 4%. This includes the city tax hike, the second pillar reform of the corporate tax, the introduction of energy gain taxation, and the increase in tax increase, etc. I am offset.	20. 3	March 2024 NICS reductions: a further 2 percentage point reduction in the NICS base rate for both employees and the self-employed announced in the Budget (effective from 6 April).	-twenty five	452, 3	The latter projections (Tables 4. 7 and 4. 8) reflect the impact of the detailed departmental plans for 2023-24 and 2024-25 published in the October 2021 Spending Review, the latest Supplementary Estimates for 2023-24 set by Treasury in February 2024,[32] and policy announcements since then. Over the past few years, the government has set departmental funding plans and implemented strict expenditure restraints, which have been broadly adhered to.
479, 2	0.4	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
PSCE in AME	0.4	0.7	1.2	1.4	1.2	0.8
643, 6	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.7
As a result of examining external estimates regarding the degree of price sensitivity of overseas travelers, the elasticity used in 2020 cost calculation was the highest in this range, as the result was in the range o f-2, 1-0, 4. 。 h We have made some adjustments, although we mainly answered that we were traveling for reasons other than vacation, we could take the VAT paid RES purchase. Therefore, our policy states that this policy has reduced the number of RES VAT claimers by 2025-26 by 34, 000, and in 2025-2026, 3 million pounds more than 2020 cost calculation. Will decrease. The number of RES VAT travelers is particularly uncertain because the cost of visiting costs increases in proportion to travelers from other countries. Therefore, the data did not overturn the original assumption, but this has a great uncertainties, and the number of deteriorated travelers may be higher and less. As a result, in order to offset static policy savings in government behavior, the reaction of this group must be much higher than any data we surveyed.	3.5	3.5	2.9	2.6	2.1	2.2
660, 2	2026-27	-1. 2	-0. 9	-14	2026-27	The two new tax revenues of E-liquid and carbon border regulation mechanism used at the time of release will increase the number of tax revenues by £ 700 million by 2028-29.
295, 8	315. 1	329, 0	329, 0	GDP growth	GDP growth	GDP growth
60. 1	2025-26	2025-26	2025-26
69. 3	Information on past measures	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
75. 4	Interest on central government debt, net of APF (1)	-685	104. 7	89. 0	88. 9	Note: Positive sign means increased borrowing. For a breakdown of each cost by indicator, see the online supplementary scorecard. 33 Behavior is an important component of tax cost calculations, capturing how individuals and firms change their behavior in response to a policy, thereby changing the tax base to which the new tax applies. Figure 3. 2 shows the magnitude of the estimated behavioral response for selected taxes announced in the Budget. Figure 3. 2 shows the proportion of static costs remaining when behavioral responses are taken into account for the taxes announced in the Budget. This shows that some measures are expected to have proportionally small behavioral responses. For example, fuel demand is relatively inelastic to price, so the static cost of freezing fuel tax rates through an increase in fuel prices is small. Similarly, a reduction in NICs is strengthened by indirect behavioral responses (increased labor supply) but has relatively low direct behavioral responses (low tax breaks). The three excise taxes (alcohol tax, tobacco tax, and new vapour tax) have different characteristics, so the magnitude of their behavioral effects varies. The impact of tax reform on demand is measured by price elasticities, and each sector has a degree of product substitutability within it (measured by cross-price elasticities). However, alcohol is more difficult to avoid and has lower levels of non-compliance. The relatively high tariffs on tobacco, especially cigarettes, suggest that tobacco revenues may be at or beyond their maximum.
103. 0	109. 6	109. 6	39. 6	42. 6	0.0	0.0
44. 4	66. 1	1) Unregulated GDP as of end-March.	d) Since these goals are for the DEL set, it is assumed that when calculating the impact of RDEL, it will increase in proportion to the distribution of RDEL and CDEL in 2024-25.	-51	EU economic settlement	Unfunded civil servant pensions
Corporation tax and other tax credits	10. 2	A further potential channel for indirect effects is the possibility that reduced external demand for RES goods will reduce employment and long-run potential output.	11. 0	-5. 0	4) Landfill tax (except decentralised), aggregates tax, gambling tax, customs duty, profit diversion tax, soft drinks industry tax, residential property development tax, carbon border adjustment mechanism, vape tax, plastic packaging tax.	1. 158. 0
1. 191. 3	8.2	8.5	5.1	4.5	6.4	7.4
1. 231, 1	7.1	4.3	2.6	2.2	2.2	2.6
0, 29	8.5	4.1	6.6	6.3	6.9	6.6
CDEL PSGI	2.0	1.2	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.5
89. 8	95. 6	2.5	452, 3	The government has expressed his intention to sell some retails of nut wests, following the support of the market and achieving value for money. At this stage, the details such as the time of sale are inadequate, so it cannot be incorporated into this forecast.	b) For more information about insurance premium settings, see Briefing Paper No. 6 "Insurance Premiums and Our Expectives" (March 2014).	1.5
98. 3	3.7	3.0	3.2	2.2	2.7	1.7
97. 4	4.8	4.0	2.0	0.7	0.2	0.0
Ame PSGI	0, 03	4. 27 We have revised our average receipts by £1. 7 billion between 2024-25 and 2028-29 in relation to our November forecasts. This is mainly due to lower gas prices. The one-year extension of the EPL to 2028-29 has increased this by £2 billion from the last November forecast. Conflict in the Middle East, including shipping disruptions in the Red Sea, has had little impact on oil and gas prices so far, but remains a source of uncertainty in the forecast, as noted in Box 2. 2.	Information on past measures	Policy risks describe potential policies that have not yet affected our central forecast.	Policy risks describe potential policies that have not yet affected our central forecast.	March 2024
33. 2	home	Local capital expenditure	Welfare allowances that can be received by the impact on the fiscal resources of alternative immigration scenarios are limited to at least five years after entering the country for most immigrants. Most new immigrants cannot be initially benefited, except for the return to the United Kingdom and Ireland or who have entered the country on humanitarian routes. The qualification of the public pension requires that the payment of national insurance premiums for at least 10 years has been approved, so almost all new immigrants are not initially eligible. Therefore, the impact of new immigrants on welfare expenditures in five years of prediction is very small.	Capital spending by public companies	-7. 0	11. 2
11, 7	11, 6	1	CBAM's responsibility belongs to the importer after a year of £ 10. 000.	11, 7	Student loan	Public pension system
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
Scottish government capital expenditure	Housing price (8)	4.6	2.5	1.9	1.9	2.2
Other PSGI items of Ame	The Government’s spending assumptions following the Spending Review from 2025-26 onwards set out two overall expenditure totals (total DEL resources and total DEL capital) but do not provide detailed plans for how they will be allocated across Government departments and agencies. As we approach the end of the 2021 Spending Review period, this overall spending framework covers four of the five years in our forecast. As noted in Box 4. 2, these expenditure totals have historically undergone significant upward revisions before or at the end of the Spending Review process in which these funds are allocated across departments and agencies.	Energy Benefits Levy	-0. 5	-0, 5	Other HMRC Taxes (4)	-0, 5
-0, 8	-0, 8	-59	7.1	Housing price (8)	4.9	Total (personal tax decision)
136. 0	2.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
132. 1	GDP growth	GDP growth	GDP growth	GDP growth	GDP growth	GDP growth

-69. 4

-71. 1

-73. 1

Table A.12: Public sector net debt profile: changes since November

What is the driving force behind the growth of British service trade?
British service trade has continued to grow strongly, including the relationship with the EU, despite the increase in trade barriers after Brexit. Looking at the configuration by department, about tw o-thirds of the growth of trade services since 2019 are leading by the "Other Business Services" department, including management consultants, research and development, and advertising (Chart H). 。 In contrast, financial services and transportation exports have been delayed to other departments, and each has decreased by 5 and 9 %to 2, 0 %. These are the most susceptible sectors due to the effects of blepjit friction.
The powerful growth of the UK's "Other Business Services" may reflect several factors. First, the trade barrier with the EU may be lower than the strict regulations such as goods and banking businesses. In the second G, exports to the United States have shown a particularly powerful growth, which may have been supported by recent pounds and incorporate outsourcing operations on the U. S. company to the UK. H Finally, it is suggested that service companies may avoid trade barriers by selling through overseas subsidiaries.	As a whole, our assumptions on the impact of Brexit seem to be as planned, and recently published research is generally consistent with these estimates. However, considering the challenges of the confusion due to the simultaneous impact of geopolitical trends that affect Braeggit, pandemic, and other global trade, it is still difficult to make a solid conclusion. Trade data is unstable, especially service trade is easily corrected. In addition, the complete implementation of the TCA will further increase the barrier of goods trade with the EU. It is expected that the impact of Bluejit will appear completely a few years after the complete implementation of these barriers. Until then, we will continue to consider Brexit projects.	(a) OBR, Brexit and the Obr's Brexit Forecast, Octom 2018. Detailed analysis of trade and productivity relevance is box 2.	b) See. Box 2. The economic impact of Brexit on investment and immigration is 4 in March 2023 for economic and tax prospects.	c) See. Box D: Briefing Agent on the Bank of England, February 2024, February 2024.	d) Resolution Foundation, Ending Stagnation: New economic strategy for the UK, December 2023.
-0, 8	-0, 5	-34	Prospect	1. 216	1. 226	1. 252
1. 9	-5. 2	The policy is designed to give an active change in behavioral changes by producers, and it is difficult to predict how successful this will be.	Static cost calculation	f) Springford, J., Brexit, Four Years ON: Correspondence to two trade paradox, January 2024.	Of which	Supplementary estimate
2022-23	2023-24	Springford, J., Brexit, four years on: Responses to two trade paradoxes, January 2024, estimates that the impact of Brexit on the UK will be consistent with a 4-5% reduction in GDP to date. NIESR, revisiting the Brexit impact, November 2023, GDP will be lower 5-6 % by 2035. Goldman Sachs, UK-The structural and cyclical costs of Brexit, February 2024, estimates that the GDP impact from the referendum will be 5 %.	2026-27	315. 1	-5. 1	2028-29
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
-13. 1	2028-29	3. 5 The expenditure decision announced on a budget is almost offset in terms of budget. The government has reduced the average of £ 800 million per year to the current standards of the current ministries, assumed after 2024-2025. In three years from 2025-26 to 2027-28, the company allocated an additional £ 900 million pounds for a program in public sector focusing on NHS. The decision to expand the target of child benefits will increase the number of children's allowance by about 400 million pounds a year.	GDP growth	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) after adjustment of 41 will be maintained at 4 % or more for the time being, and will be reduced to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) after adjustment of 41 will be maintained at 4 % or more for the time being, and will be reduced to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) after adjustment of 41 will be maintained at 4 % or more for the time being, and will be reduced to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.
-3. 2	0.0
-2. 2	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
-3. 0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1
-1. 1	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of revenues in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:	Information on past measures	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
3) Includes stamp duty, transfer duty and annual tax on vacant dwellings.	2024-25	CPI inflation	-0, 4	f) Springford, J., Brexit, Four Years ON: Correspondence to two trade paradox, January 2024.	CBAM's responsibility belongs to the importer after a year of £ 10. 000.	-0. 1
-2. 6	f) Springford, J., Brexit, Four Years ON: Correspondence to two trade paradox, January 2024.	3. 6 The indirect effect of these policies leads to shor t-term demand and a permanent increase on the supply side. The former is mainly due to a shor t-term tax reduction of household income, such as freezing on the ongoing fuel tariffs and reducing NICs. The latter will boost labor supply by improving the motivation to work, along with child allowance measures. This is somewhat offset by additional liabilities expenses associated with the funding of this measure. As a whole, the indirect effect of the policy package reduces the average annual borrowing of £ 800 million.	f) Springford, J., Brexit, Four Years ON: Correspondence to two trade paradox, January 2024.	f) Springford, J., Brexit, Four Years ON: Correspondence to two trade paradox, January 2024.	Static cost calculation	2023-24
-11, 5	0.1	0.0	2024-2028 average growth rate	Information on past measures	Information on past measures	Information on past measures
479, 2	0.1	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
PSCE in AME	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	0.1	0.3	0.5	0.6
643, 6	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	Information on past measures	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.1	0.7	0.7
As a result of examining external estimates regarding the degree of price sensitivity of overseas travelers, the elasticity used in 2020 cost calculation was the highest in this range, as the result was in the range o f-2, 1-0, 4. 。 h We have made some adjustments, although we mainly answered that we were traveling for reasons other than vacation, we could take the VAT paid RES purchase. Therefore, our policy states that this policy has reduced the number of RES VAT claimers by 2025-26 by 34, 000, and in 2025-2026, 3 million pounds more than 2020 cost calculation. Will decrease. The number of RES VAT travelers is particularly uncertain because the cost of visiting costs increases in proportion to travelers from other countries. Therefore, the data did not overturn the original assumption, but this has a great uncertainties, and the number of deteriorated travelers may be higher and less. As a result, in order to offset static policy savings in government behavior, the reaction of this group must be much higher than any data we surveyed.	1.1	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. < SPAN> 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) will maintain 4 % or more for the time being, and will drop slightly to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	0.0	0.0	0.1
660, 2	0.2	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
295, 8	f) Springford, J., Brexit, Four Years ON: Correspondence to two trade paradox, January 2024.	f) Springford, J., Brexit, Four Years ON: Correspondence to two trade paradox, January 2024.	f) Springford, J., Brexit, Four Years ON: Correspondence to two trade paradox, January 2024.	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) after adjustment of 41 will be maintained at 4 % or more for the time being, and will be reduced to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) after adjustment of 41 will be maintained at 4 % or more for the time being, and will be reduced to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) after adjustment of 41 will be maintained at 4 % or more for the time being, and will be reduced to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.
Domestic subsidy	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.0
69. 3	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.1
75. 4	2028-29	1. 216	-0. 2	-0. 2	329, 0	-0, 6
No n-domestic energy support	2024-2028 average growth rate	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0
Pension system by public sector	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	-0. 9	-0. 9	-33	2025-26	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:
Corporation tax and other tax credits	CBAM's responsibility belongs to the importer after exceeding £ 10. 000 per year.	111. 2	2028-29	2026-27	Static cost calculation	GDP growth
-6. 6	Information on past measures	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) after adjustment of 41 will be maintained at 4 % or more for the time being, and will be reduced to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	0.1	1.1	1.0
1. 231, 1	2, 40 RHDI per capita has increased from 2023-24 for the third consecutive year, and is expected to recover the peak before the pandemic in 2025-26, two years earlier than the forecast in November. This is mainly because the recovery from the situation of the trade shock is accelerated, and the ratio of the whole economy as a whole is high in the labor market in the short term. During the forecast period, RHDI per person increases about 1%from the prediction as of November. With a decrease in consumer prices, RHDI per capita rises 1. 3%from November. In accordance with the decline in inflation, the per capita income per person by 2028-29 will decrease by 0. 7%(the offset is not perfect due to the improvement of trade conditions). In addition, RHDI per capita increases 0. 6 % due to household benefits and tax predictions and policy changes. It is expected that the NIC headline tax rate will be reduced by 2 pounds, which was announced in this budget, will directly increase the real household income by 0. 5 %. This will be added to the same scale by reducing the NIC announced in the fall of 2023. These estimates do not take into account the behavioral reaction to the policy or the financial hinder due to the freezing of the tax standard.	0.0	0.8	Information on past measures	0.4	0.0
0, 29	4. 27 We have revised our average receipts by £1. 7 billion between 2024-25 and 2028-29 in relation to our November forecasts. This is mainly due to lower gas prices. The one-year extension of the EPL to 2028-29 has increased this by £2 billion from the last November forecast. Conflict in the Middle East, including shipping disruptions in the Red Sea, has had little impact on oil and gas prices so far, but remains a source of uncertainty in the forecast, as noted in Box 2. 2.	2026-27	0.0	An additional 600 million pounds will increase by 2028-29 by 2028-29, due to tax reforms for furnishings and the abolition of collapse rescue measures.	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	3. 4 The cost of these tax reductions is partially offset by a series of means of revenue increase in the medium term. The most important thing is the current reform of the current tax-free system, and the tax revenue of £ 2. 6 billion is expected by 2028-29. The estimated cost of other tax hike measures is as follows:
CDEL PSGI	0.0	0.0	2024-2028 average growth rate	2024-2028 average growth rate	2024-2028 average growth rate	2024-2028 average growth rate
Student loan	8.3	8.9	0.8	0.5	Other tax measures increase the number of £ 500 million a year in the last three years of the prediction. < SPAN> 3. Two forecasts have a financial and budget impact on all policy measures announced since the fall of the fall of the fall of 2023. The Prime Minister chose to spend the prior outlook after November on budget measures. Overall, these measures are estimated to increase the average of £ 8. 8 billion (0. 3 % of GDP). Box 3. 1 indicates that it continues to have a historic pattern of discretionary fiscal easing on fiscal improvement.	2027-28
98. 3	0.4	0.2	1.3	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	2024-2028 average growth rate	0.8
Tax difference	2. 43 Bank interest rates rose, and the current level reached the current level in the third quarter of 2023, so the number of housing transactions was 256. 000, a decrease by 40 % from the peak after the franchise. The preliminary survey indicators of the British Royal Certified Surveyor Association suggest that the market will continue to decline, but demand begins to recover as the new mortgage rates are declining in anticipation of bank interest rate reductions. There are also signs. According to our central prediction, housing transactions in 2024 were almost flat, and as of November, the decrease was reduced by 7 %. After that, the transaction recovered and reached the prescribed level in early 2025, two years earlier than expected in November. < SPAN> 2. 41 Household savings (excluding pensions) will maintain 4 % or more for the time being, and will drop slightly to 3. 5 % during the prediction period. It is expected that the proportion of savings in the disposable income of the household budget will be 4. 3 % in 2023 due to a slightly weaker consumption and an increase in income, and will increase by 1. 1 % in November. Later, the weakening of the labor market will promote the increase in preventive savings, and the rise in deposits interest rates will promote savings that bring interest rates. In the second half of the predictions, the interest rate is high, so the household savings after adjustment are expected to return only on the average lon g-term average. It is estimated that the headline savings rate, which takes into account the accumulation of pension funds, reached 9. 1%in 2023, and is expected to fall to less than 8%in 2028. This is almost the same as expected in November, but has been offset by a decline in pension evaluation due to recent changes in interest rates.	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.0	0.0
Ame PSGI	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
33. 2	-119	7.7	0.4	4. 27 We have revised our average receipts by £1. 7 billion between 2024-25 and 2028-29 in relation to our November forecasts. This is mainly due to lower gas prices. The one-year extension of the EPL to 2028-29 has increased this by £2 billion from the last November forecast. Conflict in the Middle East, including shipping disruptions in the Red Sea, has had little impact on oil and gas prices so far, but remains a source of uncertainty in the forecast, as noted in Box 2. 2.	0.7	3.8
11, 7	-0. 1	Student loan	In terms of expenditure, shor t-term downward revisions of nominal GDP are largely due to a decrease in nominal consumption, which is an important driving force in revenue. In 2024-2025, the nominal GDP was 0. 8 % lower than expected in November due to a decrease in real consumption and a decrease in personal consumption default. By 2028-29, the growth potential of real consumption partially offsets the decrease in spending default, and the contribution to the name GDP due to nominal consumption decreases by about 0. 1 % from November. < SPAN> 2. 47 This central prediction is 0. 3 % lower than the forecast of 2028-29 as of November as of November (£ 11 billion), in conjunction with some modification of past data. Due to a high starting point of 0. 2 % in 2023-24, the name GDP growth rate in the next five years will be 17 %, down 0. 6 % from expected in November. The increase in the accumulated growth rate of the real GDP is offset by the slowdown in the GDP deflator growth. Analyzing these changes will be as follows:	Static cost calculation	Hundreds of millions of pounds	The policy is designed to give an active change in behavioral changes by producers, and it is difficult to predict how successful this will be.
2. 32 After the pandemic, the number of inactive people of working age increased by about 750, 000 to a peak in mid-2022 and remained close to this level at the end of 2023. Previous LFS estimates had predicted a decline in the inactive population in early 2023. However, our data now show that the inactive population increased by 120, 000 from late 2022 to late 2023, returning to an 11-year high of 9. 3 million (Figure 2. 13, left). Inactivity due to long-term illness reached 2. 8 million, about one-third of the total (Figure 2. 13, right), increasing by 200, 000 in the year to 2023. This picture is consistent with a 20. Inactivity for other reasons in the LFS also differs from previous estimates. The share of students in the inactive population is now 0. 6 percentage points higher, the share of carers 0. 3 percentage points higher, and the share of retired people 0. 5 percentage points lower. [6]
Scottish government capital expenditure	This chapter: Note the classification problems that affect the prediction (from paragraph 4. 4).	3.2	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.5
Other PSGI items of Ame	0.8	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.2	0.3
0, 0	Reduction of depreciation costs in public sector	Very high	2027-28	3, 3 Tax reduction measures increase the average of £ 12. 6 billion per year (Table 3:	0.4	0.8
136. 0	4.5	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0
132. 1	GDP growth	GDP growth	GDP growth	GDP growth	GDP growth	GDP growth

-69. 4

-71. 1

-73. 1

Index of charts and tables

Box 4. 2: Government spending plans after the review
- -11, 4
- 1) Includes an increase in debt payment by APF.
- GDP ratio
- afternoon
- prediction
- 2022-23
- 2023-24
- 2024-25
- 2025-26
- 2026-27
- 2027-28
- 2028-29
- Margin and expenditure
- Ordinary income in public sector (a)
- 40. 3
- 40. 4
- 40. 9
- 40. 8
- 40. 9
- 41. 1
- 41. 2
- Accounting national tax
- 36. 3
- 36. 1
- 36. 5
- 36. 7
- 36. 9
- 37. 0
- 37. 1
- Total management expenditure (b)
- 45. 3
- 44. 5
- 44. 0
- 43. 5
- 43. 2
- 42. 8
- 42. 5
- Ordinary expenditure in public sector (c)
- 41. 2
- 39. 6
- 39. 1
- 38. 9
- 38. 8
- 38. 5
- 38. 4
- Public Section Jun Extract (D)
- Depreciation cost (e)
- Tax obligations and additional goals
- Public division pure debt excluding England Bank (1)
- 84. 9
- 88. 8
- 91, 7
- 92. 8
- 93. 2
- 93. 2
- 92. 9
- Public sector pure rental (B-A)
- Other deficit measures
- Formula deficit (C+E-A)
- -0. 2
- -0. 4
- Connectively adjusted in recycling
- Ordinary budget after circulation adjustment
- -0. 2
- -0. 4
- Main deficit
- -0. 4
- -1. 1
- -1, 6
- Basic budget deficit after circulation adjustment
- -0. 2
- -0, 6
- -1. 2
- -1, 6
- Financing
- Metropolitan government's net funding demand
- Net of net claims for public sectors
- Balance sheet alternative indicator
- Pure debt in the public sector (1)
- 95. 7
- 97. 6
- 98. 8
- 96. 4
- 95, 5
- 95. 1
- 94. 3
- Pure value of public sector (reversal) (1)
- 69, 7
- 69, 5
- 70. 2
- 69, 5
- 67. 9
- 66. 0
- 63. 9
- Pure financial debt in public sector (1)
- 81, 4
- 82. 9
- 83. 6
- 83. 2
- 82. 1
- 80, 6
- 78. 7
- International comparison (2)
- General government pure rental (GGNB)
- Circulation adjusted ggnb
- General government debt
- 99, 8
- 98. 6
- 101. 9
- 103. 4
- 103. 8
- 103. 6
- 103. 1
- Hundreds of millions of pounds
- Budget deficit
- 82. 7
- 46. 9
- 20. 7
16. 5

-5. 8

-13. 6

Public sector pure investment

46. 0

67. 1

66. 6

61. 0

59. 1

56. 3

53. 1

Public sector pure loan

128. 7

114. 1

87. 2

77. 5

68. 7

50. 6

39. 4

Pure rental after circulation adjustment

150, 9

116. 7

75, 5

65. 5

62. 8

48. 7

39. 1

Ordinary budget for recycling

105. 0

49, 6

-7. 6

-14. 0

Public division pure debt

2. 540

2. 691

2. 793

2. 820

2. 903

2. 995

3. 078

Public division pure debt excluding England Bank

2. 252

2. 447

2. 593

2. 715

2. 832

2. 936

3. 033

Pure debt

Elim Poon - Journalist, Creative Writer
Last modified: 27.08.2024

The OBR forecasts the economy to grow by % in , with growth then increasing to % and % in and Growth then returns. Economic and fiscal outlook – March Mar 06, Go to the profile of Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR). Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR). Inflation is expected to fall to around the % target rate by Q2 , then level off (chart ). Food price inflation is likewise expected.

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Economic and fiscal outlook March 2024 - Office for Budget Responsibility

Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2024