Anti-bribery and Corruption Policies in International Sports Governing Bodies

The International Sports Management Organization (hereinafter referred to as "ISGB") shares the need to maintain a reputation for fulfilling its accountability from the eyes of the stakeholder, although its purpose is different. There are documents discussing general governance concerns faced by these organizations, but the focus on bribery and corruption ("ABC") in this field is limited. The purpose of this article is to explore the ABC's best practice policy in ISGB. In this paper, a critical review of various ABC governance policies on large ISGBs through the analysis of governance documents released on the sample ISGB website. The review was implemented on the same ISGB twice in 2017 and 2020, and the changes were investigated. The survey showed the best practices of the best practices that the ISGB as a whole showed that ISGB had no appropriate policy on bribery risk. According to the survey results, there was no area in which the ISGB achieved good performance as a whole, and there was no powerful ISGB with a bribery prevention policy in all areas. However, in comparison between 2017 and 2020, policy improvement was seen.

Introduction

Sports in sports is not a rare phenomenon. Boxer Eupolos (SPIVEY, 2012), who gave bribes to Olympic athletes in 388 BC, gave a vote (REID, 2014), a bribe that bribed the stables for a horse pickled in the 1960s. Until the FIFA Executive Committee members (Blake and Calvert, 2015; Conn, 2018), which gave a bribe to secure, sports are full of corruption in such a form.

Brix and corruption in the international sports world are widespread, organized, existed, and are related to stakeholders from players to sponsors, but the governance aspects are attracting most attention. For example, in the 2015 FIFA governance corruption scandal, most of the executive committees were charged in the United States or undergoing internal sanctions (Conn, 2018). < SPAN> International Sports Management Organization (hereinafter, "ISGB") shares the need to maintain the reputation of fulfilling its accountability in the eyes of stakeholds, although its purpose is different. There are documents discussing general governance concerns faced by these organizations, but the focus on bribery and corruption ("ABC") in this field is limited. The purpose of this article is to explore the ABC's best practice policy in ISGB. In this paper, a critical review of various ABC governance policies on large ISGBs through the analysis of governance documents released on the sample ISGB website. The review was implemented on the same ISGB twice in 2017 and 2020, and the changes were investigated. The survey showed the best practices of the best practices that the ISGB as a whole showed that ISGB had no appropriate policy on bribery risk. According to the survey results, there was no area in which the ISGB achieved good performance as a whole, and there was no powerful ISGB with a bribery prevention policy in all areas. However, in comparison between 2017 and 2020, policy improvement was seen.

Sports in sports is not a rare phenomenon. Boxer Eupolos (SPIVEY, 2012), who gave bribes to Olympic athletes in 388 BC, gave a vote (REID, 2014), a bribe that bribed the stables for a horse pickled in the 1960s. The sports are full of corruption, up to the FIFA Executive Committee members (Blake and Calvert, 2015; Conn, 2018), which gave a bribe to secure.

Brix and corruption in the international sports world are widespread, organized, existed, and are related to stakeholders from players to sponsors, but the governance aspects are attracting most attention. For example, in the 2015 FIFA governance corruption scandal, most of the executive committees were charged in the United States or undergoing internal sanctions (Conn, 2018). The International Sports Management Organization (hereinafter referred to as "ISGB") shares the need to maintain a reputation for fulfilling its accountability from the eyes of the stakeholder, although its purpose is different. There are documents discussing general governance concerns faced by these organizations, but the focus on bribery and corruption ("ABC") in this field is limited. The purpose of this article is to explore the ABC's best practice policy in ISGB. In this paper, a critical review of various ABC governance policies on large ISGBs through the analysis of governance documents released on the sample ISGB website. The review was implemented on the same ISGB twice in 2017 and 2020, and the changes were investigated. The survey showed the best practices of the best practices that the ISGB as a whole showed that ISGB had no appropriate policy on bribery risk. According to the survey results, there was no area in which the ISGB achieved good performance as a whole, and there was no powerful ISGB with a bribery prevention policy in all areas. However, in comparison between 2017 and 2020, policy improvement was seen.

Sports in sports is not a rare phenomenon. Boxer Eupolos (SPIVEY, 2012), who gave bribes to Olympic athletes in 388 BC, gave a vote (REID, 2014), a bribe that bribed the stables for a horse pickled in the 1960s. The sports are full of corruption, up to the FIFA Executive Committee members (Blake and Calvert, 2015; Conn, 2018), which gave a bribe to secure.

Brix and corruption in the international sports world are widespread, organized, existed, and are related to stakeholders from players to sponsors, but the governance aspects are attracting most attention. For example, in the 2015 FIFA governance corruption scandal, most of the executive committees were charged in the United States or undergoing internal sanctions (Conn, 2018).

Bribery loses the dignity and image of sports (Gorse and Chadwick, 2010; KIHL et al., 2017), and impairs the efficiency and growth in the industry (Azfar et al.) The vulnerability against this form of corruption. Despite continuing, how international sports organizations (hereinafter referred to as "ISGB") are dealing with the ethics of corporate governance and corruption and bribery (hereinafter "ABC") to deal with bribery. The literature on is limited.

In addition, there is no global guidelines on the best practices in operation for sports organizations (Michie and Oghton, 2005), but some countries create their own guidelines in connection with the presence or absence of public funds. (Australian Sports Commission, 2015, 2020, Sport English UK Sport, 2016). The United Nations (2017) has also announced guidance on ABC measures for countries facing the sports corruption. ABC's policy is necessary to make iSGB into account, and a clear policy enables sanctions on violations. Thus, benchmarking individual ABC governance of ISGBS is out of the scope of this paper, but the lack of appropriate policies affects corruption.

Corporate Governance and Sport

The issues faced by the sports industry when designing and implementing ABC policies include different structures and hierarchies in iSGBS (Chappelet and Mrkonjic, 2013, Pielke, 2016, Garden et Al, 2014, Pielke, 2016). For example, the 2015 FIFA scandal is the protection (Linked, Tap, 2014, 2014, which is given to ISGBS by the Swiss Corporation Law, the ISGB and member federation structures (TIGHE AND ROWAN, 2020), conflicts of profits (Blake and Calvert, 2015). ) It was related to the problem.

Since ISGB is a sports regulator, it is necessary to evaluate the ISGB ABC policy to understand the problem and propose the optimal policy for other ISGB. The purpose of this article is to conduct a search qualitative evaluation of the content of the policy and language for the ISGB ABC policy. This is performed on a bribery framework developed by Philippou (2019) to evaluate ABC policy based on interdisciplinary studies on corruption. Its intention is to emphasize the best practices (and missing) in this framework currently adopted by several ISGB, and to outline the risk of bribery in ISGB as a group. 。

Contribution to this paper is a critical review of the current ISGB corruption governance policy to prevent bribery.

In the next section of this article, after discussing that the corporate governance policy is being implemented in ISGB, the outline of the ABC literature is explained, and then the framework and method used to evaluate the ABC policy. We will consider the results obtained from contextual evidence.

The European Sports Charter states that "spontaneous sports organizations have the right to establish autonomous decisio n-making procedures within the scope of the law" (European Council, 2001, Article 3, Paragraph 3). 。 Autonomy has led to sel f-regulation (Forster and Pope, 2004; Forster, 2006; Chappelet, 2016), but some researchers actually have this in this position. (Szymanski and Kuypers, 2000; Barker, 2013). Since the 1990s, SMITH and STEWART (2010) has decreased from 10 to 4 sports industries (STEWART and SMITH, 1999), which implement corporate governance policy in sports organizations. It is pointed out that it contains the existence of legally acceptable monopoly and / or oligopoly structure.

Governance is solved by applying issues identified by the proxy theory (1976) to sports. Agency issues may be caused by division (Berle and Means, 1930) between principal (resource distributors and stakeholders such as fans and athletes) and agents (managers of these resources like ISGB). be.

ISGB has evolved into a larg e-scale revenue source and has increased its name recognition (PWC, 2011, 2016; Gardiner et al.)

Thus, ISGB's corporate governance is becoming more and more important for governments and policy planners. Political organizations like the European Council (Council of Europe) are currently regarded as important issues, and support the 2013 Berlin Declaration (Geeraert (Geeraert)) , 2016; Gardiner et al.)

Considering the sel f-government principles of sports special exemption by law (European Council, 2001), it is natural that iSGB has a different governance and board composition compared to other corporate organizations. , Especially lack of accountability. This is especially true if the governance person is not interested, does not notice, or cannot identify corruption (Brooks et al., 2013; Kirkeby, 2016).

There are the following solutions to corporate governance issues (and related to corruption) facing the ISGB proposed by researchers and policy planners:

-Ret reports on benchmarking (Geeraert, 2016) and corporate governance measures (CHAPPELET AND MRKONJIC, 2013).

-Asal accountability for the behavior of members, including controllings on the receipt and use of funds (Ionescu, 2015; Pielke, 2016).

-In improvement of transparency, such as the salary of advanced managers and the disclosure of procurement methods (Geeraert et al. Maennig, 2016; MENARY, 2016; Transparency International, 2016).

-The exemplary of good governance that other sports coordinations should follow through the Best Practice Norm (Michie and OUGHTON, 2005; Pielke, 2016) (Pedersen, 2016).

Bribery

Researchers have been trying to develop benchmark tools to evaluate the strength of the corporate governance structure in sports organizations (not necessarily ISGB). However, if autonomy and sel f-regulation are some of the reasons for the low governance in the sports industry, comparison with the same organization will only have a limited ABC tool. The benchmark tools of the Good Governance (Aggis) in international sports are targeted in the field of transparency and chec k-an d-balance. The transparency and accountability related to the check and balance are all check items (Solomon, 2013, pp. 151-190) frequently used in the ABC territory, and will be described later in this paper.

Chappetet and Mrkonjic (2013) integrate indicators to measure corruption in sport governing bodies, including organizational transparency and reporting, control mechanisms, and sport integrity, which overlap with the ABC framework used in this paper (Philippou, 2019). Other benchmarks that have been applied to sport governance include Play The Game's National Sport Governance Observer (Geeraert, 2018; Alm, 2019). However, none of the benchmark assessments explicitly address anti-bribery measures, which is a suggested area for further research.

There is limited research on ABC data in the context of sport governance. One example is Pielke (2016), who assessed conflicts of interest and other ABC measures in FIFA against a framework of accountability mechanisms (including legal, market, peer, and public accountability), but not stakeholder accountability. At the same time, FIFA performed well in AGGIS benchmarking, coming in second in the list of 35 Olympic sports federations (Geeraert, 2015).

Although efforts to increase transparency have been made in various organizations over time, the above methodology has rarely been adopted with a focus on ABC, and research on the application of ABC corporate governance to ISGB is limited. This paper aims to start the process of addressing this knowledge gap by analyzing best practices as a first step towards an ABC best practice code, following Michie and Oughton (2005) and Pielke (2016).

Theoretical Framework

Like corruption (Ashforth and Anand, 2003; Den Nieuwenboer and Kaptein, 2008? Gorse and Chadwick, 2010; Rose, 2017), bribery has many definitional problems and is subject to biases in the public sector literature. This may be due in part to the idea that sport is a public good, even if the institutions that govern it are not.

ISGBs are typically private bodies, and while corruption is often internal to the organisation (voter rigging, cheating, race rigging), senior officials hold public office in parallel to their ISGB roles. Notable exceptions are national hosting of major sporting events such as the Olympics and the FIFA World Cup. These events often require government-provided infrastructure and the entertainment of ISGB members by public officials, exposing the possibility of external bribery and procurement fraud (Dorsey, 2015).

Bribery can be defined as "the offer, promise, provision, acceptance, or solicitation of a benefit that is an inducement to an illegal, unethical, or dishonest act" (Transparency International, 2017b). This definition is broader than public sector definitions (such as the US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (Sarbanes-Oxley, 2002)), but it does not define the terms "ethical" and "dishonest," raising future questions. Therefore, we use it in this paper.

Empirical studies on bribery are limited. Hanousek and Kochanova (2016) found that the "local bribery environment" affected firm performance in European countries, but their subjects were public officials. Rodrigues-Neto (2014) modeled different forms of bribery and showed that when monetary bribes are paid, the bargaining power of bribers is relatively small. Other studies have focused on identifying bribery in the context of corruption (see, for example, Ryvkin et al., 2017) or on the issue of bribery from a business perspective (Bray, 2007; Transparency International, 2011). These latter studies are based on perceptions and measure beliefs rather than quantity (Sampford, 2006; Brooks et al.). In this paper, we analyze ABC policies rather than the quality or quantity of bribery cases, although perceptions play a role in the reputational damage that companies suffer as a result of corruption.

Limited theoretical frameworks are available for critical evaluation of ABC policies. One such example is De Waegeneer et al. (2016), who created a classification framework for a content analysis of the effectiveness of the ISGB Code of Ethics. This includes thematic and procedural content classifications, both of which are related to general governance policies but not explicitly to the ISGB. Another is Masters’ (2015) TASP sport corruption typology, which can be explicitly applied to cases of corruption in sport and the context of specific scandals within the ISGB.

Clarifying Concepts: Definitions

Svensson (2005) describes corruption as a result of “a country’s legal, economic, cultural and political institutions”, whereas bribery is the result of many similar variables, both thematic and procedural, that need to be addressed in ABC policies.

Philippou (2019) presents a theoretical framework of bribery in sport governance. The framework (Figure 1) is divided into three parts: conceptual clarification (e. g., the definitions of corruption and bribery used), assessment of risk factors (financial rents, discretionary powers, culture), and evaluation of governance (accountability, monitoring and control systems, enforcement). This paper uses this framework because it explicitly addresses ABC in sport governance and is built on the fusion of interdisciplinary ABC research. Its elements and related literature are discussed below.

Figure 1

Figure 1. Theoretical framework of bribery and ABC. Adapted from Philippou (2019).

Assessing Risk Factors

Economic Rent

The global scope and activities of the ISGB make it subject to various ABC laws and regulations, and its internal policies and norms must comply with them. The ability of the ISGB to avail itself of regulatory arbitration (such as the ICC's relocation from the UK to Dubai in 2005) will affect the policies and procedures that are required and therefore enacted.

The definition of bribery in the US FCPA (1977, §78dd-3) requires the involvement of a public official (UK Government, 2010). The UK Bribery Act 2010 has a broader definition of bribery, covering private sector bribery (and therefore ISGB employees), active as well as passive bribery (both giving and receiving bribes) and facilitation. Facilitation is an incentive given to an employee to carry out a normal business transaction in a (legitimate) business. Facilitating payments are permitted under the FCPA (Baughn et al.

ISGBs may be influenced by the definition of facilitating payments that the public sector facilitates when managing sport events and related procurement activities or during negotiations for broadcasting rights. ISGBs may also be influenced by bribery of the private sector, for example by soliciting support in the form of votes in exchange for allocating funds for a specific development project.

Discretionary Powers

Considering the risk of reputation involved in a bribery scandal (Gorse and Chadwick, 2010), iSGBS should be included in the definition of no n-active (agreed but not aggressive) bribery. This is because, as in tennis matchfix allegations (Mitchell, 2016; for example, BLAKE, 2016), it may hurt the reputation of ISGB just by agreed to bribery. As a result, when such practices are established in culture, they are woven into sports textiles, like the cultural problems facing the Australian cricket team (Lemon, 2018).

Culture

The policy-based corruption theory is rooted in the tradition of the frameworks of KLITGAARD ​​(1988) and Rose-Ackerman (1999), which is trying to understand the cause of corruption. Critguard (1988, 1998B) also acknowledges the existence of corruption in the private sector. Since bribery is a part of corruption, both of them include economic rents that affect ABC in their theoretical frameworks.

Economic rents are the concept of monopoly. This is the level of pricing, which is unable to sustainable in competition (Ricardo, 1821; KRUEGER, 1974). Alberto Ades and Rafael Di Tella (1999) discovered that countries that are profitable from highe r-level economic rents are more likely to be corrupted. The regression analysis of bribery in the publi c-interest business division of the migration economy by Clarke and Xu (2004) revealed that the economic ultra is a corruption factor, the higher the competitive level and the higher the profitability, the more bribery it is. 。

Assessing Governance

Accountability

ISGBS has an exclusive power to its sports (for IOC events) (Morgan, 2002) due to the nature of the global organization. The exceptions are AIBA (AIBA (IOC), despite the IOC's revocation by the IOC, including four major ISGBs (World Boxing Association, World Boxing Council, IBF/USBA, World Boxing Organization). It is an oligopolistic structure of governance of the amateur and professional in 2018) (IOC, 2019; Morgan, 2020). However, this is still enough for ISGB to bring out financial rents from fans and other stakeholders.

The discretion of governance actors influences the level of corruption (Klitgaard, 1988; Rose-Acherman, 1999; Jain, 2001). The autonomy that sport governing bodies enjoy under the law (Geeraert et al., 2014, 2015; Chappelet, 2016) increases the level of discretion that governing bodies have over sport.

The definition of bribery influences behavior (Steidlmeier, 1999; Transparency International, 2013a, article 5.)

Cultural attitudes towards bribery affect both the tendency to pay (Pitt and Abratt, 1986) and accept (Lambsdorff and Frank, 2010) bribes. Therefore, where “gift and entertainment practices are deeply ingrained” (Transparency International, 2017a, Article 6, paragraph 7) and as a result of the global reach of the ISGB, attention is required, as with other risk areas.

Gifts and entertainment (or hospitality) is a key area of ​​ABC (Transparency International, 2013a, 2017a) and is part of the cultural controls. The need for gifts and entertainment in the ISGBS should be assessed as part of the risk. It is also necessary to provide guidance beyond the appropriate (sometimes zero) level at which a receipt or donation may be construed as a bribe. For example, the UK Bribery Act 2010 (unlike the US FCPA 1977) does not provide an exception for business promotion, so marketing and entertainment (if there is corrupt intent) fall within the scope of the Act regardless of the amount.

Monitoring/Control

The growing role of the media (especially through investigative journalism) has fuelled strong public sentiment among stakeholders, including fans and taxpayers, calling for ISGB accountability (Ionescu, 2015). Conversely, it has been argued that the media has encouraged corruption by portraying unethical sporting behaviour in a biased positive light (Whannel, 2002, pp. 290-292; Numerato, 2009). The discretionary power of governance actors influences the level of corruption (Klitgaard, 1988; Rose-Acherman, 1999; Jain, 2001). The autonomy enjoyed by sport governing bodies under the law (Geeraert et al., 2014, 2015; Chappelet, 2016) increases the level of discretionary power that governing bodies have over sport. The definition of bribery influences behavior (Steidlmeier, 1999; Transparency International, 2013a, article 5.). Cultural attitudes towards bribery affect both the tendency to pay (Pitt and Abratt, 1986) and to accept (Lambsdorff and Frank, 2010) bribes. Therefore, where “gift and entertainment practices are deeply ingrained” (Transparency International, 2017a, Article 6. 7), and as a result of the global nature of the ISGB, attention is required, as with other risk areas.

Whistleblowing

Gifts and entertainment (or hospitality) are an important area of ​​ABC (Transparency International, 2013a, 2017a) and are part of cultural controls. The need for gifts and entertainment in the ISGBS should be assessed as part of the risk. There is also a need to provide guidance above the appropriate (sometimes zero) level at which receipts or donations may be interpreted as bribes. For example, the UK Bribery Act 2010 (unlike the US FCPA 1977) does not provide an exception for business promotion, so marketing and entertainment are covered by the act regardless of the amount (provided there is corrupt intent).

The growing role of the media (particularly through investigative journalism) has fuelled strong public sentiment among stakeholders, including fans and taxpayers, calling for ISGB to be held accountable (Ionescu, 2015). Conversely, it has been argued that the media has encouraged corruption by portraying unethical sporting behaviour in a biased positive light (Whannel, 2002, pp. 290-292; Numerato, 2009). The discretionary power of governance actors influences the level of corruption (Klitgaard, 1988; Rose-Acherman, 1999; Jain, 2001). The autonomy enjoyed by sport governing bodies under the law (Geeraert et al., 2014, 2015; Chappelet, 2016) increases the level of discretionary power they have over sport.

Enforcement

The definition of bribery influences behavior (Steidlmeier, 1999; Transparency International, 2013a, article 5.)

Cultural attitudes towards bribery affect both the propensity to pay (Pitt and Abratt, 1986) and accept (Lambsdorff and Frank, 2010) bribes.

Therefore, caution is warranted, as with other risk areas, where “deeply ingrained practices regarding gifts and hospitality” (Transparency International, 2017a, Article 6. 7) and as a result of the global reach of the ISGB.

Method

Gifts and entertainment (or hospitality) are a key area of ​​ABC (Transparency International, 2013a, 2017a) and part of cultural controls. The need for gifts and entertainment in ISGBS should be assessed as part of the risk. Guidance should also be provided beyond the appropriate (sometimes zero) level at which receipts or donations may be interpreted as bribes. For example, the UK Bribery Act 2010 (unlike the US FCPA 1977) does not provide an exception for business promotion, so marketing and entertainment (if there is corrupt intent) fall within the scope of the Act regardless of the amount.

The increasing role of the media (especially through investigative journalism) has fuelled strong public opinion among stakeholders, including fans and taxpayers, calling for ISGB to be held accountable (Ionescu, 2015). Conversely, it has been argued that the media has encouraged corruption by portraying unethical sporting behaviour in a biased positive light (Whannel, 2002, pp. 290-292; Numerato, 2009).

The transparency as a concept is wider than the accountability (defined below), and clearly clarifies the structure, funding, expenditure, and behavior of the organization through the report of "Rules, Plan, Process, Process, Action" (2017c). Related to doing, the disclosure is an important aspect of transparency as seen in the UK corporate governance code (FRC, 2016). However, in order to avoid "administrative accountability" (processing to enable management) (Henne, 2015), which is not always suitable for the industry. You need to pay attention to.

KlitgaArd (1988) and Rose-Ackerman (1999) stated that if the level of management accountability is high, the level of corruption and bribes will be lower. In the case of ISGB (mainly private companies), if there is no effective mechanism to question the responsibility for the behavior of senior managers, the level of bribery is likely to increase.

Accountability is a duty of an organization that is responsible for reporting activities and the appropriate execution of authority (Transparency International, 2017B), or a series of standards that can be sanctioned in case of violation. (Stiglitz, 2003; Grant and Keohane, 2005). This includes a clear reference line for members, employees, and other stakeholders, and is usually stipulated in policies and procedures. The definition of no n-audit accountability (mainly policy) focuses on behavior and responsibility, but there is also a confusion over the definition (McGrath and White, 2018). Accountability in the sense of control in this paper is a report on specific tasks, an organization liable for a specific function or behavior in the organization, and / or in the organization. Defined as a series of standards, such as the specified of senior administrators.

Transparency and accountability contribute to ABC because governance control leads to a lower bribe level. For example, Duggan and Levit (Dugan and Levitt, 2002) discovered that the number of media's attention in the sumo wrestling decreases.

Monitoring is a form of resource control (Lipicer and Lajh, 2013) and can include the use of compliance functions and ethics (McNamee and Fleming, 2007).

It is one of the main methods for monitoring and managing complaints. The complaint processing policy enables members to express concerns about ethics, law, and business standards, and enable monitoring and control. For example, ACFE (2016) is the most likely discovery form of "reporting", but "organizations with reporting hot lines are much more likely to discover fraud by reporting." I have pointed out. The importance of whistleblowing is also recognized by the ABC guidance of Transparency International (Transparency International, 2013a, 5, 2017a, Article 9. 2). Title organization ( Cottrell and Erickson, 2018) is also increasing.

The confidentiality and safety of the whistl e-blowing hotline is important to encourage witnesses to give information (Soon and MANNING, 2017). This is recognized by various laws and regulations around the world, despite the differences in culture. According to a review of the EU internal advertisement law by Transparency International (2013B, P. 8), the law has provided advanced provisions for "/ or the whistleblower of the private sector". Only four countries (Luxembourg, Romania, Slovenia, UK) were only very limited or very limited. The EU's attitude toward the protection of whistleblowing was enhanced by the appearance of the protection of those who report the violation of the EU (European Union Council, 2019). US Sabens Oxley (Congress. Gov, 2002, §1514A) also punishs retaliation to whistleblower.

Results

Even if a policy for whistleblowing has been stipulated, the enforcement of rules and rules for witness protection and confidentiality obligations will increase the tendency for whistleblowers to give information (ACFE, 2016). Such execution capabilities are applied to all aspects of policies and governance processes, and execution capabilities have some positive correlation with the target of the individual (CROALL, 2004). < SPAN> This is one of the main ways to monitor and manage complaints. The complaint processing policy enables members to express concerns about ethics, law, and business standards, and enable monitoring and control. For example, ACFE (2016) is the most likely discovery form of "reporting", but "organizations with reporting hot lines are much more likely to discover fraud by reporting." I have pointed out. The importance of whistleblowing is also recognized by the ABC guidance of Transparency International (Transparency International, 2013a, 5, 2017a, Article 9. 2). Title organization ( Cottrell and Erickson, 2018) is also increasing.

The confidentiality and safety of the whistl e-blowing hotline is important to encourage witnesses to give information (Soon and MANNING, 2017). This is recognized by various laws and regulations around the world, despite the differences in culture. According to a review of the EU internal advertisement law by Transparency International (2013B, P. 8), the law has provided advanced provisions for "/ or the whistleblower of the private sector". Only four countries (Luxembourg, Romania, Slovenia, UK) were only very limited or very limited. The EU's attitude toward the protection of whistleblowing was enhanced by the appearance of the protection of those who report the violation of the EU (European Union Council, 2019). US Sabens Oxley (Congress. Gov, 2002, §1514A) also punishs retaliation to whistleblower.

Clarifying Concepts—Definitions

Even if a policy for whistleblowing has been stipulated, the enforcement of rules and rules for witness protection and confidentiality obligations will increase the tendency for whistleblowers to give information (ACFE, 2016). Such execution capabilities are applied to all aspects of policies and governance processes, and execution capabilities have some positive correlation with the target of the individual (CROALL, 2004). It is one of the main methods for monitoring and managing complaints. The complaint processing policy enables members to express concerns about ethics, law, and business standards, and enable monitoring and control. For example, ACFE (2016) is the most likely discovery form of "reporting", but "organizations with reporting hot lines are much more likely to discover fraud by reporting." I have pointed out. The importance of whistleblowing is also recognized by the ABC guidance of Transparency International (Transparency International, 2013a, 5, 2017a, Article 9. 2). Title organization ( Cottrell and Erickson, 2018) is also increasing.

The confidentiality and safety of the whistl e-blowing hotline is important to encourage witnesses to give information (Soon and MANNING, 2017). This is recognized by various laws and regulations around the world, despite the differences in culture. According to a review of the EU internal advertisement law by Transparency International (2013B, P. 8), the law has provided advanced provisions for "/ or the whistleblower of the private sector". Only four countries (Luxembourg, Romania, Slovenia, UK) were only very limited or very limited. The EU's attitude toward the protection of whistleblowing was enhanced by the appearance of the protection of those who report the violation of the EU (European Union Council, 2019). US Sabens Oxley (Congress. Gov, 2002, §1514A) also punishs retaliation to whistleblower.

Even if a policy for whistleblowing has been stipulated, the enforcement of rules and rules for witness protection and confidentiality obligations will increase the tendency for whistleblowers to give information (ACFE, 2016). Such execution capabilities are applied to all aspects of policies and governance processes, and execution capabilities have some positive correlation with the target of the individual (CROALL, 2004).

Investigative and enforcement power are related to accountability, as the ability to enforce independent decisions indicates that those who violate policies and procedures will be held accountable. (Geeraert et al., 2014) assessed the quality of corporate governance of 35 Olympic sports organizations, including the enforcement power of the ethics/integrity committees in the ISGBS sample. At the time, only one organization (UCI) was able to initiate the process on its own.

From an economics perspective, Becker's (1968) rational choice theory was adapted to model utility choices of public corruption in South Korea and Hong Kong (Jin-Wook, 2009). This approach was criticized for being simplistic and was updated by Nichols (2012) to include the possibility of using covert bribery, the perceived (rather than actual) risk of detection, and the emotional and psychological costs of acting. This helps explain why sanctions (both criminal and social) are an important part of an ABC strategy, as enforcement power is required to impose sanctions.

The anti-corruption framework developed by Filippi (2019) was used to evaluate the policies and procedures of 22 ISGBs (listed in Table 1). The evaluation of the ABC methodology used requires substantial disclosure data from the ISGBs on the internal organizational structures and policies used. This is not always available and varies between ISGBs.

Table 1

Table 1. Sample sports and ISGBS

According to the concept of economic rents influencing corruption (Klitgaard, 1988), the sample of ISGBs used in this study was the largest. This is consistent with Maennig's (2005) findings that only sports that generate high incomes (and economic rents) were affected by corruption, although these findings may have been influenced by selection bias in the classification of "large-scale evidence-based cases" (p. 190). This approach is also consistent with the sample selection by Geeraert et al. (2014) and Gorse and Chadwick (2011) in their analyses of governance issues and corruption in sport, respectively.

Therefore, the list of profitability by sports is incomplete. Researchers claim the popularity of popularity defined by media and terrestrial broadcasting in the main sports market (CHADWICK, 2013, P. 515; Geeraert et al., 2014, 2015; PWC) , 2016). Table 1 is a list of ISGB related to the sports contained in the sample. In this article, the IOC contains (indicated as ISGB) is because the compliance with the IOC rule is clearly indicated as a basis for many other ISGB policies.

In May 2017 and December 2020, we downloaded all available documents on structures, governance, financial management, noble, and corruption from the ISGB sample website, and analyzed them. The analysis was conducted on two dates to evaluate the progress of the ISGB on ABC policy.

Of the 22 ISGBs, one (IRB, 2017, 2020) did not publish related documents on the website (during each period).

The diversity of the available information and the related lessons obtained from it are explained in a section of transparency and accountability.

Assessing Risk Factors

Culture

Gifts and Entertainment

The theme analysis is implemented in the available iSGB documents according to the approach indicated by Braun and Clarke (2006, 2016), and then evaluated by theme of qualitative results [ABC PHILIPPOU (2019) Framework]. Holded (Stemler, 2001; Robson and McCartan, 2016, P. 349). These 95 documents (2017) and additional 82 documents (2020) were reviewed and analyzed by researchers using NVIVO qualitative data analysis software. In the first stage of coding, we examined the policy in the document. A theme was created from the first coding to identify issues related to bribery and corruption prevention. Next, the second coding was performed for the specified content, the relevant code (such as cash payments and cash amounts) was integrated, and the necessary code (such as ABC) was divided. Later, comparing the code with the framework, the final analysis of the data was performed to confirm that both the theme and the concept of the framework were covered by analysis. Later, the process was repeated in 2020, and a document added / updated in December 2020 was received.

Of the 22 ISGB reviewed, 14 had some ABC policy in 2017, but did not publish anything. In 2020, this increased to 17, and the lack of ABC policy was reduced in the whole group. In 2017, eight and nine ISGB had a specific ABC policy in 2020, but some of the ABC policies, including the Code of Conduct, Ethics, and Conference, included ABC policies. This affects all elements in the governance evaluation section of the bribery framework. The discussion that the need for staff training on this issue is increasing.

Another problem was that the ISGBS policy was inconsistent. An example of fraud in the 2017 batch is the policy of ITF (the UK private registered company, which is subject to the British bribery law policy), saying "ITF or the payment of facilitations on behalf of ITF, but afterwards. It is only allowed when the conditions are met ... ". "ITF, 2012), which implies that it is acceptable for convenience in certain situations, but then the same document that defines convenience as an example of a no n-convenient bribe (positive). In the case of a British registered company, it is inconsistent with (ITF, 2012), and the Cultural Samples in 2020 have two ant i-corruption programs (ITF, 2020A, B. ), But no bribery is mentioned in the general ant i-disturbing and ant i-corruption clause of ITF Conduct (ITF, 2019).

The following mentions of bribery and corruption include:

-The specific details about the subject of the policy / procedure

-The concrete policy regarding the establishment of matching

Assessing Governance Factors

Accountability

Governance Aims

-Definition of bribery and corruption

-The example of bribery and corruption < SPAN> Of the 22 ISGBs reviewed, 14 had some ABC policy in 2017, but on e-third did not publish anything. In 2020, this increased to 17, and the lack of ABC policy was reduced in the whole group. In 2017, eight and nine ISGB had a specific ABC policy, but in other documents, such as the Code of Conduct, Ethics, and Conventions, there were also places in other documents. This affects all elements in the governance evaluation section of the bribery framework. The discussion that the need for staff training on this issue is increasing.

Another problem was that the ISGBS policy was inconsistent. An example of fraud in the 2017 batch is the policy of ITF (the UK private registered company, which is subject to the British bribery law policy), saying "ITF or the payment of facilitations on behalf of ITF, but afterwards. It is only allowed when the conditions are met ... ". "ITF, 2012), which implies that it is acceptable for convenience in certain situations, but then the same document that defines convenience as an example of a no n-convenient bribe (positive). In the case of a British registered company, it is inconsistent with (ITF, 2012), and the Cultural Samples in 2020 have two ant i-corruption programs (ITF, 2020A, B. ), But no bribery is mentioned in the general ant i-disturbing and ant i-corruption clause of ITF Conduct (ITF, 2019).

The following mentions of bribery and corruption include:

-The specific details about the subject of the policy / procedure

-The concrete policy regarding the establishment of matching

Transparency and Accountability

-Definition of bribery and corruption

-Ard an example of bribery and corruption, 14 of the 22 ISGBs, which were reviewed, had some ABC policy in 2017, but did not publish anything. In 2020, this increased to 17, and the lack of ABC policy was reduced in the whole group. In 2017, eight and nine ISGB had a specific ABC policy in 2020, but some of the ABC policies, including the Code of Conduct, Ethics, and Conference, included ABC policies. This affects all elements in the governance evaluation section of the bribery framework. The discussion that the need for staff training on this issue is increasing.

Another problem was that the ISGBS policy was inconsistent. An example of fraud in the 2017 batch is the policy of ITF (the UK private registered company, which is subject to the British bribery law policy), saying "ITF or the payment of facilitations on behalf of ITF, but afterwards. It is only allowed when the conditions are met ... ". "ITF, 2012), which implies that it is acceptable for convenience in certain situations, but then the same document that defines convenience as an example of a no n-convenient bribe (positive). In the case of a British registered company, it is inconsistent with (ITF, 2012), and the Cultural Samples in 2020 have two ant i-corruption programs (ITF, 2020A, B. ), But no bribery is mentioned in the general ant i-disturbing and ant i-corruption clause of ITF Conduct (ITF, 2019).

The following mentions of bribery and corruption include:

-The specific details about the subject of the policy / procedure

-The concrete policy regarding the establishment of matching

-Definition of bribery and corruption

Monitoring/Control

Whistleblowing

-Examples of bribery and corruption

Who is covered by the policies varies among the ISGBs in the sample. All apply to officials (see, for example, IFAF, 2012; IIHF, 2014a; World Rugby, 2017; Wbsc, n. d.) and/or athletes and their representatives (IIHF, 2014a; WBC, 2015b). Some also include a much broader range of stakeholders, such as “cities and countries wishing to host the events” (FIBA, 2014a) or “sponsors, partners, suppliers, ski industry and media representatives involved in and/or connected to FIS activities” (FIS, 2016b). They offer best practice solutions to the corporate governance problems proposed by Michie and Oughton (2005) and Pielke (2016). Some ISGBs refer specifically to stakeholders as a “family” (FIFA, 2012a; IAAF, 2015), reinforcing the idea of ​​autonomy (Forster and Pope, 2004; Forster, 2006), while potentially countering the independent ideal embedded in a culture of accountability and transparency (Geeraert, 2016; Maennig, 2016).

The ITF and FIA were the only organisations in the 2017 ISGB sample that defined the term bribery as “the offer, promise, giving, acceptance or exertion of any advantage (financial or otherwise) as an inducement to do any act which is unlawful or breach of trust” (ITF, 2012), and more specifically, “the giving of undue influence to any person or ... rewards for the performance of any function or activity in order to secure or obtain a commercial, contractual, regulatory or personal advantage” (FIA, 2017b). In the 2020 sample, FIFA defines bribery as “the provision of anything of value with the intent of obtaining an improper business advantage” (FIFA, 2020e), while IRL defines bribery as “an inducement or reward offered or promised to obtain a commercial or other advantage” (IRL, 2020a). These are consistent with the general definitions mentioned above (2002; Transparency International, 2017b). The FIA ​​further elaborates on best practices by providing examples such as “the provision of assistance or donations or the use of voting power with the intent of exerting improper influence” (FIA, 2017b).

In the case of a bribe, the second coating of each batch determined whether or not a no n-money bribe (defined) could be included. No n-gold bribes refers to the exchange of no n-money, such as voting, personal and political convenience, and division of roles within the organization. The definition of no n-gold bribes is one of three in the sample, and some ISGB incorporate multiple definitions:

-Remarks or services of all properties (for example, FIBA, 2014; IIHF, 2014; IGF, 2014; 2016b; FIA, 2017b).

Enforcement

-Hidden profits "(for example, FIH, 2012, n. D.; IOC, 2015a; UCI, n. D.)

No n-gold bribes match the "deprecation" elements of the definition of a bribe of Transparency (2017B) and matches the correspondence in the 2015 FIFA scandal, which is said to have been convenient in exchange for votes. (Conn, 2018).

It has been pointed out that the importance of reputation risks for ISGB, "illegal, unethical, immoral behavior" (FIFA, 2012), "ICC, 2014a)," ICC, 2014a) Avoid no n-ethical actions that shame many people involved in sports "(WBC, 2015A)," Do not act like muding sports "(WBC, 2015a). 。 Governance and Administration "(ICC, 2014a)" Avoiding] of UNETHICAL BEHAVIOR THAY BRING SHAME TOPEOLE INVOLVED IN THE SPORT "WBC, 2015a) Acting in A Way Might Tink The Reputation of the Olympic Movement "( IOC, 2020A, etc., etc., "The people's trust in sports competitions, and the consequences of the results are extremely important. It is damaged (IFAF, 2017a). These results support the story that the integrity of sports is important for ISGB.

Therefore, ISGB should focus on ABC in consideration of the property that bribery impairs sincerity (Gorse and Chadwick, 2010). Thus, bribery without action should be covered by the best practices ABC policy and is actually covered by several ISGB. For example, it mentions that there is a violation of "whether the benefits have actually been provided or received" (IGF, 2016a). However, bribery without action can be claimed that it is covered in the term "defamation of sports" (for example, IFAF, 2017b). The problem from the viewpoint of enchanting the latter is that the latter term is wide, so it may be difficult for the investigative authorities to prove compared to the specific bribery violations. Therefore, the best practices need to include specific details.

Documents that contained guidance on accepting or offering gifts and entertainment were coded under the theme “gifts and entertainment.”

One of the challenges ISGBS face is having to balance international compliance requirements with possible cultural issues (Pitt and Abratt, 1986) in countries where, for example, it is considered rude to refuse the offer of gifts or entertainment (Steidlmeier, 1999). For this reason, some ISGBs have put forward general policies in their ABC efforts, such as “entertainment provided to members, staff... and accompanying persons shall not exceed the standards prevailing in the host country” (FIBI, 1999). And accompanying persons shall not exceed the standards prevailing in the host country” (FIBA, 2014a). This “reasonableness test”, which requires evaluation by members, suffers from the same self-regulatory implementation problems that the ISGB faces in terms of general governance (Geeraert et al, 2015; Chappelet, 2016). The FIA ​​is the only ISGB to state explicitly that “the intention behind the gift must always be taken into account” (FIA, 2017b).

Progress

According to Transparency International’s ABC principles (Transparency International, 2013a), perception seems to be relevant for ISGBS. The ICC (2014a), like FIBA ​​(2015), explicitly prohibits gifts that “influence or appear to influence the recipient to decline official duties” “in circumstances where the participant could reasonably be expected to bring himself or the sport into disrepute”. According to Nichols (2012), the FIA ​​recognizes the importance of transparency and lists one of its requirements for gifts as being “given openly, not secretly” (FIA, 2017b). Meanwhile, FIFA (2020 sample) “uses a standardized procedure for registering gifts and hospitality and requires all FIFA team members to follow it” (FIFA, 2020d).