Good Court-Packing The Paradoxes of Constitutional Repair in Contexts of Democratic Decay German

“Good” Court-Packing? The Paradoxes of Constitutional Repair in Contexts of Democratic Decay

The US debate on Supreme Court reform, including the controversial breaking of the rule that one should not pack the court to repair democratic institutions, has generally focused on historical precedents and domestic institutions, with little comparative analysis. However, the US debate raises fundamental questions for comparative constitutional scholars about the paradox of constitutional restoration in the context of democratic breakdown. This study argues that honing the analytical tools to understand such reforms requires a new comparative and theoretical approach that draws on the experiences of countries in the global South and utilizes and connects ideas from four overlapping research compartments: democratic breakdown, democratization, constitutional making, and transitional justice. Thus, this paper aims to provide a comparative analysis of the legitimacy of the Supreme Court's packing through the case studies of Turkey and Argentina, and to offer an analytical framework with five dimensions: (i) democratic context, (ii) modular objectives of reform, (iii) reform options, (iv) reform process, and (v) risk of repetition. In doing so, this paper seeks to avoid presenting a rigid checklist for evaluating the legitimacy of reforms. Article type

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Information German Law Journal Volume 23 Issue 8 October 2022 pp. 1071 - 1103 Creative Commons This article is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons License (https://creativecommons. org/licenses/by/4. 0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution and reproduction in any medium. The original work is properly cited.

© The author, 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the German Law Journal Following the death of Judge Ruth Vader Ginsberg on September 18, 2020, Jimmy Cony Barrett, a supe r-conservative in the Senate on October 26, quickly and 48 votes (all of the Democratic Party opposite). Unilaterally approved, the election of President Joseph Biden in November 2020 has increased the need for reforming the Supreme Court of the Federal Court, and has become a great sense of crisis. The 5 0-year history, which has been recognized as a right under the federal constitution due to the 6 to 3 majority decision of the Dobs vs. Jackson trial (previous note 1) in June 2022, has ended a common history, and has been common. This trend has been even stronger due to uncertainty in the continuous approval of other rights (such as contraception and the rights of sam e-sex marriage) based on doctrine. Footnote 2 Mark Tushnet pointed out in April 2019 that structural reforms such as court and others have returned to political issues "in the form of decades." Late 3 2020, in late 2020, scholars, such as Ja n-Verner Muller and Aaron Belkin footnote 4, in order to save US democracy, that is, for the purpose of democracy by violating ant i-packing rules. He argued that by violating the rules of democracy, the only way to "fire the fire with a fire". Footnote 5: This raises a problem that is rarely asked outside of the "democratic rules". Following the death of Judge Ruth Vader Ginsberg on September 18, 2020, Judge Amy Connie Barrett, a supe r-conservative in the Senate on October 26, 52-48 votes (all of the Democratic Party opposed). The prompt and unilateral approval was approved, and in November 2020, President Joseph Biden increased the need for reforming the Supreme Court of the Federal Court, which gained a great sense of crisis. The 5 0-year history, which has been recognized as a right under the federal constitution due to the 6 to 3 majority decision of the Dobs vs. Jackson trial (previous note 1) in June 2022, has ended a common history, and has been common. This trend has been even stronger due to uncertainty in the continuous approval of other rights (such as contraception and the rights of sam e-sex marriage) based on doctrine. Footnote 2 Mark Tushnet pointed out in April 2019 that structural reforms such as court and others have returned to political issues "in the form of decades." Late 3 2020, in late 2020, scholars, such as Ja n-Verner Muller and Aaron Belkin footnote 4, in order to save US democracy, that is, for the purpose of democracy by violating ant i-packing rules. He argued that by violating the rules of democracy, the only way to "fire the fire with a fire". Footnote 5: This raises a problem that is rarely asked outside of the "democratic rules". Following the death of Judge Ruth Vader Ginsberg on September 18, 2020, Jimmy Cony Barrett, a supe r-conservative in the Senate on October 26, quickly and 48 votes (all of the Democratic Party opposite). Unilaterally approved, the election of President Joseph Biden in November 2020 has increased the need for reforming the Supreme Court of the Federal Court, and has become a great sense of crisis. The 5 0-year history, which has been recognized as a right under the federal constitution due to the 6 to 3 majority decision of the Dobs vs. Jackson trial (previous note 1) in June 2022, has ended a common history, and has been common. This trend has been even stronger due to uncertainty in the continuous approval of other rights (such as contraception and the rights of sam e-sex marriage) based on doctrine. Footnote 2 Mark Tushnet pointed out in April 2019 that structural reforms such as court and others have returned to political issues "in the form of decades." Late 3 2020, in late 2020, scholars, such as Ja n-Verner Muller and Aaron Belkin footnote 4, in order to save US democracy, that is, for the purpose of democracy by violating ant i-packing rules. He argued that by violating the rules of democracy, the only way to "fire the fire with a fire". Footnote 5: This raises a problem that is rarely asked outside of the "democratic rules".

A. Introduction

This paper is premised on four basic methodological theories that are broadly relevant in comparative constitutional law studies. First, I argue that to date, the framework and terminology of the debate around US court packaging, crystallized in the Committee on Foreign Relations’ analysis of the Biden administration’s Supreme Court reform, have obscured the “transitional” aspect of the Reform Gateway reform framework: the restoration of democracy in response to a (highly contested) democratic breakdown. Analysts have generally focused on “time travel” focused on domestic historical precedents to analyze whether court packaging can be justified. This may mean that the debate is merely the latest phase in the battle between legal constitutionalists and those who wish to preserve and restore a long-standing system of judicial supremacy, supported by those who defend a kind of political constitutionalism, or at least a balance of power in the elected government branch.

However, many supporters of the package have emphasized the high stakes of court reform, as not only relevant for the improvement of democracy but also necessary to eliminate democratic decline, i. e., the “deterioration of American democracy” and to eliminate the difficult enough situation of a democratic crisis. Footnote 7 Constitutional restoration and democratic restoration (treated here as synonyms) in this sense refer to systemic change, not simply a re-creation of the status quo. This obviously does not reflect more recognizable contexts such as democratic decline in countries such as Hungary or India, or authoritarian-democratic transitions in countries such as Spain, Poland, or Brazil. But the resonance with these contexts becomes more apparent given that the nature, quality, and trajectory of contemporary American democracy is highly contentious. At the time of writing, the United States has recently experienced a presidential term marked by an intensified crackdown on fundamental democratic rights, especially the right to vote, contested judicial appointments, a fiercely contested presidential election that included vigorous challenges to the legitimacy of the electoral system, violent turmoil at the heart of government, a general decline in scores on top-tier democratic assessments, Footnote 8, and the election of a new administration centered on a policy platform that: Footnote 9

Second, the fact that this is not a normal debate about constitutional reform or constitutional grand politics means that even for those willing to engage in "space travel" (looking abroad for guidance), it is difficult to find useful comparative examples in modern history from the world's long-standing liberal democracies, such as the United Kingdom, Australia, Germany, Ireland, and Japan. Other states that have experienced court packing in the context of both democratization and democratic breakdown have received little attention. For example, the working paper of the Presidential Commission on Supreme Court Reform mentions court packing in one paragraph as a "troubling symptom of democratic backsliding" in Argentina, Venezuela, Turkey, Hungary, and Poland. Footnote 10 Identifying useful comparisons requires a major shift in perspective about the situations that are appropriate for comparison. Comparative theorists have long tended, implicitly or explicitly, to separate the Global North from the Global South. Footnote 11 But the democratic flows in both the Global North and the Global South, and especially in the Global South, are very different from the democratic flows in both the Global North and the Global South.

Third, to make meaningful comparisons between the United States and these unlikely comparisons and to determine the international implications of the U. S. argument, we need to sharpen our analytical tools and intellectual frameworks to distinguish democratic restoration in the context of democratic decline as a category of constitutional transition distinct from the other two categories: “ordinary” constitutional reform and full democratic transitions from authoritarianism. This analysis requires drawing on and connecting insights from four somewhat overlapping but still underexplored fields of research: democratic decline, constitution-making, democratization, and transitional justice. Footnote 12

Fourth, for those who resist the second proposition, considering that the recovery of democracy, which includes the reform of the Supreme Court, is becoming a global challenge, is raised by the United States. Analysis of the theoretical, constitutional, and actual challenges from a comparison perspective seems to be a useful and beneficial: elections in Hungary, Poland, Turkey, Brazil, etc. Attention has been focused on the issues of repairing the constitution when democratic incumbent is expelled. In the pos t-conflict scenario, the corruption of the court may also need a personnel change that may require a personnel transfer to create a more legal and functional Supreme Court. It may be related. The problem of breaking the rules aimed at recovering democracy in the footnote was that Hungarian's opposition leadership was avoided by the Fides administration in 2011, and through a referendum, before the parliamentary election in 2022. It is a matter of saying "change of government" by recovering check and balance. Questions about the immediate recovery of democracy in Poland 14 Fourth, for those who resist the second proposition, the recovery of democracy, which includes the reform of the Supreme Court, is a global task that is not limited to this. Considering that it is becoming becoming become, it seems that analyzing the theoretical, constitutional, and actual issues proposed by the US court controversy in a comparative perspective: Elections have been held in Hungary, Poland, Turkey, and Brazil, and attention has been focused on the task of repairing the constitution when no n-democratic incumbent is expelled. In the pos t-conflict scenario, the corruption of the court may also need a personnel change that may require a personnel transfer to create a more legal and functional Supreme Court. It may be related. The problem of breaking the rules aimed at recovering democracy in the footnote was that Hungarian's opposition leadership was avoided by the Fides administration in 2011, and through a referendum, before the parliamentary election in 2022. It is a matter of saying "change of government" by recovering check and balance. Filnilla 14 In the fourth question of the immediate recovery of democracy in Poland, for those who resist the second proposition, the recovery of democracy, which includes the reform of the Supreme Court, has become a global issue Considering something, analyzing the theoretical, constitutional, and actual issues proposed by US court controversy from a comparison perspective seems to be a useful useful: Hungary, Poland. In Turkey, Brazil, etc., elections are held, and attention has been focused on the issues of constitutional repair when no n-democratic incumbent is expelled. In the pos t-conflict scenario, the corruption of the court may also need a personnel change that may require a personnel transfer to create a more legal and functional Supreme Court. It may be related. The problem of breaking the rules aimed at recovering democracy in the footnote was that Hungarian's opposition leadership was avoided by the Fides administration in 2011, and through a referendum, before the parliamentary election in 2022. It is a matter of saying "change of government" by recovering check and balance. Footnote 14 questions about the immediate recovery of democracy in Poland

Therefore, in this paper, we will invest a stone in the United States and explore a wider range of problems brought by "space travel". In this article, the packaging aimed at strengthening the democratic system suggests the possibility of "good" packaging, but the background and reforms have finally denied the positive impact. Verification of Case Study: Turkey and Argentina, whose constitutional court was reorganized in 2012. Footnote 17: And Argentina, which was a dangerous precedent for the modest package of the Supreme Court in the 1980s. In particular, KOSAř and š š š š š š 20 20 20 20 20 20 I am. Footnote 18 is important, while the democratic rationale for packaging courts in a state like Hungary and Poland as of 2010, in Turkey and Argentina can simply continue existing forms. The Supreme Court, whose reform is justified from the viewpoint of liberal democracy, is shown. The analysis is still long. So, in this paper, we will invest a stone in the United States and explore a wider problem that will be brought about by "Space Travel". In this article, the packaging aimed at strengthening the democratic system suggests the possibility of "good" packaging, but the background and reforms have finally denied the positive impact. Verification of Case Study: Turkey and Argentina, whose constitutional court was reorganized in 2012. Footnote 17: And Argentina, which was a dangerous precedent for the modest package of the Supreme Court in the 1980s. In particular, KOSAř and š š š š š š 20 20 20 20 20 20 I am. Footnote 18 is important, while the democratic rationale for packaging courts in a state like Hungary and Poland as of 2010, in Turkey and Argentina can simply continue existing forms. The Supreme Court, whose reform is justified from the viewpoint of liberal democracy, is shown. The analysis is still long. Therefore, in this paper, we will invest a stone in the United States and explore a wider range of problems brought by "space travel". In this article, the packaging aimed at strengthening the democratic system suggests the possibility of "good" packaging, but the background and reforms have finally denied the positive impact. Verification of Case Study: Turkey and Argentina, whose constitutional court was reorganized in 2012. Footnote 17: And Argentina, which was a dangerous precedent for the modest package of the Supreme Court in the 1980s. In particular, KOSAř and š š š š š š 20 20 20 20 20 20 I am. Footnote 18 is important, while the democratic rationale for packaging courts in a state like Hungary and Poland as of 2010, in Turkey and Argentina can simply continue existing forms. The Supreme Court, whose reform is justified from the viewpoint of liberal democracy, is shown. The analysis is still long.

This paper elaborates on two case studies and draws on various relevant research fields to present a framework for examining the democratic legitimacy of proposed reforms. (ii) clarity of purpose - the need to make the reform objectives sufficiently clear and how good they are; (iii) reform options - in particular, whether alternative or less controversial reforms could achieve the desired results; (iv) reform process - the emergence of an open, pluralistic and participatory process for reform; (v) risk of repetition - how to ensure that good-faith reforms do not become triggers for retaliation. For example, in the case of the United States, this is the risk that "good-faith" packaging does not fall into a cycle of retaliation and remedial packaging. We do not claim that this framework is comprehensive or robust. It is merely intended to set a clearer basis for analysis and to bring to the fore important aspects of the challenges posed by constitutional reform through democratic restoration that are more broadly applicable and deserve greater attention.

The discussion unfolds in five parts. Section B summarizes the contours of the legal debate in the United States and places it in a global context. Section C discusses the ambiguous nature of the judicial package in Turkey in the 2010s, highlighting the potential for a "good" judicial package while emphasizing the importance of the reform context and process. Section D provides a background on the Supreme Court in Argentina, highlighting key aspects of the country's political and constitutional development, while Section E analyzes indicators of judicial conflict in Argentina since the restoration of electoral democracy in 1983; initially as a legitimate remedy to reform authoritarian-era institutions in the absence of other reform options, and later as a return to negative pathologies. Finally, Section F applies insights from the two case studies and the five-dimensional analytical framework to consider the dilemmas and complexities of constitutional reform in a contentious U. S. context, and lessons for the world.

It is impossible to capture the full discussions of the US court and the worldwide and historical background that will be the stage. In this section, the main elements of this debate, the underlying tension, and how the packaging in the US context is different from recent packaging measures in the nation, such as Hungary and Turkey. The purpose is.

B. The U.S. Debate in Global and Historical Context

In the United States, the debate over the Federal Court dates back to the 1930s. President Franklin D. Roosevelt defeated the Federal Supreme Court's planning to reduce the number of recruitment of the Federal Supreme Court, which was later regarded as a major institutional obstacle to prevent social economic structural reform. In recent decades, the idea of packing has retreated to a historic but modern importance. Footnote 19 However, the role of the court as a central means of advanced reform has become increasingly challenged by political liberal schools, and the composition and legitimacy of the court ensure the Democratic rule of judicial appointment. As the political controversial work for the purpose of doing was also influenced, a wide range of discussions about packaging and the Supreme Court's footnote reform returned to the forefront. Footnote 21 Packaging can be seen as an effort to realize a more typical court that reflects the major political cracks of the United States, and in 2016, the Senate Republican Party deliberated on Melick Garland. Considering the refusal, it can be seen as a relief, that is, "correction of mistakes." Of course, it is impossible to capture the full of the

On April 9, 2021, the Biden administration announced the rules of 36 supe r-particists, including scholars who are active at the forefront of constitutional, history, and politics. The committee has been working to create a report within 180 days of the first meeting, hold a public hearing, and listen to testimony from the following people.

The purpose of this committee is to provide an analysis of major issues in modern national arguments in the Supreme Court's reform, including the merits and valuation of the specific reform proposals. The themes to be handled are the start of the debate over reform, the role of the court in the constitutional system, the number of courts of the court judge, the turnover rate, the members of the court, the scale of the court, the selection of the court, the rules, and comparison. Footnote 24

The 28 8-pages announced in December 2021 did not recommend specific action guidelines. The report pointed out that diplomatic support for the introduction of the 1 8-yea r-old term renewal system is high, and pointed out the authority of Congress to expand the court and "deep opinions" regarding the latter options. Not too much. Footnote 25 The Biden administration announced on April 9, 2021, a commerce of 36 supe r-party members, including scholars who are active in constitutional, history, and political science. 。 The committee has been working to create a report within 180 days of the first meeting, hold a public hearing, and listen to testimony from the following people.

The 28 8-pages announced in December 2021 did not recommend specific action guidelines. The report pointed out that diplomatic support for the introduction of the 1 8-yea r-old term renewal system is high, and pointed out the authority of Congress to expand the court and "deep opinions" regarding the latter options. Not too much. The footnote 25 Biden administration announced on April 9, 2021, a committee consisting of 36 ultr a-partic members, including scholars who are active at the forefront of constitutional science, history, and politics. The committee has been working to create a report within 180 days of the first meeting, hold a public hearing, and listen to testimony from the following people.

Of course, in another country where constitutional reform is easier and in the context of broader political change stimulated by democratic transition or peacebuilding, such a contentious possibility of reforming the Supreme Court might involve the creation of a new institution: a new iteration of the Supreme Court, as in Kenya, a new constitutional division of the Supreme Court, as in Estonia or Nepal, or an entirely new constitutional court, as in Germany in the 1950s or Hungary or South Africa in the 1990s. 26 In even rarer cases, it would be possible to assign a large number of foreign judges to the court, as in Kosovo, 27 or to assess judges' suitability individually, as in Kenya after the adoption of its 2010 constitution. 28 Extraordinary emergency measures. The rigidity of the U. S. Constitution, the totality of the Supreme Court's sociopolitical and cultural prestige, and the difference in democratic contexts make it clear that such an option is out of the question. But despite its clear heterogeneity, the current U. S. situation, with its focus on institutional reform after a severe crisis of democracy, raises questions that resonate in these contexts. Of course, in another country, where constitutional reform is easier and in the context of broader political change stimulated by democratic transition or peacebuilding, such a contentious possibility of reforming the Supreme Court might involve the creation of a new institution: a new iteration of the Supreme Court, as in Kenya, a new constitutional division of the Supreme Court, as in Estonia or Nepal, or an entirely new constitutional court, as in Germany in the 1950s or Hungary or South Africa in the 1990s. Footnote 26 In even rarer cases, it would be possible to assign a large number of foreign judges to the court, as in Kosovo. Footnote 27 Or, as in Kenya after the adoption of its 2010 constitution, to assess judges' suitability on an individual basis. Footnote 28 Extraordinary emergency measures. The rigidity of the U. S. Constitution, the totality of the Supreme Court's sociopolitical and cultural prestige, and the difference in democratic contexts make it clear that such an option is out of the question. But despite its clear heterogeneity, the current U. S. situation, with its focus on institutional reform after a severe crisis of democracy, raises questions that resonate in these situations. Of course, in another country where constitutional reform is easier and in the context of broader political change stimulated by democratic transition or peacebuilding, such a contentious possibility of reforming the Supreme Court might involve the creation of a new institution: a new iteration of the Supreme Court, as in Kenya, a new constitutional division of the Supreme Court, as in Estonia or Nepal, or an entirely new constitutional court, as in Germany in the 1950s or Hungary or South Africa in the 1990s. 26 In even rarer cases, it would be possible to assign a large number of foreign judges to the court, as in Kosovo, 27 or to assess judges' suitability individually, as in Kenya after the adoption of its 2010 constitution. 28 Extraordinary emergency measures. The rigidity of the U. S. Constitution, the totality of the Supreme Court's sociopolitical and cultural prestige, and the difference in democratic contexts make it clear that such an option is out of the question. But despite its clear heterogeneity, the current U. S. situation, with its focus on institutional reform after a severe crisis of democracy, raises questions that resonate in these contexts.

Four key proposals in the US reform debate show how the scope and nature of proposals vary, shaped by legal and political constraints: packaging, term limits, selection, and jurisdictional divestiture. 29 Proponents argue that packaging is easier to implement legally than 18-year non-renewable terms. Packaging also offers more immediate political benefits than term limits, which have decades of impact. Some packaging proposals attempt to achieve the best of both worlds. To balance the postponed appointments of Neil Gorsuch and Merrick Garland at the end of President Obama's term in 2016, a "balance" plan would appoint two federal judges, designated by statute to serve on the Supreme Court for 18 years, with a political commitment to liberal appointments. 30 Other options seek to depoliticize the court by focusing on selection: The lottery option would appoint all 179 existing federal judges to the Supreme Court and create a nine-member commission.

Beyond the technical issues of reform options and their political feasibility, the debate is driven by a deeper normative position on the democratic and constitutional legitimacy of participation in the norm, namely, the rule prohibiting the packaging of an independent court to achieve a defined political objective. Writing in September 2020, Mueller argued that the Senate Republicans’ rush to nominate a “hardline” justice to replace Justice Ginsburg is not only inconsistent with their refusal to consider the nomination of Justice Garland in 2016, but also that the Republicans will stop at nothing to stay in power, while the Democrats remain bound by the rules and even harbor expectations of dual power. Republicans have gained the upper hand through their willingness to use “constitutional hardball” (i. e., actions that are technically permissible under the Constitution that violate the current Constitutional concept footnote 34), and the only option left for Democrats is to “add fuel to the fire,” particularly through the expansion of the Supreme Court. He emphasizes that packaging is part of broader Democratic reforms, such as strengthening protections for voting rights and abolishing the filibuster.

In doing so, whether one accepts the argument or not, proponents of court packaging proposals in the United States seek to distinguish these measures from the negative experiences of court packaging in other countries. Many authors also avoid the term “packaging,” preferring the terms “court expansion” and “rebalancing.” Footnote 36 Recent court packaging in countries such as Turkey, Hungary, and Poland is portrayed as a clearly identifiable first step in an “authoritarian script” in which democratically elected, anti-democratic executives seek to undermine democratic regimes by subjugating independent institutions. In other words, court packaging is approached as a strong indicator that democratic systems are undergoing negative transformations. As Sadulski explains in the Hungarian context:

The seizure of the Constitutional Court proceeded by changing the rules for appointing judges, then by limiting the jurisdiction of the Court, and finally by control of the Court, including by increasing the number of judges, thus ensuring a Fidesz (ruling party) majority on the Court. Footnote 37

In Poland, Sadursky describes the accumulation of Constitutional Court by the ruling, law and justice (PIS) as an important part of the "constitutional collapse" of the nation. Before the accumulation, there was a sustainable government's sustainable information operation campaign, which features a judge as an elite that does not fit the communist era. Footnote 38 This is not a simple process of expanding the court to ensure loyalty to the ruling party, but a judge who has not been appointed in accordance with the constitutional procedure. This is a series of complicated measures, including replacement, forcing some judges to take cumulative leave, and reducing the retirement age of the judge. CJEU) was not compatible. Footnote 39

In terms of reform frameworks, all of these changes occurred in an environment where the abilities of each institution that restricted the administration were weakened in a short period of time due to the shocking measures that reinforce them. : For example, the constitution that two courts were newly established in the Supreme Court, which has the authority to handle political issues, including election results, and the Court Reform Law is unconstitutional that almost all court Secretary has been replaced. Refusing the disclosure of negative judgments of the court, restricting opposition in the Diet, strengthening government control to stat e-management broadcasting stations, replacing the leaders of all public servants, and changing the "agency". It was installed. Footnote 40 Furthermore, in terms of reform processes, the process itself was exclusive in the process of realizing this ant i-monitoring change. In Poland, the required bills were submitted to Congress in the "secret atmosphere". For example, opposition members' speeches are limited to 30 seconds. Regarding the results of the footnote 42 reform, the "paralyzed court" was initially "paralyzed", and in Poland, Sadulusky accumulated a constitutional court by the ruling, law and justice party (PIS), and the "constitutional collapse" of the state. He describes it as an important part of. Before the accumulation, there was a sustainable government's sustainable information operation campaign, which features a judge as an elite that does not fit the communist era. Footnote 38 This is not a simple process of expanding the court to ensure loyalty to the ruling party, but a judge who has not been appointed in accordance with the constitutional procedure. This is a series of complicated measures, including replacement, forcing some judges to take cumulative leave, and reducing the retirement age of the judge. CJEU) was not compatible. Footnote 39

In terms of reform frameworks, all of these changes occurred in an environment where the abilities of each institution that restricted the administration were weakened in a short period of time due to the shocking measures that reinforce them. : For example, the constitution that two courts were newly established in the Supreme Court, which has the authority to handle political issues, including election results, and the Court Reform Law is unconstitutional that almost all court Secretary has been replaced. Refusing the disclosure of negative judgments of the court, restricting opposition in the Diet, strengthening government control to stat e-management broadcasting stations, replacing the leaders of all public servants, and changing the "agency". It was installed. Footnote 40 Furthermore, in terms of reform processes, the process itself was exclusive in the process of realizing this ant i-monitoring change. In Poland, the required bills were submitted to Congress in the "secret atmosphere". For example, opposition members' speeches are limited to 30 seconds. Regarding the results of the footnote 42 reform, in Poland, which originally became the "paralyzed court," Sadulusky has accumulated a constitutional court by the ruling, law and justice (PIS), and is important to the "constitutional collapse" of the nation. It is partially described. Before the accumulation, there was a sustainable government's sustainable information operation campaign, which features a judge as an elite that does not fit the communist era. Footnote 38 This is not a simple process of expanding the court to ensure loyalty to the ruling party, but a judge who has not been appointed in accordance with the constitutional procedure. This is a series of complicated measures, including replacement, forcing some judges to take cumulative leave, and reducing the retirement age of the judge. CJEU) was not compatible. Footnote 39

Nearly 30 years ago, in 2000, Vladimir Putin gained power, one of the most reliable signs of Russian democratization experiments was the establishment of the Constitutional Court in 1993 as the adoption of Ellizin's new constitution. That would be. According to Epstein, Knight, and Schwetzois, the new constitutional court has been added after the new constitutional judge, who is currently a judge of the former law (many of the old laws have opposed Ellizin), as part of the Ellizin reform. It is not completely incorporated into the administrative office, but the new judge was "slightly closer to Ellizin in 1991-93." 。 Footnote 45 This movement was born in the early 1990s, with the court interfered with the struggle between the President and Congress, and Ellizin dispatched a tank to bombard the National Diet Hall, and the Nadir administration was born due to the danger of citizens' opportunities. It was a response to. The constitution enacted in 1993 was a constitutional referendum that was passed through a manual rally through a manual assembly via a parliament that had refused to adopt a compromise plan. It was created in a heav y-dominated process. Footnote 46 A Nearly 30 years ago, in 2000, Vladimir Putin gained power, one of the most reliable signs of Russian democratization experiments in 1993 in 1993. The Constitutional Court would have been established. According to Epstein, Knight, and Schwetzois, the new constitutional court has been added after the new constitutional judge, who is currently a judge of the former law (many of the old laws have opposed Ellizin), as part of the Ellizin reform. It is not completely incorporated into the administrative office, but the new judge was "slightly closer to Ellizin in 1991-93." 。 Footnote 45 This movement was born in the early 1990s, with the court interfered with the struggle between the President and Congress, and Ellizin dispatched a tank to bombard the National Diet Hall, and the Nadir administration was born due to the danger of citizens' opportunities. It was a response to. The constitution enacted in 1993 was a constitutional referendum that was passed through a manual rally through a manual assembly via a parliament that had refused to adopt a compromise plan. It was created in a heav y-dominated process. Footnote 46 A nearly 30 years ago, in 2000, Vladimir Putin, one of the most reliable signs of Russian democratization experiments, was the Constitution Court in 1993 at the same time as the adoption of Ellizin's new constitution. It would have been established. According to Epstein, Knight, and Schwetzois, the new constitutional court has been added after the new constitutional judge, who is currently a judge of the former law (many of the old laws have opposed Ellizin), as part of the Ellizin reform. It is not completely incorporated into the administrative office, but the new judge was "slightly closer to Ellizin in 1991-93." 。 Footnote 45 This movement was born in the early 1990s, with the court interfered with the struggle between the President and Congress, and Ellizin dispatched a tank to bombard the National Diet Hall, and the Nadir administration was born due to the danger of citizens' opportunities. It was a response to. The constitution enacted in 1993 was a constitutional referendum that was passed through a manual rally through a manual assembly via a parliament that had refused to adopt a compromise plan. It was created in a heav y-dominated process. Footnote 46 A

Unilateral court actions continue to spread today as governments with anti-democratic agendas around the world target independent institutions. In 2013, they challenged the removal of the Chief Justice of Sri Lanka under the Rajapaksa government, and in 2018 they lobbied against another strongman, Philippines Chief Justice Maria Lourdes Sereno, a vocal critic of President Duterte. 48 In Brazil, a constitutional amendment proposed in October 2019 by the vice-chair of President Bolsonaro's Social Liberal Party (PSL) seeks to overturn a May 2015 constitutional amendment that raised the retirement age of Supreme Court justices from 70 to 75 in the lower house of parliament, raising concerns about an attempt to pack the court given the blatant anti-democratic nature of the Bolsonaro government. 49 Either way, the move needs to be considered in context. In Sri Lanka, for example, it was government retaliation against a Supreme Court ruling that upheld human rights, blocking the creation of a new government department that would give the executive direct control over welfare payments. Perhaps most bluntly, it replaced the Chief Justice with an advisor.

The rule against political interference in the courts is obviously not just a convention of the US constitutional order. It is one of the totems of a narrative of democratic supremacy that took full shape during the Cold War. Political interference in the courts has been constructed in an anti-political way, in the sense that it is generally seen as something that autocrats, tyrants, and authoritarians do. Think of the contemporary Russian concept of telefonnoe parvo ("justice by telephone"), which captures the direct political pressure felt by judges and the obstacles that individuals face in obtaining an independent and impartial judiciary. 51 In contrast, in the democratic tradition, it is generally portrayed as something that does not happen. Institutionally, it is an ideal that characterizes the socialist-era prosecutorial system that remains in post-Soviet states such as Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine (which is endowed with significant powers of oversight over the courts in general) as difficult to integrate into a democratic framework. 52 Indeed, Partlett states that the abolition of such oversight in the Baltic states after 1989 reflected "a strong desire to move away from the Russian and Soviet heritage and return to Western European roots." 53 In short, this is one of the basic ideas for imagining a common cultural background. The rule against political interference in the courts is obviously not just a convention of the American constitutional order. It is one of the totems of the narrative of democratic supremacy that took full shape during the Cold War. Political interference in the courts has been constructed in an anti-political way, in the sense that it is generally seen as something that autocrats, tyrants, and authoritarians do. Think of the contemporary Russian concept of telefonnoe parvo ("justice by telephone"), which captures the direct political pressure felt by judges and the obstacles that individuals face in obtaining an independent and impartial judiciary. 51 In contrast, in the democratic tradition, it is generally portrayed as something that does not happen. Institutionally, it is an ideal that characterizes the socialist-era prosecutorial system (endowed with significant powers of general court supervision) remaining in post-Soviet states such as Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine as difficult to integrate into a democratic framework. 52 Indeed, Partlett describes the abolition of such supervision in the Baltic states after 1989 as reflecting "a strong desire to move away from the Russian and Soviet heritage and return to Western European roots." 53 In short, this is one of the basic ideas for imagining a common cultural background. The rule against political interference in courts is obviously not just a convention of the US constitutional order. It is one of the totems of the narrative of democratic supremacy that came into full view during the Cold War. Political interference in courts has been constructed in an anti-political way, in the sense that it is generally seen as something that tyrants, tyrants, and authoritarians do. Think of the notion of telefonnoe parvo ("justice by telephone") in contemporary Russia. This concept captures the direct political pressures felt by judges and the obstacles they face in obtaining an independent and impartial judiciary. 51 In contrast, it is portrayed as something that is generally not done in the democratic tradition. Institutionally, it is an ideal that characterizes the socialist-era prosecutorial systems that remain in post-Soviet states such as Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine (which are endowed with significant powers of general court supervision) as difficult to integrate into a democratic framework. 52 Indeed, Partlett has noted that the abolition of such supervision in the Baltic states after 1989 reflected "a strong desire to move away from Russian and Soviet legacies and return to Western European roots." 53 In short, this is one of the basic ways of imagining a common cultural background.

Yet a comparative perspective on court packaging reveals important nuances regarding its democratic legitimacy. As Kosař and Šipulová recently observed, “court packaging is a flourishing practice around the world,” but the conceptual understanding of packaging is underdeveloped. Footnote 54 Defining packing as “the deliberate and irregular quantitative and qualitative changes to the composition of an existing court, either forming new majorities within the court or reducing old majorities” highlights the problematic thin line between legitimate reforms aimed at improving the functioning of the judiciary and illegitimate interference with the court. It also provides a classification of the mechanisms used and important distinctions to keep in mind when determining what kind of reforms are found. Thus, while the term “court packaging” and its most famous historical context, the 1930s U. S. policy, tend to evoke court-size—“enlargement”—plots as seen in Hungary and Turkey, two important additional techniques are used. These include reducing the size of the Court – “vacuuming” – as in Poland in 2010 and in the United States in 1801, when the Supreme Court was reduced from six to five judges; and “replacement” – a re-arrangement to achieve a reshuffle of incumbent judges rather than a reshuffle of judges.

If such measures can be expressed in parallel with additional measures such as deprivation of jurisdiction, if such measures can be expressed with a more wide range of plans to eliminate institutional constraints on administrative power. Many. Hungary was a good example, and the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court was restricted under the new constitution of 2012, in which the constitution was revised in March 2013, all of the previous court rulings were invalidated. Note 57 Obviously, the government, which aims to realize a more friendly court, does not express its purpose. The measures are inevitably presented as democratic reforms necessary to improve the efficiency and legitimacy of the court. As seen in Poland, the need to eliminate the communist judge from the court was a central debate. Footnotes 58 & amp; lt; Pan & amp; gt) If you can be convinced that such a work is a bigger plan to remove institutional restrictions on administrative regulations, it is often the right to jurisdiction. It is pursued in parallel with additional measures such as diversion of. Hungary was a good example, and under the 2012 New Constitution (Basic Law), the control of the Constitution was restricted, and the constitution was subsequently revised. In parallel with additional measures such as deprivation of jurisdiction, if such measures can be expressed with confidence that they are part of a more wid e-range planning to eliminate institutional restrictions on administrative power. Often proceeded. Hungary was a good example, and the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court was restricted under the new constitution of 2012, in which the constitution was revised in March 2013, all of the previous court rulings were invalidated. Note 57 Obviously, the government, which aims to realize a more friendly court, does not express its purpose. The measures are inevitably presented as democratic reforms necessary to improve the efficiency and legitimacy of the court. As seen in Poland, the need to eliminate the communist judge from the court was a central debate. Footnotes 58 & amp; lt; Pan & amp; gt) If you can be convinced that such a work is a bigger plan to remove institutional restrictions on administrative regulations, it is often the right to jurisdiction. It is pursued in parallel with additional measures such as diversion of. Hungary was a good example, and under the 2012 New Constitution (Basic Law), the control of the Constitution was restricted, and the constitution was subsequently revised. If such measures can be expressed in parallel with additional measures such as deprivation of jurisdiction, if such measures can be expressed with a more wide range of plans to eliminate institutional constraints on administrative power. Many. Hungary was a good example, and the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court was restricted under the new constitution of 2012, in which the constitution was revised in March 2013, all of the previous court rulings were invalidated. Note 57 Obviously, the government, which aims to realize a more friendly court, does not express its purpose. The measures are inevitably presented as democratic reforms necessary to improve the efficiency and legitimacy of the court. As seen in Poland, the need to eliminate the communist judge from the court was a central debate. Footnotes 58 & amp; lt; Pan & amp; gt) If you can be convinced that such a work is a bigger plan to remove institutional restrictions on administrative regulations, it is often the right to jurisdiction. It is pursued in parallel with additional measures such as diversion of. Hungary was a good example, and under the 2012 New Constitution (Basic Law), the control of the Constitution was restricted, and the constitution was subsequently revised.

C. Turkey: Ambiguous Court-Packing in an Increasingly Authoritarian Context

It is also important to note that in discussing the Court, Kosaj and Shiplova present a wide variety of states. These include fully authoritarian states such as Bolivia and Egypt in the 1960s; liberal democracies that have recently undergone a significant democratic deterioration, such as Poland and Hungary; and states that are in the process of transition from undemocratic rule to a problematic democratization process characterized by a complex mix of democratization and democratic reversal indicators at the same time, such as Argentina in the 1980s and Turkey since the early 2000s. Clearly, different prevailing political contexts lead to different initial assessments of the Court's conflict management. Courts in authoritarian states are unlikely to become more independent. On the contrary, some form of packaging after or during democratic transitions may be one of the only responses to reconstitute the Court in the new democratic image of the state. As transitional justice researcher Ruti Teitel argues, in contexts where less fidelity to normal fundamental principles like legal consistency and predictability is acceptable, footnote 59, especially when presented in isolation as a "one-off" measure; it is not repeated in the context of relatively clear new constitutional arrangements; and in more ambiguous contexts.

I. Background to Packing the Constitutional Court (1961–2012)

One way to consider the legitimacy of court reorganization in the context of the United States is to do "time travel". In recent research, it is empirical and constitutional that the current proposal has analyzed the current proposal in light of the US constitutional history and the president can appoint a judge at any time during the presidential. I claim. It is ultimately the responsibility of the Senate to crack down on the frustration of the public's will in the nomination, and the clear treaty requires the nomination of the election year, and the court. The packaging itself can be understood as a mechanism rooted in the sovereign sovereign in c o-production of the court, which is part of the intentional design of the father of the founding. What this means is that a serious movement to the lineup can be justified, even if it does not lead to package as a countermeasure. Thomas Keck's footnote 60 clearly clarifies the "constitutional har d-line means" performed for democratic erosion based on the historical experience of court packing in the United States, and the packaging performed for constitutional restoration. I am distinguishing. Prior to the fact that Jefferson became the President, the federal government's packing into a court was discussed as a precedent in 1800 elections, and the federal government before Jefferson was appointed president, and other cases in a court. , The 1800 election is discussed as a precedent.

Even if the government is intentionally stuffed a faithful judge who intends to get a court, and that the judge explicitly exercises its power in a part y-style way, the government is trying to prevent the opposition from being packed in court. The supporters cannot be trusted even if they appeal to the norms of the judiciary. Footnote 61 One way to consider the legitimacy of the court reorganization in the context of the United States is to do "time travel". In recent research, it is empirical and constitutional that the current proposal has analyzed the current proposal in light of the US constitutional history and the president can appoint a judge at any time during the presidential. I claim. It is ultimately the responsibility of the Senate to crack down on the frustration of the public's will in the nomination, and the clear treaty requires the nomination of the election year, and the court. The packaging itself can be understood as a mechanism rooted in the sovereign sovereign in c o-production of the court, which is part of the intentional design of the father of the founding. What this means is that a serious movement to the lineup can be justified, even if it does not lead to package as a countermeasure. Thomas Keck's footnote 60 clearly clarifies the "constitutional har d-line means" performed for democratic erosion based on the historical experience of court packing in the United States, and the packaging performed for constitutional restoration. I am distinguishing. Prior to the fact that Jefferson became the President, the federal government's packing into a court was discussed as a precedent in 1800 elections, and the federal government before Jefferson was appointed president, and other cases in a court. , The 1800 election is discussed as a precedent.

Even if the government is intentionally stuffed a faithful judge who intends to get a court, and that the judge explicitly exercises its power in a part y-style way, the government is trying to prevent the opposition from being packed in court. The supporters cannot be trusted even if they appeal to the norms of the judiciary. Footnote 61 One way to consider the legitimacy of the court reorganization in the context of the US is to do "time travel". In recent research, it is empirical and constitutional that the current proposal has analyzed the current proposal in light of the US constitutional history and the president can appoint a judge at any time during the presidential. I claim. It is ultimately the responsibility of the Senate to crack down on the frustration of the public's will in the nomination, and the clear treaty requires the nomination of the election year, and the court. The packaging itself can be understood as a mechanism rooted in the sovereign sovereign in c o-production of the court, which is part of the intentional design of the father of the founding. What this means is that a serious movement to the lineup can be justified, even if it does not lead to package as a countermeasure. Thomas Keck's footnote 60 clearly clarifies the "constitutional har d-line means" performed for democratic erosion based on the historical experience of court packing in the United States, and the packaging performed for constitutional restoration. I am distinguishing. Prior to the fact that Jefferson became the President, the federal government's packing into a court was discussed as a precedent in 1800 elections, and the federal government before Jefferson was appointed president, and other cases in a court. , The 1800 election is discussed as a precedent.

II. Democratic Court-Packing?

However, in his own historical analysis, Joshua Braver points out that the size of the Supreme Court has changed seven times, but expresses strong caution, pointing out that past experiences of court packing before the Civil War occurred in completely different historical and institutional contexts, that packing had not occurred for over 150 years, and that the 1801 court repealed previous laws that reduced the size of the court with a clear condemnation of court packing. In particular, compared to the "successful" cases in the 1860s, the risk was low because of the lack of support for the president from either party. Braver, who defines court packing as "the manipulation of the size of the Supreme Court primarily to change its ideological composition" like Kosař and Šipulová, like Schwartz et al., understands that court packing by the current administration poses an unacceptable risk that it will encourage the opposition to pack after they come to power. Footnote 62

In considering how we can better understand legal packaging, its risks, and what this tells us about democratic restoration in environments of democratic decline, the following sections attempt to engage in “space travel,” building on the explanation of “time travel.” By analyzing in detail the impact of court freezing and court liquidation in Turkey and Argentina, the contexts of both countries challenge the starting point of the assumption that packaging is undemocratic. In both cases, the courts were initially justified but were inextricably embedded in deeper or developing pathologies in the political system.

The Turkish context is easy to judge as undemocratic in hindsight, but its nature was much more nuanced than a simple political capture of the Constitutional Court. The case is a thought-provoking example of how the expansion of the Court can be justified as a necessary part of a broader process of change to achieve a liberal democratic regime with full respect for popular control and elected institutions, but where the modus operandi and context of the reform undermine the apparent possibility of “good” play.

The constitution was founded in 1962: Austria (1945), Germany (1951) and Italy (1956). However, as a product of the constitution after the 1961 coup, its role in the constitutional order of Turkey is the historical, constitutional and political context of the Constitutional Court, and is operated in the first 50 years. Due to the fact, the role of other courts in each nation is different in terms of important points.

In particular, three factors are considered important. First, the foundation of the Turkish state itself is based on the goal of creating a modern and secular nation, and as a result, certain values such as secularism have become the central pillars of successive constitutions, and national sovereignty. It has been supported by considerable tension with other values, such as protecting personal rights. Second, the framework of state power does not reflect the traditional separation of government, legislation, and justice. Rather, along with these power, the army played a primary educational role, and the national bureaucrats have been accompanied as a representative of the basic values of democracy and the elite that married. This is reflected in the concept of the nation between the "permanent" civilian state, the military state (Devlet) and the "changing" elections (Hikimel). Footnote 63 If this value is regarded as threatened by the development of the election, the military seizes the power of power in an important phase in 1960-61, 1971, and 1980-83. The new constitution was adopted twice in 1961 and 1982. Third, because there is no direct complaint mechanism, the court recognizes that the first role is the administrator of the values of the Republic of the Republic, rather than a guardian of the Republican establishment. It has come. Constitutional court was established in 1962: Austria (1945), Germany (1951) and Italy (1956). However, as a product of the constitution after the 1961 coup, its role in the constitutional order of Turkey is the historical, constitutional and political context of the Constitutional Court, and is operated in the first 50 years. Due to the fact, the role of other courts in each nation is different in terms of important points.

In particular, three factors are considered important. First, the foundation of the Turkish state itself is based on the goal of creating a modern and secular nation, and as a result, certain values such as secularism have become the central pillars of successive constitutions, and national sovereignty. It has been supported by considerable tension with other values, such as protecting personal rights. Second, the framework of state power does not reflect the traditional separation of government, legislation, and justice. Rather, along with these power, the army played a primary educational role, and the national bureaucrats have been accompanied as a representative of the basic values of democracy and the elite that married. This is reflected in the concept of the nation between the "permanent" civilian state, the military state (Devlet) and the "changing" elections (Hikimel). Footnote 63 If this value is regarded as threatened by the development of the election, the military seizes the power of power in an important phase in 1960-61, 1971, and 1980-83. The new constitution was adopted twice in 1961 and 1982. Third, because there is no direct complaint mechanism, the court recognizes that the first role is the administrator of the values of the Republic of the Republic, rather than a guardian of the Republican establishment. It has come. The constitution was founded in 1962: Austria (1945), Germany (1951) and Italy (1956). However, as a product of the constitution after the 1961 coup, its role in the constitutional order of Turkey is the historical, constitutional and political context of the Constitutional Court, and is operated in the first 50 years. Due to the fact, the role of other courts in each nation is different in terms of important points.

The trials from 1961 to 2012 have been strongly criticized by many observers for not protecting individual rights and hindering the liberalization reform. The most prominent is the surprisingly frequent use of the authority to prohibit political parties, and in 1998, including referral partiti (Welfare Party), which has 4 million members, the national worl d-friendly personality and territory. In two6 years, more than 25 political parties were banned for integrity. Footnote 66 In 2008, there were two rulings regarding the abolition of swimwear ban at universities and the ban on the ruling and Fair Development Party (AKP), and the focus of the Constitutional Court is to protect the principle of state of the nation. In 2002, it was in a tension between democratic demands seeking the liberalization of the National Agency promoted by AKP, the first government. The Constitutional Court asserts the authority to evaluate the constitutional constitution of the constitutional amendment, maintains the constitutional nature of AKP with a slight difference, and has ruled that this amendment will be invalidated. At the center of the political structure, it created a tension with other national power, and was greatly criticized by the people and civil society. Footnote 67

III. Erdoğan’s Authoritarian Turn and the Impossibility of Independence

Against this background, drastic reforms, including expanding their qualifications in the court, were introduced. A larg e-scale structural reform was carried out in the court as part of the 1982 constitutional reform package adopted in 2012 and 2010 and approved in the referendum on September 12, 2010. The purpose of the positive direction was to improve the access to the court and strengthen the rights protection system, but for the first time in this reform to deal with many applications submitted to Turkey to the European Human Rights Court. A personal application system was introduced. The personal application system is part of the package consisting of 26 constitutional amendments, focusing on dealing with more stricter elements of the 1982 constitution by restricting the military detection rights. 。 For example, the reduction of the jurisdiction of the military court, the start of a significant judicial reform, the access to government records, and the strengthening of individual privacy rights for national interference. Footnote 68 The trial between 1961 to 2012 was strongly criticized by many observers for not fully protecting individual rights and hindered liberalization reform. The most prominent is the surprisingly frequent use of the authority to prohibit political parties, and in 1998, including referral partiti (Welfare Party), which has 4 million members, the national worl d-friendly personality and territory. In two6 years, more than 25 political parties were banned for integrity. Footnote 66 In 2008, there were two rulings regarding the abolition of swimwear ban at universities and the ban on the ruling and Fair Development Party (AKP), and the focus of the Constitutional Court is to protect the principle of state of the nation. In 2002, it was in a tension between democratic demands seeking the liberalization of the National Agency promoted by AKP, the first government. The Constitutional Court asserts the authority to evaluate the constitutional constitution of the constitutional amendment, maintains the constitutional nature of AKP with a slight difference, and has ruled that this amendment will be invalidated. At the center of the political structure, it created a tension with other national power, and was greatly criticized by the people and civil society. Footnote 67

Against this background, drastic reforms, including expanding their qualifications in the court, were introduced. A larg e-scale structural reform was carried out in the court as part of the 1982 constitutional reform package adopted in 2012 and 2010 and approved in the referendum on September 12, 2010. The purpose of the positive direction was to improve the access to the court and strengthen the rights protection system, but for the first time in this reform to deal with many applications submitted to Turkey to the European Human Rights Court. A personal application system was introduced. The personal application system is part of the package consisting of 26 constitutional amendments, focusing on dealing with more stricter elements of the 1982 constitution by restricting the military detection rights. 。 For example, the reduction of the jurisdiction of the military court, the start of a significant judicial reform, the access to government records, and the strengthening of individual privacy rights for national interference. Footnote 681961 to 2012 has been strongly criticized by many observers for not fully protecting individual rights and hinders liberalization reform. The most prominent is the surprisingly frequent use of the authority to prohibit political parties, and in 1998, including referral partiti (Welfare Party), which has 4 million members, the national worl d-friendly personality and territory. In two6 years, more than 25 political parties were banned for integrity. Footnote 66 In 2008, there were two rulings regarding the abolition of swimwear ban at universities and the ban on the ruling and Fair Development Party (AKP), and the focus of the Constitutional Court is to protect the principle of state of the nation. In 2002, it was in a tension between democratic demands seeking the liberalization of the National Agency promoted by AKP, the first government. The Constitutional Court asserts the authority to evaluate the constitutional constitution of the constitutional amendment, maintains the constitutional nature of AKP with a slight difference, and has ruled that this amendment will be invalidated. At the center of the political structure, it created a tension with other national power, and was greatly criticized by the people and civil society. Footnote 67

Against the background of the reform, these reforms were only the latest reforms that seemed to strengthen democracy performed since the 1990s. Following the abolition of television radio broadcasting national monopoly in 1993, a series of reforms was introduced in 1995. The evidence of the coup deter in 1980 was deleted from the preamble of the Constitution, the ban on the political activities of trade unions, associations, and public vocational organizations was reduced, and the age of voting was reduced to 18 years old. Following a military judge from the National Security Court in 1999, a more widespread series of reforms occurred in 2001, and the preamble of Article 33 of the Constitution was revised, and general restrictions on rights and freedom. The elimination of citizen and political rights, the expansion of economic and social rights, shortening of pr e-trial detention, and banning the authority of the Constitutional Court to review the laws established under the former military. Further reforms from 2002 to 2006 have abolished the National Safety Court, reduced age restrictions to get public office, and revised Article 90 of the Constitution to strengthen international status.

In the 2012 Constitutional Court Reform, the increase in the amount of work was expected to increase, and 11 permanent judges and four vice judges to 17 permanent judges without the vice judge were increased. Previously, the court, which had previously formed all cases at the plenary session, introduced two and six committees. Footnote 70 The members of the Supreme Court Prosecutor's Council (HSYK), which have a very important authority for the accidents, have also expanded. In recent years, this judicial expansion has been presented as an obvious negative step in recent years. As Ozan Valol mentioned in 2018, this expansion was "enabled the government (Constitutional Court and the Supreme Council) to solidify with members who are advantageous to their own ideology." Looking at the background of the Undernote 71 reform, these reforms were only the latest reforms that seemed to strengthen democracy since the 1990s. Following the abolition of television radio broadcasting national monopoly in 1993, a series of reforms was introduced in 1995. The evidence of the coup deter in 1980 was deleted from the preamble of the Constitution, the ban on the political activities of trade unions, associations, and public vocational organizations was reduced, and the age of voting was reduced to 18 years old. Following a military judge from the National Security Court in 1999, a more widespread series of reforms occurred in 2001, and the preamble of Article 33 of the Constitution was revised, and general restrictions on rights and freedom. The elimination of citizen and political rights, the expansion of economic and social rights, shortening of pr e-trial detention, and banning the authority of the Constitutional Court to review the laws established under the former military. Further reforms from 2002 to 2006 have abolished the National Safety Court, reduced age restrictions to get public office, and revised Article 90 of the Constitution to strengthen international status.

In the 2012 Constitutional Court Reform, the increase in the amount of work was expected to increase, and 11 permanent judges and four vice judges to 17 permanent judges without the vice judge were increased. Previously, the court, which had previously formed all cases at the plenary session, introduced two and six committees. Footnote 70 The members of the Supreme Court Prosecutor's Council (HSYK), which have a very important authority for the accidents, have also expanded. In recent years, this judicial expansion has been presented as an obvious negative step in recent years. As Ozan Valol mentioned in 2018, this expansion was "enabled the government (Constitutional Court and the Supreme Council) to solidify with members who are advantageous to their own ideology." Looking at the background of the footnote 71 reform, these reforms were only the latest reforms that seemed to strengthen democracy since the 1990s. Following the abolition of television radio broadcasting national monopoly in 1993, a series of reforms was introduced in 1995. The evidence of the coup deter in 1980 was deleted from the preamble of the Constitution, the ban on the political activities of trade unions, associations, and public vocational organizations was reduced, and the age of voting was reduced to 18 years old. Following a military judge from the National Security Court in 1999, a more widespread series of reforms occurred in 2001, and the preamble of Article 33 of the Constitution was revised, and general restrictions on rights and freedom. The elimination of citizen and political rights, the expansion of economic and social rights, shortening of pr e-trial detention, and banning the authority of the Constitutional Court to review the laws established under the former military. Further reforms from 2002 to 2006 have abolished the National Safety Court, reduced age restrictions to get public office, and revised Article 90 of the Constitution to strengthen international status.

But at that time, for example, despite concerns about continuing the status of the Minister of Justice in HSYK's footnote 72, many observers have a general positive background of political and constitutional reform. Because of it, it did not look like a negative court case. According to ASLı Bâli written in 2013, the movement has led to "expanding the representative of the judicial and legal profession in the court in accordance with the democratic process of judge appointed in Europe and other countries." The analysis of the Venice Committee on the footnote 73 Reform Plan has pointed out some drawbacks that it was not clear whether the abstract constitutional examination of laws and rules would be excluded, but members of the court. The expansion itself did not matter as a problem. Regarding the choice of footnote 74 reform, unlike many countries, which include the establishment of a completely new constitutional court as a central system reform since 1945, the existence of existing Constitutional Court is available. It seemed to be restricted in the reform options.

D. Argentina: Background to the Packing Saga

However, it is important to emphasize the reform process itself, especially how to work on reforms at a furious speed. As Bozkult pointed out, the characteristic of Prime Minister Erdogan (then) is "I or the royal road", and without a wide range of talks with stakeholders, including the opposition powers and people who are directly affected by the reform. Reform Agenda was unilaterally promoted. Constitutional amendments and bills were drafted by a small number of advisors in the Prime Minister's Office, and were submitted to Congress without notice or debate time. However, at that time, for example, concerns such as continuing the status of the Minister of Justice in HSYK's footnote 72, for many observers, generally positive for political and constitutional reform. The background did not look like a negative court case. According to ASLı Bâli written in 2013, the movement has led to "expanding the representative of the judicial and legal profession in the court in accordance with the democratic process of judge appointed in Europe and other countries." The analysis of the Venice Committee on the footnote 73 Reform Plan has pointed out some drawbacks that it was not clear whether the abstract constitutional examination of laws and rules would be excluded, but members of the court. The expansion itself did not matter as a problem. Regarding the choice of footnote 74 reform, unlike many countries, which include the establishment of a completely new constitutional court as a central system reform since 1945, the existence of existing Constitutional Court is available. It seemed to be restricted in the reform options.

I. Dictatorship, Autocracy, Democracy

However, it is important to emphasize the reform process itself, especially how to work on reforms at a furious speed. As Bozkult pointed out, the characteristic of Prime Minister Erdogan (then) is "I or the royal road", and without a wide range of talks with stakeholders, including the opposition powers and people who are directly affected by the reform. Reform Agenda was unilaterally promoted. Constitutional amendments and bills were drafted by a small number of advisors in the Prime Minister's Office, and were submitted to Congress without notice or debate time. But at that time, for example, despite concerns about continuing the status of the Minister of Justice in HSYK's footnote 72, many observers have a general positive background of political and constitutional reform. Because of it, it did not look like a negative court case. According to ASLı Bâli written in 2013, the movement has led to "expanding the representative of the judicial and legal profession in the court in accordance with the democratic process of judge appointed in Europe and other countries." The analysis of the Venice Committee on the footnote 73 Reform Plan has pointed out some drawbacks that it was not completely clear whether the abstract constitutional screening of laws and rules would be excluded, but members of the court. The expansion itself did not matter as a problem. Regarding the choice of footnote 74 reform, unlike many countries, which include the establishment of a completely new constitutional court as a central system reform since 1945, the existence of existing Constitutional Court is available. It seemed to be restricted in the reform options.

Focusing on the impact of reforms makes things more complicated. The reform of the court's law seemed to at least reflect an independent institution that could effectively protect the rights and democracy. It is undoubtedly deviating from the previous role of the court as a guardian of the Kemarism order. The court has steadily provided important judgments and has already submitted 165 personal rights violations by July 2014, less than two years after the introduction of personal petition. Footnote 76 These rulings seemed to have strongly supported the protection of freedom of speech, the right to take fair trials, the autonomy of individuals, the rights of privacy, and the right of equality, and changed their roles. The members of the footnote 77 Court thought that this new mechanism was "an effective means to protect basic rights" and a "promising" development. Footnotes 79 70 % or more (119) of these rulings were related to the right to receive fair trials, followed by 12 % (21) for personal freedom and 18 %. The following judgments have been issued regarding the rights of life, physical and mental completion, political participation, privacy, freedom of religion, and freedom of expression. Focusing on the effects of reforms makes things more complicated. The reform of the court's law seemed to at least reflect an independent institution that could effectively protect the rights and democracy. It is undoubtedly deviating from the previous role of the court as a guardian of the Kemarism order. The court has steadily provided important judgments and has already submitted 165 personal rights violations by July 2014, less than two years after the introduction of personal petition. Footnote 76 These rulings seemed to have strongly supported the protection of freedom of speech, the right to take fair trials, the autonomy of individuals, the rights of privacy, and the right of equality, and changed their roles. The members of the footnote 77 Court thought that this new mechanism was "an effective means to protect basic rights" and a "promising" development. Footnotes 79 70 % or more (119) of these rulings were related to the right to receive fair trials, followed by 12 % (21) for personal freedom and 18 %. The following judgments have been issued regarding the rights of life, physical and mental completion, political participation, privacy, freedom of religion, and freedom of expression. Focusing on the impact of reforms makes things more complicated. The reform of the court's law seemed to at least reflect an independent institution that could effectively protect the rights and democracy. It is undoubtedly deviating from the previous role of the court as a guardian of the Kemarism order. The court has steadily provided important judgments and has already submitted 165 personal rights violations by July 2014, less than two years after the introduction of personal petition. Footnote 76 These rulings seemed to have strongly supported the protection of freedom of speech, the right to take fair trials, the autonomy of individuals, the rights of privacy, and the right of equality, and changed their roles. The members of the footnote 77 Court thought that this new mechanism was "an effective means to protect basic rights" and a "promising" development. Footnotes 79 70 % or more (119) of these rulings were related to the right to receive fair trials, followed by 12 % (21) for personal freedom and 18 %. The following judgments have been issued regarding the rights of life, physical and mental completion, political participation, privacy, freedom of religion, and freedom of expression.

In July 2014, Judge Arslan, who was elected President of the Court in 2015, delivered a speech at a conference in Strasbourg in which he introduced a series of landmark cases. 81 In the Twitter v. YouTube judgments decided in spring 2014, the Court invalidated blanket bans imposed by the State on access to Twitter and YouTube separately, as they were not provided for in law. In the Twitter case, the Court found that the bans imposed by the relevant administrative authorities had no factual basis. 82 In contrast, in the YouTube case, based on the relevant Strasbourg judgment, the Court found that the law on which the bans were based lacked the necessary certainty and foreseeability. Following Strasbourg case law, the Court also emphasized the important role that the Internet and social media play in democratic societies as instruments of freedom of expression. Footnote 83 In the 2014 decision in the Ekaran case (Footnote 84), the Constitutional Court again emphasized the importance of freedom of speech in a democratic society and declared the official seizure and destruction of the book "Kurdistan Revolutionary Manifesto" by Kurdish political leader Abdullah Ekaran to be disproportionate.

There have also been a number of landmark decisions on the right to a fair trial. In one case, the court ruled that the practice of applying the maximum five-year criminal sentence separately for each crime a convicted defendant committed, resulting in excessively long prison terms, was an unconstitutional violation of the right to freedom. 85 In a subsequent case involving petitions by imprisoned representatives, the court emphasized the importance of political participation in a democracy. Having found that the detention of members of the House of Representatives had prevented them from representing their constituents, the court found that the restrictions imposed were disproportionate and not necessary in a democratic society. 86 In June 2014, the Sledgehammer court found that the trial of 230 applicants convicted of participating in a military coup attempt to overthrow the AKP government violated two aspects of the right to a fair trial (the right to a reasonable sentence and the procedural principle of equality of arms) because the court had treated questionable evidence and refused to hear certain witnesses. Footnote 87

II. The Supreme Court(s) of Argentina until 1983

On the other hand, the Strasbourg Court found that the system in principle provides an effective judicial remedy within the meaning of Article 6 ECHR Footnote 88 and the number of applications to the Strasbourg Court steadily decreased. More importantly, after the introduction of the Strasbourg Court, Turkish citizens had "high expectations" of the expanded Court and the individual application procedure. The number of individual applications certainly seemed to reflect a considerable interest and perhaps hope for the new procedure among citizens and civil society. Footnote 89 Applications were filed with the Court immediately after the introduction of the procedure, and already since January 20, 2014, a total of 11. Footnote 90 This number had increased to 32. 000 by January 2015. Footnote 91

Since 2013, democratic power has been gradually overthrowed under the Erdogan administration, and the ruling system is being reconstructed in a more authoritative type, so the political background for the court has become more and more limited. Ta. In 2013, a larg e-scale corruption investigation for four ministers, his relatives, and luxury bureaucrats began, and AKP was suspected of a "coup" by the Grenist religious movement led by Fetta Glenn, a former AKP ally. The government has taken measures to strengthen control of prosecutors and the judicial council (HSYK). In 2015, the AKP administration became increasingly weaker, and in June elections, the majority of the AKP lasted 13 years, but in the early elections held in November, both polarization was instigated and vulnerable opposition unity. As a result of developing a campaign to collapse, he won a landslide victory. The government also ended the vulnerable peace process between the state and the Kurdish armed forces in the summer of 2015 and the two and a half years informal ceasefire. As a result, both the Domestic Court and the Strasbourg Court have petitions on the ban on going out at night, killing, excessive military behavior, and freedom of speech. In February 2016, the Strasbourg Court of the Court of the Strasbourg pointed out that Turkey had the largest number of claims on freedom of expression. Footnote 93

The independence of the Constitutional Court, which respects the rights, has caused significant dissatisfaction within the government. In the spring of 2015, the ruling Party AKP began to raise the need for a review, stating that the personal petition system could overload the court, but the court officially denied this claim. Footnote 94 In the early 2015, former Court Court, in particular, decided to accept personal petitions to eliminate 10 % of the election standards for political parties, especially an important mechanism that supports the maintenance of AKP's administration. He talked about the "strong pressure" that was applied to court members by external powers. Note 95) In January 2015, the court decided to refuse to hear this petition (Note 96). Since 2013, democratic power has been gradually overthrowed under the Erdogan administration, and the ruling system is being rebuilt in more authoritative types, so the political background for the court is increasingly useful. It became. In 2013, a larg e-scale corruption investigation for four ministers, his relatives, and luxury bureaucrats began, and AKP was suspected of a "coup" by the Grenist religious movement led by Fetta Glenn, a former AKP ally. The government has taken measures to strengthen control of prosecutors and the judicial council (HSYK). In 2015, the AKP administration became increasingly weaker, and in June elections, the majority of the AKP lasted 13 years, but in the early elections held in November, both polarization was instigated and vulnerable opposition unity. As a result of developing a campaign to collapse, he won a landslide victory. The government also ended the vulnerable peace process between the state and the Kurdish armed forces in the summer of 2015 and the two and a half years informal ceasefire. As a result, both the Domestic Court and the Strasbourg Court have petitions on the ban on going out at night, killing, excessive military behavior, and freedom of speech. In February 2016, the Strasbourg Court of the Court of the Strasbourg pointed out that Turkey had the largest number of claims on freedom of expression. Footnote 93

E. Court-Packing: From Remedy to Pathology

I. Court-Packing as Remedy

The independence of the Constitutional Court, which respects the rights, has caused significant dissatisfaction within the government. In the spring of 2015, the ruling Party AKP began to raise the need for a review, stating that the personal petition system could overload the court, but the court officially denied this claim. Footnote 94 In the early 2015, former Court Court, in particular, decided to accept personal petitions to eliminate 10 % of the election standards for political parties, especially an important mechanism that supports the maintenance of AKP's administration. He talked about the "strong pressure" that was applied to court members by external powers. Note 95) In January 2015, the court decided to refuse to hear this petition (Note 96). Since 2013, democratic power has been gradually overthrowed under the Erdogan administration, and the ruling system is being reconstructed in a more authoritative type, so the political background for the court has become more and more limited. Ta. In 2013, a larg e-scale corruption investigation for four ministers, his relatives, and luxury bureaucrats began, and AKP was suspected of a "coup" by the Grenist religious movement led by Fetta Glenn, a former AKP ally. The government has taken measures to strengthen control of prosecutors and the judicial council (HSYK). In 2015, the AKP administration became increasingly weaker, and in June elections, the majority of the AKP lasted 13 years, but in the early elections held in November, both polarization was instigated and vulnerable opposition unity. As a result of developing a campaign to collapse, he won a landslide victory. The government also ended the vulnerable peace process between the state and the Kurdish armed forces in the summer of 2015 and the two and a half years informal ceasefire. As a result, both the Domestic Court and the Strasbourg Court have petitions on the ban on going out at night, killing, excessive military behavior, and freedom of speech. In February 2016, the Strasbourg Court of the Court of the Strasbourg pointed out that Turkey had the largest number of claims on freedom of expression. Footnote 93

On July 15, 2016, a coup attempted by the military occurred, and although security forces were immediately suppressed with the cooperation of the general public, more than 250 people died, and the pursuit of justice, military, and national institutions continued. 。 The judiciary, the military, and the national institution have been purged one after another. More than 160, 000 were solved, many were arrested and prosecuted, and were often charged with controversy, including about 4, 000 of the 21, 000 judges in Japan. Footnote 97 On August 4, 2016, the Constitutional Court, which was held in the Great Court, approved two of the 17 members and permanently stripped his qualifications. Footnote 98 The government, which dismissed five members of the Judicial Council (HSYK) shortly after the attempted coup in April 2017, revised the law to manage HSYK and reduced the members by half to 13. The President gave the President directly appointed and gave the remaining seven the authority to be appointed by Congress: Erdogan, in which Erdogan, in effect Erdogan completely tailored to the right. 。 As a result, other power and accountability were sacrificed, and the government was significantly strengthened.

The de facto concentration of President Erdogan has been de facto forced by a 2017 referendum to transition from parliament to powerful presidential system. The strict secular political system dominated by the elite has been gradually democratized for several decades, but has been formally used in a more Islamic power system controlled by Erdogan. As Akman and Actual have stated, this plan shows serious concerns in advance, as the President's extensive enactment of laws and regulations, the right of parliamentary appointment, the right to dissolve, etc. will create "constitutional dictatorship". I was. Footnote 99 On July 15, 2016, a coup an attempted coup was held by the military, and although security forces were immediately suppressed with the cooperation of ordinary citizens, more than 250 people died, and the judiciary, military, and national institutions. There are a lot of purge. The judiciary, the military, and the national institution have been purged one after another. More than 160, 000 were solved, many were arrested and prosecuted, and were often charged with controversy, including about 4, 000 of the 21, 000 judges in Japan. Footnote 97 On August 4, 2016, the Constitutional Court, which was held in the Great Court, approved two of the 17 members and permanently stripped his qualifications. Footnote 98 The government, which dismissed five members of the Judicial Council (HSYK) shortly after the attempted coup in April 2017, revised the law to manage HSYK and reduced the members by half to 13. The President gave the President directly appointed and gave the remaining seven the authority to be appointed by Congress: Erdogan, in which Erdogan, in effect Erdogan completely tailored to the right. 。 As a result, other power and accountability were sacrificed, and the government was significantly strengthened.

The de facto concentration of President Erdogan has been de facto forced by a 2017 referendum to transition from parliament to powerful presidential system. The strict secular political system dominated by the elite has been gradually democratized for several decades, but has been formally used in a more Islamic power system controlled by Erdogan. As Akman and Actual have stated, this plan shows serious concerns in advance, as the President's extensive enactment of laws and regulations, the right of parliamentary appointment, the right to dissolve, etc. will create "constitutional dictatorship". I was. Footnote 992016 On July 15, which was an attempted coup an attempt by the military, the security forces were immediately suppressed with the cooperation of the general public, but more than 250 people died, and the pursuit of the judiciary, military, and national institutions continued. is. The judiciary, the military, and the national institution have been purged one after another. More than 160, 000 were solved, many were arrested and prosecuted, and were often charged with controversy, including about 4, 000 of the 21, 000 judges in Japan. Footnote 97 On August 4, 2016, the Constitutional Court, which was held in the Great Court, approved two of the 17 members and permanently stripped his qualifications. Footnote 98 The government, which dismissed five members of the Judicial Council (HSYK) shortly after the attempted coup in April 2017, revised the law to manage HSYK and reduced the members by half to 13. The President gave the President directly appointed and gave the remaining seven the authority to be appointed by Congress: Erdogan, in which Erdogan, in effect Erdogan completely tailored to the right. 。 As a result, other power and accountability were sacrificed, and the government was significantly strengthened.

The 2017 constitutional reform also introduced changes to the judiciary, including ensuring that the judiciary is not only “independent” but also “impartial,” expanding the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court to accept referrals from Parliament for specific and abstract review of the constitutionality of presidential decrees, abolishing the military court system, and reducing the number of members of the Court from 17 to 15 in accordance with Article 146 of the Constitution. 100 However, in Akman and Akçar’s view, this did little to mitigate the total transfer of power to the President. Provisions that empower Parliament to petition the Constitutional Court to invalidate decrees or to submit decrees or certain provisions to a referendum offered little reassurance given the President’s power to dominate and control Parliament. More importantly, in light of “concerns about the independence of the judiciary,” the measures were ineffective in practice. Footnote 101

In other words, while the expansion of the Constitutional Court initially seemed to improve its functioning on both the liberal and democratic axes, the room for independent institutions in Turkey became smaller and smaller in a short time due to the broader political framework of the executive branch, and the independent constraints on the executive branch were expanded and weakened. The expansion of the Constitutional Court itself is not the core of this situation. In fact, it is possible to imagine an alternative scenario in which, in a more supportive political context and based on an open and participatory constitutional reform process, the expansion of the Court might have produced a more independent court that could, in a balanced way, hold the executive accountable, curb its excesses, and uphold fundamental rights. But even then, with regard to the risk of recurrence, it would be necessary to somehow point out that the expansion itself is a completely exceptional measure, to be used very sparingly, to prevent the practice from becoming the norm. The 2017 constitutional reform also introduced changes to the courts, including: ensuring that the judiciary is not only “independent” but also “impartial”; expanding the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court to accept referrals from Parliament for specific and abstract review of the constitutionality of presidential decrees; abolishing the military court system; and reducing the number of members of the Court from 17 to 15 in accordance with Article 146 of the Constitution. Footnote 100 However, in Akman and Akçar’s view, this did little to mitigate the total transfer of power to the President. The provisions that empower Parliament to petition the Constitutional Court to invalidate decrees or to submit decrees or some of their provisions to a referendum offered little reassurance given the President’s power to dominate and control Parliament. More importantly, in light of “concerns about the independence of the judiciary,” the measures were practically ineffective. Footnote 101

In other words, while the expansion of the Constitutional Court initially seemed to improve its functioning on both the liberal and democratic axes, the room for independent institutions in Turkey became smaller and smaller in a short time due to the broader political framework of the executive branch, and the independent constraints on the executive branch were expanded and weakened. The expansion of the Constitutional Court itself is not the core of this situation. In fact, it is possible to imagine an alternative scenario in which, in a more supportive political context and based on an open and participatory constitutional reform process, the expansion of the Court might have produced a more independent court that could, in a balanced way, hold the executive accountable, curb its excesses, and uphold fundamental rights. But even then, with regard to the risk of recurrence, it would be necessary to somehow point out that the expansion itself is a completely exceptional measure, to be used very sparingly, to prevent the practice from becoming the norm. The 2017 constitutional reform also introduced changes to the judiciary, including ensuring that the judiciary is not only “independent” but also “impartial,” expanding the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court to accept referrals from Parliament for specific and abstract review of the constitutionality of presidential decrees, abolishing the military court system, and reducing the number of members of the Court from 17 to 15 in accordance with Article 146 of the Constitution. 100 However, in Akman and Akçar’s view, this did little to mitigate the total transfer of power to the President. Provisions that empower Parliament to petition the Constitutional Court to invalidate decrees or to submit decrees or certain provisions to a referendum offered little reassurance given the President’s power to dominate and control Parliament. More importantly, in light of “concerns about the independence of the judiciary,” the measures were ineffective in practice. Footnote 101

II. Court-Packing as Pathology

Turkey was not a established liberal democracy, unlike the United States at the time of the court, but did not meet the philosophy of popular control and the actual needs. It was recognized as a loose democratization, faithful to the secular statistical ideology, which is too frequent to justify the integration of the public and democratic systems to justify the integration of the public and democratic systems. However, recent trends are not a reversal of this democratization process, but reflects the essence of the process and the trajectory itself. For example, in 2012, Bâli described AKP and Kurdish politics as "coincidence democracy" to the extent that political liberalization is considered the best way to develop their political power. Note 102 Tom bus argues that occasional independence demonstrations by the Constitution have covered the overall lack of independence. Footnote 103 The positive reform to strengthen the sovereignty of the free democracy was unreasonable in such an overall situation.

In light of the 5D analysis framework described at the beginning, when considering the democratization of the clogging of the trial, the Turkish framework has the overall framework of reform and the property of the reform process (single and closed). It is suspected to be the importance of understanding or open and comprehensive). Finally, there is a threat to open the "abuse constitutional" door that endlessly define the constitution, law, and systems in a way that is advantageous to the government without setting up the pace and frequency of reforms and frequency and frequency. Must be considered. Turkey was not an established liberal democracy, unlike the United States when the court was packed, but did not match the philosophy of popular control and the actual needs. It is recognized as a gentle democratization state that is faired in a secular statistical ideology that is too frequent to justify the intentions and democratic systems to be engaged in complex processes that reduce power in power. I was. However, recent trends are not a reversal of this democratization process, but reflects the essence of the process and the trajectory itself. For example, in 2012, Bâli described AKP and Kurdish politics as "coincidence democracy" to the extent that political liberalization is considered the best way to develop their political power. Note 102 Tom bus argues that occasional independence demonstrations by the Constitution have covered the overall lack of independence. Footnote 103 The positive reform to strengthen the sovereignty of the free democracy was unreasonable in such an overall situation.

In light of the 5D analysis framework described at the beginning, when considering the democratization of the clogging of the trial, the Turkish framework has the overall framework of reform and the property of the reform process (single and closed). It is suspected to be the importance of understanding or open and comprehensive). Finally, there is a threat to open the "abuse constitutional" door that endlessly define the constitution, law, and systems in a way that is advantageous to the government without setting up the pace and frequency of reforms and frequency and frequency. Must be considered. Turkey was not a established liberal democracy, unlike the United States at the time of the court, but did not meet the philosophy of popular control and the actual needs. It was recognized as a loose democratization, faithful to the secular statistical ideology, which is too frequent to justify the integration of the public and democratic systems to justify the integration of the public and democratic systems. However, recent trends are not a reversal of this democratization process, but reflects the essence of the process and the trajectory itself. For example, in 2012, Bâli described AKP and Kurdish politics as "coincidence democracy" to the extent that political liberalization is considered the best way to develop their political power. Note 102 Tom bus argues that occasional independence demonstrations by the Constitution have covered the overall lack of independence. Footnote 103 The positive reform to strengthen the sovereignty of the free democracy was unreasonable in such an overall situation.

III. The Long-Term Effects of the Packing Spiral

Argentina's experience dates back to the 1980s, and so far has not been loudly claimed in the US court. However, it is a source of important insights that more clearly shows the case of "good" court in the context of the transition from authority to democracy, and initially had a promising result, but eventually liberal democracy. It shows a problematic precedent in an authoritarian era, which was misused by the president after not very faithful to sufficient restrictions on administrative rights. This part briefly explained the political, constitutional, and institutional background of suitcases in Argentina, then as a democratic rescue measure, and later the national constitutional and political order. As a pathology, we discuss the experience of the suitcase again.

Argentina is often depicted like a stereotype defect that affects South America's policies: the history of military intervention in politics, shaking between democratic and dictators, excessive presidential system, Strong ideology division in political life, weak Supreme Court, underdeveloped culture of constitutionalism and law, insufficient basic rights, all of them occur in a series of political and economic crisis. There is. However, there is a big nuance under this stereotype. Argentina's experience dates back to the 1980s, and so far has not been loud in the discussions on US courts. However, it is a source of important insights that more clearly shows the case of "good" court in the context of the transition from authority to democracy, and initially had a promising result, but eventually liberal democracy. It shows a problematic precedent in an authoritarian era, which was misused by the president after not very faithful to sufficient restrictions on administrative rights. This part briefly explained the political, constitutional, and institutional background of suitcases in Argentina, then as a democratic rescue measure, and later the national constitutional and political order. As a pathology, we discuss the experience of the suitcase again.

Argentina is often depicted like a stereotype defect that affects South America's policies: the history of military intervention in politics, shaking between democratic and dictators, excessive presidential system, Strong ideology division in political life, weak Supreme Court, underdeveloped culture of constitutionalism and law, insufficient basic rights, all of them occur in a series of political and economic crisis. There is. However, there is a big nuance under this stereotype. Argentina's experience dates back to the 1980s, and so far has not been loudly claimed in the US court. However, it is a source of important insights that more clearly shows the case of "good" court in the context of the transition from authority to democracy, and initially had a promising result, but eventually liberal democracy. It shows a problematic precedent in an authoritarian era, which was misused by the president after not very faithful to sufficient restrictions on administrative rights. This part briefly explained the political, constitutional, and institutional background of suitcases in Argentina, then as a democratic rescue measure, and later the national constitutional and political order. As a pathology, we discuss the experience of the suitcase again.

Until the 1930 coup, it was the same as the democracy and economic development of the Western European country, but it became difficult to distinguish between civilian governments and military government. For example, Juan Peron was appointed president by the military administration in 1943 and was elected president in 1946, but dominated the country as a dictator. Footnote 104 Since 1969, after many years of political violence between the left wing guerrilla and the national army, the military coup in the 105 1976 has gained the strong support of the people who expect peace and order to return to order. It started. However, under the military administration, Brnow described it as "definitely the most oppressive in the area" worsened. The administration has ended, with the infringement of human rights, including 106 5, 000 dead and 30, 000 missing persons, the end of the 10 7-yea r-old economic injustice, and the misery of the military. In 1983, the migration to the democracy of the electio n-based democracy was the collapse of the economy from 1981 to 1982, the rapid collapse of Argentina's decisive defeat in the Falkland conflict with the UK in 1982, It began with the collapse of the administration itself in 1983. In the October 1983 election, the rapid political party, UCR, was born. Until the coup in 1930, it was the same as democracy and economic development as a Western democracy, but it became difficult to distinguish between civilian governments and military government. For example, Juan Peron was appointed president by the military administration in 1943 and was elected president in 1946, but dominated the country as a dictator. Footnote 104 Since 1969, after many years of political violence between the left wing guerrilla and the national army, the military coup in the 105 1976 has gained the strong support of the people who expect peace and order to return to order. It started. However, under the military administration, Brnow described it as "definitely the most oppressive in the area" worsened. The administration has ended, with the infringement of human rights, including 106 5, 000 dead and 30, 000 missing persons, the end of the 10 7-yea r-old economic injustice, and the misery of the military. In 1983, the migration to the democracy of the electio n-based democracy was the collapse of the economy from 1981 to 1982, the rapid collapse of Argentina's decisive defeat in the Falkland conflict with the UK in 1982, It began with the collapse of the administration itself in 1983. In the October 1983 election, the rapid political party, UCR, was born. Until the 1930 coup, it was the same as the democracy and economic development of the Western European country, but it became difficult to distinguish between civilian governments and military government. For example, Juan Peron was appointed president by the military administration in 1943 and was elected president in 1946, but dominated the country as a dictator. Footnote 104 Since 1969, after many years of political violence between the left wing guerrilla and the national army, the military coup in the 105 1976 has gained the strong support of the people who expect peace and order to return to order. It started. However, under the military administration, Brnow described it as "definitely the most oppressive in the area" worsened. The administration has ended, with the infringement of human rights, including 106 5, 000 dead and 30, 000 missing persons, the end of the 10 7-yea r-old economic injustice, and the misery of the military. In 1983, the migration to the democracy of the electio n-based democracy was the collapse of the economy from 1981 to 82, the rapid collapse of Argentina's decisive defeat in the Folkland conflict with the United Kingdom in 1982, and the rapidly supported military government. It began with the collapse of the administration itself in 1983. In the October 1983 election, the rapid political party, UCR, was born.

Alfonsin's presidential era, the leader of the political parties, who has long supported the military political control, the political control of the military, the liberal democracy, and the constitutionalism, brought a remarkable improvement in democratic rule. This includes disabling military administration, relieving censorship, and establishment of the National Missing Committee (CONADEP), which recorded human rights infringement under the military administration. Footnote 108 However, the new administration faced strict restrictions. Alfonsin's political funds were spent in military trials, and from political background, it was impossible to adopt the new constitution, a ful l-time separation with the former constitutional order, and extensive system reform. Paynut 109, which reconfirmed the 1853 constitution 130 years ago as the "National Law of the Country", has decisively denied the national security nation in the military era, abandoned further dependence on military power, and democratic. In order to support the "new democracy foundation" and the "new social contract" that promised to governing, it means to use the old constitution paradoxically. Footnote 110 lacked a series of options for judicial reform, including the establishment of a constitutional court. The president of Alfonsin, the leader of the political parties, the military political control of the military, the religious democracy, and the constitutionalism, caused a remarkable improvement to democratic rule. This includes disabling military administration, relieving censorship, and establishment of the National Missing Committee (CONADEP), which recorded human rights infringement under the military administration. Footnote 108 However, the new administration faced strict restrictions. Alfonsin's political funds were spent in military trials, and from political background, it was impossible to adopt the new constitution, a ful l-time separation with the former constitutional order, and extensive system reform. Paynut 109, which reconfirmed the 1853 constitution 130 years ago as the "National Law of the Country", has decisively denied the national security nation in the military era, abandoned further dependence on military power, and democratic. In order to support the "new democracy foundation" and the "new social contract" that promised to governing, it means to use the old constitution paradoxically. Footnote 110 lacked a series of options for judicial reform, including the establishment of a constitutional court. Alfonsin's presidential era, the leader of the political parties, who has long supported the military political control, the political control of the military, the liberal democracy, and the constitutionalism, brought a remarkable improvement in democratic rule. This includes disabling military administration, relieving censorship, and establishment of the National Missing Committee (CONADEP), which recorded human rights infringement under the military administration. Footnote 108 However, the new administration faced strict restrictions. Alfonsin's political funds were spent in military trials, and from political background, it was impossible to adopt the new constitution, a ful l-time separation with the former constitutional order, and extensive system reform. Paynut 109, which reconfirmed the 1853 constitution 130 years ago as the "National Law of the Country", has decisively denied the national security nation in the military era, abandoned further dependence on military power, and democratic. In order to support the "new democracy foundation" and the "new social contract" that promised to governing, it means to use the old constitution paradoxically. Footnote 110 lacked a series of options for judicial reform, including the establishment of a constitutional court.

The new president, Carlos Menem of the right-wing Justiciarist Party, elected in May 1989, swung the pendulum back to a more authoritarian form of government. Rule by presidential decree was again the norm, constitutional constraints were ignored, constitutional restrictions on presidential reelection were abolished, the Supreme Court was unnecessarily oversold, and military officials convicted in 1985 were pardoned in 1989 and 1990. 111 Political resistance led to a political agreement for further reforms (the Olivos Agreement) between Menem and the opposition led by Alfonsin, and in 1994 a Constituent Assembly amended the Constitution. 112 It was intended to limit the president's emergency decree powers and change the procedure for appointing Supreme Court justices, and it was unusual in that it articulated the constitutional scheme in nine international human rights treaties, while leaving existing rights provisions in the Constitution intact. These included the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention against Torture, and two regional human rights instruments, the American Declaration of Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights. While these reforms introduced additional safeguards for judicial independence, footnote 113 they have had limited impact to date, throughout the intense post-Menem crisis period (1999-2003), the Kirchner era (2003-2015), and the post-Kirchner era (2015-present). One of the central challenges facing the development of a strong democratic system based on the rule of law is the “original sin” of how Alfonsin approached the Supreme Court reorganization in 1989 as a legitimate reform in the democratic transition, which arguably promoted a return to the cycle of unjust struggles rather than breaking this cycle once and for all. However, this long tradition itself suggests that the subsequent packaging by Menem and others would have been possible even if Alfonsin had followed a less problematic process. footnote 114 In the next part, we will discuss these moves in more detail. First, the final section of the main text provides necessary background on the Supreme Court as an institution. The new president, Carlos Menem of the right-wing Justiciarist Party, elected in May 1989, swung the pendulum back to a more authoritarian form of government. Rule by presidential decree was again the norm, constitutional constraints were ignored, constitutional restrictions on presidential reelection were abolished, the Supreme Court was unnecessarily oversold, and military officials convicted in 1985 were pardoned in 1989 and 1990. Footnote 111 Political resistance led to a political agreement for further reforms (the Olivos Agreement) between Menem and the opposition led by Alfonsin, and in 1994 a Constituent Assembly amended the Constitution. Footnote 112 It was intended to limit the president's emergency decree powers and change the procedure for appointing Supreme Court justices, and it was unusual in that it articulated the constitutional scheme in nine international human rights treaties while leaving existing rights provisions in the Constitution intact. These included the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention against Torture, and two regional human rights instruments, the American Declaration of Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights. While these reforms introduced additional safeguards for judicial independence, footnote 113 they have had limited impact to date, throughout the intense post-Menem crisis period (1999-2003), the Kirchner era (2003-2015), and the post-Kirchner era (2015-present). One of the central challenges facing the development of a strong democratic system based on the rule of law is the “original sin” of how Alfonsin approached the Supreme Court reorganization in 1989 as a legitimate reform in the democratic transition, which arguably promoted a return to the cycle of unjust struggles rather than breaking this cycle once and for all. However, this long tradition itself suggests that the subsequent packaging by Menem and others would have been possible even if Alfonsin had followed a less problematic process. footnote 114 In the next part, we will discuss these moves in more detail. First, the final section of the main text provides necessary background on the Supreme Court as an institution. The new president, Carlos Menem of the right-wing Justiciarist Party, elected in May 1989, swung the pendulum back to a more authoritarian form of government. Rule by presidential decree was again the norm, constitutional constraints were ignored, constitutional restrictions on presidential reelection were abolished, the Supreme Court was unnecessarily oversold, and military officials convicted in 1985 were pardoned in 1989 and 1990. 111 Political resistance led to a political agreement for further reforms (the Olivos Agreement) between Menem and the opposition led by Alfonsin, and in 1994 a Constituent Assembly amended the Constitution. 112 It was intended to limit the president's emergency decree powers and change the procedure for appointing Supreme Court justices, and it was unusual in that it articulated the constitutional scheme in nine international human rights treaties, while leaving existing rights provisions in the Constitution intact. These included the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention against Torture, and two regional human rights instruments, the American Declaration of Human Rights and the American Convention on Human Rights. While these reforms introduced additional safeguards for judicial independence, footnote 113 they have had limited impact to date, throughout the intense post-Menem crisis period (1999-2003), the Kirchner era (2003-2015), and the post-Kirchner era (2015-present). One of the central challenges facing the development of a strong democratic system based on the rule of law is the “original sin” of how Alfonsin approached the Supreme Court reorganization in 1989 as a legitimate reform in the democratic transition, which arguably promoted a return to the cycle of unjust struggles rather than breaking this cycle once and for all. However, this long tradition itself suggests that the subsequent packaging by Menem and others would have been possible even if Alfonsin had followed a less problematic process. footnote 114 In the next part, we will discuss these moves in more detail. First, the final section of the main text provides necessary background on the Supreme Court as an institution.

The Supreme Court was modest in the political system and was relatively independent from 1853 to 1930. Footnote 115 The court, established under the tradition of the liberal constitution, underestimated the power of constitutional screening in the 1880s. Footnote 116

However, in the 20th century, the court became increasingly involved in the distortion of Argentina politics, and the typical government was a legitimate government by making a resolution (Acordadas) that recognized as constitutional in exchange for the pledge. It was a realistic development of giving. To respect the constitution. This approach has never been successful. The military leaders broke the constitution, and the court proved that they could not control them. In the constant political turmoil of the 20th century, the independence of Argentina's justice was constantly exposed to pressure, the constitution's security was periodically stopped, and the Supreme Court was forced to swear to the new system. It was repeatedly purged in 1946, 1955, 1966, 1973, and 1976. In the latter, all court judges were dismissed. Footnote 117

F. The U.S. Court-Packing Debate: Lessons for the World

In its history, the court had a flash of rebellion and claims, but in the past it was generally difficult to suppress administrative governments and exercise consistent authority against constitutional order. I was careful. In 1981, Fine Rider concluded: "Despite an example of a judicial right in Argentina, the Court in Argentina is almost unrelated to maintaining military power and authority. It seems that it seems to have followed the pattern of claiming the authority. "Peis Forto 118 Ociel claims that it is too simplified to decide the attitude of the court under the military dictatorship, but it is too simple to decide, but hits 119 military. Under the administration, the court was truly inconvenient for the military government, albeit irrelevant. The administration has appointed a person who has not been regularly interfered with the court, but is known that the administration does not want to disagree with military policies. Footnote 120 Supreme Court had a modest importance in the political system and was relatively independent from 1853 to 1930. Footnote 115 The court, established under the tradition of the liberal constitution, underestimated the power of constitutional screening in the 1880s. Footnote 116

I. What is the Reform Context?

In its history, the court had a flash of rebellion and claims, but in the past it was generally difficult to suppress administrative governments and exercise consistent authority against constitutional order. I was careful. In 1981, Fine Rider concluded: "Despite an example of a judicial right in Argentina, the Court in Argentina is almost unrelated to maintaining military power and authority. It seems that it seems to have followed the pattern of claiming the authority. "Peis Forto 118 Ociel claims that it is too simplified to decide the attitude of the court under the military dictatorship, but it is too simple to decide, but hits 119 military. Under the administration, the court was truly inconvenient for the military government, albeit irrelevant. The administration has appointed a person who has not been regularly interfered with the court, but is known that the administration does not want to disagree with military policies. The footnote 120 Supreme Court had a modest importance in the political system, relatively independent from 1853 to 1930. Footnote 115 The court, established under the tradition of the liberal constitution, underestimated the power of constitutional screening in the 1880s. Footnote 116

However, in the 20th century, the court became increasingly involved in the distortion of Argentina politics, and the typical government was a legitimate government by making a resolution (Acordadas) that recognized as constitutional in exchange for the pledge. It was a realistic development of giving. To respect the constitution. This approach has never been successful. The military leaders broke the constitution, and the court proved that they could not control them. In the constant political turmoil of the 20th century, the independence of Argentina's judiciary was constantly exposed to pressure, the constitution's security was periodically stopped, and the Supreme Court was forced to swear to the new system. It was repeatedly purged in 1946, 1955, 1966, 1973, and 1976. In the latter, all court judges were dismissed. Footnote 117

II. What is the Articulated Purpose?

Thus, the Supreme Court collapsed in the new era of electoral democracy in 1983, yawning, timid, and sadly single. The Court gained little from the return to democratic rule. The absence of a direct constitutional process provided little real opportunity for renewal within the original democratization process, nor were real reforms pursued through ordinary legislation. Unlike the Supreme Courts of neighboring countries, the Court was not formally strengthened in its constitutional status or powers, nor were its judicial powers reformed. The Court remained a supreme court of general jurisdiction, functioning as the final court of appeal and as the final judicial authority in constitutional interpretation.

As the transition to electoral democracy was swift after the collapse of the military junta, a central effort by the Alfonsin government to make the Court fit for purpose in the new democratic climate was to purge its members. Important for present purposes, this was not done through an open and inclusive process that could have fully articulated the necessity and democratic legitimacy of such exceptional measures, although it was done with significant diplomatic support and non-executive participation. Instead, once Alfonsin's plan to abolish the judges by decree became public, it was carried out by the resignation of the judges, an unusual case of "evacuation" of the court in the analytical framework of Corsage and that of Corsage and Siprova. Footnote 121 As Rebecca Bill Chavez has pointed out, President Alfonsin could have emphasized the new regime's commitment to the primacy of the constitution by using a formal challenge procedure that was once justified on democratic grounds, as the court had been seated under the military dictatorship. But he instead opted for more informal means, "reinforcing the informal practices" that had undermined judicial autonomy since Perón's first term in the 1930s. Footnote 122

III. What are the Reform Options?

Despite the suspicious means, cleanup initially shifted to a more dynamic court, including some legal "stars." The first Supreme Court, which was operated after the election returned to democracy and the purge by Alfonsin, appears to have a completely different character than his predecessor. In a short period of about six years, we submitted several important rulings, weakened the impact of legal systems, and advanced on basic rights and social issues-To a nation that the military government valued In contrast to the evaluation of and Catholic's legitimacy, he took a strong position in general. This literature converges to some important rulings of the court: supports the constitutional procedure security that stipulates the freedom of the press, the refusal right of the press, the veto, search, seizure, confession, and exclusion provisions. 。

IV. What Might a Justifiably Democratic Reform Process Look like?

By execution of the oppressive existence of the state in both the public and private regions, and the advantage of democratic laws, the court is comparable to the Turkish Constitution Court afte r-2012-. -It seemed to blow life into the new democratic foundation described above. The constitution's promises and guarantees were thoroughly implemented, and as a result, the character of the Argentine state was gradually redefined in a democratic image. For the first time in more than 50 years, ful l-fledged measures were taken at the judicial level to make the constitution stronger and to make the constitution, which had been hollowed, to be real and meaning. Despite the suspicious means, cleanup initially shifted to a more dynamic court, including some legal "stars." The first Supreme Court, which was operated after the election returned to democracy and the purge by Alfonsin, appears to have a completely different character than his predecessor. In a short period of about six years, we submitted several important rulings, weakened the impact of legal systems, and advanced on basic rights and social issues-To a nation that the military government valued In contrast to the evaluation of and Catholic's legitimacy, he took a strong position in general. This literature converges to some important rulings of the court: supports the constitutional procedure security that stipulates the freedom of the press, the refusal right of the press, the veto, search, seizure, confession, and exclusion provisions. 。

By execution of the oppressive existence of the state in both the public and private regions, and the advantage of democratic laws, the court is comparable to the Turkish Constitution Court afte r-2012-. -It seemed to blow life into the new democratic foundation described above. The constitution's promises and guarantees were thoroughly implemented, and as a result, the character of the Argentine state was gradually redefined in a democratic image. For the first time in more than 50 years, ful l-fledged measures were taken at the judicial level to make the constitution stronger and to make the constitution, which had been hollowed, to be real and meaning. Despite the suspicious means, cleanup initially shifted to a more dynamic court, including some legal "stars." The first Supreme Court, which was operated after the election returned to democracy and the purge by Alfonsin, appears to have a completely different character than his predecessor. In a short period of about six years, we submitted several important rulings, weakened the impact of legal systems, and advanced on basic rights and social issues-To a nation that the military government valued In contrast to the evaluation of and Catholic's legitimacy, he took a strong position in general. This literature converges to some important rulings of the court: supports the constitutional procedure security that stipulates the freedom of the press, the refusal right of the press, the veto, search, seizure, confession, and exclusion provisions. 。

These rulings were in line with the government's policy under President Alfonsin. Paynote 124 However, the court took a unique position to balance the three rights. For example, Zappa, which was in the midst of the financial crisis, completely rejected the administrative claim that "financial emergency" could reduce retirement support without the approval of Congress. Footnote 125 This can be regarded as a decision to strengthen democracy in the following three points: Tends to strengthen existing authority distribution in the Constitutional Article. In difficult situations, the challenge of the lon g-standing government to bypass the legislature has moved in a direction to cut off the old order. In addition, by taking an independent position, the court claims the original role of the constitution's scheme and participates in the "system construction."

V. How to Mitigate the Repetition Risk?

Probably more important is that the court refused to work on transitional justice. The most important thing is that despite the enthusiastic atmosphere after the Juntas trial between 1986 and 1987, the story of the coup has come back again, and Alfoncin has been excited to relieve the fear of the undercuts of the lower class. Nevertheless, the court has refused to provide a legal interpretation of legal submitted laws to dispose of the subfonsine, which was expected by Alfonsin.

In the groundbreaking ruling of the Camp case (footnote 126), who was charged with torture to political criminals when General Camp Ramon was a Police Director of Buenos Aires, the court was a legitimate obedience. He affirmed the law and ordered three defendants in December 1986 to release the three defendants. In the basics of the principle of the separation of rights, the court shows a strong reluctance in reviewing the constitutional nature of the amnesty given by the political agency, and the parliament has the authority to pursue the policy. The federal parliament, which emphasized, has the authority to pursue policy purposes in a reasonable way, and said, "In some cases, other values and solutions are more desirable than those that have been embodied in this law. It is the authority of the Federal Congress, not the court, who decides the path to pursue in the situation. " Footnote 127 These rulings were in line with the government's policy under President Alfonsin. Paynote 124, however, the court took a unique position to balance the three rights. For example, Zappa, which was in the midst of the financial crisis, completely rejected the administrative claim that "financial emergency" could reduce retirement support without the approval of Congress. Footnote 125 This can be regarded as a decision to strengthen democracy in the following three points: Tends to strengthen existing authority distribution in the Constitutional Article. In difficult situations, the challenge of the lon g-standing government to bypass the legislature has moved in a direction to cut off the old order. In addition, by taking an independent position, the court claims the original role of the constitution's scheme and participates in the "system construction."

In the groundbreaking ruling of the Camp case (footnote 126), who was charged with torture to political criminals when General Camp Ramon was a Police Director of Buenos Aires, the court was a legitimate obedience. He affirmed the law and ordered three defendants in December 1986 to release the three defendants. In the ruling basically based on the principles of the separation of rights, the court shows a strong reluctance to review the constitutional nature of amnesty given by the political agency, and the parliament has the authority to pursue the policy. The federal parliament, which emphasized, has the authority to pursue policy purposes in a reasonable way, and said, "In some cases, other values and solutions are more desirable than those that have been embodied in this law. It is the authority of the Federal Congress, not the court, who decides the path to pursue in the situation. " Footnote 127 These rulings were in line with the government's policy under President Alfonsin. Payniling 124 However, the court took a unique position to balance the three rights. For example, Zappa, which was in the midst of the financial crisis, completely rejected the administrative claim that "financial emergency" could reduce retirement support without the approval of Congress. Footnote 125 This can be regarded as a decision to strengthen democracy in the following three points: Tends to strengthen existing authority distribution in the Constitutional Article. In difficult situations, the challenge of the lon g-standing government to bypass the legislature has moved in a direction to cut off the old order. In addition, by taking an independent position, the court claims the original role of the constitution's scheme and participates in the "system construction."

Judge Bakue has a strong argument that it is not a constitution, because the law, which has been opposed by himself, gives signpards to serious crimes that cannot be classified as general crimes or political crimes. did. Note 128) However, the attitude hardly affected the majority, and the court claimed the advantage of the International Convention on Domestic Law, in the ruling of the torture accused of Rafo, Jose Antonio and others in 1988. Then he refused to destroy the obedience again. The court claimed that they had the same position in the constitutional order, and Judge Bakue was once opposed to it. Footnote 129

By the end of the term of President Alfonsin, his liquidation by the Supreme Court seemed to be justified. The court had begun to open up the real independence and sel f-government area with the clear intentions to incorporate the constitutional promises into the Argentine society and politics itself.

G. Conclusion: Global Challenges of Democratic Restoration and Constitutional Repair

Under President Menem, the unreasonable struggle in court has occurred, and this development has stopped. Menem, who won the 1989 presidential election, did not spend his time sending a proposal to add four judges to the court in 1990 and increase the number of judges from five to nine. Unlike the Purperson in the Alfonsin administration, Menem was the goal of realizing a court that was not contaminated by military administration's experience, and there was no extensive legitimacy to change the court members. Menem stated frankly: "Why do I have to be the only president who didn't have their own court in the last 50 years?" In the case, the updraft could not be stopped. Judge 132 Bakue is a constitutional because it gives a serious crime that cannot be classified as general crimes or political crimes, and is a constitutional law. I strongly claimed that there was no. Note 128) However, the attitude hardly affected the majority, and the court claimed the advantage of the International Convention on Domestic Law, in the ruling of the torture accused of Rafo, Jose Antonio and others in 1988. Then he refused to destroy the obedience again. The court claimed that they had the same position in the constitutional order, and Judge Bakue was once opposed to it. Footnote 129

Footnotes

Under President Menem, the unreasonable struggle in court has occurred, and this development has stopped. Menem, who won the 1989 presidential election, did not spend his time sending a proposal to add four judges to the court in 1990 and increase the number of judges from five to nine. Unlike the Purperson in the Alfonsin administration, Menem was the goal of realizing a court that was not contaminated by military administration's experience, and there was no extensive legitimacy to change the court members. Menem stated frankly: "Why do I have to be the only president who didn't have their own court in the last 50 years?" In the case, the updraft could not be stopped. Footnote 132 Bakue, Bakue, expresses his opposition alone, and is a constitutional law, which is a constitutional, because it gives a complement to serious crimes that cannot be classified as general crimes or political crimes. I strongly claimed. Note 128) However, the attitude hardly affected the majority, and the court claimed the advantage of the International Convention on Domestic Law, in the ruling of the torture accused of Rafo, Jose Antonio and others in 1988. Then he refused to destroy the obedience again. The court claimed that they had the same position in the constitutional order, and Judge Bakue was once opposed to it. Footnote 129

Elim Poon - Journalist, Creative Writer

Last modified: 27.08.2024

We are increasingly confronted by a pressing question: how can a constitutional democracy be repaired after being deeply degraded, but not ended. Daly T. G., “Good” Court‐Packing? The Paradoxes of Constitutional Repair in Contexts of Democratic Decay, German Law Journal, № 23, с. lcusoccer.org However, the debate raises fundamental questions for comparative constitutional lawyers regarding the paradoxes of democratic restoration in.

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