JRFM Free Full-Text Troubles with the Chf Loans in Croatia The Story of a Case Still Waiting to Be
Troubles with the Chf Loans in Croatia: The Story of a Case Still Waiting to Be Closed
In many Central and Eastern European countries (CEE), the global financial crisis and the sluggish Swiss franc (CHF) against euro exchange rates worsened the repayment of households due to exceptional CH F-built debt. In Croatia, CHF loans were mainly approved as a mortgage loan for unprotected, unprotected, unprotected, unprotected, unprotected, unprotected, unprotected, unprotected, unprotected household borrowers. The purpose of this paper is the reason behind the credit boom of the loan, as a result, the difficulties of sustainable Switzerland debt facing the household division, and how to solve it by focusing the Croatian bank sector. To clarify. Croatian CHF cases have several specialty about the transfer of loans loaned by the government and the government, but the knowledge of the CHF credit boom supply and demand is the systemic risk and financial stability. It is useful to observe the universal threats of the exotic currency link loan early and minimize negative external properties due to potential debt relief measures. Based on the description statistics and singl e-rate statistics implemented in.
In many keywords < SPAN> Central E-E -European countries (CEE), the global financial crisis and the sluggish Swiss franc (CHF) against euro have worsened the repayment of households due to exceptional CH F-built debts. 。 In Croatia, CHF loans were mainly approved as a mortgage loan for unprotected, unprotected, unprotected, unprotected, unprotected, unprotected, unprotected, unprotected, unprotected household borrowers. The purpose of this paper is the reason behind the credit boom of the loan, as a result, the difficulties of sustainable Switzerland debt facing the household division, and how to solve it by focusing the Croatian bank sector. To clarify. Croatian CHF cases have several specialty about the transfer of loans loaned by the government and the government, but the knowledge of the CHF credit boom supply and demand is the systemic risk and financial stability. It is useful to observe the universal threats of the exotic currency link loan early and minimize negative external properties due to potential debt relief measures. Based on the description statistics and singl e-rate statistics implemented in.1. Introduction
Keywords In many Middle East European countries (CEE), the global financial crisis and the sluggish Swiss franc (CHF) vs. European exchange rates have worsened the repayment of households due to exceptional CH F-built debt. In Croatia, CHF loans were mainly approved as a mortgage loan for unprotected, unprotected, unprotected, unprotected, unprotected, unprotected, unprotected, unprotected, unprotected household borrowers. The purpose of this paper is the reason behind the credit boom of the loan, as a result, the difficulties of sustainable Switzerland debt facing the household division, and how to solve it by focusing the Croatian bank sector. To clarify. Croatian CHF cases have several specialty about the transfer of loans loaned by the government and the government, but the knowledge of the CHF credit boom supply and demand is the systemic risk and financial stability. It is useful to observe the universal threats of the exotic currency link loan early and minimize negative external properties due to potential debt relief measures. Based on the description statistics and singl e-rate statistics implemented in.
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Since Croatian bank sectors have a large number of no n-defective loans (hereinafter referred to as CHF loans) in Switzerland Fran, the foreign exchange (FX) provisions (that is, the FX interlocked loan) and management interest rates are economical and legal. , It has been recognized as a social and political issue. A general retail bank that approves loans with an option to unilaterally change interest rates (without clear market reference) with FX clause, known as management interest rates or discretion interest rates Until the beginning, it was not socially or academic. The rare domestic literature on this topic before the Swiss Fran debt crisis has supported this (đeno et al., 2009; Francišković 2011; koški 2012). On the other hand, many articles on the problem of loan dollar / euro exploitation have worked as a warning about what can occur in the case of an unprotected borrower, banking department, and economic economy in the case of exchange rate (FX rate) evaluation (Beer). et al. After the CHF/EUR exchange rate was not exempted in January 2015, many European emerging housing CHF borrower CHF mortgage repayments became more complicated, and later governmen t-supported loan conversion programs. Since it was normally introduced, the Forex Forex (that is, FX) claims (that is, FX) has since been a large number of no n-Swis s-franced defective claims (CHF loans) in Croatian bank sectors. Loans) have been recognized as a management interest rate or discretionary interest rate, which has been recognized as economic, legal, social, and political issues. A general retail bank, which has a gradual option, has not been academic or academic before 20101. The rare domestic documents of this topic are backed by this (đeno et al., 2009; Francišković 2011; (FX rate) In the case of evaluation, it functioned as a warning about what could happen in the defenseless borrower, banking department, and economic as a whole (Beer et al. After the Chf/EUR exchange rate was exempted in January 2015 Many European emerging housing CHF borrowers have become more complicated, and since then, the Legal Croatia's bank sector has been introduced in Switzerland. Since a large amount of bad debts (hereinafter referred to as CHF loans) occurred, the foreign exchange (FX) clause (that is, F X-linked loan) and management interest rates are recognized as economic, legal, social, and political issues. It has been done with the management interest rate or a discretionary interest rate, and with an FX clause (without clear market reference), a general business line of retail banks that gradually approve the loan. Until the early 20101, this rare domestic literature on the Swiss franc debt crisis has not been noticed in socially or academic (đeno et al. 2009; Francišković 2011; koški 2012). On the other hand, many articles on the problem of loan dollar / euro exploitation have worked as a warning about what can occur in the case of an unprotected borrower, banking department, and economic economy in the case of exchange rate (FX rate) evaluation (Beer). et al. After the CHF/EUR exchange rate was not exempted in January 2015, many European emerging housing CHF borrower CHF mortgage repayments became more complicated, and later governmen t-supported loan conversion programs. It was usually introduced.
This is especially true if the analysis of the development problem and the Swiss franc loan problem is handled from different angles.
This article aims to fill the Gap of the Literature on the Swiss Fran controversy in Croatian Republic. More precisely, we provide insigh t-filled explanations for the three stages that make up episodes of the Swiss Fran debt crisis. First, we will deal with the phases of risk accumulation and take up the Swiss Franc Credit Boom suppl y-based factors. Second, credit default risks, clarifying the views of economic experts on CHF cases and shining light on the behavior of Croatian citizens to protect the interests of CHF, a consumer with financial debt. ・ Present the boom facts. Finally, we have an overview of measures that are being implemented to solve the sustainable CHF debt of many debtor throughout Croatia, and advocate people who could first prevent the epidemic of the CHF debt crisis. 。
2. Literature Review
2.1. Croatian Banking Market—A Look at the Severity of CHF Loans Issues
Croatia has a specialty related to foreign exchange margin trading in major currency Swiss francs, but many other Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, especially Hungary and Poland, are facing similar problems. This article is a wide and interesting international reader. Interestingly, in early 2007, the global receivables displayed in Switzerland, Switzerland, which have contributed to their budget, reached $ 678 billion, almost twice the estimated GDP in Switzerland in 2006 (Beer et Al. In this way, this paper is added to the general knowledge of the cause and results of the household budget in many bank categories. It also highlights that foreign currency risk is an important financial stability issue for many economy and economy around the world. < SPAN> Especially if the development problem and the analysis of the Swiss franc loan problem are handled from different angles.
The article aims to fill the Gap of the Literature on the Swiss Franc controversy in the Croatian Republic. More precisely, we provide insigh t-filled explanations for the three stages that make up episodes of the Swiss Fran debt crisis. First, we will deal with the phases of risk accumulation and take up the Swiss Franc Credit Boom suppl y-based factors. Second, credit default risks, clarifying the views of economic experts on CHF cases and shining light on the behavior of Croatian citizens to protect the interests of CHF, a consumer with financial debt. ・ Present the boom facts. Finally, we have an overview of measures that are being implemented to solve the sustainable CHF debt of many debtor throughout Croatia, and advocate people who could first prevent the epidemic of the CHF debt crisis. 。
Croatia has a specialty related to foreign exchange margin trading in major currency Swiss francs, but many other Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, especially Hungary and Poland, are facing similar problems. This article is a wide and interesting international reader. Interestingly, in early 2007, the global receivables displayed in Switzerland, Switzerland, which have contributed to their budget, reached $ 678 billion, almost twice the estimated GDP in Switzerland in 2006 (Beer et Al. In this way, this paper is added to the general knowledge of the cause and results of the household budget in many bank categories. It also highlights that foreign currency credit risk is an important financial stability issue for many economy and economy around the world. This is especially true if the analysis of the development problem and the Swiss franc loan problem is handled from different angles.
This article aims to fill the Gap of the Literature on the Swiss Fran controversy in Croatian Republic. More precisely, we provide insigh t-filled explanations for the three stages that make up episodes of the Swiss Fran debt crisis. First, we will deal with the phases of risk accumulation and take up the Swiss Franc Credit Boom suppl y-based factors. Second, credit default risks, clarifying the views of economic experts on CHF cases and shining light on the behavior of Croatian citizens to protect the interests of CHF, a consumer with financial debt. ・ Present the boom facts. Finally, we have an overview of measures that are being implemented to solve the sustainable CHF debt of many debtor throughout Croatia, and advocate people who could first prevent the epidemic of the CHF debt crisis. 。
Croatia has a specialty related to foreign exchange margin trading in major currency Swiss francs, but many other Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, especially Hungary and Poland, are facing similar problems. This article is a wide and interesting international reader. Interestingly, in early 2007, the global receivables displayed in Switzerland, Switzerland, which have contributed to their budget, reached $ 678 billion, almost twice the estimated GDP in Switzerland in 2006 (Beer et Al. In this way, this paper is added to the general knowledge of the cause and results of the household budget in many bank categories. It also highlights that foreign currency credit risk is an important financial stability issue for many economy and economy around the world.
The empirical part of the study includes descriptive and univariate statistics, a case study approach, and a questionnaire survey. Descriptive and univariate statistics on exchange rates and interest rates from Bloomberg and the Croatian National Bank (CNB) were used to explore the main reasons behind the expansion of Swiss franc loans in Croatia. Avoidance of currency mismatches, banks' constraints on exchange rate risk, and interest rate differentials were analyzed as potential supply-side factors for the CHF lending boom, while on the demand side, transfer trade behavior was the main argument for accepting such loans. After addressing the supply and demand sides of CHF lending history, the results of a questionnaire survey on the CHF case conducted among Croatian economic experts from academia were revealed. Most of them agreed that exchange clauses (or exchange-linked loans) should be abolished as they overprotect banks and transfer exchange rate risk to unprotected borrowers, while they considered administered interest rates to be a serious threat to the protection of financial consumers. Regardless of the recognition of the unfair banking practice of market risk management, market risk makes banks overprotected.
2.2. Related Studies
However, it is recognized as the limit of the survey that the number of respondents is small and that only the economic experts in the academic world are included. Therefore, no advanced statistical data analysis other than description statistics was performed.
The remaining part of this paper is composed as follows. In the second section, the literature on the decision of foreign currency loans in Central and Eastern European countries will be summarized to confirm the seriousness of the Swiss franc loan in the Croatian bank market. Section 3 shows Croatia's empirical evidence on the theme of this paper. Discussed factors that affect the supply and demands of foreign currenc y-linked loans in Croatian bank sector, then clarified their opinions on issues related to the CHF case, and finally were taken to solve the CHF debt crisis. In summary of measures. Section 4 emphasizes the lessons to learn so that similar cases will not occur in the future, and will give a final feeling in the last section.
The Swiss franced loan can be called a hig h-risk loan of Croatia (other European emerging countries), and has no confidence in the loan (eur o-built loan) linked to the euro. Approved by the borrower of the household budget. In particular, the Swiss Franc Croatia Kuna (CHF/HRK) was at the historic and low volatility, but the Swiss Fran Loan was built in the early stages of credit. It was more affordable than the loan (đeno et al.
However, Croatia's retail bank uses a foreign exchange clause and a management interest rate (one that can be unilaterally changed by bank management) without having a transparency or market benchmark, has no appropriate protection of the borrower rights. Due to the permission, the market risk of the loan has completely relocated to a borrower with a lo w-financing bank with a low financial literacy. The CHF/HRK exchange rate became unstable in 2009 and turned up to rise (Figure 1). In addition, the bank has raised the management interest rate in several cases to compensate for the loss of the already impaired CHF loan, deepened the risk of default as a whole, and worsened borrower repayment issues. The global financial crisis spread to the underdeveloped Croatian economy, the economic recession began, and the rise in unemployment rates has resulted in oil on fire. < SPAN> However, it is recognized as the limit of the survey that the number of respondents is small and that only the economic experts in the academic world are included. Therefore, no advanced statistical data analysis other than description statistics was performed.
The remaining part of this paper is composed as follows. In the second section, the literature on the decision of foreign currency loans in Central and Eastern European countries will be summarized to confirm the seriousness of the Swiss franc loan in the Croatian bank market. Section 3 shows Croatia's empirical evidence on the theme of this paper. Discussed factors that affect the supply and demands of foreign currenc y-linked loans in Croatian bank sector, then clarified their opinions on issues related to the CHF case, and finally were taken to solve the CHF debt crisis. In summary of measures. Section 4 emphasizes the lessons to learn so that similar cases will not occur in the future, and will give a final feeling in the last section.
3. Empirical Evidence for Croatia
The Swiss franced loan can be called a hig h-risk loan of Croatia (other European emerging countries), and has no confidence in the loan (eur o-built loan) linked to the euro. Approved by the borrower of the household budget. In particular, the Swiss Franc Croatia Kuna (CHF/HRK) was at the historic and low volatility, but the Swiss Fran Loan was built in the early stages of credit. It was more affordable than the loan (đeno et al.
However, Croatia's retail bank uses a foreign exchange clause and a management interest rate (one that can be unilaterally changed by bank management) without having a transparency or market benchmark, has no appropriate protection of the borrower rights. Due to the permission, the market risk of the loan has completely relocated to a borrower with a lo w-financing bank with a low financial literacy. The CHF/HRK exchange rate became unstable in 2009 and turned up to rise (Figure 1). In addition, the bank has raised the management interest rate in several cases to compensate for the loss of the already impaired CHF loan, deepened the risk of default as a whole, and worsened borrower repayment issues. The global financial crisis spread to the underdeveloped Croatian economy, the economic recession began, and the rise in unemployment rates has resulted in oil on fire. However, it is recognized as the limit of the survey that the number of respondents is small and that only the economic experts in the academic world are included. Therefore, no advanced statistical data analysis other than description statistics was performed.
The remaining part of this paper is composed as follows. In the second section, the literature on the decision of foreign currency loans in Central and Eastern European countries will be summarized to confirm the seriousness of the Swiss franc loan in the Croatian bank market. Section 3 shows Croatia's empirical evidence on the theme of this paper. Discussed factors that affect the supply and demands of foreign currenc y-linked loans in Croatian bank sector, then clarified their opinions on issues related to the CHF case, and finally were taken to solve the CHF debt crisis. In summary of measures. Section 4 emphasizes the lessons to learn so that similar cases will not occur in the future, and will give a final feeling in the last section.The Swiss franced loan can be called a hig h-risk loan of Croatia (other European emerging countries), and has no confidence in the loan (eur o-built loan) linked to the euro. Approved by the borrower of the household budget. In particular, the Swiss Franc Croatia Kuna (CHF/HRK) was at the historic and low volatility, but the Swiss Fran Loan was built in the early stages of credit. It was more affordable than the loan (đeno et al.
However, Croatia's retail bank uses a foreign exchange clause and a management interest rate (one that can be unilaterally changed by bank management) without having a transparency or market benchmark, has no appropriate protection of the borrower rights. Due to the permission, the market risk of the loan has completely relocated to a borrower with a lo w-financing bank with a low financial literacy. The CHF/HRK exchange rate became unstable in 2009 and turned up to rise (Figure 1). In addition, the bank has raised the management interest rate in several cases to compensate for the loss of the already impaired CHF loan, deepened the risk of default as a whole, and worsened borrower repayment issues. The global financial crisis spread to the underdeveloped Croatian economy, the economic recession began, and the rise in unemployment rates has resulted in oil on fire.The entire CHF loan case and the debt crisis were particularly suffering. Most of these loans were mortgages, and teachers who did not fall into debt defaults lost their homes. Approximately 90 % of the loan balance with CHF FX clause from 2010 to 2013 was approved by households, and 90 % of these CHF loans were mortgages. CHF mortgages accounted for 40 % from 2010 to 2014, contributing to small mortgages (CNB, official website).
3.1. Supply-Driven Factors of FX Loans Acceptance
According to Table 2, CHF mortgages in 2010 were about twice as much as the euro mortgage, and the bad loans (NPLS) reached 3%of the Euro mortgage, but at the same time 5, 73%for CHF mortgages. Recorded. Swiss franced mortgages continued to increase to 12, 36%in 2013, dramatically increased in mi d-2016, and more than 63%of Swiss Franc mortgages became bad claims. Ta. To show the size of this problem, in the middle of 2016, 6, 74 % of the CHF mortgage loan became a bad claim, which was more than nine times that of the CHF mortgage.
During this time, considering that the monthly CHF loan repayment of the household division increased by about 220 euros (Rodik 2015), the rapid deterioration of the CHF loan was expected. Obviously, the CHF debt crisis could only be solved by the Croatian government intervention. In other words, the ant i-banking activities of Croatian citizens, which were organized through the Frank Association (NGO), have developed legal procedures for eight major banks and foreign banks that provided CHF loans in Croatia between 2004 and 2008. On the other hand, Croatia Central Bank remained inactive in the role of protecting financial consumers.
Since many other countries in Croatia faced the same CHF loan repayment crisis, why the loan provider and borrower accepted this kind of loan, in general, why did they accept FX loans? I have a question. The following bars summarize the main reasons behind these actions in the background literature. < SPAN> CHF loan incident and the occurrence of debt crisis were particularly suffering. Most of these loans were mortgages, and teachers who did not fall into debt defaults lost their homes. Approximately 90 % of the loan balance with CHF FX clause from 2010 to 2013 was approved by households, and 90 % of these CHF loans were mortgages. CHF mortgages accounted for 40 % from 2010 to 2014, contributing to small mortgages (CNB, official website).
According to Table 2, CHF mortgages in 2010 were about twice as much as the euro mortgage, and the bad loans (NPLS) reached 3%of the Euro mortgage, but at the same time 5, 73%for CHF mortgages. Recorded. Swiss franced mortgages continued to increase to 12, 36%in 2013, dramatically increased in mi d-2016, and more than 63%of Swiss Franc mortgages became bad claims. Ta. To show the size of this problem, in the middle of 2016, 6, 74 % of the CHF mortgage loan became a bad claim, which was more than nine times that of the CHF mortgage.
During this time, considering that the monthly CHF loan repayment of the household division increased by about 220 euros (Rodik 2015), the rapid deterioration of the CHF loan was expected. Obviously, the CHF debt crisis could only be solved by the Croatian government intervention. In other words, the ant i-banking activities of Croatian citizens, which were organized through the Frank Association (NGO), have developed legal procedures for eight major banks and foreign banks that provided CHF loans in Croatia between 2004 and 2008. On the other hand, Croatia Central Bank remained inactive in the role of protecting financial consumers.
Since many other countries in Croatia faced the same CHF loan repayment crisis, why the loan provider and borrower accepted this kind of loan, in general, why did they accept FX loans? I have a question. The following bars summarize the main reasons behind these actions in the background literature. The entire CHF loan case and the debt crisis were particularly suffering. Most of these loans were mortgages, and teachers who did not fall into debt defaults lost their homes. Approximately 90 % of the loan balance with CHF FX clause from 2010 to 2013 was approved by households, and 90 % of these CHF loans were mortgages. CHF mortgages accounted for 40 % from 2010 to 2014, contributing to small mortgages (CNB, official website).According to Table 2, CHF mortgages in 2010 were about twice as much as the euro mortgage, and the bad loans (NPLS) reached 3%of the Euro mortgage, but at the same time 5, 73%for CHF mortgages. Recorded. Swiss franced mortgages continued to increase to 12, 36%in 2013, dramatically increased in mi d-2016, and more than 63%of Swiss Franc mortgages became bad claims. Ta. To show the size of this problem, in the middle of 2016, 6, 74 % of the CHF mortgage loan became a bad claim, which was more than nine times that of the CHF mortgage.
During this time, considering that the monthly CHF loan repayment of the household division increased by about 220 euros (Rodik 2015), the rapid deterioration of the CHF loan was expected. Obviously, the CHF debt crisis could only be solved by the Croatian government intervention. In other words, the ant i-banking activities of Croatian citizens, which were organized through the Frank Association (NGO), have developed legal procedures for eight major banks and foreign banks that provided CHF loans in Croatia between 2004 and 2008. On the other hand, Croatia Central Bank remained inactive in the role of protecting financial consumers.Since many other countries in Croatia faced the same CHF loan repayment crisis, why the loan provider and borrower accepted this kind of loan, in general, why did they accept FX loans? I have a question. The following bars summarize the main reasons behind these actions in the background literature.
The growing trends for specific bank products, as in other products, are the same in demand and supply. In this way, the steep length of FX loans in the bank market is the logical profitability of the bank's management structure on the supply side, and the possibility and value of such a loan on the demand side. Table 3's factors on the supply side and the supply demand side that accepts FX loans, led by household budget. Here, enough data to support Croatian cases is shown. It is expected that there will be some interaction between these factors. The growing conjugation of bread specific bank products, like other products, is demand and at the same time. In this way, the steep growth of FX loans in the bank market is the result of logical profitability due to the bank's management structure on the supply side, and on the demand side due to the possibility of obtaining such a loan and a sense of value. be. Table 3's factors on the supply side and the supply demand side that accepts FX loans, led by household budget. Here, enough data to support Croatian cases is shown. It is expected that there will be some interaction between these factors. The growing tendency for specific bank products is the same as other products, as well as demand and supply. In this way, the steep length of FX loans in the bank market is the logical profitability of the bank's management structure on the supply side, and the possibility and value of such a loan on the demand side. Table 3's factors on the supply side and the supply demand side that accepts FX loans, led by household budget. Here, enough data to support Croatian cases is shown. It is expected that there will be some interaction between these factors. The growing conjugation of bread specific bank products, like other products, is demand and at the same time. In this way, the steep growth of FX loans in the bank market is the result of logical profitability due to the bank's management structure on the supply side, and on the demand side due to the possibility of obtaining such a loan and a sense of value. be. Table 3's factors on the supply side and the supply demand side that accepts FX loans, led by household budget. Here, enough data to support Croatian cases is shown. It is expected that there will be some interaction between these factors. Increased tendency for specific bank products, as in other products, is the same in demand and supply. In this way, the steep length of FX loans in the bank market is the logical profitability of the bank's management structure on the supply side, and the possibility and value of such a loan on the demand side. Table 3's factors on the supply side and the supply demand side that accepts FX loans, led by household budget. Here, enough data to support Croatian cases is shown. It is expected that there will be some interaction between these factors. The growing conjugation of bread specific bank products, like other products, is demand and at the same time. In this way, the steep growth of FX loans in the bank market is the result of logical profitability due to the bank's management structure on the supply side, and on the demand side due to the possibility of obtaining such a loan and a sense of value. be. Table 3's factors on the supply side and the supply demand side that accepts FX loans, led by household budget. Here, enough data to support Croatian cases is shown. It is expected that there will be some interaction between these factors. increase
3.2. Demand-Driven Factors of FX Loans Acceptance
First of all, the FX lending boom in Central and Eastern European countries has spread that retail banks, especially foreig n-affiliated banks, have been fully involved in the proof of the parent bank cros s-border funding. The fact that the equal sales funding provided by the pr o-banks can be used and affordable, supports the rapid credit growth of subsidiaries in the indifferent and undeveloped emerging bank market, which is often low in Japan. It is considered. Contrary to this view, Brown and de Haas (2012), based on empirical estimates for 20 European emerging countries between 2001 and 2004, rather than FX loan decisions, but rather, rather. He concludes that it is an effect. In other words, in addition to the standard debate of foreign banks and interest gates, FX lending can be caused by the currency mismatch on the bank balance sheet. For example, according to the Calculation of Bank Swiss Fran Exposure by YEşin (2013), in the period from 2007 to 2011, 13 European bank sectors have a ne t-free Swiss franc, less than 5 % of total assets. It was. In other words, the ris k-shift behavior of bank borrowers by lending FX plays a role in balancing the currency mismatch of the asset. < SPAN> First, it is spread that the FX lending boom in Central and Eastern European countries has been fully involved in retail banks, especially foreig n-affiliated banks, have been fully involved in the pr o-bank's cros s-border funding. The fact that the equal sales funding provided by the pr o-banks can be used and affordable, supports the rapid credit growth of subsidiaries in the indifferent and undeveloped emerging bank market, which is often low in Japan. It is considered. Contrary to this view, Brown and de Haas (2012), based on empirical estimates for 20 European emerging countries between 2001 and 2004, rather than FX loan decisions, but rather, rather. He concludes that it is an effect. In other words, in addition to the standard debate of foreign banks and interest gates, FX lending can be caused by the currency mismatch on the bank balance sheet. For example, according to the Calculation of Bank Swiss Fran Exposure by YEşin (2013), in the period from 2007 to 2011, 13 European bank sectors have a ne t-free Swiss franc, less than 5 % of total assets. It was. In other words, the ris k-shift behavior of bank borrowers by lending FX plays a role in balancing the currency mismatch of the asset. First of all, the FX lending boom in Central and Eastern European countries has spread that retail banks, especially foreig n-affiliated banks, have been fully involved in the proof of the parent bank cros s-border funding. The fact that the equal sales funding provided by the pr o-banks can be used and affordable, supports the rapid credit growth of subsidiaries in the indifferent and undeveloped emerging bank market, which is often low in Japan. It is considered. Contrary to this view, Brown and de Haas (2012), based on empirical estimates for 20 European emerging countries between 2001 and 2004, rather than FX loan decisions, but rather, rather. He concludes that it is an effect. In other words, in addition to the standard debate of foreign banks and interest gates, FX lending can be caused by the currency mismatch on the bank balance sheet. For example, according to the Calculation of Bank Swiss Fran Exposure by YEşin (2013), in the period from 2007 to 2011, 13 European bank sectors have a ne t-free Swiss franc, less than 5 % of total assets. It was. In other words, the risk shift behavior of bank borrowers by lending FX plays a role in balancing asset currency mismatches.
If the reliability of domestic monetary policy is not sufficient, inflation premium allocates the assignment to domestic currency, so the FX loan interest rate is usually lower than the domestic currency interest rate. For this reason, FX loans are attractive not only for borrowers but also for those who make a loan. Banks are working on credit distribution processes as part of the normal credit risk management strategy, and the pricing of credit score is an important factor in credit distribution. Credit prices (simplified the interest rate of approved loans) reflect the current status of the borrower's creditworthiness and determine their future repayment capacity, so that banks prevent excessive credit risk. (Kundid and ErceGovac 2011, P. 66). As a whole, banks maximize the expected returns from the rental activities by avoiding borrowers / projects that require higher interest rates than optimal interest rates (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). Therefore, market risks (exchange risks and interest rates risks), credit risks (through credit prices), and FX loans are expected to reduce regulatory burden imposed on these risks, from the viewpoint of bank management. It will be a choice. < SPAN> If the reliability of domestic monetary policy is not sufficient, inflation and premiums will expand allocation to domestic currency, so FX loan rates are usually lower than domestic currency interest rates. For this reason, FX loans are attractive not only for borrowers but also for those who make a loan. Banks are working on credit distribution processes as part of the normal credit risk management strategy, and the pricing of credit score is an important factor in credit distribution. Credit prices (simplified the interest rate of approved loans) reflect the current status of the borrower's creditworthiness and determine their future repayment capacity, so that banks prevent excessive credit risk. (Kundid and ErceGovac 2011, P. 66). As a whole, banks maximize the expected returns from the rental activities by avoiding borrowers / projects that require higher interest rates than optimal interest rates (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). Therefore, market risks (exchange risks and interest rates risks), credit risks (through credit prices), and FX loans are expected to reduce regulatory burden imposed on these risks, from the viewpoint of bank management. It will be a choice. If the reliability of domestic monetary policy is not sufficient, inflation premium allocates the assignment to domestic currency, so the FX loan interest rate is usually lower than the domestic currency interest rate. For this reason, FX loans are attractive not only for borrowers but also for those who make a loan. Banks are working on credit distribution processes as part of the normal credit risk management strategy, and the pricing of credit score is an important factor in credit distribution. Credit prices (simplified the interest rate of approved loans) reflect the current status of the borrower's creditworthiness and determine their future repayment capacity, so that banks prevent excessive credit risk. (Kundid and ErceGovac 2011, P. 66). As a whole, banks maximize the expected returns from the rental activities by avoiding borrowers / projects that require higher interest rates than optimal interest rates (Stiglitz and Weiss 1981). Therefore, market risks (exchange risks and interest rates risks), credit risks (through credit prices), and FX loans are expected to reduce regulatory burden imposed on these risks, from the viewpoint of bank management. It will be a choice.
On the other hand, the story of the demand side that FX loans are booming tends to be neglected. According to Fidrmuc et al. (2013), analysis of micr o-economic data obtained from adults participating in the Nine Country East is not only recognized that its own currency is unstable, but also in domestic finance. Low trust in institutions and domestic banks has increased household FX loans and savings. However, inflation and expectations for exchange rates did not affect decision making use of foreign exchange loans. Similarly, Brown and de Haas (2012, P. 61) restricted bank sales funding, and by "reliable macro economic policy that encourages deposits to save in their own currency". He pointed out that it is more likely that the widespread recruitment of FX loans will be maintained by emerging nations. Furthermore, it is summarized that the probability of FX loans is required will increase from the viewpoint of hig h-interest difference requirements and low real exchange rates. In other words, the lower the interest rate, the higher the demand for such an interest rate loan. If this applies to FX loans, if the fluctuation rate of the exchange rate is low, even if you are a no n-borrower, you may accept FX loans and choose FX loans rather than more expensive sel f-country currenc y-building loans. do not have. Furthermore, if you have no sufficient disposable income and have no more expensive domestic currency loans, you have no choice but to accept a lower interest rate FX loan if you usually want to avoid rejection. CSAJBók et al. (2010) has concluded the importance of interest rates based on data from 10 EU New League countries from 1999 to 2008. In addition, they showed the low volatility of domestic interest rates and the fact that lon g-term fixed interest rate mortgages in domestic currency are available for small household loans. Interestingly, households in the nine European Union (CEE) recognize that FX loans, a more expensive eur o-built loan, have been more risky due to the declining foreign exchange rate since the global financial crisis. However, it is still said that these loans are contributed from their own currency (Beckmann and Stix 2012). Nevertheless, adopting a FX loan may be a logical and wise choice for households that already have foreign currency assets.
Therefore, the exchange rate is almost or completely hedged (Fidrmuc et al.)
According to the research introduced, the boom of foreign exchange recruitment has also been caused by some kind of relevant nature. Based on the meta analysis approach, Hake et al. (2014) concludes that not only the unstable macro economy, that is, fluctuations in inflation, but also the banking of foreign currency in banks will be lending. In addition, Prudential Office has regularly restricted bank exchange exposers, which is considered to explain the disgust of currency mismatches. However, the use of financial derivatives to hedge foreign exchange risks, as the ownership of the Central Europe bank sector has changed, has become easier to access the international financial market, which can be a bigger range. 。 However, if the law has recognized the foreign exchange clause (contract linked to foreign exchange rates) and the bank regulation is restricted in foreign exchange exposure through weight capital and specific currency products, it will be added by entering a financial derivative. Taking such risks and increasing costs seems to be a less desirable solution from a bank management perspective. This is especially < SPAN>, so the exchange rate is almost completely hedged (Fidrmuc et al.)
3.3. Financial Experts’ Opinions about FX Loans Terms
According to the research introduced, the boom of foreign exchange recruitment has also been caused by some kind of relevant nature. Based on the meta analysis approach, Hake et al. (2014) concludes that not only the unstable macro economy, that is, fluctuations in inflation, but also the banking of foreign currency in banks will be lending. In addition, Prudential Office has regularly restricted bank exchange exposers, which is considered to explain the disgust of currency mismatches. However, the use of financial derivatives to hedge foreign exchange risks, as the ownership of the Central Europe bank sector has changed, has become easier to access the international financial market, which can be a bigger range. 。 However, if the law has recognized the foreign exchange clause (contract linked to foreign exchange rates) and the bank regulation is restricted in foreign exchange exposure through weight capital and specific currency products, it will be added by entering a financial derivative. Taking such risks and increasing costs seems to be a less desirable solution from a bank management perspective. This is because the exchange rate is almost completely hedged (Fidrmuc et al.)
According to the research introduced, the boom of foreign exchange recruitment has also been caused by some kind of relevant nature. Based on the meta analysis approach, Hake et al. (2014) concludes that not only the unstable macro economy, that is, fluctuations in inflation, but also the banking of foreign currency in banks will be lending. In addition, Prudential Office has regularly restricted bank exchange exposers, which is considered to explain the disgust of currency mismatches. However, the use of financial derivatives to hedge foreign exchange risks, as the ownership of the Central Europe bank sector has changed, has become easier to access the international financial market, which can be a bigger range. 。 However, if the law has recognized the foreign exchange clause (contract linked to foreign exchange rates) and the bank regulation is restricted in foreign exchange exposure through weight capital and specific currency products, it will be added by entering a financial derivative. Taking such risks and increasing costs seems to be a less desirable solution from a bank management perspective. This is especially
Regarding the behavioral aspects of the expansion of foreign currency loans, there seem to be excessive exchange rate fluctuations, the so-called anchoring effect, and excessive optimism as if the exchange rate were more or less stable. Herding behavior may also be a reason for the introduction of foreign currency loans in order to gain or maintain a certain market share in each banking sector in emerging Europe (see, for example, Kraft and Galac 2011). Also, catastrophic myopia and poor institutional memory of past foreign currency loan crises, given similar episodes in advanced European countries with exotic yen loans (Berger and Udell 2004). The countries that experienced such foreign currency debt crises are also home countries of parent banks that own most of the large banks in emerging CEE. In other words, developed country parent banks have a certain influence on the credit risk policies of their emerging country subsidiaries, as confirmed, for example, by Škrabić Perić et al. (2018) for 16 Central European countries during the credit boom period (2000-2010). Overall, the credit standards and credit culture of the host subsidiary banks are
So far, this paper has described the foreign currency loan repayment drama in the Croatian banking sector and summarized related research on the determinants of foreign currency loan acceptance in Middle East countries. In the following, the advantages and disadvantages of adopting foreign currency loans in the Croatian banking market are addressed from the supply and demand side, focusing on CHF loans. It also reveals the views of Croatian economic experts on this topic obtained through a questionnaire survey. Finally, it provides insights into the settlement of the CHF debt crisis and litigation in Croatia.
The empirical evidence combines several methodological approaches, starting from descriptive and univariate statistics carried out using Bloomberg and CNB foreign exchange and interest rate data, to a questionnaire survey and finally a case study approach, to answer the following research question:
What explains the supply and demand of exchange-linked loans in the Croatian banking sector?
What did Croatian economic experts have about the issues related to the CHF incident?
3.4. Debt Crisis Resolution
How was Croatia's CHF debt crisis solved?
Thus, empirical evidence provides an analysis of Croatia's CHF debt crisis from various actors, lenders, borrowers, prudence authorities, governments, and financial experts.
In Croatian bank sector, FX loans (including foreign currency loans and foreign currency index loans are comparable to Croatian bank sector (Figure 2). In the period from 2002 to 2015. The average share of the euro loan was about 60 %, and the Croatian Kun a-built loan was about 28 % of the Switzerland Francs before 2004. In 2007, the Swiss franc was almost 12 % since 2016. In the past five years, loans to Croatia Kuna have greatly increased their share in the banking section, but this is mainly due to no n-consumer loans, that is, the general purpose of cash loan. In addition to the low creditworthiness of Croatia's household budget, the Croatian economic experts are still very popular because of the low credit standards required to approve these loans. What kind of attitude did you take about the related issues?
How was Croatia's CHF debt crisis solved?
Thus, empirical evidence provides an analysis of Croatia's CHF debt crisis from various actors, lenders, borrowers, prudence authorities, governments, and financial experts.
4. Lessons Learned
In Croatian bank sector, FX loans (including foreign currency loans and foreign currency index loans are comparable to Croatian bank sector (Figure 2). In the period from 2002 to 2015. The average share of the euro loan was about 60 %, and the Croatian Kun a-built loan was about 28 % of the Switzerland Francs before 2004. In 2007, the Swiss franc was almost 12 % since 2016. In the past five years, loans to Croatia Kuna have greatly increased their share in the banking section, but this is mainly due to no n-consumer loans, that is, the general purpose of cash loan. In addition to the low creditworthiness of Croatian households, the Croatian economic experts are still very popular because of the low credit standards required to approve these loans. What kind of attitude did you take about the problem?
How was Croatia's CHF debt crisis solved?
Thus, empirical evidence provides an analysis of Croatia's CHF debt crisis from various actors, lenders, borrowers, prudence authorities, governments, and financial experts.
5. Conclusions
In Croatian bank sector, FX loans (including foreign currency loans and foreign currency index loans are comparable to Croatian bank sector (Figure 2). In the period from 2002 to 2015. The average share of the euro loan was about 60 %, and the Croatian Kun a-built loan was about 28 % of the Switzerland Francs before 2004. In 2007, the Swiss franc was almost 12 % since 2016. In the past five years, loans to Croatia Kuna have significantly increased their share in the banking section, but this is mainly due to no n-consumer loans, that is, the general purpose of cash loan. In addition to the low creditworthiness of Croatian households, it is still very popular today because of the low credit standards required to approve these loans.
There are several reasons why the exchange clause is widely accepted in the loan contract. There is a general debate related to the hedging of bank assets and debt balance sheets (šVerko 2007). In other words, the currency configuration of assets and liabilities has almost completely consistent with the main currencies at the bank sector level for many years. Having a market risk open position can be a troublesome and costly option. In Croatia's bank sector, banks are obliged to comply with the minimum required amount of foreign currency claims, and the decisions on capital maintenance and capital conservation measures. The minimum required amount of foreign currenc y-constructed claims is to maintain the liquidity of Bank's FX by maintaining 17 % or more of foreign currenc y-constructed debt every day. Capital regulations require banks to provide 8 % collateral for the total FX risk. At the time of Swiss franc lending, the upper limit of FX's net open position was set to a level of 20 % of the daily basis, and was raised to 30 % in 2009. However, no limit was reached, and the total amount of FX open positions in Croatian banks was raised to 30 % in 2009. There are several reasons for the < SPAN> exchange clause that is widely accepted in the loan contract. There is a general debate related to the hedging of bank assets and debt balance sheets (šVerko 2007). In other words, the currency configuration of assets and liabilities has almost completely consistent with the main currencies at the bank sector level for many years. Having a market risk open position can be a troublesome and costly option. In Croatia's bank sector, banks are obliged to comply with the minimum required amount of foreign currency claims, and the decisions on capital maintenance and capital conservation measures. The minimum required amount of foreign currenc y-constructed claims is to maintain the liquidity of Bank's FX by maintaining 17 % or more of foreign currenc y-constructed debt every day. Capital regulations require banks to provide 8 % collateral for the total FX risk. At the time of Swiss franc lending, FX's net open position was set to a level of 20 % of the daily basis on a daily basis and was raised to 30 % in 2009. However, no limit was reached, and the total amount of FX open positions in Croatian banks was raised to 30 % in 2009. There are several reasons why the exchange clause is widely accepted in the loan contract. There is a general debate related to the hedging of bank assets and debt balance sheets (šVerko 2007). In other words, the currency configuration of assets and liabilities has almost completely consistent with the main currencies at the bank sector level for many years. Having a market risk open position can be a troublesome and costly option. In Croatia's bank sector, banks are obliged to comply with the minimum required amount of foreign currency claims, and the decisions on capital maintenance and capital conservation measures. The minimum required amount of foreign currenc y-constructed claims is to maintain the liquidity of Bank's FX by maintaining 17 % or more of foreign currenc y-constructed debt every day. Capital regulations require banks to provide 8 % collateral for the total FX risk. At the time of Swiss franc lending, the upper limit of FX's net open position was set to a level of 20 % of the daily basis, and was raised to 30 % in 2009. However, no limit was reached, and the total amount of FX open positions in Croatian banks was raised to 30 % in 2009.
Funding
Regarding the spread of euros in bank balance sheets, Croatia is known to be the main currency of savings and time deposits. Low beliefs in their own currency and high inflation are associated with the history of hyperinflation several times (Sorić and Ižmešija 2013). Despite the stability of prices for many years, cognitive bias such as conservative bias (causing anchoring and adjustment Hulistics), related Hulistics and use Hulistics still exists (Ivanov 2009, P. 18) Sorić and čIžmešija 2013). As a result, the decision on lending and savings of FX will be determined by each other due to lack of reliability of domestic financial authorities (KOšKI 2012). As a result, Croatian Kuna's deposit interest rates have been funded by the euro, despite the high deposit interest rates. Furthermore, even now, 20 years after the previous bank crisis, it is remarkable that cash that cannot be earned at home in Croatia tends to save in the euro, and in the STIX 2013 edition, more than on e-third of the population saved in the euro. It became clear that there was. In many other European emerging countries, the background of cash savings has lack of trust in banks and deposit insurance organizations due to previous banks, and informal savings (STIX 2013 edition). On the other hand, in terms of the spread of euros in < SPAN> bank balance sheets, it is known that the euro is the main currency of savings and time deposits in Croatia. Low beliefs in their own currency and high inflation are associated with the history of hyperinflation several times (Sorić and Ižmešija 2013). Despite the stability of prices for many years, cognitive bias such as conservative bias (causing anchoring and adjustment Hulistics), related Hulistics and use Hulistics still exists (Ivanov 2009, P. 18) Sorić and čIžmešija 2013). As a result, the decision on lending and savings of FX will be determined by each other due to lack of reliability of domestic financial authorities (KOšKI 2012). As a result, Croatian Kuna's deposit interest rates have been funded by the euro, despite the high deposit interest rates. Furthermore, even now, 20 years after the previous bank crisis, it is remarkable that cash that cannot be earned at home in Croatia tends to save in the euro, and in the STIX 2013 edition, more than on e-third of the population saved in the euro. It became clear that there was. In many other European emerging countries, the background of cash savings has lack of trust in banks and deposit insurance organizations due to previous banks, and informal savings (STIX 2013 edition). On the other hand, in Croatia, the euro is the main currency of savings and time deposits in Croatia. Low beliefs in their own currency and high inflation are associated with the history of hyperinflation several times (Sorić and Ižmešija 2013). Despite the stability of prices for many years, cognitive bias such as conservative bias (causing anchoring and adjustment Hulistics), related Hulistics and use Hulistics still exists (Ivanov 2009, P. 18) Sorić and čIžmešija 2013). As a result, the decision on lending and savings of FX will be determined by each other due to lack of reliability of domestic financial authorities (KOšKI 2012). As a result, Croatian Kuna's deposit interest rates have been funded by the euro, despite the high deposit interest rates. Furthermore, even now, 20 years after the previous bank crisis, it is remarkable that cash that cannot be earned at home in Croatia tends to save in the euro, and in the STIX 2013 edition, more than on e-third of the population saved in the euro. It became clear that there was. In many other European emerging countries, the background of cash savings has lack of trust in banks and deposit insurance organizations due to previous banks, and informal savings (STIX 2013 edition). on the other handData Availability Statement
The interest rate difference also explains the high share of FX loans in the Croatian bank sector. Despite having a strong positive correlation in the movement of interest rates (Table 4), the gap between the two is remarkable (Fig. 4 and Fig. 5). Furthermore, according to the 6-month LIBOR (London Bank Transportation Rate) and ZIBOR (Zagreb Bank Transaction Rate), there is a large difference between the Euro, Swiss Franc, US dollar LIBOR interest rates and the inte r-banks between banks in the Croat Aquana. be.
Acknowledgments
In this way, banks are approved for FX loans that can be funded by the inflow of overseas hole sale funds that can be easily obtained at affordable prices (especially in the case of excessive fluid like the previous global financial crisis). It will be possible:
Conflicts of Interest
Accelerate and record higher credit growth (as a result, expand market share)References
- Partially reduces credit risks (because credit prices for borrowers are more advantageous than domestic financial loans).
- Improvement of market risk management
- Among all the trends indicated, the si x-month CHF LIBOR consistently fell below other currencies (Figure 4). The main 6-month LIBOR currency description statistics from 2002 to 2020 is an additional evidence (Table 5). In other words, all 6 months of CHF LIBOR's description statistics were the lowest in the selected currency. Furthermore, compared to the 6-month LIBOR description statistics (Table 6), it is clear that the FX loan, especially the CHF loan, was preferred over its own currency. Since the EUR and CHF loans were the most common FX loans, it was confirmed that there was a significant difference between the six months of LIBOR interest rates (Table 7). At the time when the CHF loan was a boom (2004-2008), it was as low as 100-150 basic points than the EUR loan (Kraft and Galac 2011, P. 4). Nevertheless, these interest rates should not be overlooked that risk, premium and systematic factors for borrowers / projects have been added. Nevertheless, from a historic point of view, it has been revealed that foreign currency credit risks have been underestimated in the loan approval process, and banks later have tried to make up for them by raising interest rates. < SPAN> Interest rates also explain the high FX loan share in Croatian banks. Despite having a strong positive correlation in the movement of interest rates (Table 4), the gap between the two is remarkable (Fig. 4 and Fig. 5). Furthermore, according to the 6-month LIBOR (London Bank Transportation Rate) and ZIBOR (Zagreb Bank Transaction Rate), there is a large difference between the Euro, Swiss Franc, US dollar LIBOR interest rates and the inte r-banks between banks in the Croat Aquana. be.
- In this way, banks are approved for FX loans that can be funded by the inflow of overseas hole sale funds that can be easily obtained at affordable prices (especially in the case of excessive fluid like the previous global financial crisis). It will be possible:
- Accelerate and record higher credit growth (as a result, expand market share)
- Partially reduces credit risks (because credit prices for borrowers are more advantageous than domestic financial loans).
- Improvement of market risk management
- Among all the trends indicated, the si x-month CHF LIBOR consistently fell below other currencies (Figure 4). The main 6-month LIBOR currency description statistics from 2002 to 2020 is an additional evidence (Table 5). In other words, all 6 months of CHF LIBOR's description statistics were the lowest in the selected currency. Furthermore, compared to the 6-month LIBOR description statistics (Table 6), it is clear that the FX loan, especially the CHF loan, was preferred over its own currency. Since the EUR and CHF loans were the most common FX loans, it was confirmed that there was a significant difference between the six months of LIBOR interest rates (Table 7). At the time when the CHF loan was a boom (2004-2008), it was as low as 100-150 basic points than the EUR loan (Kraft and Galac 2011, P. 4). Nevertheless, these interest rates should not be overlooked that risk, premium and systematic factors for borrowers / projects have been added. Nevertheless, from a historic point of view, it has been revealed that foreign currency credit risks have been underestimated in the loan approval process, and that banks later raised interest rates to make up for it. The interest rate difference also explains the high share of FX loans in the Croatian bank sector. Despite having a strong positive correlation in the movement of interest rates (Table 4), the gap between the two is remarkable (Fig. 4 and Fig. 5). Furthermore, according to the 6-month LIBOR (London Bank Transportation Rate) and ZIBOR (Zagreb Bank Transaction Rate), there is a large difference between the Euro, Swiss Franc, US dollar LIBOR interest rates and the inte r-banks between banks in the Croat Aquana. be.
- In this way, banks are approved for FX loans that can be funded by the inflow of overseas hole sale funds that can be easily obtained at affordable prices (especially in the case of excessive fluid like the previous global financial crisis). It will be possible:
- Accelerate and record higher credit growth (as a result, expand market share)
- Partially reduces credit risks (because credit prices for borrowers are more advantageous than domestic financial loans).
- Improvement of market risk management
- Among all the trends indicated, the si x-month CHF LIBOR consistently fell below other currencies (Figure 4). The main 6-month LIBOR currency description statistics from 2002 to 2020 is an additional evidence (Table 5). In other words, all 6 months of CHF LIBOR's description statistics were the lowest in the selected currency. Furthermore, compared to the 6-month LIBOR description statistics (Table 6), it is clear that the FX loan, especially the CHF loan, was preferred over its own currency. Since the EUR and CHF loans were the most common FX loans, it was confirmed that there was a significant difference between the six months of LIBOR interest rates (Table 7). At the time when the CHF loan was a boom (2004-2008), it was as low as 100-150 basic points than the EUR loan (Kraft and Galac 2011, P. 4). Nevertheless, these interest rates should not be overlooked that risk, premium and systematic factors for borrowers / projects have been added. Nevertheless, from a historic point of view, it has been revealed that foreign currency credit risks have been underestimated in the loan approval process, and that banks later raised interest rates to make up for it.
- Finally, intentional breeding was one of the factors that contributed to the prosperity of CHF loans in Croatia. In other words, Austrian banks (Kraft and Galac 2011, P. 4), a pioneer in Croatia's bank market, followed other major banks to maintain the market. Apparently, there was a lack of foresight approach to changes in economic conditions and some disaste r-oper (Kraft and Galac 2011, P. 14).
- The size of the income, the market price, and the required amount are the main factors in household demand for goods and services. Thus, in the Croatian bank department during the migration period, the use of Swiss Franc loan for the household division was the main cause of hollowing out. Swiss franc loans had lower interest rates than the Euro loan and were often approved at campaign interest rates. Therefore, the main reason for the Swiss franc and borrowing was the relocation trading. To put it simply, the lower the interest rate, the higher the demand for loans. In this regard, Fidrmuc et al. (2013) estimates that if the difference rate rises by 1 % for nine Middle East, the demand for FX loans will increase by 0. 6 %. Past data on the average interest rate on the Euro and Switzerland loans in the Croatian household division has not been disclosed, but if you look at the overview of the retail bank offer during the credit expansion period (2004-2008), Switzerland Fran You can see that the mortgage loan for building was the cheapest and the promotional interest rate was below 4 %. However, at that time, the credit price and additional loan approval cost, the credit price was not clear and clearly defined. The trend has changed, and since then, the interest rates of these loans are
- Looking at Figure 6, you can see that Swiss Fran's mortgage loans have lower interest rates than the Euro mortgage loan over the long term between 2011 and 2020. However, the standard deviation of the Euro Loan interest rate is almost 1. 22 for Swiss Fran loans. Therefore, it turned out that the interest rate risk was much higher when the household used a CHF mortgage. < SPAN> Finally, intentional breeding was one of the factors that contributed to the prosperity of CHF loans in Croatia. In other words, Austrian banks (Kraft and Galac 2011, P. 4), a pioneer in Croatia's bank market, followed other major banks to maintain the market. Apparently, there was a lack of foresight approach to changes in economic conditions and some disaste r-oper (Kraft and Galac 2011, P. 14).
- The size of the income, the market price, and the required amount are the main factors in household demand for goods and services. Thus, in the Croatian bank department during the migration period, the use of Swiss Franc loan for the household division was the main cause of hollowing out. Swiss franc loans had lower interest rates than the Euro loan and were often approved at campaign interest rates. Therefore, the main reason for the Swiss franc and borrowing was the relocation trading. To put it simply, the lower the interest rate, the higher the demand for loans. In this regard, Fidrmuc et al. (2013) estimates that if the difference rate rises by 1 % for nine Middle East, the demand for FX loans will increase by 0. 6 %. Past data on the average interest rate on the Euro and Switzerland loans in the Croatian household division has not been disclosed, but if you look at the overview of the retail bank offer during the credit expansion period (2004-2008), Switzerland Fran You can see that the mortgage loan for building was the cheapest and the promotional interest rate was below 4 %. However, at that time, the credit price and additional loan approval cost, the credit price was not clear and clearly defined. The trend has changed, and since then, the interest rates of these loans are
- Looking at Figure 6, you can see that Swiss Fran's mortgage loans have lower interest rates than the Euro mortgage loan over the long term between 2011 and 2020. However, the standard deviation of the Euro Loan interest rate is almost 1. 22 for Swiss Fran loans. Therefore, it turned out that the interest rate risk was much higher when the household used a CHF mortgage. Finally, intentional breeding was one of the factors that contributed to the prosperity of CHF loans in Croatia. In other words, Austrian banks (Kraft and Galac 2011, P. 4), a pioneer in Croatia's bank market, followed other major banks to maintain the market. Apparently, there was a lack of foresight approach to changes in economic conditions and some disaste r-oper (Kraft and Galac 2011, P. 14).
- The size of the income, the market price, and the required amount are the main factors in household demand for goods and services. Thus, in the Croatian bank department during the migration period, the use of Swiss Franc loan for the household division was the main cause of hollowing out. Swiss franc loans had lower interest rates than the Euro loan and were often approved at campaign interest rates. Therefore, the main reason for the Swiss franc and borrowing was the relocation trading. To put it simply, the lower the interest rate, the higher the demand for loans. In this regard, Fidrmuc et al. (2013) estimates that if the difference rate rises by 1 % for nine Middle East, the demand for FX loans will increase by 0. 6 %. Past data on the average interest rate on the Euro and Switzerland loans in the Croatian household division has not been disclosed, but if you look at the overview of the retail bank offer during the credit expansion period (2004-2008), Switzerland Fran You can see that the mortgage loan for building was the cheapest and the promotional interest rate was below 4 %. However, at that time, the credit price and additional loan approval cost, the credit price was not clear and clearly defined. The trend has changed, and since then, the interest rates of these loans are
- Looking at Figure 6, you can see that Swiss Fran's mortgage loans have lower interest rates than the Euro mortgage loan over the long term between 2011 and 2020. However, the standard deviation of the Euro Loan interest rate is almost 1. 22 for Swiss Fran loans. Therefore, it turned out that the interest rate risk was much higher when the household used a CHF mortgage.
- In addition, the CHF/HRK exchange rate was stable until the global financial crisis occurred. Before that, the Chf/HRK exchange rate was sem i-stable and recognized. According to the description statistics in Table 1, the standard deviation of the Chf/HRK exchange rate from 2003-2008 was 0. 17, and it was expected to be clearly stable. Furthermore, the volatility of the CHF/HRK exchange rate was not significantly different from EUR/HRK (Table 8).
- Considering everything, accepting a CHF loan seems to have been a reasonable choice at the time, even in statistically. However, as banks incorporated foreign exchange clauses and administrative rates into the loan contract, no n-financial open positions were completely exposed to foreign exchange risks and interest rate risks. Similarly, foreign currency lending to a physically hedged household budget, that is, to households with large income in each foreign currency, was less than 10 % in the center, eastern and southeast Europe (Yşinin 2013, p. 222). Regarding mortgages, almost 100 % of Croatian borrowers were borrowers without a bank account (Croatian National Bank 2010B, P. 36).
- In summary, inactive behavior by Prudential regulatory authorities, undeveloped consumer finance protection, inadequate information on financial risk provided by personal banking advisors during advertising and sale of CHF loans, and excessive anchoring, excess A specific behavioral bias, such as optimism and flock behavior, has led to future debt destruction and credit risk. < SPAN> In addition, the Chf/HRK exchange rate was stable until the global financial crisis occurred. Before that, the Chf/HRK exchange rate was sem i-stable and recognized. According to the description statistics in Table 1, the standard deviation of the Chf/HRK exchange rate from 2003-2008 was 0. 17, and it was expected to be clearly stable. Furthermore, the volatility of the CHF/HRK exchange rate was not significantly different from EUR/HRK (Table 8).
- Considering everything, accepting a CHF loan seems to have been a reasonable choice at the time, even in statistically. However, as banks incorporated foreign exchange clauses and administrative rates into the loan contract, no n-financial open positions were completely exposed to foreign exchange risks and interest rate risks. Similarly, foreign currency lending to a physically hedged household budget, that is, to households with large income in each foreign currency, was less than 10 % in the center, eastern and southeast Europe (Yşinin 2013, p. 222). Regarding mortgages, almost 100 % of Croatian borrower was a borrower without a bank account (Croatian National Bank 2010B, P. 36).
- In summary, inactive behavior by Prudential regulatory authorities, undeveloped consumer finance protection, inadequate information on financial risk provided by personal banking advisors during advertising and sale of CHF loans, and excessive anchoring, excess A specific behavior bias, such as optimism and flock behavior, has led to future debt destruction and credit risk. In addition, the CHF/HRK exchange rate was stable until the global financial crisis occurred. Before that, the Chf/HRK exchange rate was sem i-stable and recognized. According to the description statistics in Table 1, the standard deviation of the Chf/HRK exchange rate in 2003-2008 was 0. 17, which was expected to be clearly stable. Furthermore, the volatility of the CHF/HRK exchange rate was not significantly different from EUR/HRK (Table 8).
- Considering everything, accepting a CHF loan seems to have been a reasonable choice at the time, even in statistically. However, as banks incorporated foreign exchange clauses and administrative rates into the loan contract, no n-financial open positions were completely exposed to foreign exchange risks and interest rate risks. Similarly, foreign currency lending to a physically hedged household budget, that is, to households with large income in each foreign currency, was less than 10 % in the center, eastern and southeast Europe (Yşinin 2013, p. 222). Regarding mortgages, almost 100 % of Croatian borrower was a borrower without a bank account (Croatian National Bank 2010B, P. 36).
- In summary, inactive behavior by Prudential regulatory authorities, undeveloped consumer finance protection, inadequate information on financial risk provided by personal banking advisors during advertising and sale of CHF loans, and excessive anchoring, excess A specific behavior bias, such as optimism and flock behavior, has led to future debt destruction and credit risk.
- In April 2012, the Croatian civil society NGO "Franc for Consumer Protection of Users of Financial Services" (abbreviated as "Franc"), supported by the Croatian Union of Consumer Protection Organizations (abbreviated as "Consumer"), filed a class action lawsuit against six large and two medium-sized banks in the Republic of Croatia. The claims were brought against the Republic of Croatia's economic consumer rights due to harmful banking practices of including administered interest rates and Swiss franc currency clauses in loan contracts during the credit boom (2004-2008), which led to unsustainable debt for many households across Croatia. The odds of winning the "CHF case" were often described in the media as similar to those of the "David vs. Goliath" and "Erin Brockovich" cases. On the other hand, academic financial and banking experts rarely share the public's stance on this issue and have not paid much attention to the CHF loan issue in their research (except for Đeno et al. 2009; Francišković 2011; Koški 2012, etc.). In April 2012, the Croatian civil society NGO "Franc Association for Consumer Protection of Users of Financial Services" (abbreviated as "Franc Association"), supported by the Croatian Union of Consumer Protection Organizations (abbreviated as "Consumer"), filed a class action lawsuit against six large and two medium-sized banks in the Republic of Croatia. The claim was brought against the Republic of Croatia's economic consumer rights due to harmful banking practices of incorporating controlled interest rates and Swiss franc currency clauses in loan contracts during the credit boom (2004-2008), which led to unsustainable debt for many households across Croatia. The media often said that the odds of winning the CHF case were similar to those of the David vs. Goliath or Erin Brockovich cases. On the other hand, academic finance and banking experts rarely shared the public’s stance on the issue and rarely paid attention to the CHF loan issue in their research (except for Đeno et al. 2009; Francišković 2011; Koški 2012, etc.). In April 2012, the Croatian civil society NGO “Franc for Consumer Protection of Users of Financial Services” (abbreviated as Franc), supported by the Croatian Union of Consumer Protection Organizations (abbreviated as Consumer), filed a class action lawsuit against six large and two medium-sized banks in the Republic of Croatia. The claim was brought against the economic consumer rights of the Republic of Croatia due to harmful banking practices of incorporating administered interest rates and Swiss franc currency clauses in loan contracts during the credit boom (2004-2008), which led to unsustainable debt for many households across Croatia. The odds of winning the “CHF case” were often described in the media as similar to those of the “David vs. Goliath” or “Erin Brockovich” cases. On the other hand, academic finance and banking experts rarely shared the public’s stance on the issue and rarely focused on the CHF loan issue in their research (except for e. g. Đeno et al. 2009; Francišković 2011; Koški 2012).
- Therefore, a complete original questionnaire survey was conducted for 83 students who were enrolled in the Faculty of Economics of all national universities in Croatia to explore student awareness of the CHF case. A survey on the attitude of Kordić and žiVKO (2011) in the context of the EU in the context of the currency has led to the main reasons for adopting such an approach. However, while their surveys are for students, this research was conducted as an expert survey. Specifically, (1) is involved in lectures, guidance, and research activities in the field of economics (that is, at least a part of scientific and educational tasks is dedicated to financial service issues), and (2) Financial. He treated the Faculty of Economics, which meets the two conditions: a Ph. D., or later acquired a doctorate in the same field, as an expert on this theme. Experts who may be invited to exchange opinions about CHF cases are banking specialists, domestic central bank experts, hig h-ranking banks, consultant companies, and consumer finance NGOs. Representatives of the Croatia Bank Association. However, they all were removed from the investigation because they were all "Croatian consumer finance experts." < SPAN> So, for 83 students in Croatia's Faculty of Economics, we conducted a completely original questionnaire survey to explore the student's awareness of problems related to the CHF case. A survey on the attitude of Kordić and žiVKO (2011) in the context of the EU in the context of the currency has led to the main reasons for adopting such an approach. However, while their surveys are for students, this research was conducted as an expert survey. Specifically, (1) is involved in lectures, guidance, and research activities in the field of economics (that is, at least a part of scientific and educational tasks is dedicated to financial service issues), and (2) Financial. He treated the Faculty of Economics, which meets the two conditions: a Ph. D., or later acquired a doctorate in the same field, as an expert on this theme. Experts who may be invited to exchange opinions about CHF cases are banking specialists, domestic central bank experts, hig h-ranking banks, consultant companies, and consumer finance NGOs. Representatives of the Croatia Bank Association. However, they all were removed from the investigation because they were all "Croatian consumer finance experts." Therefore, a complete original questionnaire survey was conducted for 83 students who were enrolled in the Faculty of Economics of all national universities in Croatia to explore student awareness of the CHF case. A survey on the attitude of Kordić and žiVKO (2011) in the context of the EU in the context of the currency has led to the main reasons for adopting such an approach. However, while their surveys are for students, this research was conducted as an expert survey. Specifically, (1) is involved in lectures, guidance, and research activities in the field of economics (that is, at least a part of scientific and educational tasks is dedicated to financial service issues), and (2) Financial. He treated the Faculty of Economics, which meets the two conditions, which has acquired a Ph. D. or later acquired a doctorate in the same field, as an expert on this theme. Experts who may be invited to exchange opinions on CHF cases are banking experts, domestic central bank experts, hig h-ranking banks, consultant companies, and consumer finance NGOs. Representatives of the Croatia Bank Association. However, they all were removed from the investigation because they were all "Croatian consumer finance experts."
- The primary data was collected by a simple questionnaire for four months (March to July 2013). This questionnaire was sent by mail, not e-mail so that data collection could be controlled only by the target person. Participation in the questionnaire survey was optional and anonymous. The response rate was about 57 %, with 47 people in Croatian, Faculty of Economics, and 47 people who were enrolled. The survey was conducted a few years ago, but the survey was only verbally discussed in several specialized seminars that the writer of this paper also participated in. However, it seems that collecting answers on this lawsuit at this time, where this lawsuit is being reported almost every day, is more important than updating the collected data in the opinion of economic experts. Ta. In addition, the opinions of economic experts should last for a long time. The obtained data was operated using SPSS.
- Out of 31 (66 %) of the 47 respondents in the questionnaire, 15 (32 %) supported the use of the exchange clause in a loan contract in Croatian banks. I can't say either one. " As a result, 30 financial experts (65 %) have expressed their position to abolish foreign exchange clause, and the rest opposed this idea. In consideration of the possibility that the Fran's Association may win the Swiss Fran loan lawsuit, only two economic experts have shown a positive attitude in the victory scenario, and we believe that the rest can be very little ignorant. 。 A general consensus was obtained on the problem of management interest rates. In particular, 38 (83 %) respondents consider that the loan contract contains this kind of interest rate as unfair practices, and the rest agree with their use (6, 13 %), or either. I couldn't say (two). < SPAN> Primary data was collected by a simple questionnaire for four months (March to July 2013). This questionnaire was sent by mail, not e-mail so that data collection could be controlled only by the target person. Participation in the questionnaire survey was optional and anonymous. The response rate was about 57 %, with 47 people in Croatian, Faculty of Economics, and 47 people who were enrolled. The survey was conducted a few years ago, but the survey was only verbally discussed in several specialized seminars that the writer of this paper also participated in. However, it seems that collecting answers on this lawsuit at this time, where this lawsuit is being reported almost every day, is more important than updating the collected data in the opinion of economic experts. Ta. In addition, the opinions of economic experts should last for a long time. The obtained data was operated using SPSS.
- Out of 31 (66 %) of the 47 respondents in the questionnaire, 15 (32 %) supported the use of the exchange clause in a loan contract in Croatian banks. I can't say either one. " As a result, 30 financial experts (65 %) have expressed their position to abolish foreign exchange clause, and the rest opposed this idea. In consideration of the possibility that the Fran's Association may win the Swiss Fran loan lawsuit, only two economic experts have shown a positive attitude in the victory scenario, and we believe that the rest can be very little ignorant. 。 A general consensus was obtained on the problem of management interest rates. In particular, 38 (83 %) respondents consider that the loan contract contains this kind of interest rate as unfair practices, and the rest agree with their use (6, 13 %), or either. I couldn't say (two). The primary data was collected by a simple questionnaire for four months (March to July 2013). This questionnaire was sent by mail, not e-mail so that data collection could be controlled only by the target person. Participation in the questionnaire survey was optional and anonymous. The response rate was about 57 %, with 47 people in Croatian, Faculty of Economics, and 47 people who were enrolled. The survey was conducted a few years ago, but the survey was only verbally discussed in several specialized seminars that the writer of this paper also participated in. However, it seems that collecting answers on this lawsuit at this time, where this lawsuit is being reported almost every day, is more important than updating the collected data in the opinion of economic experts. Ta. In addition, the opinions of economic experts should last for a long time. The obtained data was operated using SPSS.
- Out of 31 (66 %) of the 47 respondents in the questionnaire, 15 (32 %) supported the use of the exchange clause in a loan contract in Croatian banks. I can't say either one. " As a result, 30 financial experts (65 %) have expressed their position to abolish foreign exchange clause, and the rest opposed this idea. In consideration of the possibility that the Fran's Association may win the Swiss Fran loan lawsuit, only two economic experts have shown a positive attitude in the victory scenario, and we believe that the rest can be very little ignorant. 。 A general consensus was obtained on the problem of management interest rates. In particular, 38 (83 %) respondents consider that the loan contract contains this kind of interest rate as unfair practices, and the rest agree with their use (6, 13 %), or either. I couldn't say (two).
- In addition to general questions about exchange clause and administrative management interest rates, the respondents were asked to assert their attitudes with 1 to 5 points in the given description. The list of statements can be seen in various presentations and interviews of bank sector, including bank CEOs, Chief Economists, Croatia's Banking Association, and members of the academic world specializing in banks and financial economics. It was created based on the pros and cons of the adoption of exchange terms and management interest rates. The description statistics for each statement are shown in Table 9 (exchange terms) and Table 10 (administrative interest rate).
- In particular, the foreign exchange clause relocates the foreign exchange risk from the bank to the borrower (average value = 4, 47), and the bank has sufficient risk management ability, so excessive banks protect the bank (average (average)). I agree with the value = 4, 19) (average value = 3, 87). It was also mainly opposed to the fact that the number of foreign currency household savings was the reason for using foreign exchange rates (average = 2, 5). Regarding administrative management rates, we agree that the use of the bank protects the interests of the bank, the bank is in a position that is more advantageous compared to the customer (average = 4, 7), and clarifies lending and deposit agreements. I agreed to the opinion that it was (average = 4, 62).
- As a whole, most of the financial experts in the academic world have opposed the bank's practice to add money to loan contracts to loan contracts, and mostly opposes banks that have superior risk management skills than individuals. 。 A similar conclusion was also supported in the September 2019 Fran Association lawsuit. In addition to general questions about the < SPAN> exchange clause and administrative management interest rates, the respondents were asked to assert their attitudes with 1 to 5 points in the given description. The list of statements can be seen in various presentations and interviews of bank sector, including bank CEOs, Chief Economists, Croatia's Banking Association, and members of the academic world specializing in banks and financial economics. It was created based on the pros and cons of the adoption of exchange terms and management interest rates. The description statistics for each statement are shown in Table 9 (exchange terms) and Table 10 (administrative interest rate).
- In particular, the foreign exchange clause relocates the foreign exchange risk from the bank to the borrower (average value = 4, 47), and the bank has sufficient risk management ability, so excessive banks protect the bank (average (average)). I agree with the value = 4, 19) (average value = 3, 87). It was also mainly opposed to the reason that the number of foreign currenc y-constructed household savings was the reason for using foreign exchange rates (average = 2, 5). Regarding administrative management rates, we agree that the use of the bank protects the interests of the bank, the bank is in a position that is more advantageous compared to the customer (average = 4, 7), and clarifies lending and deposit agreements. I agreed to the opinion that it was (average = 4, 62).
- As a whole, most of the financial experts in the academic world have opposed the bank's practice to add money to loan contracts to loan contracts, and mostly opposes banks that have superior risk management skills than individuals. 。 A similar conclusion was also supported in the September 2019 Fran Association lawsuit. In addition to general questions about exchange clause and administrative management interest rates, the respondents were asked to assert their attitudes with 1 to 5 points in the given description. The list of statements can be seen in various presentations and interviews of bank sector, including bank CEOs, Chief Economists, Croatia's Banking Association, and members of the academic world specializing in banks and financial economics. It was created based on the pros and cons of the adoption of exchange terms and management interest rates. The description statistics for each statement are shown in Table 9 (exchange terms) and Table 10 (administrative interest rate).
- In particular, the foreign exchange clause relocates the foreign exchange risk from the bank to the borrower (average value = 4, 47), and the bank has sufficient risk management ability, so excessive banks protect the bank (average (average)). I agree with the value = 4, 19) (average value = 3, 87). It was also mainly opposed to the reason that the number of foreign currenc y-constructed household savings was the reason for using foreign exchange rates (average = 2, 5). Regarding administrative management rates, we agree that the use of the bank protects the profit of the bank, the bank is in a better position compared to the customer (average = 4, 7), and the loan / deposit agreement is clearer. I agreed to the opinion that it was (average = 4, 62).
As a whole, most of the financial experts in the academic world have opposed the bank's practice to add money to loan contracts to loan contracts, and mostly opposes banks that have superior risk management skills than individuals. 。 A similar conclusion was also supported in the September 2019 Fran Association lawsuit.
The Croatian Republic has been allowed to adopt exchange clauses in the Civil Remarks Law and its revision (Slakoper 2002; Giunio 2005). This is a protection clause used when the exchange rate fluctuations and the repayment period of the debt are prolonged (Slakoper 2002; Giunio 2005). It should be an exception, not a general rule in various contracts, and should be linked to a fixed currency when adopted voluntarily. On the other hand, the ban on exchange clause may significantly reduce credit growth. This is because the entire credit price and inflation risk premium are included instead of the exchange clause. Therefore, in financial markets where deposits are remarkable, the exchange clause is likely to be justified. However, it is an unresolved issue for the health supervision authorities to permit any currency or exotic currency in exchange rates that cannot affect domestic monetary policy.
Obviously, Croatian National Bank (CNB) fully recognizes that Swiss franc's loan boom can cause potential risks for all stakeholders, such as borrower, bank, and the general public. 。 In May 2006, in May 2006, CNB's Prudential regulation and bank supervision department announced guidelines on the management of credit risk due to currency. According to this document (National Bank of Croatia 2006), banks review the policies related to the management and reporting of credit risks caused by foreign currency, record them appropriately, include them in credit margins, and eventually hedge. It was encouraged to secure additional capital commitments for lending to unpolished borrowers. Uncated debtor was defined as a mismatch of foreign currency, more accurately, as a debtor who covers less than 80 % of foreign currenc y-building debt. At the same time, the scale of the exposure was to exceed 50. 000 HRK for individual customers and 500. 000 HRK for corporations (National Bank of Croatia 2010a). However, nothing changed in terms of further growth of the financing by Croatia, Switzerland and Franc. < SPAN> The Croatian Republic has been allowed to adopt exchange clauses in contracts due to civil receivables and revisions (Slakoper 2002; Giunio 2005). This is a protection clause used when the exchange rate fluctuations and the repayment period of the debt are prolonged (Slakoper 2002; Giunio 2005). It should be an exception, not a general rule in various contracts, and should be linked to a fixed currency when adopted voluntarily. On the other hand, the ban on exchange clause may significantly reduce credit growth. This is because the entire credit price and inflation risk premium are included instead of the exchange clause. Therefore, in financial markets where deposits are remarkable, the exchange clause is likely to be justified. However, it is an unresolved issue for the health supervision authorities to permit any currency or exotic currency in exchange rates that cannot affect domestic monetary policy.
Obviously, Croatian National Bank (CNB) fully recognizes that Swiss franc's loan boom can cause potential risks for all stakeholders, such as borrower, bank, and the general public. 。 In May 2006, in May 2006, CNB's Prudential regulation and bank supervision department announced guidelines on the management of credit risk due to currency. According to this document (National Bank of Croatia 2006), banks review the policies related to the management and reporting of credit risks caused by foreign currency, record them appropriately, include them in credit margins, and eventually hedge. It was encouraged to secure additional capital commitments for lending to unpolished borrowers. Uncated debtor was defined as a mismatch of foreign currency, more accurately, as a debtor who covers less than 80 % of foreign currenc y-building debt. At the same time, the scale of the exposure was to exceed 50. 000 HRK for individual customers and 500. 000 HRK for corporations (National Bank of Croatia 2010a). However, nothing changed in terms of further growth of the financing by Croatia, Switzerland and Franc. The Croatian Republic has been allowed to adopt exchange clauses in the Civil Remarks Law and its revision (Slakoper 2002; Giunio 2005). This is a protection clause used when the exchange rate fluctuations and the repayment period of the debt are prolonged (Slakoper 2002; Giunio 2005). It should be an exception, not a general rule in various contracts, and should be linked to a fixed currency when adopted voluntarily. On the other hand, the ban on exchange clause may significantly reduce credit growth. This is because the entire credit price and inflation risk premium are included instead of the exchange clause. Therefore, in financial markets where deposits are remarkable, the exchange clause is likely to be justified. However, it is an unresolved issue for the health supervision authorities to permit any currency or exotic currency in exchange rates that cannot affect domestic monetary policy.
Obviously, Croatian National Bank (CNB) fully recognizes that Swiss franc's loan boom can cause potential risks for all stakeholders, such as borrower, bank, and the general public. 。 In May 2006, in May 2006, CNB's Prudential regulation and bank supervision department announced guidelines on the management of credit risk due to currency. According to this document (National Bank of Croatia 2006), banks review the policies related to the management and reporting of credit risks caused by foreign currency, record them appropriately, include them in credit margins, and eventually hedge. It was encouraged to secure additional capital commitments for lending to unpolished borrowers. Uncated debtor was defined as a mismatch of foreign currency, more accurately, as a debtor who covers less than 80 % of foreign currenc y-building debt. At the same time, the scale of the exposure was to exceed 50. 000 HRK for individual customers and 500. 000 HRK for corporations (National Bank of Croatia 2010a). However, nothing changed in terms of further growth of the financing by Croatia, Switzerland and Franc. The Croatian Republic has been allowed to adopt exchange clauses in the Civil Remarks Law and its revision (Slakoper 2002; Giunio 2005). This is a protection clause used when the exchange rate fluctuations and the repayment period of the debt are prolonged (Slakoper 2002; Giunio 2005). It should be an exception, not a general rule in various contracts, and should be linked to a fixed currency when adopted voluntarily. On the other hand, the ban on exchange clause may significantly reduce credit growth. This is because the entire credit price and inflation risk premium are included instead of the exchange clause. Therefore, in financial markets where deposits are remarkable, the exchange clause is likely to be justified. However, it is an unresolved issue for the health supervision authorities to permit any currency or exotic currency in exchange rates that cannot affect domestic monetary policy.
When the Swiss National Bank separated Switzerland and Franc from the euro in January 2015, many European emerging countries had a significant problem of at least 20 % of Switzerlan d-Franc o-building loans. Soon, the defective loans of Swiss francs were about tripled as the same Eur o-building loan (Table 2). In January 2015, Croatia Congress has decided to temporarily freeze Swiss franc's interest rates for all kinds of loans for households. In September 2015, the revision of the Credit Organization Law and the Consumer Credit Law was passed, and this amendment could convert a Swiss fran c-building loan to the euro if the borrower was Swiss Fran. It is. Meanwhile, the bank extended the repayment period of the CH F-built mortgage to a maximum of 40 years, and the loan repayment has been postponed for a maximum of one year, and a certain conversion solution is provided to the CH F-built debtor. Due to the disadvantage of the new loan products, the borrower did not use these options or conversion of private sector. In particular, most of these offers include the loan debt balance five years later < Span> Switzerland, Switzerland, separated Switzerland and Fran from the Euro, and many European emerging countries in Switzerland in Switzerland. Regarding the repayment of the francel loan, a serious problem caused at least 20 % of the exchange rate. Soon, the defective loans of Swiss francs were about tripled as the same Eur o-building loan (Table 2). In January 2015, Croatia Congress has decided to temporarily freeze Swiss franc's interest rates for all kinds of loans for households. In September 2015, the revision of the Credit Organization Law and the Consumer Credit Law was passed, and this amendment could convert a Swiss fran c-building loan to the euro if the borrower was Swiss Fran. It is. Meanwhile, the bank extended the repayment period of the CH F-built mortgage to a maximum of 40 years, and the loan repayment has been postponed for a maximum of one year, and a certain conversion solution is provided to the CH F-built debtor. Due to the disadvantage of the new loan products, the borrower did not use these options or conversion of private sector. In particular, most of these offers include the loan in many Europeans in many European emerging countries when the loan debt balance was further five years later, when the Swiss National Bank separated Switzerland and Franc from the Euro in January 2015. Regarding the repayment of, a serious problem occurred due to at least 20 % exchange rate rise. Soon, the defective loans of Swiss francs were about tripled as the same Eur o-building loan (Table 2). In January 2015, Croatia Congress has decided to temporarily freeze Swiss franc's interest rates for all kinds of loans for households. In September 2015, the revision of the Credit Organization Law and the Consumer Credit Law was passed, and this amendment could convert a Swiss fran c-building loan to the euro if the borrower was Swiss Fran. It is. Meanwhile, the bank extended the repayment period of the CH F-built mortgage to a maximum of 40 years, and the loan repayment has been postponed for a maximum of one year, and a certain conversion solution is provided to the CH F-built debtor. Due to the disadvantage of the new loan products, the borrower did not use these options or conversion of private sector. In particular, most of these offers have a loan debt balance five years later.
When the Swiss National Bank separated Switzerland and Franc from the euro in January 2015, many European emerging countries had a significant problem of at least 20 % of Switzerlan d-Franc o-building loans. Soon, the defective loans of Swiss francs were about tripled as the same Eur o-building loan (Table 2). In January 2015, Croatia Congress has decided to temporarily freeze Swiss franc's interest rates for all kinds of loans for households. In September 2015, the revision of the Credit Organization Law and the Consumer Credit Law was passed, and this amendment could convert a Swiss fran c-building loan to the euro if the borrower was Swiss Fran. It is. Meanwhile, the bank extended the repayment period of the CH F-built mortgage to a maximum of 40 years, and the loan repayment has been postponed for a maximum of one year, and a certain conversion solution is provided to the CH F-built debtor. Due to the disadvantage of the new loan products, the borrower did not use these options or conversion of private sector. In particular, most of these offers include the loan debt balance five years later < Span> Switzerland, Switzerland, separated Switzerland and Fran from the Euro, and many European emerging countries in Switzerland in Switzerland. Regarding the repayment of the francel loan, a serious problem caused at least 20 % of the exchange rate. Soon, the defective loans of Swiss francs were about tripled as the same Eur o-building loan (Table 2). In January 2015, Croatia Congress has decided to temporarily freeze Swiss franc's interest rates for all kinds of loans for households. In September 2015, the revision of the Credit Organization Law and the Consumer Credit Law was passed, and this amendment could convert a Swiss fran c-building loan to the euro if the borrower was Swiss Fran. It is. Meanwhile, the bank extended the repayment period of the CH F-built mortgage to a maximum of 40 years, and the loan repayment has been postponed for a maximum of one year, and a certain conversion solution is provided to the CH F-built debtor. Due to the disadvantage of the new loan products, the borrower did not use these options or conversion of private sector. In particular, most of these offers include the loan in many Europeans in many European emerging countries when the loan debt balance was further five years later, when the Swiss National Bank separated Switzerland and Franc from the Euro in January 2015. Regarding the repayment of, a serious problem occurred due to at least 20 % exchange rate rise. Soon, the defective loans of Swiss francs were about tripled as the same Eur o-building loan (Table 2). In January 2015, Croatia Congress has decided to temporarily freeze Swiss franc's interest rates for all kinds of loans for households. In September 2015, the revision of the Credit Organization Law and the Consumer Credit Law was passed, and this amendment could convert a Swiss fran c-building loan to the euro if the borrower was Swiss Fran. It is. Meanwhile, the bank extended the repayment period of the CH F-built mortgage to a maximum of 40 years, and the loan repayment has been postponed for a maximum of one year, and a certain conversion solution is provided to the CH F-built debtor. Due to the disadvantage of the new loan products, the borrower did not use these options or conversion of private sector. In particular, most of these offers have a loan debt balance five years later.
Specifically, under the representation hypothesis, public regulation of the banking sector is enacted to protect the interests of individuals who cannot directly represent and control banks (Dewatripont and Tirole 1994, p. 32). Thus, prudential regulators have an intermediate role to protect the interests of these individuals, whether they are borrowers or the general public. In particular, the information asymmetries that arise from the fact that banks lend funds in both directions between depositors and borrowers (Akerlof 1970) and the increased costs of monitoring in the event of violations by individual (private) banks (Diamond 1984) justify the existence of public regulators such as central banks and other supervisory authorities. These institutions are expected to reduce adverse selection, moral hazard, and transaction costs. However, when regulators fail, they may become inactive in solving the accumulated problems or even start gambling on regulations, assuming that they will be solved when the macroeconomic situation improves or that they will be transferred to a new government (the so-called “I’m not in it” behavior) (Dewatripont and Tirole 1994, p. 195). In short, this is exactly what happened in Croatia, considering the behavior of the Croatian central bank.
Specifically, under the representation hypothesis, public regulation of the banking sector is enacted to protect the interests of individuals who cannot directly represent and control banks (Dewatripont and Tirole 1994, p. 32). Thus, prudential regulators have an intermediate role to protect the interests of these individuals, whether they are borrowers or the general public. In particular, the information asymmetries that arise from the fact that banks lend funds in both directions between depositors and borrowers (Akerlof 1970) and the increased costs of monitoring in the event of violations by individual (private) banks (Diamond 1984) justify the existence of public regulators such as central banks and other supervisory authorities. These institutions are expected to reduce adverse selection, moral hazard, and transaction costs. However, when regulators fail, they may become inactive in solving the accumulated problems or even start gambling on regulations, assuming that they will be solved when the macroeconomic situation improves or that they will be transferred to a new government (the so-called “I’m not in it” behavior) (Dewatripont and Tirole 1994, p. 195). In short, this is exactly what happened in Croatia, considering the behavior of the Croatian central bank.
In September 2015, the Croatian government adopted amendments to the Credit Institutions Act and the Consumer Credit Act to resolve the CHF loan crisis. The Croatian regulatory changes allowed loans with CHF exchange clauses to be converted into loans with euro exchange clauses. Such loans were converted en masse, and CHF loans have almost disappeared from banks’ balance sheets since 2016. Similar government-backed loan conversion programs, with some differences between countries, were implemented in other Central European countries3. At the same time, Croatian civil NGOs Franc Association and Consumer fought at various levels of court to win cases against the eight largest banks in Croatia (all foreign-owned). Unfair practices associated with the gradual increase of administered interest rates and the adoption of CHF exchange clauses that significantly increased principal and interest made loan repayment intolerable, if not impossible. After CHF loans were converted into euros following the acts mentioned above, the NGOs won class action lawsuits against the banks. The defendant banks were ordered to pay damages incurred by economic consumers who overpaid interest and exchange differences for Swiss franc loans approved between 2004 and 2008 after filing private lawsuits. Ultimately, the CHF loan drama ended in a
In September 2015, the Croatian government adopted amendments to the Credit Institutions Act and the Consumer Credit Act to resolve the CHF loan crisis. The Croatian regulatory changes allowed loans with CHF exchange clauses to be converted into loans with euro exchange clauses. Such loans were converted en masse, and CHF loans have almost disappeared from banks’ balance sheets since 2016. Similar government-backed loan conversion programs, with some differences between countries, were implemented in other Central European countries3. At the same time, Croatian civil NGOs Franc Association and Consumer fought at various levels of court to win cases against the eight largest banks in Croatia (all foreign-owned). Unfair practices associated with the gradual increase of administered interest rates and the adoption of CHF exchange clauses that significantly increased principal and interest made loan repayment intolerable, if not impossible. After CHF loans were converted into euros following the acts mentioned above, the NGOs won class action lawsuits against the banks. The defendant banks were ordered to pay damages incurred by economic consumers who overpaid interest and exchange differences for Swiss franc loans approved between 2004 and 2008 after filing private lawsuits. Ultimately, the CHF loan drama ended in a
Finally, the lessons learned from the Croatian Swiss Fran Loan case are universal, and are considered to be comparable to other Latin American countries faced similar problems with unable to sustainable Swiss franc debt. It is considered to be noticeable for the highly dollar / euro economic supervisory authorities and governments that have been highly dollarized / euro for the first signs of the potential credit boom by foreign currency.
Finally, the lessons learned from the Croatian Swiss Fran Loan case are universal, and are considered to be comparable to other Latin American countries faced similar problems with unable to sustainable Swiss franc debt. It is considered to be noticeable for the highly dollar / euro economic supervisory authorities and governments that have been highly dollarized / euro for the first signs of the potential credit boom by foreign currency.
Finally, the lessons learned from the Croatian Swiss Fran Loan case are universal, and are considered to be comparable to other Latin American countries faced similar problems with unable to sustainable Swiss franc debt. It is considered to be noticeable for the highly dollar / euro economic supervisory authorities and governments that have been highly dollarized / euro for the first signs of the potential credit boom by foreign currency.
Finally, the lessons learned from the Croatian Swiss Fran Loan case are universal, and are considered to be comparable to other Latin American countries faced similar problems with unable to sustainable Swiss franc debt. It is considered to be noticeable for the highly dollar / euro economic supervisory authorities and governments that have been highly dollarized / euro for the first signs of the potential credit boom by foreign currency.
Finally, the lessons learned from the Croatian Swiss Fran Loan case are universal, and are considered to be comparable to other Latin American countries faced similar problems with unable to sustainable Swiss franc debt. It is considered to be noticeable for the highly dollar / euro economic supervisory authorities and governments that have been highly dollarized / euro for the first signs of the potential credit boom by foreign currency.
Finally, the lessons learned from the Croatian Swiss Fran Loan case are universal, and are considered to be comparable to other Latin American countries faced similar problems with unable to sustainable Swiss franc debt. It is considered to be noticeable for the highly dollar / euro economic supervisory authorities and governments that have been highly dollarized / euro for the first signs of the potential credit boom by foreign currency.
Empirical analysis of the Croatian case shows that the Croatian franc credit boom was driven by both demand and supply, as interest rate differentials and trading behavior were the main causes of the Croatian franc credit boom. However, the main role in its occurrence was attributed to insufficient credibility of monetary policy and inactive action of the domestic prudential authorities. For the same reasons, the burden of resolving the Swiss franc debt crisis was placed on the Croatian government and financial protection NGOs of Croatian citizens. In particular, despite the financial justification of Croatian-Swiss franc loans, unprotected borrowers were burdened with huge interest rates and high exchange rate risks. Their unfair position was recognized through court cases and government-led debt relief programs. Similarly, Croatian financial experts who participated in the survey were almost unanimous in their opinion that exchange rate clauses and administered interest rates built into such loans should be abolished. Meanwhile, the domestic central bank significantly improved financial consumer protection in Croatia. However, the cost paid to learn many important lessons from this case is very high and could have been lower if the prudential authorities had been more vigilant and proactive since the introduction of the Financial Instruments and Exchange Law. | This study did not receive external funding. | The official website of the Croatian National Bank (https://www. hnb. hr/en/) provides the following Excel tables, which we used for some calculations and figures: excel-SP4, e-mp_13, e-mp_15, e-g7b, e-g2b. | We thank the employees of Croatian OTP Bank for sharing Bloomberg data on foreign exchange and interest rates. | The authors declare that they have no conflicts of interest. |
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