Litigating the Climate Emergency Chapter 1 - Litigating the Climate Emergency

1 - Litigating the Climate Emergency

This chapter presents a comprehensive survey of rights-based cases filed in national courts and regional, international, and quasi-judicial tribunals from 2015 to 2021. Part I provides an overview of human rights-based climate change (HRCC) litigation. Part II analyses the legal rules and principles emerging from HRCC cases and judgments around the world. Part III offers conclusions on the potential and limitations of HRCC litigation in advancing climate action. This chapter argues that the normative basis and strategy of HRCC litigation should be considered at the intersection of international and domestic governance. Litigants have primarily pursued a two-stage strategy: (1) they have called on courts to adopt climate regime goals (as set out in the Paris Agreement and IPCC reports) as a benchmark for evaluating national government policies; (2) they have sought to impose national and international climate action targets on the international climate change agenda, given governments’ reluctance to take the urgent measures necessary to address the climate emergency; and (3) they have sought to impose national and international climate action targets on the international climate change agenda. Given governments’ reluctance to take the urgent measures necessary to address the climate emergency, HRCC disputes can be seen as a bottom-up mechanism to give domestic traction to international climate action. Chapter Type

Keywords

Information How Human Rights, Courts, and Legal Mobilization Can Strengthen Climate Action , p. 9 - 83 Publisher Cambridge University Press Year of Print Publication: 2022 University of Cambridge, Cambridge This content is open access and distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons CC-BY-NC-ND 4. 0 License https://creativecommons. org/cclicenses/

In April 2021, the German Court said, "As long as the national climate goals and annual emissions allowed until 2030 (the federal climate change law) have suffered sufficient standards for further reduction since 2031. In the case, it would not be compatible with the basic rights, "he surprised the obsolete on the country's climate change legislation and young plaintiffs. Footnote 1 Neibauer's groundbreaking ruling raised the greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction target to 2030, set further raising, and moved the net carbon native due date in 2045. 。 This ruling has been in the mi d-2010s on the impact of global warming on human rights, the judicial examination of government behavior on climate change, the rights of future generations, and the binding of the government's international climate change measures. It is based on the legal innovation introduced by the parties and court, and is expanded.

Among the important precedents quoted by the German Constitutional Court, from 2015 to 2018, in the Urgenda incident in the Urgenda incident that supported the lower referee ruling that the Dutch government is urgently and significantly reduced global warming emissions. There is a 2019 Dutch Supreme Court ruling. Footnote 2 Urgenda incident has been found in the first case that has been found to be an internationally recognized human rights infringement of climate change and asks the government legal responsibility for international pledge and domestic goals regarding greenhouse gas emission reduction. be. By the end of 2020, the court ordered the government to raise the goal of reducing the greenhouse gas emissions from 20 % to 25 % from 1990, which is the country's traditional goals and the maximum global warming scenario. It is in line with the scientific evaluation of the Inte r-Agency Panel (IPCC) on the United Nations and the 2015 Paris Agreement, which is in line with the minimum contributions that developed countries need to avoid. 。 < SPAN> In April 2021, the German Court lacked sufficient standards for further reduction of national climate goals and annual emissions (the federal climate change law) until 2030. As far as it was, it would not be compatible with the basic rights, "he claimed, surprised observations and young plaintiffs, who had opposed the climate change legislation. Footnote 1 Neibauer's groundbreaking ruling raised the greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction target to 2030, set further raising, and moved the net carbon native due date in 2045. 。 This ruling has been in the mi d-2010s on the impact of global warming on human rights, the judicial examination of government behavior on climate change, the rights of future generations, and the binding of the government's international climate change measures. It is based on the legal innovation introduced by the parties and court, and is expanded.

Among the important precedents quoted by the German Constitutional Court, from 2015 to 2018, in the Urgenda incident in the Urgenda incident that supported the lower referee ruling that the Dutch government is urgently and significantly reduced global warming emissions. There is a 2019 Dutch Supreme Court ruling. Footnote 2 Urgenda incident has been found in the first case that has been found to be an internationally recognized human rights infringement of climate change and asks the government legal responsibility for international pledge and domestic goals regarding greenhouse gas emission reduction. be. By the end of 2020, the court ordered the government to raise the goal of reducing the greenhouse gas emissions from 20 % to 25 % from 1990, which is the country's traditional goals and the maximum global warming scenario. It is in line with the scientific evaluation of the Inte r-Agency Panel (IPCC) on the United Nations and the 2015 Paris Agreement, which is in line with the minimum contributions that developed countries need to avoid. 。 In April 2021, the German Court said, "As long as the national climate goals and annual emissions allowed until 2030 (the federal climate change law) have suffered sufficient standards for further reduction since 2031. In the case, it would not be compatible with the basic rights, "he surprised the obsolete on the country's climate change legislation and young plaintiffs. Footnote 1 Neibauer's groundbreaking ruling raised the greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction target to 2030, set further raising, and moved the net carbon native due date in 2045. 。 This ruling has been in the mi d-2010s on the impact of global warming on human rights, the judicial examination of government behavior on climate change, the rights of future generations, and the binding of the government's international climate change measures. It is based on the legal innovation introduced by the parties and court, and is expanded.

Among the important precedents quoted by the German Constitutional Court, from 2015 to 2018, in the Urgenda incident in the Urgenda incident that supported the lower referee ruling that the Dutch government is urgently and significantly reduced global warming emissions. There is a 2019 Dutch Supreme Court ruling. Footnote 2 Urgenda incident has been found in the first case that has been found to be an internationally recognized human rights infringement of climate change and asks the government legal responsibility for international pledge and domestic goals regarding greenhouse gas emission reduction. be. By the end of 2020, the court ordered the government to raise the goal of reducing the greenhouse gas emissions from 20 % to 25 % from 1990, which is the country's traditional goals and the maximum global warming scenario. It is in line with the scientific evaluation of the inte r-government panel (IPCC) on the United Nations and the 2015 Paris Agreement, which is based on the minimum contribution required by developed countries to avoid. 。

According to the database created for the survey, only 19 climate change lawsuits were filed in the world before 2015. This database, which was opened in early 2020 and has been updated regularly, is a systematic reading of documents and ruling sentences, and interviews with major officials. Based on the first specialized database that collects detailed information about human rights and climate change (HRCC) projects (see Table 1. 1 in the appendix for the project list). Before 3, from 2015 to December 2021, the lawsuit filed 148 climate change litigation, including words and claims, in 38 domestic judicial jurisdictions and 11 international justice and sem i-judicial agencies. As shown in Fig. 1. 1, human rights infringement litigation increased in a stable rate during this period, even if there was progress in relation to the Paris Agreement in 2015 (sometimes repelled).

According to the database created for this survey < SPAN> The number of annual fileds for HRCC < SPAN>, only 19 human rights lawsuits were filed before 2015 for climate change. 。 This database, which was opened in early 2020 and has been updated regularly, is a systematic reading of documents and ruling sentences, and interviews with major officials. Based on the first specialized database that collects detailed information about human rights and climate change (HRCC) projects (see Table 1. 1 in the appendix for the project list). Before 3, from 2015 to December 2021, the lawsuit filed 148 climate change litigation, including words and claims, in 38 domestic judicial jurisdictions and 11 international justice and sem i-judicial agencies. As shown in Fig. 1. 1, human rights infringement litigation increased in a stable rate during this period, even if there was progress in relation to the Paris Agreement in 2015 (sometimes repelled).

According to a database created for an annual survey of the HRCC annual complaint, only a 1 9-human rights lawsuit on climate change was filed before 2015. This database, which was opened in early 2020 and has been updated regularly, is a systematic reading of documents and ruling sentences, and interviews with major officials. Based on the first specialized database that collects detailed information about human rights and climate change (HRCC) projects (see Table 1. 1 in the appendix for the project list). Before 3, from 2015 to December 2021, the lawsuit filed 148 climate change litigation, including words and claims, in 38 domestic judicial jurisdictions and 11 international justice and sem i-judicial agencies. As shown in Fig. 1. 1, human rights infringement litigation increased in a stable rate during this period, even if there was progress in relation to the Paris Agreement in 2015 (sometimes repelled).

Figure 1. 1 Annual complaint of HRCC

Outside the United States, the share of climate change cases litigated on human rights grounds has increased to about 91% since 2015, with Europe being the most active region for rights-based climate change litigation (see Figure 1. 2). Footnote 4 Urgenda-type lawsuits have been filed, with mixed results, in Belgium, Brazil, Canada, the European Union, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Nepal, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, among others. Footnote 5 Outside Europe, in 2015, Pakistan's Lahore High Court ruled that the government's delays in enacting climate legislation in the country violated citizens' fundamental rights. Footnote 6 In 2018, Colombia's Supreme Court ruled in favor of young plaintiffs who sued the country to hold it accountable to its international climate-related commitments to reduce deforestation in the Amazon region. Footnote 7 Other rights-based cases involving young plaintiffs have been filed in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, the European Union, Germany, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, South Korea, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Court of Human Rights. Footnote 8 Human rights courts and institutions in the European Union, European Court of Human Rights ... Footnote 5 Outside Europe, in 2015, Pakistan's Lahore High Court ruled that the government's delays in enacting climate legislation in the country violated citizens' fundamental rights. Footnote 6 In 2018, Colombia's Supreme Court ruled in favor of young plaintiffs who sued the country to hold the government accountable to its climate-related international commitments to reduce deforestation in the Amazon region. Footnote 7 Other rights-based cases involving young plaintiffs have been filed in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, the European Union, Germany, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, South Korea, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Court of Human Rights. Footnote 8 Human rights courts and institutions of the European Union, European Court of Human Rights ... Figure 1. 2 HRCC Cases by Region Since 2015 Outside the United States, the share of climate change lawsuits litigated on human rights grounds has increased to about 91% since 2015, with Europe being the most active region for rights-based climate change litigation (see Figure 1. 2). Footnote 4 Urgenda-type lawsuits have been filed, with mixed results, in Belgium, Brazil, Canada, the European Union, France, Germany, India, Ireland, Nepal, South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, among others. Footnote 5 Outside Europe, in 2015, Pakistan's Lahore High Court ruled that the government's delays in enacting climate legislation in the country violated citizens' fundamental rights. Footnote 6 In 2018, Colombia's Supreme Court ruled in favor of young plaintiffs who sued the country to hold it accountable to its international climate-related commitments to reduce deforestation in the Amazon region. Footnote 7 Other rights-based cases involving young plaintiffs have been filed in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, the European Union, Germany, India, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, South Korea, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the European Court of Human Rights. Footnote 8 Human rights courts and agencies in the European Union, European Court of Human Rights ...

At the international level, the UN Human Rights Committee, in a case against New Zealand, ruled that states have an obligation not to send to other states asylum seekers whose lives or physical integrity would be seriously endangered by climate-related harm. Footnote 11 A petition filed by young climate activists, including Greta Thunberg, against Argentina, Brazil, France, Germany, and Turkey, called on the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child to declare that the respondent states were violating their rights by contributing to global warming and to propose actions for the respondent states to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to the effects of climate change. Footnote 12 And although the Committee ultimately rejected the petition on procedural grounds, it made clear that states could be held liable for damages resulting from emissions produced within their territory and felt by children living outside their territory.

In a handful of early cases in this trend, analysts correctly identified a “rights shift” in climate change litigation. Footnote 13 So far, the literature on this trend has tended to focus on the stories of one or a few particularly successful cases. Footnote 14 In the absence of a systematic analysis of the “rights shift,” we are left with an incomplete understanding of legal theory and its implications for climate change action. This edited volume helps to fill this scientific and practical gap. This chapter provides the empirical background for the following chapters and proposes a framework for understanding the main features and emerging norms of climate change rights-based litigation. This chapter summarizes the findings of my research on HRCC cases brought in national courts and regional and international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies. Drawing on theories of global governance and legal mobilization, I have provided a broader discussion of these findings elsewhere. Footnote 15 In doing so, I have attempted to theorize and empirically document the origins, typologies, norms, and impacts of the rights shift and its interactions with the adoption and implementation of the 2015 Paris Agreement. At the international level, the UN Human Rights Committee, in a case against New Zealand, ruled that states have an obligation not to send to other states asylum seekers whose lives or physical integrity would be seriously endangered by climate-related harm. Footnote 11 A petition filed by young climate activists, including Greta Thunberg, against Argentina, Brazil, France, Germany, and Turkey, called on the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child to declare that the states were violating the rights of the respondents by contributing to global warming, and to propose actions for the respondents to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to the effects of climate change. Footnote 12 And, although the Committee ultimately rejected the petition on procedural grounds, it made clear that states could be held liable for damages resulting from emissions produced within their territory and felt by children living outside their territory.

In a handful of early cases in this trend, analysts correctly identified a “rights shift” in climate change litigation. Footnote 13 So far, the literature on this trend has tended to focus on the stories of one or a few particularly successful cases. Footnote 14 In the absence of a systematic analysis of the “rights shift,” we are left with an incomplete understanding of legal theory and its implications for climate change action. This edited volume helps to fill this scientific and practical gap. This chapter provides the empirical background for the following chapters and proposes a framework for understanding the main features and emerging norms of climate change rights-based litigation. This chapter summarizes the findings of my research on HRCC cases brought in national courts and regional and international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies. Drawing on theories of global governance and legal mobilization, I have provided a broader discussion of these findings elsewhere. Footnote 15 In doing so, I have attempted to theorize and empirically document the origins, typologies, norms, and impacts of the rights shift and its interactions with the adoption and implementation of the 2015 Paris Agreement. At the international level, the UN Human Rights Committee, in a case against New Zealand, ruled that states have an obligation not to send to other states asylum seekers whose lives or physical integrity would be seriously endangered by climate-related harm. Footnote 11 A petition filed by young climate activists, including Greta Thunberg, against Argentina, Brazil, France, Germany, and Turkey, called on the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child to declare that the respondent states were violating their rights by contributing to global warming and to propose actions for the respondent states to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to the effects of climate change. Footnote 12 And although the Committee ultimately rejected the petition on procedural grounds, it made clear that states could be held liable for damages resulting from emissions produced within their territory and felt by children living outside their territory.

In a handful of early cases in this trend, analysts correctly identified a “rights shift” in climate change litigation. Footnote 13 So far, the literature on this trend has tended to focus on the stories of one or a few particularly successful cases. Footnote 14 In the absence of a systematic analysis of the “rights shift,” we are left with an incomplete understanding of legal theory and its implications for climate change action. This edited volume helps to fill this scientific and practical gap. This chapter provides the empirical background for the following chapters and proposes a framework for understanding the main features and emerging norms of climate change rights-based litigation. This chapter summarizes the findings of my research on HRCC cases brought in national courts and regional and international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies. Drawing on theories of global governance and legal mobilization, I have provided a broader discussion of these findings elsewhere. Footnote 15 In doing so, I have attempted to theorize and empirically document the origins, typologies, norms, and impacts of the rights shift and its interactions with the adoption and implementation of the 2015 Paris Agreement.

This chapter focuses on the period after Paris, when most lawsuits have been filed or ruled. My analysis is the practice of HRCC litigation and each chapter in the HRCC litigation, despite the fact that the majority of the HRCC litigation work and the incidents featured in this book chapter. Most of the incidents are focused on what kind of case is. It is in contrast to duty on protecting people and ecosystems due to the inevitable effects of global warming. This analytical selection is justified by the fact that about 94 % of HRCC, which has been sued after 2015, is mainly intended to expand and accelerate climate easing. Focusing on the government's goals, not a company, can be explained from the fact that about 85 % of the HRCC projects filed by the government in 2015 set their goals.

1.1 The Post-Paris Regime and Climate Rights Litigation

I argue that the normative logic and strategy of the HRCC dispute must be considered at the intersection of international governance and domestic governance. Specifically, it is assumed that the litigation party has mainly pursued a tw o-step strategy. (1) As a benchmark that evaluates the government's climate change behavior, the court asked the court to adopt the goal of the climate change system (indicated by the IPCC report, and other authoritative sources). (2) In order to ask the government for legal responsibilities for these goals, the standards, frameworks, frameworks, and human rights execution mechanisms were activated. Considering that each government is reluctant or hostile to take the emergency measures necessary for the emergency of climate change, the conflict of HRCC is international legal and science for climate change measures. It can be regarded as a botto m-up mechanism that gives a domestic traction to the consensus. From a different point of view, the HRCC dispute contributed to the emergency of climate change by providing at least a part of the linked links between international promises and domestic actions. By doing so, the time to avoid the most catastrophic global warming scenarios is approaching, HRCC provides a leverage point that is very needed to expand and accelerate climate change behavior. be. < SPAN> This chapter focuses on the period after Paris, when most lawsuits have been filed or ruled. My analysis is the practice of HRCC litigation and each chapter in the HRCC litigation, despite the fact that the majority of the HRCC litigation work and the incidents featured in this book chapter. Most of the incidents are focused on what kind of case is. It is in contrast to duty on protecting people and ecosystems due to the inevitable effects of global warming. This analytical selection is justified by the fact that about 94 % of HRCC, which has been sued after 2015, is mainly intended to expand and accelerate climate easing. Focusing on the government's goals, not a company, can be explained from the fact that about 85 % of the HRCC projects filed by the government in 2015 set their goals.

I argue that the normative logic and strategy of the HRCC dispute must be considered at the intersection of international governance and domestic governance. Specifically, it is assumed that the litigation party has mainly pursued a tw o-step strategy. (1) As a benchmark that evaluates the government's climate change behavior, the court asked the court to adopt the goal of the climate change system (indicated by the IPCC report, and other authoritative sources). (2) In order to ask the government for legal responsibilities for these goals, the standards, frameworks, frameworks, and human rights execution mechanisms were activated. Considering that each government is reluctant or hostile to take the emergency measures necessary for the emergency of climate change, the conflict of HRCC is international legal and science for climate change measures. It can be regarded as a botto m-up mechanism that gives a domestic traction to the consensus. From a different point of view, the HRCC dispute contributed to the emergency of climate change by providing at least a part of the linked links between international promises and domestic actions. By doing so, the time to avoid the most catastrophic global warming scenarios is approaching, HRCC provides a leverage point that is very needed to expand and accelerate climate change behavior. be. This chapter focuses on the period after Paris, when most lawsuits have been filed or ruled. My analysis is the practice of HRCC litigation and each chapter in the HRCC litigation, despite the fact that the majority of the HRCC litigation work and the incidents featured in this book chapter. Most of the incidents are focused on what kind of case is. It is in contrast to duty on protecting people and ecosystems due to the inevitable effects of global warming. This analytical selection is justified by the fact that about 94 % of HRCC, which has been sued after 2015, is mainly intended to expand and accelerate climate easing. Focusing on the government's goals, not a company, can be explained from the fact that about 85 % of the HRCC projects filed by the government in 2015 set their goals.

I argue that the normative logic and strategy of the HRCC dispute must be considered at the intersection of international governance and domestic governance. Specifically, it is assumed that the litigation party has mainly pursued a tw o-step strategy. (1) As a benchmark that evaluates the government's climate change behavior, the court asked the court to adopt the goal of the climate change system (indicated by the IPCC report, and other authoritative sources). (2) In order to ask the government for legal responsibilities for these goals, the standards, frameworks, frameworks, and human rights execution mechanisms were activated. Considering that each government is reluctant or hostile to take the emergency measures necessary for the emergency of climate change, the conflict of HRCC is international legal and science for climate change measures. It can be regarded as a botto m-up mechanism that gives a domestic traction to the consensus. From a different point of view, the HRCC dispute contributed to the emergency of climate change by providing at least a part of the linked links between international promises and domestic actions. By doing so, the time to avoid the most catastrophic global warming scenarios is approaching, HRCC provides a leverage point that is very needed to expand and accelerate climate change behavior. be.

However, climate change is a complicated problem that cannot be dealt with by a single regulatory means. Litigation based on rights is only one of such measures, but as described later, there is not enough attention to climate change, and the complex causal relationship and time of global warming. There are unique tasks and blind spots, such as the limits of human rights norms to deal with.

This chapter is composed of three sections. In section 1. 1, the trends of the HRCC dispute after the Paris Agreement are outlined, characterized by the main litigation type at this time. Section 1. 2 analyzes the legal rules and principles from HRCC's lawsuit and judgment. Footnote 16) Here, instead of verifying the results and implications of these trials, the appearance of the rules, that is, regardless of the results, is a unique rule on climate change, regardless of the results. It focuses on identifying new rules specified when dealing with. Section 1. 3 presents some conclusions about the possibilities and issues of HRCC litigation in promoting climate change measures.

The normative logic of the Paris Agreement is in conflict with the regime before the Paris Agreement. According to De Bulka, Ceheine, and Sabel's global governance, international climate change governance is an attempt to build a to p-dow n-down regime (the 1997 climate change framework consolidated Kyoto Protocol). It has shifted from the failure to the current attempt (Paris Agreement). Footnote 17

The Paris Agreement does not define the state of the state determined by the state of the stat e-determined contribution (NDC) for the reduction of emissions, and the state ensures transparency in accounting for these contributions. There is no process. Considering that the success of the Paris system is transparent, this model works in Paris, and according to IPCC, the global warming is 1. 5 to 2 ° C. Only when you have a substance and reputable incentive that keeps your promises and enhances ambition to reduce the large gap between the necessary emission reductions to control between them. Footnote 19 < SPAN> Paris Agreement did not define the duty of binding the state in the application of national determination contributions (NDC) for emission reduction, and the state is transparent in accounting for these contributions. There is no process to secure. Considering that the success of the Paris system is transparent, this model works in Paris, and according to IPCC, the global warming is 1. 5 to 2 ° C. Only when you have a substance and reputable incentive that keeps your promises and enhances ambition to reduce the large gap between the necessary emission reductions to control between them. Footnote 19 Paris Agreements do not define the state of binding the state in the application of national determination contributions (NDC) for emission reduction, and the state ensures transparency in accounting for these contributions. There is no provision for the process. Considering that the success of the Paris system is transparent, this model works in Paris, and according to IPCC, the global warming is 1. 5 to 2 ° C. Only if you have a material and reputable incentive that keeps your promises and enhances ambition to reduce the large gap between the necessary emission reductions to be suppressed. Footnote 19

Most of the HRCC cases and complaints (mainly emissions reductions) can be seen as a strategy to provide the post-Party climate regime with procedural and substantive mechanisms to translate the aforementioned targets into legally binding commitments at the national level. During and after the 2015 Climate Summit, Parties often used the Paris framework to pressure states and, to a much lesser extent, corporations. Footnote 20 As mentioned above, of the 148 cases filed between 2015 and 2021, all 22 are directed at states (see Table 1. 1). The exceptions are the cases against Shell Oil Company of the Netherlands (1 case) and the Republic of South Africa (1 case), Total SA of France (2 cases), PetroOriental SA of Ecuador (1 case), Wintershall SA of Germany (1 case), and Casino de France (1 case). The OECD also filed complaints against a French utility company (one case), a German car company (two cases), a New Zealand company with high greenhouse gas emissions (one case), and a coal mining project in Australia (one case). OECD complaints against PZA S. A. in Poland and a Slovenian fracking company, a complaint against a private pension company in the UK, and five complaints against a thermoelectric power plant in Argentina. The Philippine Commission on Human Rights also launched a multi-year, cross-border investigation into 47 of the largest fossil fuel companies, known as "Big Coal." Footnote 22 The Commission launched its investigation in response to a complaint filed by Greenpeace and Filipino citizens seeking international human rights remedies for the effects of Typhoon Haiyan and other extreme weather events that are more likely to occur due to global warming. The Commission released its final report in May 2022, which included a number of legally significant findings, including, in particular, that "the corporate responsibility to avoid contributing to the impacts of climate change that affect the full enjoyment of human rights extends not only to each coal operator's entire corporate group... but to all operators in their respective coal value chains." " Footnote 23 The Commission also treated the role of Big Coal in climate science as questionable, impeding the transition away from fossil fuels. Footnote 23

The committee said, "The large coal company intentionally monitors climate science, indirectly or indirectly, and through coordination, and the company's products are seriously harmful to the environment and climate systems. In addition to the recognition that it has been concealed, and that the right of the people to make decisions after gaining enough information about the company's products, this intentional conflict could be the basis for responsibility. At least in the footnotes 24, this, according to the committee, this was a morally guilty of a major coal company. Footnote 25

Regarding the specific subjects of legal measures, the parties and applicants have used two common means to disagree with the actions and no n-cropping actions that contribute to climate change. The first means are claiming the policies of the state and corporate policies, which include the ambitions, speeds, and implementation levels of the national easing goal, but not limited. This is a route to about 74 % of the lawsuits after 2015, including recent litigation, such as the Urgenda case and the Brazilian youth in 2021, and is insufficient by the Brazilian government. He argues that the emission target is violating the national climate change policy, the Paris Agreement, and the Brazilian duty. In Nebauer vs. Germany, youth plaintiffs have opposed not only insufficient ambition but also shor t-term concentration and ambiguity of the German government's greenhouse gas emissions. The German Constitutional Court respected the government on the overall constitutional constitution of the climate change plan, but had infringed the basic rights of young people and future generations due to insufficient plans. I mentioned. However, there is a statement that hits the footnote 26 is surprised. < SPAN> committee said, "The large coal company intentionally monitors climate science, indirectly or indirectly, and through coordination, and its products become an environment and climate system. In addition to being recognized as hiding significant harm, having obtained enough information about its products and harming the right of the people to make decisions, this intentional conflict can be the basis for responsibility. I concluded. At least in the footnotes 24, this, according to the committee, this was a morally guilty of a major coal company. Footnote 25

1.2 Key Questions and Emerging Norms in Climate Rights Litigation

Regarding the specific subjects of legal measures, the parties and applicants have used two common means to disagree with the actions and no n-cropping actions that contribute to climate change. The first means are claiming the policies of the state and corporate policies, which include the ambitions, speeds, and implementation levels of the national easing goal, but not limited. This is a route to about 74 % of the lawsuits after 2015, including recent litigation, such as the Urgenda case and the Brazilian youth in 2021, and is insufficient by the Brazilian government. He argues that the emission target is violating the national climate change policy, the Paris Agreement, and the Brazilian duty. In Nebauer vs. Germany, youth plaintiffs have opposed not only insufficient ambition but also shor t-term concentration and ambiguity of the German government's greenhouse gas emissions. The German Constitutional Court respected the government on the overall constitutional constitution of the climate change plan, but had infringed the basic rights of young people and future generations due to insufficient plans. I mentioned. However, there is a statement that hits the footnote 26 is surprised. The committee said, "The large coal company intentionally monitors climate science, indirectly or indirectly, and through coordination, and the company's products are seriously harmful to the environment and climate systems. In addition to the recognition that it has been concealed, and that the right of the people to make decisions after gaining enough information about the company's products, this intentional conflict could be the basis for responsibility. At least in the footnotes 24, this, according to the committee, this was a morally guilty of a major coal company. Footnote 25

Regarding the specific subjects of legal measures, the parties and applicants have used two common means to disagree with the actions and no n-cropping actions that contribute to climate change. The first means are claiming the policies of the state and corporate policies, which include the ambitions, speeds, and implementation levels of the national easing goal, but not limited. This is a route to about 74 % of the lawsuits after 2015, including recent litigation, such as the Urgenda case and the Brazilian youth in 2021, and is insufficient by the Brazilian government. He argues that the emission target is violating the national climate change policy, the Paris Agreement, and the Brazilian duty. In Nebauer vs. Germany, youth plaintiffs have opposed not only insufficient ambition but also shor t-term concentration and ambiguity of the German government's greenhouse gas emissions. The German Constitutional Court respected the government on the overall constitutional constitution of the climate change plan, but had infringed the basic rights of young people and future generations due to insufficient plans. I mentioned. However, there is a statement that hits the footnote 26 is surprised.

The second route is an objection to specific projects and policies that discharge greenhouse gases on a scale that contradicts global warming to prevent global warming. For example, it has filed a lawsuit calling for new coal and oil projects in Ecuador, Uganda, Tanzania and Mozambique. A new airport runway in Vienna and London, a policy of promoting forests in Brazil Amazon, and subsidies for biomass energy business in Korea. In the same way as a hi t-in 28 policy, there are several cases where plaintiffs have disagued the projects designed to promote climate change. For example, in IPC Petroleum France V. France, fossil fuels argued that government decisions with mining permission were infringing property rights. Footnote 29 European Central for Central for Contitude and Human Rights: Proyecto de derechos Económicos, Sociales Y Culturales (Prodesc) v. Electricité de France (EDF) is a consultation with an indigenous community affected by EDF He filed an objection to the construction of a larg e-scale wind power plant, saying that he did not fulfill its obligation. Footnote 30

  1. In particular, our database also includes criminal cases against protest activists against climate change. These cases can be classified in accordance with the distinction between this policy and project, based on the fundamental goals of protests, but the core of the case does not depend on specific policies and projects. It is clear that it is operated to depend on the protest itself, regardless of intention.
  2. Given that rights shifts are relatively recent phenomena, they are not surprising. As shown in Fig. 1. 3, about 66 % of the HRCC lawsuits are in charge or appeal. Footnote 31 In addition, in two cases, the option of appeal is still open, but has not yet appealed. Footnote 32 In addition, although the other two cases have been ruled to support the state, there is no evidence that plaintiffs will appeal. Footnote 33
  3. Figure 1. 3 Figure 1. 3 The second route < SPAN> The second route < SPAN>, according to the parties, is opposition to specific projects and policies that discharge greenhouse gases on a scale that contradicts the state obligations of global warming. It is. For example, it has filed a lawsuit calling for new coal and oil projects in Ecuador, Uganda, Tanzania and Mozambique. A new airport runway in Vienna and London, a policy of promoting forests in Brazil Amazon, and subsidies for biomass energy business in Korea. In the same way as a hi t-in 28 policy, there are several cases where plaintiffs have disjected the projects designed to promote climate change. For example, in IPC Petroleum France V. France, fossil fuels argued that government decisions with mining permission were infringing property rights. Footnote 29 European Centrean Central and Human Rights: ECCHR) and Sociales Y Culturales (PRODESC) v. Electricité de France (EDF) is a consultation with an indigenous community affected by EDF He filed an objection to the construction of a larg e-scale wind power plant, saying that he did not fulfill its obligation. Footnote 30

In particular, our database also includes criminal cases against protest activists against climate change. These cases can be classified in accordance with the distinction between this policy and project, based on the fundamental goals of protests, but the core of the case does not depend on specific policies and projects. It is clear that it is operated to depend on the protest itself, regardless of intention.

1.2.1 The Baseline Norms: An International “Common Ground” on Climate Rights

Given that rights shifts are relatively recent phenomena, they are not surprising. As shown in Fig. 1. 3, about 66 % of the HRCC lawsuits are in charge or appeal. Footnote 31 In addition, in two cases, the option of appeal is still open, but has not yet appealed. Footnote 32 In addition, although the other two cases have been ruled to support the state, there is no evidence that plaintiffs will appeal. Footnote 33

Fig. 1. 3 The second route after 2015 is an opposition to specific projects and policies that discharge greenhouse gases on a scale that contradicts the duty of the state that is engaged in global warming. For example, it has filed a lawsuit calling for new coal and oil projects in Ecuador, Uganda, Tanzania and Mozambique. A new airport runway in Vienna and London, a policy of promoting forests in Brazil Amazon, and subsidies for biomass energy business in Korea. In the same way as a hi t-in 28 policy, there are several cases where plaintiffs have disagued the projects designed to promote climate change. For example, in IPC Petroleum France V. France, fossil fuels argued that government decisions with mining permission were infringing property rights. Footnote 29 European Central for Central for Contitude and Human Rights: Proyecto de derechos Económicos, Sociales Y Culturales (Prodesc) v. Electricité de France (EDF) is a consultation with an indigenous community affected by EDF He filed an objection to the construction of a larg e-scale wind power plant, saying that he did not fulfill its obligation. Footnote 30

In particular, our database also includes criminal cases against protest activists against climate change. These cases can be classified in accordance with the distinction between this policy and project, based on the fundamental goals of protests, but the core of the case does not depend on specific policies and projects. It is clear that it is operated to depend on the protest itself, regardless of intention.

Given that rights shifts are relatively recent phenomena, they are not surprising. As shown in Fig. 1. 3, about 66 % of the HRCC lawsuits are in charge or appeal. Footnote 31 In addition, in two cases, the option of appeal is still open, but has not yet appealed. Footnote 32 In addition, although the other two cases have been ruled to support the state, there is no evidence that plaintiffs will appeal. Footnote 33

1.2.2 A Justiciable Right to Climate Action

Figure 1. 3 Survey status after 2015

The final ruling that the court has issued so far is divided into the results of the petitioner side and the defendant's results. In fact, about 15 % ended in the claimant, and about 14 % ended in the national ruling. In the case of winning, the Urgenda Foundation vs Netherlands. Rodriguez Penha vs Colombia trial ("Amazon's Future Generation S"). Legali vs. Pakistan trial (for major coal companies). The Ireland Environmental Protection Association vs. Ireland Communnel de Grand Synth vs. France Notor Afail A to Tou Tou to France Castilla vs. Columbia Save Ram Save Ram Ram, National Environmental Management Bureau. Wilmung vs. Sorton Falk vs Pakistan Asien Development Private Environmental Assessment Service. Instituto Preservar C. Copelmi Mineracaoa LTDA; Neibauer vs. German Schesta Contrary Prime Minister's Customer Investment Bank and PZU S. A. Development Jesus Open Mine, Jesus Open Mine, Judging on the Etanol Law of the Mexico Supreme Court, Successful Opposition to South African Authority's permission of South African Authority with Earthlife. , Successful claims for administrative decisions that allow urban development to threaten local water layers in South Africa. < SPAN> The final ruling that the court has issued so far is divided into the results of the petitioner and the defendant's results. In fact, about 15 % ended in the claimant, and about 14 % ended in the national ruling. In the case of winning, the Urgenda Foundation vs Netherlands. Rodriguez Penha vs Colombia trial ("Amazon's Future Generation S"). Legali vs. Pakistan trial (for major coal companies). The Ireland Environmental Protection Association vs. Ireland Communnel de Grand Synth vs. France Notor Afail A to Tou Tou to France Castilla vs. Columbia Save Ram Save Ram Ram, National Environmental Management Bureau. Wilmung vs. Sorton Falk vs Pakistan Asien Development Private Environmental Assessment Service. Instituto Preservar C. Copelmi Mineracaoa LTDA; Neibauer vs. German Schesta Contrary Prime Minister's Customer Investment Bank and PZU S. A. Development Jesus Open Mine, Jesus Open Mine, Judging on the Etanol Law of the Mexico Supreme Court, Successful Opposition to South African Authority's permission of South African Authority with Earthlife. , Successful claims for administrative decisions that allow urban development to threaten local water layers in South Africa. The final ruling that the court has issued so far is divided into the results of the petitioner side and the defendant's results. In fact, about 15 % ended in the claimant, and about 14 % ended in the national ruling. In the case of winning, the Urgenda Foundation vs Netherlands. Rodriguez Penha vs Colombia trial ("Amazon's Future Generation S"). Legali vs. Pakistan trial (for major coal companies). The Ireland Environmental Protection Association vs. Ireland Communnel de Grand Synth vs. France Notor Afail A to Tou Tou to France Castilla vs. Columbia Save Ram Save Ram Ram, National Environmental Management Bureau. Wilmung vs. Sorton Falk vs Pakistan Asien Development Private Environmental Assessment Service. Instituto Preservar C. Copelmi Mineracaoa LTDA; Neibauer vs. German Schesta Contrary Prime Minister's Customer Investment Bank and PZU S. A. Development Jesus Open Mine, Jesus Open Mine, Judging on the Etanol Law of the Mexico Supreme Court, Successful Opposition to South African Authority's permission of South African Authority with Earthlife. , Successful claims for administrative decisions that allow urban development to threaten local water layers in South Africa.

European Parliament; Friends of the Irish Environment v. County County Fingal; Zoubek v. Austria; Sacchi v. Argentina; Segovia v. Climate Change Commission; Clean Air Council v. United States; In re the Greenhouse Gas Pricing Act (Alberta); In re the Greenhouse Gas Pricing Act (Saskatchewan); Greenpeace Netherlands v. Ministry of Finance; Greenpeace Netherlands v. Ministry of Finance; Attorney-General v. Crosland; Border Deep Sea Fishing Association v. Shell; Resolution No. 2021-825 DC ["In re Climate Resilience Bill"]; and Views adopted by the UN Human Rights Committee on the communication of Ioane Teitiota. Footnote 36 It also includes cases of “anti-climate action” in which states defended policies and actions aimed at addressing climate change: Portland Pipeline Corporation v. South Portland; IPC Petroleum France v. France; IPC Petroleum France v. France; D. G. Khan Cement Company Ltd. v. Punjab.

Again, the HRCC litigation is still in its infancy, and it is too early to draw hard and fast conclusions about its outcome. In this and subsequent chapters, we focus not on the outcome but on analyzing how litigants and courts have addressed the complex legal issues posed by climate change with new rules and doctrines emerging from filings and decisions. Indeed, this is the task of Section 1. 2.

HRCC litigation tends to revolve around common issues and rules, despite the diversity of jurisdictions, parties, and judges involved. In outlining the new legal theories and rules, we organize our discussion around the key elements of a typical HRCC case. The model is not a precise description of cases, but rather a stylized explanation that is intended to capture an ideal Weberian formula, a basic logic that would cover the vast majority of cases. Some cases and decisions are closer to the ideal formula, but all exhibit some of its characteristics.

1.2.3 The Legally Enforceable “Fair Share” of Climate Mitigation

The legal rules in the procedure vary greatly depending on the judicial jurisdiction area, and the majority of courts who have ruled in the HRCC incident are conducting a hearing on this proposal, so in contrast to the legal regulations in this section. , We will focus on the substantial rules caused by the formal incident. As described in the II Parts, the proof of legal issues, that is, the proof of the plaintiff's individual human rights infringement, and the consequences of human rights abuses and the government's climate change measures, is the concept of human rights and laws. It raises particularly complex issues, and now there is no clear international rule for these issues. Footnote 37

The ideal and typical HRCC case progresses in three steps and straddles two levels (international and domestic) after the Paris Agreement. Each step can be considered as being working on important legal issues:

(1) What are the criteria applied to the judicial evaluation of climate change behaviors of each government under international and domestic laws? The rules and legal theory for dealing with this question, from the rules of Paris Agreements and IPCC recommendations to international human rights and constitutional rules, are related to international and domestic HRCC standard legal status.

(2) In light of these criteria, is the government suffered a legitimate duty to reduce greenhouse gas emissions? Court and litigation are working on this issue through new norms on the judicial examination of climate policy and the legitimate rights for climate systems that can maintain human life.

(3) Does government policies (relating to emissions and specific greenhouse gas emissions) are compatible with these rights and duties? The new norm on this issue is a "fair division" of each country's contribution to global climate easing, in light of climate change and human rights obligations, government behavior and policy compatibility, and government responsibility. It is an attempt to set the standards for remedies that the court should recognize (if any) to pursue.

In sections 1. 2. 1, the rules that have not yet been established are explained in order of these three issues. < SPAN> The rules on the procedure vary greatly depending on the jurisdiction area, and the majority of courts who have ruled in the HRCC incident are conducting a hearing on this proposal, so what is the legal regulations in this section? In contrast, we will focus on the substantial rules caused by formal cases. As described in the II Parts, the proof of legal issues, that is, the proof of the plaintiff's individual human rights infringement, and the consequences of human rights abuses and the government's climate change measures, is the concept of human rights and laws. It raises particularly complex issues, and now there is no clear international rule for these issues. Footnote 37

The ideal and typical HRCC case progresses in three steps and straddles two levels (international and domestic) after the Paris Agreement. Each step can be considered as being working on important legal issues:

(1) What are the criteria applied to the judicial evaluation of climate change behaviors of each government under international and domestic laws? The rules and legal theory for dealing with this question, from the rules of Paris Agreements and IPCC recommendations to international human rights and constitutional rules, are related to international and domestic HRCC standard legal status.

(2) In light of these criteria, is the government suffered a legitimate duty to reduce greenhouse gas emissions? Court and litigation are working on this issue through new norms on the judicial examination of climate policy and the legitimate rights for climate systems that can maintain human life.

(3) Does government policies (relating to emissions and specific greenhouse gas emissions) are compatible with these rights and duties? The new norm on this issue is a "fair division" of each country's contribution to global climate easing, in light of climate change and human rights obligations, government behavior and policy compatibility, and government responsibility. It is an attempt to set the standards for remedies that the court should recognize (if any) to pursue.

In sections 1. 2. 1, the rules that have not yet been established are explained in order of these three issues. The legal rules in the procedure vary greatly depending on the judicial jurisdiction area, and the majority of courts who have ruled in the HRCC incident are conducting a hearing on this proposal, so in contrast to the legal regulations in this section. , We will focus on the substantial rules caused by the formal incident. As described in the II Parts, the proof of legal issues, that is, the proof of the plaintiff's individual human rights infringement, and the consequences of human rights abuses and the government's climate change measures, is the concept of human rights and laws. It raises particularly complex issues, and now there is no clear international rule for these issues. Footnote 37

1.3 Looking Ahead: The Potential and Challenges of Rights-Based climate Litigation

The ideal and typical HRCC case progresses in three steps and straddles two levels (international and domestic) after the Paris Agreement. Each step can be considered as being working on important legal issues:

(1) What are the criteria applied to the judicial evaluation of climate change behaviors of each government under international and domestic laws? The rules and legal theory for dealing with this question, from the rules of Paris Agreements and IPCC recommendations to international human rights and constitutional rules, are related to international and domestic HRCC standard legal status.

(2) In light of these criteria, is the government suffered a legitimate duty to reduce greenhouse gas emissions? Court and litigation are working on this issue through new norms on the judicial examination of climate policy and the legitimate rights for climate systems that can maintain human life.

(3) Does government policies (relating to emissions and specific greenhouse gas emissions) are compatible with these rights and duties? The new norm on this issue is a "fair division" of each country's contribution to global climate easing, in light of climate change and human rights obligations, government behavior and policy compatibility, and government responsibility. It is an attempt to set the standards for remedies that the court should recognize (if any) to pursue.

In sections 1. 2. 1, the rules that have not yet been established are explained in order of these three issues.

The first stage of the typical HRCC trial is to determine the rights and obligations applied to the dispute as a matter of climate change law and human rights law. When determining legal criteria related to judicial evaluation of climate change behavior (or unusual), litigation and courts are often legal "common infrastructure" that are often applied to domestic human rights cases. Use the European Human Rights Court (ECTHR) theory for the same legal "common infrastructure" in the system. Footnote 38 This common base includes the comparison of the international human rights treaty, other "elements of international law", the interpretation of each country, and the religions of the countries that reflect the interpretation of each country and shared values. Note 39) The European Human Rights Committee (ECTHR) stated as a ruling widely used by the parties and court in the Demil and Baikara vs Turkish case: " The petitioning country does not need to ratify all documents applied to the exact theme of the relevant trial, or the majority of international documents or the European councils. It shows the continuous development of the applicable rules and principles, and it is sufficient to show that there is a common base in modern society in the accurate regions.

Regardless of the hypothesis, almost all views and decisions regarding climate easing adopt the principle of the common base of some version. As is clear in the footnotes 41 Table 1. 1, what legal documents are regarded as part of the international common platform depends on the law. Roughly speaking, in most cases, in most cases, in the case of universal and regional treaties ratified by the state and declaring human rights (including procedural and substantial environmental rights under international law). The institution has acknowledged it as an international or customary law. The first stage of the hi t-in 42

Importantly, the common discourse in the HRCC cases includes not only human rights law but also two central elements of the global climate change regime: the Paris Agreement and the IPCC reports. As the IPCC’s findings and recommendations on the impacts of global warming on people became clearer and more precise in its 2014 and 2018 reports, litigants and adjudicators accepted the IPCC reports as the scientific gold standard for assessing human rights violations. Specifically, they incorporated the Paris Agreement’s goal of “limiting the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit warming to 1. 5°C” into a justifiable international common ground. 43 This occurred regardless of the outcome of the dispute. Courts have used the Paris-IPCC standard in judgments issued against states that failed to take sufficient care or action to achieve these goals (such as Ireland’s climate change plan and Mexico’s ethanol restrictions). Courts have also acknowledged this standard in their rulings certifying states when they conclude that the government has taken sufficient measures to contribute to the achievement of these goals (as in Greenpeace).

If confirmed by future disputes, the emerging recognition of an international normative common ground will solidify the convergence of human rights, environmental protection, and climate governance. This convergence has been taking place for over three decades through legal developments such as the prevalence of the right to a healthy environment in national constitutions and laws, the proliferation of rights-based environmental disputes around the world on issues such as air pollution, and the articulation of clear international standards through the UN's "redefinition of human rights and the environment." Footnote 44

Against this common legal and scientific standards, the second stage of the ideal controversy after Paris will insert specific rights and obligations on climate change measures based on these criteria. Is it important here that the government has a legitimate legal obligation to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases as a matter of international human rights and climate change laws?

Regardless of the type of trial and the final results, the judicial institutions and quas i-judicial agencies in HRCC litigation have always been positive to this question. In particular, two new rules are affirmed in this case law. First, the legitimate rights for climate systems that can maintain human life have been recognized as derived from universal human rights or in constitutional rights for a healthy environment. It is important that youth and future generations inhibit the right to enjoy sustainable Earth. In trials such as the Neibauer vs. Germany and the Amazon future generation and Colombia trials, the constitutional human rights rules are interpreted in recognition that young people and future humanity will bear the damage caused by climate change, and the size and urgent problem and urgent problem. He acknowledges the right to justify the government's climate change measures.

The second rule is related to climate change measures, especially the legal ability of the court that executes government obligations regarding emission reduction. The problem of justifying the possibility is (1) a problem of (1) the protection of the rights and the discretion of the policy, and (2) the coordination of the court's obligations that provide relief to infringement of the rights and the principle of the division of rights. As is common in human rights litigation and public interest lawsuits, these issues are becoming more serious due to the characteristics of global warming issues, the scale, time, and uncertainty. < SPAN> As a backdrop of these common legal and scientific standards, the second stage of the ideal controversy after Paris is to extract specific rights and obligations on climate change measures arising from these standards. Will be. Is it important here that the government has a legitimate legal obligation to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases as a matter of international human rights and climate change laws?

Regardless of the type of trial and the final results, the judicial institutions and quas i-judicial agencies in HRCC litigation have always been positive to this question. In particular, two new rules are affirmed in this case law. First, the legitimate rights for climate systems that can maintain human life have been recognized as derived from universal human rights or in constitutional rights for a healthy environment. It is important that youth and future generations inhibit the right to enjoy sustainable Earth. In trials such as the Neibauer vs. Germany and the Amazon future generation and Colombia trials, the constitutional human rights rules are interpreted in recognition that young people and future humanity will bear the damage caused by climate change, and the size and urgent problem and urgent problem. He acknowledges the right to justify the government's climate change measures.

The second rule is related to climate change measures, especially the legal ability of the court that executes government obligations regarding emission reduction. The problem of justifying the possibility is (1) a problem of (1) the protection of the rights and the discretion of the policy, and (2) the coordination of the court's obligations that provide relief to infringement of the rights and the principle of the division of rights. As is common in human rights litigation and public interest lawsuits, these issues are becoming more serious due to the characteristics of global warming issues, the scale, time, and uncertainty. Against this common legal and scientific standards, the second stage of the ideal controversy after Paris will insert specific rights and obligations on climate change measures based on these criteria. Is it important here that the government has a legitimate legal obligation to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases as a matter of international human rights and climate change laws?

Regardless of the type of trial and the final results, the judicial institutions and quas i-judicial agencies in HRCC litigation have always been positive to this question. In particular, two new rules are affirmed in this case law. First, the legitimate rights for climate systems that can maintain human life have been recognized as derived from universal human rights or in constitutional rights for a healthy environment. It is important that youth and future generations inhibit the right to enjoy sustainable Earth. In trials such as the Neibauer vs. Germany and the Amazon future generation and Colombia trials, the constitutional human rights rules are interpreted in recognition that young people and future humanity will bear the damage caused by climate change, and the size and urgent problem and urgent problem. He acknowledges the right to justify the government's climate change measures.

The second rule is related to climate change measures, especially the legal ability of the court that executes government obligations regarding emission reduction. The problem of justifying the possibility is (1) a problem of (1) the protection of the rights and the discretion of the policy, and (2) the coordination of the court's obligations that provide relief to infringement of the rights and the principle of the division of rights. As is common in human rights litigation and public interest lawsuits, these issues are becoming more serious due to the characteristics of global warming issues, the scale, time, and uncertainty.

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Elim Poon - Journalist, Creative Writer

Last modified: 27.08.2024

and Higham, Global trends in climate change litigation (n 1) p. [58] César Rodríguez Garavito, 'Litigating the Climate Emergency - The Global. This chapter asserts a risk-thematic approach for African climate litigation. It engages with the methodological and conceptual approaches that could be used. In this article we define as 'just transition litigation' cases that rely in whole or in part on human rights to question the distribution of the benefits and.

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