National Indian Law Library NILL

Connecticut and Mashantucket Pequot Tribe Reach an Agreement

2018 WL 4681619. Only the Westlaw report is currently available. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA STATE OF CONNECTICUT AND MASHANTUCKET PEQOT TRIBE, PLAINTIFFS, v. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR RYAN ZINKE, DEFENDANTS, CIVIL ACTION NO.: 17-2564 (RC) | 9/29/2018 SIGNED

ATTORNEYS AND LAW FIRM MARK FRANCIS KOHLER, ROBERT WILLIAM CLARK, JOSEPH J. CHAMBERS, MICHAEL K. SCHOLD, CONNECTICUT ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, SPECIAL LITIGATION SECTION, HARTFORD, CT, ROBERT LEE ZIPPS, KANE SMITH JR, Drummond Woodsum MacMahon, Portland, ME, Catherine F. Munson, Keith M. Harper, Kilpatrick Townsend & amp; amp; Stockton, LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintients. Devon Lehman McCune, U. S. Department of Justice, Denver, CO, for defendant.

MEMORANDUMU. S. DISTRICT JUDGMENT RUDOLPH CONTRERAS

MGM's Motion for Appeal GRANTED; Federal Motion to Dismiss DENIED for Defendants

I. Introduction

The permitting and regulating gambling (or "gaming") on Native American ("tribal") lands requires a careful balance of tribal, state, and federal law, and this case concerns that balance. Plaintiffs, the State of Connecticut ("State") and the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe ("Pequot"), are seeking to amend the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA") process for permitting gaming on Pequot lands in Connecticut. The amendments are necessary for the Pequot to operate a commercial casino on Connecticut lands. The amendments require the plaintiffs to obtain the Secretary of the Interior's ("Secretary") approval of the proposed amendments, which the Secretary has refused to approve. Plaintiffs argue that IGRA requires the Secretary of the Interior and the U. S. Department of the Interior (collectively, the “Department of the Interior”) (the “Federal Defendants”) to certify that the amendments have been approved, and the Court has required the Secretary of the Interior to publish a notice of approval in the Federal Register.

MGM Resorts Global Development, LLC (hereinafter "MGM"), a multinational commercial casino company, if the Secretary approves the amendment proposed by the plaintiff, PEQUOT is MGM in the commercial gaming market in the Connecticut and nearby states. He argues that this lawsuit has an interest in a competitive advantage to the company. First, MGM proposes a casino development at the Bridgeport, Connecticut State and PEQUOT, and whether the state will approve one proposal from the other proposal is an issue in this lawsuit. He claims that it will be greatly influenced by the decision of the Secretary. Second, the MGM remains the last obstacle that hinders the development of casinos in the Connecticut East Winzer, which is directly competing with MGM casinos in Springfield, Massachusetz, by the Secretary approved by the defendant. He claims to be. Therefore, MGM calls him to participate as a defendant.

Currently, the court has submitted a federal defendant's rejected claim, the MGM participation in the defendant, and several relevant claims. For the reasons described below, the court accepts the defendant and rejects the defendant's complaint, saying that it has not proven the claims for rescue.

II. Fact

Α. The background of legal and regulation IGRA regulates class III casinogaming (black jack, roulette, and other table games) in the tribal land. 25 U. S. C. § 2701 et Seq. 25 C. F. R. § 502, 4; Amador Cty. Of Cal. V. , Amador CTY. The United States Law Collection Article 2710 (1) (C). Usually, such permissions are secured through negotiations between tribes and states, that is, "tribal and stat e-o f-th e-scenes". Article 25 of the United States Code, Article 2710 (D) (3) (A). However, IGRA has given the Secretary of the Secretary to determine the "procedure" ("Secretary Procedure" or "Procedure"), which allows the tribe and state to reach the class III gaming. See Article 271 (D) (7) (B) (VII) (VII). Two forms of approval, one tribe and state agreement and secretary procedure, are specified by separate provisions of IGRA as follows.

1. The compact Article 2710 (D) (8) stipulates the approval of the compact tribal qualification, and the Federal Rules Collections, Article 293, Paragraph 1 shall apply this clause. Article 2710 (D) (8) (a) gives the Secretary Picture to approve the compact, and Article 293, Paragraph 3 of the Federal Rules, Article 293, Paragraph 3 further provides the authority to approve the compact correction. 。 Article 293, Paragraph 3 of the Federal Rules Collection 25 also gives the Secretary's authority to approve the tribal compact and its correction. The Secretary shall have one of the compact tribal compact and its correction within 45 days after receiving it. Federal Rules Collections, Article 293, Paragraph 4 (b), Article 293, Paragraph 12. The Secretary violates (1) IGRA, (2) violating the other provisions of federal law, which has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of gaming in the tribal land, (3) the US trust obligations on the United States. By one of the three reasons that violates, it is possible to reject compact or compact fixes. The United States Code 25 Article 2710 (D) (8) (B). Article 293, Paragraph 14 of the Federal Rules Collection 25. The important thing for this behavior is that within 45 days, the Secretary does not explicitly approve or be dismissed by the Secretar y-General of the compact or tribal status in [2710 (D) (8) (a)]. In some cases, its compact or correction is "must be considered to have been approved by the Secretary." "Federal rules, Article 293, Paragraph 12 of the Federal Regulations.

The status revision of the compact or compact or compact tribe, approved by the Secretary, or approved by the law, will enter into effect when the notification of the approval is published in the Federal Gazette. Federal Rules Collections, Article 293, Paragraph 15 (A). The Secretary also said, "We must publish within 90 days after approval, and the Secretary must announce the notification of approval within 90 days from the date of the Indian Gaming Bureau accepted an agreement or amendment. "Noboru" (Federal Rules Collection, Article 293 (A)). Article 225 of the United States Law 2710 (D) (8) (D). Article 293, Paragraph 15 of the Federal Rules Collection 25. In other words, the Secretary can only among the corrections of the compact or compact tribal status within 45 days after the receipt, only one of the three specified reasons, and the Secretary immediately If the compact or compact fix is not accepted, the approval must be promptly represented by the Federal Gazette.

2. Article 2710 (D) (7) stipulates a secretary procedure for tribal gaming in a compact tribal nation if the tribal and the state do not reach a sincere agreement. If there is no agreement, the tribe shall first appeal to the state in the Federal Court in Article 2510 (7) (A) (i) in the United States Code. If the court concluded that the state had not negotiated compactly, the court would return to the parties to negotiate and create a compact within 60 days. The same article. § If the tribe and the state cannot reach the agreement within 60 days, "the two tribes submit the proposed compact to the mediator appointed by the court to the last best proposal for compact. I have to do it. " Article 2710 (D) (7) of the same law. § Article 2710 (D) (7) (B) (IV).

If the tribe and the state are assigned to mediation, the mediator is "the most appropriate from the two proposal two compacts, the federal laws of [IGRA], the federal law, and the court's findings and orders. You must select "to" select "and submit the selected compact to the state and tribes. Article 2710 (d) § If the state agrees with the selected compact proposal, the proposal is based on Article 2710 (D) (3) and Article 2710 (D) (8). Treated. The same Article. Article 2710 (D) (7) (B) (VI). However, if the state does not agree, Ombuzmann informs the Ombudsman that "the Secretary and the Secretary will set up a procedure that meets the compact proposal selected by the Ombudsman after consultation with the Indian tribe." I have to do it. "It is. In short, the rescue provisions of §2710 (D) (7) (b) (VII) are compact for the tribe and the state in each stage of the process that the tribe and the state have new negotiations. On the other hand, if other means, the government has been designed to promote the process to conclude. 2710 (D) (7) (7) does not promulged the rules for implementing Article 2710 (7). If not, if there is no agreement on a secretary procedure for tribal gaming, the tribe first in the Federal Court Article 270 (7) (a) (I). If the state must not negotiate a compact negotiation, the court will return to the negotiations within 60 days. § If the tribe and the state cannot reach the agreement within 60 days, "the two tribes have submitted the proposed compact to the mediator for the last. I have to do it. " Article 2710 (D) (7) of the same law. § Article 2710 (D) (7) (B) (IV).

If the tribe and the state are assigned to mediation, the mediator is "the most appropriate from the two proposal two compacts, the federal laws of [IGRA], the federal law, and the court's findings and orders. You must select "to" select "and submit the selected compact to the state and tribes. Article 2710 (d) § If the state agrees with the selected compact proposal, the proposal is based on Article 2710 (D) (3) and Article 2710 (D) (8). Treated. The same Article. Article 2710 (D) (7) (B) (VI). However, if the state does not agree, Ombuzmann informs the Ombudsman that "the Secretary and the Secretary will set up a procedure that meets the compact proposal selected by the Ombudsman after consultation with the Indian tribe." I have to do it. "It is. In short, the rescue provisions of §2710 (D) (7) (b) (VII) are compact for the tribe and the state in each stage of the process that the tribe and the state have new negotiations. On the other hand, if other means, the government has been designed to promote the process to conclude. 2710 (D) (7) Rules for implementing (7) are not promulgated by Article 2710 (D) (7) when the tribe and the state are not sincere agreement. If there is no agreement on the implementation of a secretary procedure for tribal gaming, the tribe first in the Federal Court, Article 271 (A) (I). If the state has to do a compact negotiation, the court will return to the negotiations within 60 days. If the state cannot reach the agreement within 60 days, "The two tribes must submit the proposed compact to the mediator appointed by the court to the last best proposal for compact. No. " Article 2710 (D) (7) of the same law. § Article 2710 (D) (7) (B) (IV).

B. Procedural History This case originally involved two tribes operating casinos in Connecticut: the Pequot and the Mohegan Tribe of Connecticut Indians ("Mohegan") (the "Tribes"). The Pequot has operated under a secretarial procedure ("Pequot procedure") since 1991 because it was unable to reach an intertribal compact with the state. See Complaint, Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 913 F. 2d at 1032-33; cf. 56 Fed. Kan. 24. 996 (May 31, 1991). The Mohegan, on the other hand, has operated under a tribal-state compact ("Mohegan Compact") since 1994. Compl. ¶ 24; 59 Fed. Kan. 65, 130 (Dec. 16, 1994).

Importantly, the Pequot Procedures MOU and Mohegan Compact MOU provide that the State may receive up to 30% of the Tribe's gross operating revenues derived from certain gaming activities, and that if the State permits "any other person" to operate such games, the State forfeits its right to receive royalties (the "Exclusivity Clause"). See Pequot Procedures MOU, Mohegan Compact MOU. By their provisions, both the Pequot Procedures and Mohegan Compact may only be amended by written agreement between the Tribe and the State, and an amendment shall not become effective until the Secretary has approved it and published notice of such approval in the Federal Register pursuant to 25 U. S. C. § 2710(d)(3)(B). 5 Pequot Procedures at 49-50? Mohegan Compact at 47.

In 2015, the tribes agreed to form a joint venture, MMCT Venture LLC ("MMCT"), to build and operate a commercial off-reservation casino in East Windsor, Connecticut. See Uri Clinton's Dec. ("Clinton Decl.") ¶ 17-19, ECF No. Intervene Supp. Defs. ("MGM Intervention Mem.") Ex. A, ECF No. 11-3. In 2017, the tribes incorporated MMCT, stating that Public Law 17-89. 6 2017 Cong. Acts 17-89 (Kan. Cess.) Public Law 17-89 authorizes MMCT to "conduct licensed gaming at a casino located at 171 Bridge Street, East Windsor." § 14(β).

The legislation of the law suggests that the law has "launched the development of MG M-owned land," in Springfield, Massachusetts, and MGM claims it. 12 miles from Eastwinder. SENATE HEARING ON PUBLIC LAW 17-89 Before Gen. Assembly (Conn. One member of the Diet has expressed his intention to protect "regional monopoly" in "Native American Gaming". A very large MGM casino will soon open in the spring field. "I say. (Martin Rooney's remarks). The members of the Diet said that East Windsor Casino said," I provide the Connecticut State to keep the state niche in this important division. He said that it was a process step. Was stated. The second member of the Diet said, "If there is a propulsion behind [ACT], it is possible that MGM is open and operated, so you may lose your income immediately." Same above (remarks by Senator Steve Cassano).

The state parliament agreed to approve the East Windsor tribal casino, but the State Congress will be a no n-split organization in which MMCT will be gaming in Connecticut if there are no appropriate protection measures. He seemed to be aware of the exclusive clause of Procedures and Mohegan Compact Memoranda of Understanding. Therefore, the Public Law 17-89, (1) the tribe and the governor, performed "Revision" of Pequot Procedures, Mohegan Compact, and Memorandum of Understanding, set up MMCT exceptions, and "MMCT approval is in Connecticut State. Unless it is, its approval is not effective. " Casino) Gaming does not terminate the "duty of the tribe that pays the royalty from the gaming activity". (2) In accordance with [IGRA], in accordance with "IGRA]," shall be deemed to have been approved by the Secretary or approved. IGRA] and (3)-(4) amendments by the Connecticut State Congress. The tribe must be approved in 2017 that the state can appeal to the state if the MMCT does not pay. 89 § 14 (C) (Reg. Sess.).

In order to meet the conditions of the law, the state and tribes were amended to revise the Pecot procedures and Mojigan agreements, and agreed to exclude MMCT from the exclusive clause. supplement. ¶ 27. During the correction process, the tribes said that the Indian Gaming Bureau had called for technical support, and plaintiffs and others said that they "repeatedly to the tribal representatives that they intend to approve the correction." That's right. ¶¶ 28-31. The tribes and state approved and executed the corrections in accordance with the tribal law and state law. Same up. 33.

From late July 2017 to early August 2017, the tribes requested that Bureau of Indian Gaming officially approved the correction, as required by the PEQUOT procedure, Mohegan Compact, and 17-89 public law. The same book. ¶ 32. However, instead of approving the amendment, the Secretary "returned" the "to maintain the status quo" to the plaintiff and stated: Insufficient information to determine whether a new The casino operated by the Mojigan tribe and the Mashan Tacket Pecot tribe (hereafter, tribe) violates the gaming exclusive clause of the agreement. Judge that there is. The tribes signed an agreement with the state and agreed that this agreement would not violate the exclusive [clause]. Therefore, we do not need our actions at this time. See also ECF No. 9-8, 9-16; 8 Corm. 37.

The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the trial, as the Secretar y-General did not obtain the approval of the revised proposal. Since the tribes have submitted a amendment, more than 90 days have passed, so IGRA (Article 2710 (D) (8)) of IGRA (U. S. Code (D) (8)) has been approved by the Secretary. He argues that he has demanded the approval of the approval in the Federal Gazette. That's right. ¶¶ 41-60. According to the plaintiffs, the not doing so is arbitrary and whim, and does not follow the law, violating the administrative procedure law (5 U. S. C. § 706), the authorities of the authorities are illegal. It is on hold. They declare (1) the Secretary that the Secretary did not cope with the correction that was deemed to have been approved, and declared an arbitrary and whimsical method that violates IGRA, and (2) to the Secretary of the country. The official gazette is seeking an order to forcibly publish the notification of amendment approval. 12. In order to meet the conditions of the law, the state and tribes have revised the Pecot procedure and the Mojigan agreement, and agreed to exclude MMCT from the exclusive clause. supplement. ¶ 27. During the correction process, the tribes said that the Indian Gaming Bureau had called for technical support, and plaintiffs and others said that they "repeatedly to the tribal representatives that they intend to approve the correction." That's right. ¶¶ 28-31. The tribes and state approved and executed the corrections in accordance with the tribal law and state law. Same up. 33.

The plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the trial, as the Secretar y-General did not obtain the approval of the revised proposal. Since the tribes have submitted a amendment, more than 90 days have passed, so IGRA (Article 2710 (D) (8)) of IGRA (U. S. Code (D) (8)) has been approved by the Secretary. He argues that he has demanded the approval of the approval in the Federal Gazette. That's right. ¶¶ 41-60. According to the plaintiffs, the not doing so is arbitrary and whim, and does not follow the law, violating the administrative procedure law (5 U. S. C. § 706), the authorities of the authorities are illegal. It is on hold. They declare (1) the Secretary that the Secretary did not cope with the correction that was deemed to have been approved, and declared an arbitrary and whimsical method that violates IGRA, and (2) to the Secretary of the country. The official gazette is seeking an order to forcibly publish the notification of amendment approval. 12. In order to meet the conditions of the law, the state and tribes have revised the Pecot procedure and the Mojigan agreement, and agreed to exclude MMCT from the exclusive clause. supplement. ¶ 27. During the correction process, the tribes said that the Indian Gaming Bureau had called for technical support, and plaintiffs and others said that they "repeatedly to the tribal representatives that they intend to approve the correction." That's right. ¶¶ 28-31. The tribes and state approved and executed the corrections in accordance with the tribal law and state law. Same up. 33.

In mi d-2018, the Secretary approved the plaintiff's Mojigan compact amendment and published its approval in the Federal Gazette. 83 fed. Reg. 25. First Joint Status Report at 1, ECF No. 41. Mohegan has agreed to reject Mohegan claims after obtaining the requested for the complaint. In general, the dismissal abolition, ECF No. 40. However, PEQUOT and state have continued to claim the federal defendant, as the Secretary did not approve the plaintiff's correction for the PEQUOT lawsuit.

The interest of the MGM participating in this lawsuit is due to the involvement of the commercial casino market in Connecticut and the surrounding state. 9 In 2014, MGM acquired a casino development license in Springfield, Massachusetts. ¶ 13. MGM built a facility for four years to open a spring field casino in 2018. Similar. ¶¶ 13-16. In 2015, during the construction of a spring field, the MGM began to develop a commercial casino in the southwestern conjutcat near the bridge port. Clinton Decl. 5.

In order to promote Connecticut's proposal, and in contrast to the tribal East Windsor's proposal, MGM competes for the right to operate the Connecticut's first commercial casino, rather than giving the tribes through MMCT. We requested the state to adopt a selection process. That's right. 6. From 2015, MGM has worked on the process at the Connecticut State Congress with the governor and other state leaders. Same up. However, despite the MGM lobby activities, the Connecticut State Congress passed the public law 17-89 in 2017, and approved MMCT to operate an East Windsor casino as the first commercial casino in the state. See 2017 Conn. Acts 17-89 § 14 (B) (Kan. Sess.). As mentioned above, the site of East Windsor Casino is only 12 mile south of the MGM Springfield casino, and at least it seems that it was approved by the General Assembly because it could compete with Springfield casinos. Clinton Decl. 17, 19.

Despite the setbacks before the annual meeting, in September 2017, the MGM announced a 675 million dollar casino project in a bridge port, ensuring contracted rights for development candidate sites. Clinton Decl. ¶¶ 8-9. MGM has also announced that it will seek bridgeport casinos approval during the 2018 Connecticut General Assembly. Clinton Decl. ¶ 10. In December 2017, the tribes announced their own bridgeport casino projects that competed with MGM proposals. Clinton Decl. ¶¶ 21-22.

There are several ripe claims in the court. What is particularly important is (1) MGM claims (ECF No. 11) to participate as a defendant (1) and (ECF No. 18), which calls for the dissolution (ECF No. 18). The court will easily examine two of them, and examine other claims while evaluating the MGM participation and the opposition to the defendant's dismissal.

First, the court acknowledged the federal defendant to abandon local rules 7 (n) because there is no need to investigate administrative records. 11 Fed. Defs. LABOR LOCAL CIVIL RULE 7 (N), ECF No. 49. In this way, the court shall follow the comparison of other courts in this jurisdiction if an administrative record is not necessary for the decision of the rejected. See also Mdewakanton Sioux Indians of Minn. Peta v. U. S. Fish & Amp; amp; Wildlife Serv., 59 F. Supp. 3D 91, 94 n. Despite the setbacks before the annual general meeting, in September 2017, the MGM announced a $ 675 million casino project by a bridge port, ensuring the rights of the development candidate site. Clinton Decl. ¶¶ 8-9. MGM has also announced that it will seek bridgeport casinos approval during the 2018 Connecticut General Assembly. Clinton Decl. ¶ 10. In December 2017, the tribes announced their own bridgeport casino projects that competed with MGM proposals. Clinton Decl. ¶¶ 21-22.

First, the court acknowledged the federal defendant to abandon local rules 7 (n) because there is no need to investigate administrative records. 11 Fed. Defs. LABOR LOCAL CIVIL RULE 7 (N), ECF No. 49. In this way, the court shall follow the comparison of other courts in this jurisdiction if an administrative record is not necessary for the decision of the rejected. See also Mdewakanton Sioux Indians of Minn. Peta v. U. S. Fish & Amp; amp; Wildlife Serv., 59 F. Supp. 3D 91, 94 n. Despite the setbacks before the annual meeting, in September 2017, the MGM announced a 675 million dollar casino project in a bridge port, ensuring contracted rights for development candidate sites. Clinton Decl. ¶¶ 8-9. MGM has also announced that it will seek bridgeport casinos approval during the 2018 Connecticut General Assembly. Clinton Decl. ¶ 10. In December 2017, the tribes announced their own bridgeport casino projects that competed with MGM proposals. Clinton Decl. ¶¶ 21-22.

Second, the court rejects the plaintiff's allegations of the plaintiff's briefing schedule, as the schedule proposed by the plaintiff does not promote the effective solution of the trial. PLS. Mot. In the current schedule, the abbreviation of the plaintiff's subordinates remains in charge of the federal defendant's rejected petition until 30 days later. reference. The ECF No. plaintiff, which allows c o-claims regarding changes in the preparation document submission schedule, is currently asking the court to examine the substantial claim at the same time as the federal defendant's rejection. This is because the plaintiffs argue that these claims have raised certain common law issues. argument. Fixed a briefing schedule (6). That may be a fact, but the plaintiff's claim has raised additional issues that have not been raised in the federal defendant, and plaintiffs have opposed the formula of the party backed by the court in administrative records. Before considering, it has not offered enough reasons to deviate from the APA's normal procedure, which disposes a request.

III. Legal standards

Α. Federal rules 24 (a) Intervention as a right of rights, "The intervention right prescribed by the rules 24 is given to all parties who actually have interest to the controversy, and the benefits of justice are the most well achieved. The basic legal premise of "is specifically specified: [If you apply in a timely manner, you can interfere with the lawsuit. However, unless the claimant claims the property or transaction, and the claimant is not properly represented by the existing parties If the Federal Code 24 (A) may not be lost or hindered. In the current schedule, the allegation of the Federal Defendant is subsequent. The plaintiff is now specified by the Court, which is now considered to be a joint claim on the change in the submitted schedule, and to simultaneously filed a submitted claim for the federal defendant. It may be a federal defendant's claim because it has been raised to make a common legal issue. An additional problem is raised, and plaintiffs deviate from the normal APA procedure to dispose of the claim before the court examines the opposition to the abbreviation of the parties supported by the administrative record. It has not offered enough reasons.

III. Legal standards

Α. Federal rules 24 (a) Intervention as a right of rights, "The intervention right prescribed by the rules 24 is given to all parties who actually have interest to the controversy, and the benefits of justice are the most well achieved. The basic legal premise of "is specifically specified: [If you apply in a timely manner, you can interfere with the lawsuit. However, unless the claimant claims the property or transaction, and the claimant is not properly represented by the existing parties The Court of the Court of the Federal Code 24 (A), which may not be damaged or may be hindered. Rejected the plaintiffs of the Federation of Defendants in the current schedule. The plaintiff, which is now, is now looking for a specific claim for the Federal Defendant's rejection of the Federal Defendant's claim. It is an additional claim for the federal defendant, although it is a federation of bleeding schedule. The plaintiff has raised the problem, and the court deviates from the normal APA procedure of disposing of the proposal before examining the opposition of the parties supported by the administrative record. Not presented.

III. Legal standards

D. C. Circuit: (1) whether the motion to join was timely filed, (2) whether the moving party asserts an interest in the property or transaction that is the subject of the lawsuit, (3) whether the moving party is in a position where disposition of the lawsuit would impair or impede its ability to protect its interest, and (4) whether the moving party's interest is adequately represented by an existing party. See Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Norton, 322 F. 3d 728, 731 (D. C. C. 2003) (citations omitted); see also Jones v. Prince George's Cty, Md., 348 F. 3d 1014, 1017 (D. C. ir. 2003) (citing the four factors in Rule 24(a) "timeliness, interest, impairment of interest, and adequacy of representation"). Moreover, a plaintiff seeking to join in right under Rule 24(a) must have Article 3 standing to join the action. See Jones, 348 F. 3d at 1017; Fund for Animals, 322 F. 3d at 731-32.

B. The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 706(1). The APA empowers courts to "compel agency action that has been unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed." Unlike provisions that direct courts to "set aside" unlawful conduct (5 U. S. C. § 706(2)), § 706(1) "provides a remedy for failure to act." " Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Zinke , 260 F. Supp. 3d 11, 20 (D. D. C. 2017) (citing Norton v. S. Utah Wilderness All. ("SUWA") , 542 U. S. 55, 62, 124 S. Ct. 23 159 L. Ed. However, "a section 706(1) claim may proceed only if a plaintiff alleges that an agency failed to take a specific administrative action that was required." SUWA, 542 U. S. at 64, 124 S. Ct. 2373. A "law" that creates a mandatory requirement need not be a statute but may be an "agency rule having the force of law." In short, section 706 A plaintiff seeking to compel an agency to "compel unreasonably delayed... action" under section 1 must point to agencies that have failed to take specific compelling action. See SUWA, 542 U. S. at 64, 124 S. Ct. 2373.

Γ. Federal Civil Procedure Regulations 12 (B) (6) The Federal Litigation Rules requested the defendant to notify the defendant and request that the complaint includes the "concise and obvious statement of claims". I am. Federal Civil Procedure Regulations 8 (A) (2); Agreement Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U. S. 89, 93, 127 S. CT. 2197, 167 L. ED. The complaints of the rejection based on the rules 12 (B) (6) do not test the possibility that the plaintiff will eventually succeed in this proposal. Rather, it is questionable whether the plaintiff's claim is appropriate. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U. S. 232, 236, 94 S. CT. 1683, 40 L. ED. The court that considers such a claim assumes that the claim of the facts in the complaint is true. Feel free to interpret the plaintiff. For example, see United States v. Philip Morris, Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d 131, 135 (D. D. C. 2000). The plaintiff does not need to describe all of the spelled materials in the complaint. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U. S. 506, 511-14, 122 S. CT. 992, 152 L. ED. 2D 1 (2002); Bryant V. See 2010).

However, in order to withstand the complaints of the rejection, the complaint must include sufficient facts that are recognized as the truth in order to "make the plausible salvation claim." 2D 868 (2009) (Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twomble, 550 U. S. 544, 570, 127 S. CT. 1955, 167 L. ED. 2D 929) (20). (Even if the fact is suspicious), it is sufficient to raise the right to receive relief to a level of guessing, assuming that all claims of the complaint are true. " Therefore, "an irregular description of the element of the complaint, supported by a mere conclusion description" is not enough to withstand the rejection. IQBAL, 556 U. S. at 678, 129 S. CT. 1937. The court does not need to accept the plaintiff's legal conclusions as truth, and does not have to estimate the accuracy of the legal conclusions expressed as facts. See TWOMBLY, 550 U. S. at 555, 127 S. CT. 1955.

If the complaint, which includes the APA claim based on Article 706 (1) of the United States Law Collection, cannot identify individual compulsory duty, the court allows the defendant's rules 12 (B) (6). , We must reject the claim. For example, see Network Conservation Network V. Pritzker, 70 F. Supp. 3D 427, 439-41 (D. D. C. 2014), 809 F. 3D 664 (D. C. C., 2016). Also, Sierra Club V. Jackson, 648 F. 3D 848, 853-54 (D. C. CIR. 2011) (If the plaintiff claims class obligations appropriately, the rules 12 (b) (1), but the rules 12 (b) ) (6) Explains that it is properly analyzed.)

IV. MGM participation claim

The court first collects MGM participation. "The court is not theoretical, or sufficiently responsible, stated in a statement that supports participation, complaints, reply to participation, and pleasure, unless there are false or malicious intent, or other objections. Think of it as the truth, draws Wildearth Guardians v. Salazar, 272 F. R. 4, 9 (D. D. C. 2010) For). Also, Foster V. Gueory, 655 F. 2D 1319, 1324 (D. C. IR., 1981) ("The evidence of the obstruction is usually a sufficiently recognized issue in the response of the petition, complaint, and obstruction. "As mentioned above, the court determines whether MGM is qualified to be a defendant or not. If Jones, 348 F. 3D at 1017. MGM is qualified, the Court 24 (A) says that the Court "Title, Further, and Propaid rights. It is necessary to take into account the rights of the rights.

Before reaching the elements of Article 24 (A), the judge shall consider whether or not the MGM has a status of Article 3 to participate in the lawsuit. "It is sel f-evident that the article demands damages, causal relationships, and compensation, and the court concluded that MGM satisfies all of these three requirements.

1. First, the court must determine whether MGM would suffer actual injury if the plaintiffs were successful in this action. In Lujan v. Defs of Wildlife, 504 U. S. 555, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 119 L. Ed. 2d 351 (1992), the Supreme Court explained the elements of injury in production as requiring proof of an actual or imminent, rather than hypothetical or speculative, harm to a legally protected interest that is (a) specific and particularized, and (b) not hypothetical or speculative. 560, 112 S. Ct. 2130. When a party seeks to join as a defendant to support a government action, as in this case, that party must show that it would "suffer actual injury from the defeat of the government action it seeks to defend, that the harm would be caused by the defeat, and that the harm would be avoided if the government action were upheld." Potawatomi cmty. v. United States ("Forest County I"), 317 F. R. D. 6, 11 (D. D. C. 2015) (citing Am. Horse Prot. Ass'n, Inc. v. Veneman, 200 F. R. D. 153, 156 (D. D. C. 2001)). The court concluded that MGM met these elements.

MGM's damage claim is twofold. First, it argues that modifying the Pequot procedure would allow MMCT to open new commercial casinos without depriving the state of hundreds of millions in annual royalty payments, thus giving the state an incentive to prioritize MMCT's proposals (in Bridgeport and elsewhere) over MGM's proposals. "MGM Intervention MEM. at 15. Second, the amendment "would give MMCT the exclusive right to operate a new commercial casino in East Windsor, thereby creating new competition just 12 miles from the new MGM Springfield site." Based on the recent case in this jurisdiction, Forest County I, MGM argues that it has standing because "approval of the amendment would put MGM's casino project at a disadvantage relative to the Tribe's competing proposal." Id. at 13. MGM also argues that it has standing under the "competitive position doctrine" because "an order requiring the Secretary to approve the amendment would expose MGM to new competition." Id. at 15. The Court agrees that Plaintiffs are entitled to joinder in that their relief -- the Secretary's approval of Plaintiffs' proposed amendment to the PEQUOT proceeding -- sufficiently prejudices MGM.

MGM persuasively argues that, despite defendants' strenuous efforts to distinguish Forest County, our analysis of MGM's ability to compete for its casino project in Connecticut should be guided by Forest County. Forest County joined the Forest County Potawatomi Community ("Potawatomi") in its challenge to the Secretary's decision to award an amendment to the compact of tribal status between the Potawatomi and the State of Wisconsin under IGRA. 317 F. R. D. at 8. The amendment included a provision requiring the State to compensate the Potawatomi for lost revenues if another tribe secured land for gaming purposes within 50 miles of the Potawatomi's existing gaming facility in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Id. at 9. In other words, the ordinance created a "50-mile noncompete zone" around the Potawatomi facility. In rejecting the amendment, the Secretary noted that it would improperly impose a duty on the Wisconsin Indian tribes to "compensate the Potawatomi for revenues lost from the Menominee's proposed casino in Kenosha, Wisconsin, approximately 33 miles from the Potawatomi's gaming facilities." We agree. The Menominee's plans to build a casino required federal approval. Yes, that's right.

The Menominee sought to be joined as a matter of right, arguing that the amendment, as the Potawatomi had requested, "if adopted or deemed adopted would have a direct and adverse effect on [the Menominee's] right and interest to conduct gaming in Kenosha." "Id. at 10. The Court concluded that "Menominee has sought to develop gaming facilities on the Kenosha lands for many years. [Menominee] will continue those efforts. 11. However, the Potawatomi's proposed non-competitive zone would significantly increase the cost of Menominee's casino license because it would require the State to compensate the Potawatomi for lost revenues. Thus, Potawatomi's "requested relief, if granted, would, as a practical matter, impede Menominee's efforts to obtain a governmental consent agreement and impede its efforts to develop gaming facilities in Kenosha." Id. at 12. Id. at 12. The Court concluded that this competitive harm was sufficient to convey Menominee's eligibility to participate. Id.

MGM is also eligible for the same reason that Menomy was qualified in Forest County I. Just as Potaawami in Forest County I, the plaintiffs, have called for a private casino developer like MGM, as Potawatomi calls out the fact that the Secretary has been dismissed for the fixes that are advantageous for the tribe and the state. The company calls for the fact that the Secretary did not approve the agreement amendment to the tribe in the state casino market. The immediate plan for the tribe is to build a casino in East Windsor, but this amendment is a royalty that receives a tribal casino gaming business, even if MMCT builds a casino elsewhere in the state. Is to prevent losing. See MGM Intervuation Mem. Ex. C, ECF No. 11-5. As MGM points out, the tribes are planned to utilize this advantage when competing with MGM to approve the casino in the bridge port. Clinton Decl. Brium Urges Competitive Bidding for A BridgePort Casino, The Day (Dec. 7, 2017). Ou t-o f-area When asking for a state approval of gaming, it is a disadvantageous position in competitive ", and" [MGM] is determined to be the rescue of [[plaintiffs]] She is in a competitive position. The plaintiffs in the state casino market for private casino developers such as MGM, as the Secretary requested that the Secretary of the Tribal and the State was dismissed. He calls for the immediate plan for the tribe in East Windsor, which is the case that the government has not approved the agreement to be advantageous. Even if a casino is built elsewhere, it is to prevent the state from losing the royalty received from the tribal casino gaming business. Se e-5, as pointed out, the tribes are planned to use this advantage when they compete with the casino in the bridge. Competitive Bidding for A Bridgeport Casino, The Day (Dec. 7, 2017). 13 "[MGM] is determined to be rescue to request [MGM] when seeking state approval of ou t-o f-residence gaming. "In a competitive disadvantage," and "[plaintiffs] of the plaintiffs], the decision of the court, which recognizes the demands, is" MGM] in a competitive disadvantage when seeking a state approval of ou t-o f-residence gaming. "Let me" is the same reason for participating in the MGM for the same reason for participating in the Forest County I. As the secretary sought to overturn what was dismissed, plaintiffs and others have revised the agreement to private casino developers such as MGM, which will be advantageous to the tribe in the state casino market. We are seeking to overturn what we did not approve. The immediate plan for the tribe is to build a casino in East Windsor, but this amendment is a royalty that receives a tribal casino gaming business, even if MMCT builds a casino elsewhere in the state. Is to prevent losing. See MGM Intervuation Mem. Ex. C, ECF No. 11-5. As MGM points out, the tribes are planned to utilize this advantage when competing with MGM to approve the casino in the bridge port. Clinton Decl. Brium Urges Competitive Bidding for A BridgePort Casino, The Day (Dec. 7, 2017). Ou t-o f-area When asking for a state approval of gaming, it will be in a competitive disadvantage ", and" [MGM] is "MGM], which is" MGM], "seeks the state approval of the outer land gaming. You will be in a competitive disadvantage. "

MGM also has a persuasive claim that if the Secretary's decision is overturned, the casino in the MGM spring field will have a new competition, so that the normal competition principle will be applied here. MGM Intervention Mem. At 15. Competition law, in fact, in fact, when a certain economic entity has "removed regulated restrictions on competitors, or not, or to intensify competition against the competitors. It acknowledges that it will be damaged. Sherley v. SEBELIUS, 610 F. 3D 69, 72 (Internal Quotation Marks Omitted) 67 (D. C.).) See also Canadian Lumber Trade All. V. United States, 517 F. 3D 1319, 1332 (Fed. CIR. 2008). 2008) (This is an economy that concludes that the government intensifies competition or acts to help the plaintiff's competitors are more likely to cause de facto damage. It depends on the reasoning. " For example, in the SHERLEY incident, the Court has said that the plaintiffs are eligible for the government rules to allow government subsidies for new type of research. 610 F. 3D AT 72-74. Federal patrol Appeals said, "There is no reason for those who are competing in search of the government to claim the benefit." MGM also claims to be convincing that if it is overturned the Secretary's decision, a new competition will occur in the casino in the Spring field of the MGM, so that the conventional competition will be applied here as well. MGM Intervention Mem. At 15. Competition law, in fact, in fact, when a certain economic entity has "removed regulated restrictions on competitors, or not, or to intensify competition against the competitors. It acknowledges that it will be damaged. Sherley v. SEBELIUS, 610 F. 3D 69, 72 (Internal Quotation Marks Omitted) 67 (D. C.).) See also Canadian Lumber Trade All. V. United States, 517 F. 3D 1319, 1332 (Fed. CIR. 2008). 2008) (This is an economy that concludes that the government intensifies competition or acts to help the plaintiff's competitors are more likely to cause de facto damage. It depends on the reasoning. " For example, in the SHERLEY incident, the Court has said that the plaintiffs are eligible for the government rules to allow government subsidies for new type of research. 610 F. 3D AT 72-74. Federal patrol Appeals said, "There is no reason for those who are competing in search of the government to claim the benefit." MGM also has a persuasive claim that if the Secretary's decision is overturned, the casino in the MGM spring field will have a new competition, so that the normal competition principle will be applied here. MGM Intervention Mem. At 15. Competition law, in fact, in fact, when a certain economic entity has "removed regulated restrictions on competitors, or not, or to intensify competition against the competitors. It acknowledges that it will be damaged. Sherley v. SEBELIUS, 610 F. 3D 69, 72 (Internal Quotation Marks Omitted) 67 (D. C.).) See also Canadian Lumber Trade All. V. United States, 517 F. 3D 1319, 1332 (Fed. CIR. 2008). 2008) (This is an economy that concludes that the government intensifies competition or acts to help the plaintiff's competitors are more likely to cause de facto damage. It depends on the reasoning. " For example, in the SHERLEY incident, the Court has said that the plaintiffs are eligible for the government rules to allow government subsidies for new type of research. 610 F. 3D AT 72-74. Federal patrol Appeals said, "There is no reason for those who are competing in search of the government to claim the benefit."

Competition cases may involve competition in the national interest, but "it is not necessary that the competitive position be wholly uninvolved in the national interest." ATA (Air Transp. Ass'n of Am.) v. Export-Import Bank of the U. S., 878 F. Supp. 2d 42, 57-58 (D. D. C. 2012), revived on other grounds, Delta Air Lines v. Export-Import Bank of the U., 718 F. 3d 974 (D. C. ir. 2013). For example, the Supreme Court has held that "a financial institution's competitors may challenge an agency's actions that relax statutory restrictions on the financial institution's activities." Trustee Nat'l Credit Union. v. First Nat. Bank & amp; amp; Trustee Nat'l Credit Union. v. First Nat. Bank & amp; amp; 2d 1 (1998). Similarly, Mova Pharm. Corp. v. Shalala In ATA, 878 F. Supp., the district court held that generic drug manufacturers may intervene as defendants to uphold FDA regulations governing how generic drug manufacturers may enter and compete in the generic drug market. The decision is at 140 F. 3d 1060, 1074 (D. C. Cir. 1998). These cases make clear that "the rationale for the competitor doctrine is that the plaintiff is harmed by increased competition." ATA, 878 F. Supp.

Applying these principles, MGM has a competitor to defend the Secretary's decision not to approve the Pequot amendments. The parties agree that Public Law 17-89 conditionally authorizes the tribe to operate the East Windsor casino, and the only condition to be met is the Secretary's approval of the Pequot amendments. MGM's Mot. Intervention ("Fed. Defs. Intervention Opp'n") at 10-11, ECF No. In other words, if the Secretary is directed to consider the amendment approved, MGM Springfield's casino will face "imminent increased competition" from a tribal casino less than 20 miles away that is, in effect, a significant injury to its underlying competitive position. P. M. Inst. of Certified Pub. accountants v. IRS , 804 F. 3d 1193, 1197-98 (D. C. Cir. 2015) (holding that an association of CPAs and accounting firms has competitors who can challenge IRS rules that allow "unregistered preparers" to obtain certain qualifications and list their practices on the IRS list, making it easier for them to compete with the plaintiffs).

The attempts of the parties trying to weaken the MGM damage theory lack persuasive power. First, the federal defendant said, "MGM does not indicate that a casino developed by tribes in other states will always separate customers from the MGM spring field. As suggested that the tribal casino competes with the MGM spring field, the tribe is in MGM Intervention Mem. Experts have submitted testimonies about the "competitive threats" given to casinos in Connecticut. See: See Statement of Dr. Clyde W. Barrow, Hearing Before J. Comm. On Finance, Revenue and Bonds, Gen. Assemble at 1-3 (Colo. 2017). Aside from the 14, aside from evidence, "basic economic logic" suggests that two large casinos within 15 miles compete for users. P. M. Inst. Of Certified Pub. 804 F. 3D at 1198 (Quotes United V. ICC, 891 F. 2D 908, 912 n. MS of Competitive Injury Based on Basic Economic Logic Can Establish Standing)), MGM, at this stage, has fully argued that the tribes East Windsor casinos will compete. attempts of the parties trying to weaken the MGM damage theory are lacking persuasive. First, the federal defendant said, "MGM does not indicate that a casino developed by tribes in other states will always separate customers from the MGM spring field. As suggested that the tribal casino competes with the MGM spring field, the tribe is in MGM Intervention Mem. Experts have submitted testimonies about the "competitive threats" given to casinos in Connecticut. See: See Statement of Dr. Clyde W. Barrow, Hearing Before J. Comm. On Finance, Revenue and Bonds, Gen. Assemble at 1-3 (Colo. 2017). Aside from the 14, aside from evidence, "basic economic logic" suggests that two large casinos within 15 miles compete for users. P. M. Inst. Of Certified Pub. 804 F. 3D at 1198 (Quotes United V. ICC, 891 F. 2D 908, 912 n. MS of Competitive Injury Based on Basic Economic Logic Can Establish Standing)), MGM, at this stage, has fully argued that the tribes East Windsor casinos will compete. The attempts of the parties trying to weaken the MGM damage theory lack persuasive power. First, the federal defendant said, "MGM does not indicate that a casino developed by tribes in other states will always separate customers from the MGM spring field. As suggested that the tribal casino competes with the MGM spring field, the tribe is in MGM Intervention Mem. Experts have submitted testimonies about the "competitive threats" given to casinos in Connecticut. See: See Statement of Dr. Clyde W. Barrow, Hearing Before J. Comm. On Finance, Revenue and Bonds, Gen. Assemble at 1-3 (Colo. 2017). Aside from the 14, aside from evidence, "basic economic logic" suggests that two large casinos within 15 miles compete for users. P. M. Inst. Of Certified Pub. 804 F. 3D at 1198 (Quotes United V. ICC, 891 F. 2D 908, 912 n. MS of Competitive Injury Based on Basic Economic Logic Can Establish Standing)), MGM, at this stage, has fully argued that the tribes East Windsor casinos will compete.

Second, the parties argue that Public Law 17-89, not the proposed amendments to the PEQUOT proceedings, authorized the East Windsor casino and that MGM's alleged competitive injury therefore results from the passage of Public Law 17-89, not the Secretary's approval of the Pequot proceedings. Mohegan & Pequot Opp'n MGM's Mot. Intervenors ("Tribes Opp'n Intervention") at 17-18, ECF No. 16 Fed. Defs. Intervention Opp'n at 10-11. In other words, the parties argue that MGM's alleged injury is too "speculative or hypothetical" to support standing with respect to the Secretary's decision. The parties similarly argue that the competitor doctrine is inapplicable because it applies to agency actions that "directly affect a market," where the Connecticut Legislature's actions, not the Secretary's decisions, affected the commercial casino market and caused MGM's alleged injury. Fed. Defs. Intervention opposition at 8-9. Tribal intervention opposition at 15-16. In making these arguments, plaintiffs liken the case to Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Bank Export-Import Bank of U. S., 85 F. Supp. 3d 250 (D. D. C. 2015). In that case, the plaintiffs challenged certain "intimate proceedings." Second, the parties argue that Public Law 17-89, not the proposed amendments to the PEQUOT proceedings, authorized the East Windsor casino and that MGM's alleged competitive injury therefore results from the passage of Public Law 17-89, not the Secretary's approval of the Pequot proceedings. Mohegan & Pequot Opp'n MGM's Mot. Intervenors ("Tribes Opp'n Intervention") at 17-18, ECF No. 16 Fed. Defs. Intervention Opp'n at 10-11. In other words, the parties argue that MGM's alleged injury is too "speculative or hypothetical" to support standing with respect to the Secretary's decision. The parties similarly argue that the competitor doctrine is inapplicable because it applies to agency actions that "directly affect a market," where the Connecticut Legislature's actions, not the Secretary's decisions, affected the commercial casino market and caused MGM's alleged injury. Fed. Defs. Intervention opposition at 8-9. Tribal intervention opposition at 15-16. In making these arguments, plaintiffs liken the case to Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Bank Export-Import Bank of U. S., 85 F. Supp. 3d 250 (D. D. C. 2015). In that case, the plaintiffs challenged certain "intimate proceedings." Second, the parties argue that Public Law 17-89, not the proposed amendments to the PEQUOT proceedings, authorized the East Windsor casino and that MGM's alleged competitive harm therefore results from the passage of Public Law 17-89, not the Secretary's approval of the Pequot proceedings. Mohegan & Pequot Opp'n MGM's Mot. Intervenors ("Tribes Opp'n Intervention") at 17-18, ECF No. 16 Fed. Defs. Intervention Opp'n at 10-11. In other words, the parties argue that MGM's alleged harms are too "speculative or hypothetical" to support standing with respect to the Secretary's decision. The parties similarly argue that the competitor doctrine is inapplicable because it applies to agency actions that "directly affect a market," where the Connecticut Legislature's actions, not the Secretary's decisions, affected the commercial casino market and caused MGM's alleged injury. Fed. Defs. Intervention opposition at 8-9. Tribal intervention opposition at 15-16. In making these arguments, plaintiffs liken the case to Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Bank Export-Import Bank of U. S., 85 F. Supp. 3d 250 (D. D. C. 2015). In that case, the plaintiff challenged certain "intimate proceedings."

But here, unlike the nonoperational EIP challenged on Delta's routes, Public Law 17-89 has been passed by the Connecticut Legislature. MGM has not asserted "hypothetical or hypothetical" damages based on future legislative action. The necessary legislative action has already occurred, and approval of the Secretary's amendments to the PEQUOT proceedings "has a clear and immediate likelihood" of causing competitive injury to MGM by inducing construction of the East Windsor casino. Id. at 262 (quoting Relevant Gas Distributions v. FERC, 899 F. 2d 1250, 1259 (D. C. Cir. 1990)). Also, ATA, 878 F. Supp. 2d at 57-58 (Plaintiffs argued that they had standing to challenge the Export-Import Bank's EIPs when, in doing so, they identified specific transactions within the EIPs that benefited foreign competitors). In other words, overturning the Commissioner's decision here would "directly affect the market" by removing the ultimate barrier to the development of the East Windsor casino. 17 Third, the parties attempted, but failed, to distinguish from Forest County i. The federal defendants argued that MGM's alleged injury from increased competition for congressional approval of a casino in Bridgeport was "much less direct" than Menominee's injury in Forest County i, because even if the Commissioner's decision were overturned here, MGM would still have to seek approval from "local governments and the Connecticut Legislature" to enter the commercial casino market. Federal Counsel Intervention at 13-14? But the federal defendants acknowledge in their briefs that the Commissioner's decision in Forest County "will have a direct and concrete effect on Menominee by making it less likely that the Governor will approve a gaming facility in Menominee." Fed. Defs. Opp'n at 13. Similarly, if the proposed amendment were approved, it would make it less likely that the State would approve MGM's Bridgeport casino. La. Energy & Power Auth., 141 F. 3d at 367 (arguing that a company has standing to challenge a government rule limiting prices to its competitors because the plaintiffs "will be harmed by increased price competition.").

In addition, the parties involved in the questions raised in the case of FOREST COUNTY I, that is, the appropriate management of Menominee is maintained by IGRA as a tribe under the IGRA supervision, but is not regulated by IGRA. He claims that it has nothing to do with MGM as a person. See Tribal Intervention Opp'N at 11-12. However, the FOREST COUNTY I Court does not take that fact in evaluating the position of Menominee, and this court actively participates in MGM actively participating in MGM. We believe that there is no connection with the MGM position because it affects the commercial casino market in the area. 19 Promoted Secretary's Obligation of Gaming Opportunities may have been related to the decision of the Secretary of the Secretary, who rejected the decision to have filed an objection in FOREST COUNTY I, but to overturn that decision. It is not associated with target damage and is not related to the potential damage of MGM here. The plaintiff has the right to participate in the interpretation of the law that intends to make the MGM successful by presenting the MGM a amendment to "become a competitive disadvantage when demanding gaming approval outside the state". I created the situation. Forest County I, 317 F. R. D. at 12.

2. Secondly, the court must determine whether the MGM will be "damaged by disabled (the decision of the Secretary), and if the government's measures are affirmed, the damage will be avoided". 。 Am. Horne Prot. Ass'n, 200 F. R. D. at 156. The court concluded that MGM meets this standard.

As described in the secretary of the Secretary of the Tribe, the decision to make the PEQUOT procedure revision of the PEQUOT procedure remain the current status of the commercial casino market. At present, the proposal of a commercial casino submitted by MGM or MMCT and approved by the General Assembly violates the exclusive clause of the tribe. Therefore, MGM and the tribes are equal to competing in the lobby activities in the legislative office in search of their approval. Also, if the decision to support the Secretary's actions is made, the tribal East Windsor Casino will not be approved, and the MGM Springfield Casino will no longer face new competition.

On the other hand, an order directing the Secretary to approve the amendment would waive the exclusivity provisions in both the Mohegan Compact and the Pequot proceedings, and therefore the amendment would waive the exclusivity provisions in both the Mohegan Compact and the Pequot proceedings. Also, this decision would satisfy the final unsatisfied condition of Public Law 17-89 and therefore immediately permit the East Windsor Casino Tribe to develop an East Windsor casino to compete with MGM's Springfield casino. Therefore, this decision would inflict the competitive injury described above on MGM. See La. Energy & amp; amp; Power Auth., 141 F. 3d at 404 (holding that plaintiffs' competitive injury from increased price competition as a result of FERC's orders "will be remedied by the court's favorable judgment setting aside FERC's orders") ("Plaintiffs will not suffer increased competition from trucks operating with Mexico throughout the United States, according to the justification and relief requirements of Article III regulations.").

The parties refuse to budge on this point, relying on New World Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 294 F. 3d 164 (D. C. C., 2002), to argue that even if the court were to reverse the Commissioner's decision, MGM would lack standing to sue because it would have other opportunities to avoid injury when it lobbied the Connecticut Legislature for casino operations and against tribal operations. Dissenting Opinion in Tribal Intervention 18; Fed. OPP'N Intervention at 6. In New World Radio, the D. C. C. Circuit held that a radio station does not have standing to challenge the FCC's license renewal of another station if the station is located in another city. New World Radio, 294 F. 3d at 171. The Court argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing because "competitive harm," if any, would occur only if Pocomoke's license were transferred to and secured by the Washington, D. C. programming area, and "therefore the challenged decision is at best a first step toward future competition." True.

The New World Radio dependent parties' arguments miss the point. If the Secretary were required to approve the Pequot Procedure amendments, as plaintiffs request, MGM would immediately lose its ability to lobby the Connecticut Legislature for casino approval on an equal footing with the tribes. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Shalala , 91 F. 3d 1493, 1499 (D. C. C. ir. 1996) ("The alleged injury is exposure to competition as a result of FDA's [regulations], and the answer is no that FDA should simply allow competing products to enter the market and leave the purchasing decision to consumers."). And the Connecticut Legislature has already approved the Tribes' East Windsor casino, subject to the Secretary's decision on the challenge. Thus, the Secretary's decision is not the first step, but rather the only step, toward increased competition between the state's next commercial casino and MGM's Springfield casino.

Other precedents quoted by the parties are more useful than the New World Radio because the MGM caused much greater speculative damage than the MGM faced. Similar. ARPAIO V. Obama, 797 F. 3D 11, 20 (D. C. CIR. The theory of plaintiffs' officers who need to spend resources). NW Airlines, Inc. 1986) (The plaintiff ((pilot) was hired by other airlines "and said," Even if (pilot) was hired by other airlines, The possibility that the pilot is employed by another airline is higher than the possibility that the pilot is employed by another airline, which is higher than the possibility of being employed by another airline, and the passenger and the plaintiff's crew. The possibility of flying to the area that has actually been damaged is too far away, and the court does not need to make a hypothetical leap. This amendment immediately harms the MGM negotiations with the state, and immediately allows the Court of Court of the MGM Springfield to support this revision. Other cases of the current market for the casino approval have caused much more speculative damage than the MGM faced here. Same as New World Radio is more useful, Obama, 797 F. CIR. He commits a crime in a specific county, and the plaintiff's theory of plaintiffs' sheriffs, Inc., is hired by other airlines. "It is possible that (pilot) is hired by other airlines (pilots), even if (pilots) are employed by other airlines (pilots). The possibility of flying in areas where the plaintiff, which is higher than the possibility of being employed by the company, has actually damaged passengers and [plaintiffs] crew, is [to configure damage. This is too far, and this is not necessary to make a leap in the MGM of MGM. The decision of the court, which supports this amendment, will be opened by the current market for the approval of this amendment. The precedent is more useful than the New World Radio, because the MGM caused a much greater speculative damage than the MGM faced here. Similar. ARPAIO V. Obama, 797 F. 3D 11, 20 (D. C. CIR. The theory of plaintiffs' officers who need to spend resources). NW Airlines, Inc. 1986) (The plaintiff ((pilot) was hired by other airlines "and said," Even if (pilot) was hired by other airlines, The possibility that the pilot is employed by another airline is higher than the possibility that the pilot is employed by another airline, which is higher than the possibility of being employed by another airline, and the passenger and the plaintiff's crew. The possibility of flying to the area that has actually been damaged is too far away, and the court does not need to make a hypothetical leap. This amendment immediately harms the MGM negotiations with the state, and immediately allows the Court of Court of the MGM Springfield to support this revision. It will maintain the current market value for casino approval.

With respect to available relief, the parties repeat many of the arguments made in the courts above. Plaintiffs also argue that "the judgment in this action cannot remedy the harm MGM believes is caused by the State's regulatory scheme." Opp'n Intervention Tribes at 21. However, MGM does not allege that its harm is "caused" by the State's regulatory scheme, but rather that its harm is caused by MGM's ability to compete within that scheme. A decision upholding the Secretary's decision would (1) preserve MGM's ability to compete on an equal basis with the Tribes for the right to build a casino in Bridgeport, thereby preventing the Tribes from gaining an advantage; and (2) preserve MGM's current competitive position at its Springfield casino, thereby preventing the entry of a competitor. Thus, this decision would remedy MGM's potential harm.

Β. Having established that MGM was entitled to participate through timeliness, we next consider the first federal factor of Rule 24(a): whether MGM's motion was timely. The timeliness of a motion to joinder must be "judged in light of all the circumstances." F. 2d 1285, 1295 (D. C. Cir. 1980)). "The timeliness requirement is primarily directed to preventing potential interference from unduly disrupting the litigation and unfairly prejudicing an existing party." Roane v. Leonhart, 741 F. 3d 147, 151 (D. C. ir. 2014) (internal citations, quotation marks, and alterations omitted). The parties do not argue that MGM's motion to join was premature because it was filed less than a month after plaintiffs filed their complaint and before the federal defendants appeared in court. Under these circumstances, the court concluded that MGM's intervention did not unduly disrupt the litigation, especially since MGM filed interim reports as the litigation progressed.

Γ. Interests. Second and Third Rule 24(a) requires the Court to consider whether MGM has demonstrated a "legally protected interest in the litigation," but that interest is diminished. Sec v. Prudential Sec. Inc, 136 F. 3d 153, 156 (D. C. Cir., 1998). This "test functions primarily as a 'practical guide' designed to dispose of disputes with as many parties as is consistent with efficiency and due process." 100Reporters LLC v. DOJ, 307 F. R. D. 269, 275 (D. D. C. 2014) (quotes Wildearth Guardians, 272 F. R. D. at 12-13). In determining whether a petitioner's interests are abated, courts in this jurisdiction consider the realistic consequences that the petitioner may suffer if the intervention is denied. See Nat. Res. Council v. Costle, 561 F. 2d 904, 909 (D. C. Cir., 1977). P. m. Horse Prot. Ass., 200 F. R. D. at 158.

The federal defendants and MGM recognize that, as in this case, potential interveners "have constitutional standing and necessarily have an interest in the property or transaction that is the subject of the litigation." 788 F. 3d 312, 320 (D. C. Cir., 2015) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)). See also Safari Club Int'l v. Salazar, 281 F. R. D. 32, 38 (D. D. C. ir. 2012) ("The relevance of damages and causation to the lodging challenge requirement is inextricably linked to the second and third elements of Rule 24(a)."). For the same reasons MGM is entitled to intervene, namely that reversing the Secretary's decision would immediately reduce MGM's chances of obtaining State approval for its Casino Bridgeport proposal and create imminent competition for MGM's Springfield casino, MGM has demonstrated a statutorily protected interest in this litigation that could be diminished if intervention was denied.

Δ. Appropriate representatives of profits In the end, the rules 24 (a) calls the court to consider whether the profit of MGM is appropriately represented by the federal defendant. The Supreme Court explains that "the appropriate requirements for (a rule 24 (a)) will be satisfied if the petitioner may have insufficient proxy on his interests." And the burden of the proof must be treated as a minimum. "Trubovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U. S. 528, 538 N. 10, 92 S. CT. 630, 30 L. ED. 2D 686 (1972); Fund for Animals, 322 F. 3D AT 735-36 Similarly, the D. C. C. Police Court also described this requirement as "not burdensome." Dimond V. District of Columbia, 792 F. 2D 179, 192 (D. C. IR., 1986). At & amp; amp; T, 642 F. 2D at 1293 In such cases, participants and governments may agree in such cases in legal positions and action policies, but D. C. patrol accusations say, "Government agencies appropriately make the interests of the intended participants. He often concludes that he does not represent, "he says, mainly, 322 F. 3D at 736. This is the primary of the government's primary obligations. On the other hand, the duty of the participants is not to represent the interests of the American people. The Supreme Court asks for the appropriate proxy for (a rule 24 (a)), asks the Court to consider whether the federal defendant is appropriately represented. It is said that it is satisfied with the possibility of being insufficient. " 10, 92 S. CT. 630, 30 L. ED. 2D 686 (1972); Fund for Animals, 322 F. 3D AT 735-36, the D. C. C. Dimond V. Unless it is clear that the parties are absent, they are usually allowed to intervene (7a Charles Alan Wright & Amp; Amp? Arthur R. In such cases, participants and governments are law The D. C. patrol accusation has agreed, "the government often concludes that government agencies do not properly represent the interests of the intended participants." , 322 F. 3D at 736. This is mainly the government's primary obligation, "the obligation is to represent the interests of the American people", whereas the participants' duty is "representing the interests of the American people. Because it is not to do. Δ. Appropriate representatives of profits In the end, the rules 24 (a) calls the court to consider whether the profit of MGM is appropriately represented by the federal defendant. The Supreme Court explains that "the appropriate requirements for (a rule 24 (a)) will be satisfied if the petitioner may have insufficient proxy on his interests." And the burden of the proof must be treated as a minimum. "Trubovich v. United Mine Workers, 404 U. S. 528, 538 N. 10, 92 S. CT. 630, 30 L. ED. 2D 686 (1972); Fund for Animals, 322 F. 3D AT 735-36 Similarly, the D. C. C. Police Court also described this requirement as "not burdensome." Dimond V. District of Columbia, 792 F. 2D 179, 192 (D. C. IR., 1986). At & amp; amp; T, 642 F. 2D at 1293 In such cases, participants and governments may agree in such cases in legal positions and action policies, but D. C. patrol accusations say, "Government agencies appropriately make the interests of the intended participants. He often concludes that he does not represent, "he says, mainly, 322 F. 3D at 736. This is the primary of the government's primary obligations. On the other hand, the duty of the participants is not to represent the interests of the American people.

We agree with MGM that "the Secretary's public service obligations and fiduciary duties to the Tribes are distinct from MGM's commercial considerations and may result in different positions at trial." MGM Intervention Mem. The federal defendants' fiduciary duties to the Tribes are particularly important because the Tribes are MGM's competitors. See Tribal Intervention Dissent 5 (discussing the Secretary's "fiduciary duties to the Tribes"). "The fact that [MGM] and the [federal defendants] have now agreed to a litigation structure does not mean that [the federal defendants] will necessarily represent [MGM]'s interests during the litigation. 20 100Reporter, 307 F. R. D. at 280 (citing Wildearth Guardians, 272 F. R. D. at 19-20 ("While there are certainly common concerns, it is not difficult to imagine how the interests of [the interveners] and the other [federal] defendants might diverge over the course of the litigation" (quotations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, although MGM's interests currently overlap with those of the federal defendants, the Court finds that MGM has satisfied the interests of the federal defendants.

As explained above, MGM may properly be joined as a defendant because it has demonstrated that it falls within Article 3 and meets the requirements of Article 24(a). 21 But the Court's inquiry does not end there, for "federal district courts may impose appropriate conditions or limitations on an intervenor's participation in the proceeding." Wildearth Guardians, 272 F. R. D. at 20 (citing Fund for Animals, 322 F. 3d at 737 n. 11). (1) MGM will not assert cross-claims, counterclaims, or other ancillary claims against Defendant and the Federal Defendants. (3) MGM will not seek extensions of time or changes to the briefing schedule without the consent of the other parties. (4) MGM's briefs in support of or against the proposal will be no more than 30 pages, and any rebuttal briefs will be no more than 20 pages.

The court concludes that MGM can participate as a defendant, and the court explains the direction of the lawsuit as an MGM defendant participant in the ECF No. If there is a right, the plaintiff's claim calls for the exclusion of the MGM status report (ECF No. 44).

V. Federal defendant's rejected claim

The court will follow the federal defendant's claim. As mentioned earlier, the plaintiffs have argued that the Secretary had violated the APA because it did not assume the impact. In accordance with the IGRA approval provisions, approve the PEQUOT procedure correction proposal. Generally see supplements. However, under the IGRA and its enforcement rules, the defendant argues that the sam e-time requirements are applied to the approval of the Secretary's procedure and procedure amendment to the approval of the Secretary's Compact and Compact Revision. Based on this interpretation of IGRA, the "forced time frame" that stipulates the secretary's actions on the modification of Mojigan Compact, which the plaintiff claims, does not apply to the Pecot procedure. Fed. PLTIAL DISMISSAL (Fed. Fed. Fed. Fed.

The plaintiffs are not surprising, reading IGRA completely different. The defendants' "how to read the IGRA" and Article 293 are the actions of all parties, including the intentions of the explicit and implicit parliament, the rules of relevant legal interpretation, and the defendants themselves. He argues that the defendant's lawyer is against the prior legal opinion, the provisions of the Pecot Compact itself, and the common sense. "23 The plaintiffs argue that the plaintiff's claim is valid and is properly submitted to the court despite the rejection of Mohegan. The court is an interim report of MGM, which supports the federal defendant's rejection (the Court of the ECF No., the Court of the MGM as a defendant's defendant, has the right to express his opinion on the direction of the lawsuit (MGM). Reject the plaintiff's claim for the exclusion of ECF No. 44).

V. Federal defendant's rejected claim

The plaintiffs are not surprising, reading IGRA completely different. The defendants' "how to read the IGRA" and Article 293 are the actions of all parties, including the intentions of the explicit and implicit parliament, the rules of relevant legal interpretation, and the defendants themselves. He argues that the defendant's lawyer is against the prior legal opinion, the provisions of the Pecot Compact itself, and the common sense. "23 The court claims that the plaintiff's claim is valid and is appropriately submitted to the court despite the rejection of Mohegan. MGM interim report that supports federal filing filing (ECF No.) MGM status report (ECF No.) says that the Court of ECF No. has also had the right to express the direction of the lawsuit as a MGM defendant. Reject the plaintiff's claim for the exclusion of 44).

V. Federal defendant's rejected claim

The Court must first consider the parties' interpretation of IGRA and what deference should be given to the Department's interpretation, and then determine the effect that the proper interpretation would have on the Court's jurisdiction and the sufficiency of Plaintiffs' claims. The Court concludes that Defendants' interpretation of IGRA is supported by the plain meaning of the relevant provisions, and therefore the Secretary need not act in the manner Plaintiffs affirm. From this conclusion, the Court should dismiss the action for failing to state a claim sufficient to grant relief.

A. IGRA Interpretation Plaintiffs, Defendants, and MGM argue that IGRA prescribes a specific outcome, but dispute what that outcome should be. Defendants and MGM argue that IGRA, in its unequivocal terms, imposes strict deadlines on the Secretary's consideration of compact tribal states, but does not impose deadlines on the imposition of procedures or the approval of changes to procedures. In general, Fed. Defs. Mem? Mgm Mem. Plaintiffs argue that the purposes of IGRA, the legal rules, and Federal Defendants' positions require that the same deadlines imposed under 25 U. S. C. § 2710(d)(8) should apply to both compacted tribal status and the Secretary's proceedings and any amendments thereto. In general, Pls. Diss. We conclude that the Court is not required to follow the Department's interpretation of IGRA, but agrees with Federal Defendants and MGM in not applying the same approval time requirements to Secretary's proceedings that IGRA applies to status agreements.

1. When analyzing an agency's interpretation of a program (here, the agency's interpretation of IGRA), the Court has followed Chevron, U. S. A., Inc. Council, 467 U. S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 81 L. Ed. In this context, the Court begins by asking "whether Congress has directly addressed the issue at hand," and if so, the Court must apply that unmistakable expressed intent. 842-43, 104 S. Ct. 2778. When the Court finds a statute ambiguous, it must evaluate whether the interpretation is reasonable. 842-43, 104 S. Ct. 2778. This approach is based on the theory that statutory ambiguity is an implied delegation from Congress to an agency to fill a gap in the statute. FDA v. Brown & amp; Williamson Tobacco Corp, 529 U. 120, 159, 120 S. Ct. 1291, 146 L. Ed. 2d 121 (2000) (citing Chevron, 467 U. S. at 844, 104 S. Ct. 2778).

Plaintiffs argue that if the Court reaches the second stage of the Chevron framework, the federal defendants' interpretation should not be given deference. 24 See generally PLS. Sur-reply. They argue that the defense is improper because (1) the Division's litigation position is not the type of statement that an agent would offer in defense of Chevron, especially when the Division has not previously explained its interpretation; (2) the "Indian interpretation rule" supersedes any presumptions of the Agency; and (3) the Division's interpretation is not a permissible interpretation of IGRA. Id. at 2-7. We agree with Plaintiffs' first argument and therefore do not endorse Federal Defendants' interpretation. 1. When analyzing an agency's interpretation of a program (here, the agency's interpretation of IGRA), the Court has followed Chevron, U. S. A., Inc. Council, 467 U. S. 837, 104 S. Ct. 2778, 81 L. Ed. In this context, the Court begins by asking "whether Congress has directly addressed the issue at hand," and if so, the Court must apply that unmistakably expressed intent. 842-43, 104 S. Ct. 2778. When the Court finds a statute ambiguous, it must evaluate whether the interpretation is reasonable. 842-43, 104 S. Ct. 2778. This approach is based on the theory that statutory ambiguity is an implied delegation from Congress to an agency to fill a gap in the statute. FDA v. Brown & amp; Williamson Tobacco Corp, 529 U. 120, 159, 120 S. Ct. 1291, 146 L. Ed. 2d 121 (2000) (citing Chevron, 467 U. S. at 844, 104 S. Ct. 2778).

In the Mirror vs. Clinton case, 687 F. 3D 1332, 1340 (D. C. C. 2012), the Supreme Court said (1) that "it seems that the parliament generally gave the authority to promulged the rules of law." In addition, (2), it was announced that Chevron's defending would be applied only when the interpretation of an organization claiming to defend was passed on in the exercise of its authority. Same up. 533 U. S. 218, 226-27, 121 S. CT. 2164 (2001). Whether the Ministry of Agency's reasonable interpretation satisfies the second requirement of the second is based on the form and context of the interpretation. See Miller, 687 F. 3D at 1341. For example, D. C. CIRCUIT does not follow the position of a ministry. Village of Barrington, Ill. V. Surface Transp. Bd., 636 F. 3D 650, 660 (D. C. CIR. 2011). It does not point out an unprecedented interpretation. Miller, 687 F. 3D at 1341-42.

The federal government may have the authority to promulged rules under IGRA, but the interpretation here has not been promulgated as the exercise of its authority. Federal defendants have not specified any guidance on the ministry that the ministry thinks that the approval procedure applied to the compact between the tribes and the state is not applied to the secretary procedure, and is even more notified and commented. There is no guidance. As the plaintiff has pointed out, Sur-Reply at 2, Department's Letter Event "The Challenged Amendmentments, DO Not Explain the DepARTMENT'S Se e-8 and 9-16. Rather, the Federal Defendant is calling on the court to relieve their assumptions in the case and the compact approval for the tribes and state after the deadline. Fed. Defs. Reply Br. 。 See Miller, 687 F. 3D at 1340-41 25.

Since Chevron is not applied, the court must define the meaning of (IGRA) in the traditional method: "The court must define the meaning of [IGRA] in the traditional method. The court is IGRA. The court of the federal claims for the reasons for the simple meaning of the issues. This is because the interpretation of IGRA is the right way to read.

2. IGRA's plain meaning, this court must start with the adoption of compacts between tribes and state, secretary procedures, and the IGRA provisions that define them. If the article is clear, the court must enforce according to the provisions. Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., Ltd. S. S. S. S. 242, 251, 130 S. CT. 2149, 176 L. ED. 2D 998 (2010).

The federal defendant and MGM correspond to the IGRA submission, which stipulates the defendant's dismissal by the IGRA article, as the IGRA subsection that stipulates the approval of the compact between the tribes and the state, but the implementation of the secretary procedure. He claims that it does not fall under the IGRA subsection. This basic rule is "If the compact described in the (a) item is submitted to the Secretary for approval, if the Secretary does not approve or accepted the compact, the compact is the Secretary. It is regarded as approved. " The "compact described in the subpalograph (a)" is "a tribe between the Indian tribes and the state that manages the gaming in the Indian land of the Indian tribe and the state." be. Article 2710 (D) (8). § Article 2710 (D) (8) (a). The provisions that impose the approval period on the 45th do not mention secretary procedures such as Pecot procedures imposed in accordance with Article 2710 (D) (7). Chevron is not applied, so the court must define the meaning of (IGRA) in the traditional method: "Court must define the meaning of [IGRA] in the ol d-fashioned way. This court Examine the plain meaning of the IGRA's issues, and the federal claims are not doubtful. The court concludes that their interpretation is the right way to read IGRA.

The federal defendant and MGM correspond to the IGRA submission, which stipulates the defendant's dismissal by the IGRA article, as the IGRA subsection that stipulates the approval of the compact between the tribes and the state, but the implementation of the secretary procedure. He claims that it does not fall under the IGRA subsection. This basic rule is "If the compact described in the (a) item is submitted to the Secretary for approval, if the Secretary does not approve or accepted the compact, the compact is the Secretary. It is regarded as approved. " The "compact described in the subpalograph (a)" is "a tribe between the Indian tribes and the state that manages the gaming in the Indian land of the Indian tribe and the state." be. Article 2710 (D) (8). § Article 2710 (D) (8) (a). The provisions that impose the approval period on the 45th do not mention secretary procedures such as Pecot procedures imposed in accordance with Article 2710 (D) (7). Since Chevron is not applied, the court must define the meaning of (IGRA) in the traditional method: "The court must define the meaning of [IGRA] in the traditional method. The court is IGRA. The court of the federal claims for the reasons for the simple meaning of the issues. This is because the interpretation of IGRA is the right way to read.

The federal defendant and MGM correspond to the IGRA submission, which stipulates the defendant's dismissal by the IGRA article, as the IGRA subsection that stipulates the approval of the compact between the tribes and the state, but the implementation of the secretary procedure. He claims that it does not fall under the IGRA subsection. This basic rule is "If the compact described in the (a) item is submitted to the Secretary for approval, if the Secretary does not approve or accepted the compact, the compact is the Secretary. It is regarded as approved. " "The compact described in the subpalograph (a)" is "a compact between the Indian tribe and the state that manages the gaming in the Indian land of the Indian tribe and the state." be. Article 2710 (D) (8). § Article 2710 (D) (8) (a). The provisions that impose the approval period on the 45th do not mention secretary procedures such as Pecot procedures imposed in accordance with Article 2710 (D) (7).

The Department's regulations are similarly structured. They state that "the Secretary shall approve or disapprove the compact or proposed amendment within 45 calendar days of receipt." 25 CFR 293. 10(a). For purposes of this provision, "amendment to a compact" is defined as "an intergovernmental agreement between a tribe and a State government under [IGRA]" and any amendment to such an agreement. 25 CFR 293. 2; 293. 3; 293. 10. As discussed in more detail below, secretarial procedures do not fall within this definition because they are "unilaterally prescribed" by the Secretary as a last resort when the State and the tribe cannot reach an agreement. 25 U. S. C. 2710(d)(7). Again, the Department's regulations are silent on approving or modifying secretarial procedures. 27

"When Congress includes certain language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same statute, Congress is generally presumed to have acted knowingly and purposely to include or exclude the other section." Russello v. United States, 464 U. S. 16, 23, 104 S. Ct. 296, 78 L. Ed. 2d 17 (1983); see also W. Minn. Power Agency v. FERC, 806 F. 3d 588, 594-95 (D. C. C., 2015). This is especially true when Congress "details" the compact and secretarial approval procedures in two different IGRA subsections, one of which includes certain procedural requirements but the other does not. Teva Pharms., Indus. v. FDA, 355 F. Supp. 2d 111, 117-18 (D. D. C. 2004) (arguing that 21 U. S. C. § 355(c), which regulates NDAs, and § 355(J), which regulates Andas, carefully describe the approval procedures for each drug class. The Court sees no reason to accept the petition. If Congress wants to impose time limits on the Secretary's review, establishment, or changes to secretarial procedures, it can do so explicitly.

As the Supreme Court has often said, in interpreting statutes, courts must always look to the cardinal canon first and foremost before all others. We have said again and again that courts must take what the Legislature says in the statute and take what the statute says and mean. When the language of a statute is clear, the first rule is also the last rule.

Conn Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253-54, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 117 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing specifically United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U. S. 235, 241-42, 109 S. Ct. 1026 , 103 L. Ed. 290 (1989)). Under the language of IGRA and its implementing regulations, the secretarial proceedings set forth in section 2710(d)(7) and administered unilaterally by the Secretary are not subject to the procedural requirements set forth in section 2710(d)(8) that apply to State-Tribal status compacts. Thus, there is no requirement to approve or disapprove amendments to the PEQUOT procedure within 45 days of their submission, nor is there a requirement to review amendments approved by statute after 45 days and publish such approval in the Federal Register.

3. Plaintiffs' argument does not challenge the federal defendants' statutory reading of IGRA. Rather, they argue that "the overall statutory system and the express and implied congressional intent thereunder show that Congress never intended to deprive compacts reached through the reconciliation process of the benefits of the review and approval process provided in section 2710(d)(8)." Plaintiffs offer a variety of arguments as to why the plain meaning statement is incorrect. As Plaintiffs say, "the meaning or ambiguity of a particular word or phrase often becomes apparent only when placed in context," and when determining whether a word is plain, the court must read the word "in light of its place in the overall statutory system." Brown & amp; Williamson, 529 U. S. at 132-133, 120 S. Ct. 1291 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Pls. Opp'n at 12. Plaintiffs' arguments here, however, do not go beyond the plain meaning of IGRA. Conn Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253-54, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 117 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing especially United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U. S. 235, 241-42, 109 S. Ct. 1026 , 103 L. Ed. 290 (1989)). IGRA 25 U. S. C. § 2710(d)(7) and its implementing regulations, the Secretary's unilateral secretarial procedures undertaken by the Secretary are not subject to the procedural requirements under § 2710(d)(8) that apply to State-Tribal status compacts. Thus, there is no requirement to approve or disapprove amendments to the PEQUOT procedures within 45 days of their submission, nor is there a requirement to review amendments approved by statute after 45 days and publish such approval in the Federal Register.

3. Plaintiffs' argument does not challenge the federal defendants' statutory reading of IGRA. Rather, they argue that "the overall statutory structure and the express and implied Congressional intent thereunder show that Congress never intended to deprive compacts reached through the reconciliation process of the benefit of the review and approval process provided in § 2710(d)(8)." Plaintiffs present a number of arguments as to why the plain meaning definition is incorrect. As they say, "the meaning or ambiguity of a particular word or phrase becomes apparent only when placed in context," and when determining whether a word is plain, courts must read the word "in light of its place in the overall legal system." Brown & amp; Williamson, 529 U. S. at 132-133, 120 S. Ct. 1291 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Pls. Opp'n at 12. Plaintiffs' arguments here, however, do not go beyond the plain meaning of IGRA. Conn Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U. S. 249, 253-54, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 117 L. Ed. 2d 391 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing especially United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U. S. 235, 241-42, 109 S. Ct. 1026 , 103 L. Ed. 290 (1989)). IGRA 25 U. S. C. § 2710(d)(7) and its implementing regulations, the Secretary's unilateral secretarial procedures undertaken by the Secretary are not subject to the procedural requirements under § 2710(d)(8) that apply to State-Tribal status compacts. Thus, there is no requirement to approve or disapprove amendments to the PEQUOT procedures within 45 days of their submission, nor is there a requirement to review amendments approved by statute after 45 days and publish such approval in the Federal Register.

A. First, the Federal Congress intends to promote tribal gaming as well as agreements between tribes and states, so the Federal Defendant's position is "obviously broke down the parliamentary intentions. It is a thing. " PLS. Opp'N at 12-13. The plaintiffs quoted the opinions of the 1991 lawyer regarding the Pecot procedure. reference. A memorandum from a lawyer to the Secretary of BIA. IA. 1102 ("Opinion Book"). 1102 ("Opinion") (April 9, 1991), ECF No. This opinion is an exclusion of Article 1166 (C) in the United States Code 18 Nevadi Resort Association's claim that all the Connecticut State Law, including gaming regulations, must be followed. § Article 1166 (c) of the United States Law exempts only the gaming that is performed in accordance with the compacts approved by the (Secretary), and the Pecot procedure is not compact between tribes and state. It is. Opinion 3-4 (quoted Article 1166 (C)). In denying this interpretation, the lawyer of the Bureau said that the parliament had a "unified, unified, unified, unified mechanism, which was unified, and a secretary procedure in order to promote gaming between tribes. He said that the interpretation of the Federation would make secretary procedures meaningless. P a. First, the Federal Council intends to promote tribal gaming as well as the federal parliamentary parliament, and the Federal defendant's position is "clearly parliamentary. It is a matter of frustration. " PLS. Opp'N at 12-13. The plaintiffs quoted the opinions of the 1991 lawyer regarding the Pecot procedure. reference. A memorandum from a lawyer to the Secretary of BIA. IA. 1102 ("Opinion Book"). 1102 ("Opinion") (April 9, 1991), ECF No. This opinion is an exclusion of Article 1166 (C) in the United States Code 18 Nevadi Resort Association's claim that all the Connecticut State Law, including gaming regulations, must be followed. § Article 1166 (c) of the United States Law exempts only the gaming that is performed in accordance with the compacts approved by the (Secretary), and the Pecot procedure is not compact between tribes and state. It is. Opinion 3-4 (quoted Article 1166 (C)). In denying this interpretation, the lawyer of the Bureau said that the parliament had a "unified, unified, unified, unified mechanism, which was unified, and a secretary procedure in order to promote gaming between tribes. He said that the interpretation of the Federation would make secretary procedures meaningless. Pa. First, the Federal Congress intends to promote tribal gaming as well as agreements between tribes and states, so the Federal defendant's position is "obviously broken the intention of the parliament. It is a thing. " PLS. Opp'N at 12-13. As a basis for this claim, the plaintiff quotes the 1991 lawyer's opinion on Pecot procedures. reference. A memorandum from a lawyer to the Secretary of BIA. IA. 1102 ("Opinion Book"). 1102 ("Opinion") (April 9, 1991), ECF No. This opinion is an exclusion of Article 1166 (C) in the United States Code 18 Nevadi Resort Association's claim that all the Connecticut State Law, including gaming regulations, must be followed. § Article 1166 (c) of the United States Law exempts only the gaming that is performed in accordance with the compacts approved by the (Secretary), and the Pecot procedure is not compact between tribes and state. It is. Opinion 3-4 (quoted Article 1166 (C)). In denying this interpretation, the lawyer of the Bureau said that the parliament had a "unified, unified, unified, unified mechanism, which was unified, and a secretary procedure in order to promote gaming between tribes. He said that the interpretation of the Federation would be meaningless in the interpretation of the Federation. P

However, the opinion did not address the provisions at issue in the IGRA approval. Nor did it conclude that the secretarial procedure and compact tribal status under IGRA should be treated consistently in all respects. Rather, it concluded that in relation to certain federal provisions exempting tribal gaming from state law, compliance with the simple provisions would require tribes to continue to negotiate and follow the six steps of the dispute resolution process established under section 2710(d)(7), but would result in the same outcome as if tribes had never requested a negotiated compact, never negotiated, never pursued legal action, and never had a designated mediator involved in the selection of the compact. 28 As the Secretary stated in a subsequent rulemaking, the secretarial procedure is therefore “appropriately considered a complete substitute for the compact” that would apply if a voluntary agreement were reached. "63 Fed. Reg. 3, 289, 3, 292 (Jan. 22, 1998) (emphasis added). Federal defendants' argument that secretarial procedures are subject to different recognition requirements than compact-status tribes does not invoke Congress' intent to treat the two forms equally in recognition.

b. The Principle of Unreasonableness Second, plaintiffs argue that courts should not adopt the plain meaning of §§2710(d)(7) and 2710(d)(8) because doing so would render other provisions of IGRA unreasonable and meaningless. Pls. Opp'n at 16. Courts have a well-established duty not to adopt statutory constructions that have an unreasonable effect. See Pub. Citizen v. DOJ, 491 U. S. 440, 454-55, 109 S. Ct. 2558, 105 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1989). This principle provides that courts may not apply the literal meaning of a statute if doing so would "make the statute unreasonable or unnecessary, or... produce effects so contrary to social values that Congress could not possibly have intended." United States v. Cook, 594 F. 3d 883, 891 (D. C. Circ. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the D. C. C. Circuit gives a narrow scope to the rule of unreasonableness, holding that a court may conclude that a statute does not mean what it says while asserting that an interpretation exceeds a "high threshold" of unreasonableness. At 891. "Because the courts' role is not to amend statutes to better serve their purposes, they will not endorse constructions that strike down enacted statutory provisions without very compelling justification. Sierra Club v. EPA, 294 F. 3d 155, 161 (D. C. Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). b. The Rule of Unreasonableness Second, plaintiffs argue that courts should not adopt the plain meaning of §§ 2710(d)(7) and 2710(d)(8) because doing so would render other provisions of IGRA unreasonable and meaningless. Pls. Opp'n at 16. Courts have a well-established duty not to adopt statutory constructions that have an unreasonable effect. Pub. Citizen v. DOJ, 491 U. S. 440, 454-55, 109 S. Ct. See 2558, 105 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1989). This doctrine provides that courts may not apply the literal meaning of a statute if doing so would "make the statute unreasonable or unnecessary, or... produce effects so contrary to social values that Congress could not possibly have intended." United States v. Cook, 594 F. 3d 883, 891 (D. C. Circ. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the D. C. C. Circuit gives narrow scope to the doctrine of unreasonableness, allowing courts to conclude that a statute does not mean what it says while asserting that an interpretation exceeds a "high threshold" of unreasonableness. At 891. "Because the courts' role is not to amend statutes to better serve their purposes, they will not endorse constructions that strike down enacted statutory provisions without very compelling justification. Sierra Club v. EPA, 294 F. 3d 155, 161 (D. C. Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). b. The Rule of Unreasonableness Second, plaintiffs argue that courts should not adopt the plain meaning of §§2710(d)(7) and 2710(d)(8) because doing so would render other provisions of IGRA unreasonable and meaningless. Pls. Opp'n at 16. Courts have a well-established duty not to adopt statutory constructions that have an unreasonable effect. Pub. Citizen v. DOJ, 491 U. S. 440, 454-55, 109 S. Ct. See 2558, 105 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1989). This doctrine provides that courts may not apply the literal meaning of a statute if doing so would "make the statute unreasonable or unnecessary, or... produce effects so contrary to social values that Congress could not possibly have intended." United States v. Cook, 594 F. 3d 883, 891 (D. C. Circ. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, the D. C. C. Circuit gives narrow scope to the doctrine of unreasonableness, allowing courts to conclude that a statute does not mean what it says while asserting that an interpretation exceeds a "high threshold" of unreasonableness. At 891. "Because the courts' role is not to modify statutes to better serve their purposes, they will not endorse constructions that strike down enacted statutory provisions without very compelling justification." Sierra Club v. EPA, 294 F. 3d 155, 161 (D. C. Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In invoking the absurdity rule, plaintiffs appear to have broadened the federal defendants' narrow distinction between tribal-State compacts and the Secretary's proceedings (limited only to the Secretary's requirement for approval of amendments) to a broader assertion that tribal-State compacts and proceedings should never be treated the same. For example, as noted above, plaintiffs point out that "if an agreement selected by a mediator and approved by the Secretary under § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii) is not treated as a contract under [IGRA], then [ 18 U. S. C. ] § 1166(18 U. S. C.)(7)(B)(vii) is not treated as a contract under [IGRA]."[18 U. S. C. ] § 1166 would require that tribal gaming conducted under such an agreement be in full compliance with all State laws applicable to non-Indian gaming. Plaintiffs' Reply 16. Similarly, plaintiffs argue that if the process is "legally distinct and inferior" to a tribal-State compact, gaming conducted pursuant to the process is unlawful under the Johnson Act (15 U. S. C. § 1175). § 25 U. S. C. § 2710(d)(6) (emphasis added) prohibits the possession or use of "any gaming device" on tribal lands, except gaming conducted pursuant to a "tribal-State compact." Finally, plaintiffs argue that if secretarial processes are "legally distinct and inferior" to tribal-State compacts, then gaming conducted pursuant to the process is unlawful under the Johnson Act (15 U. S. C. § 2710(d)(6) (emphasis added). ... § 2710(d)(6) (emphasis added) prohibits the possession or use of "any gaming device" on tribal lands, except gaming conducted pursuant to a "tribal-State compact." Finally, plaintiffs argue that if secretarial processes are "legally distinct and inferior" to tribal-State compacts, then gaming conducted pursuant to the Johnson Act (15 U. S. C. § 2710(d)(6) (emphasis added) would be unlawful under the Johnson Act (15 U. S. C. § 2710(d)(6)). § 2710(d)(6) (emphasis added) prohibits the possession or use of "any gaming device" on tribal lands, except gaming conducted pursuant to a "tribal-State compact." Finally, plaintiffs argue that if secretarial processes are "legally distinct and inferior" to tribal-State compacts, then Rather, the Federal Defendants merely argue that the provisions regarding the approval or disapproval of tribal-State compacts contained in § 2710(d)(8) do not apply to the Secretarial procedures imposed by § 2710(d)(7). The conclusion that tribal-State procedures and contracts are subject to different approval procedures "does not render [IGRA] unreasonable or unnecessary" (Cook, 594 F. 3d at 891). In invoking the absurdity rule, the Plaintiffs appear to have stretched the Federal Defendants' narrow distinction between tribal-State compacts and Secretarial procedures (limited only to the Secretary's requirement to approve amendments) to a broader assertion that tribal-State compacts and procedures should never be treated the same. For example, as noted above, plaintiffs point out that "if an agreement selected by an arbitrator and approved by the Secretary under § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii) is not treated as a contract under [IGRA], then [ 18 U. S. C. ] § 1166(7)(B)(vii) is not treated as a contract under [IGRA]." § 1166 would require tribal gaming conducted under such an agreement to be in full compliance with all State laws applicable to non-Indian gaming. Plaintiffs' Objection16 Similarly, plaintiffs argue that gaming conducted pursuant to a process that is "legally distinct and less than" a tribal-State compact is unlawful under the Johnson Act (15 U. S. C. § 1175). § 2710(d)(6) of Title 25, United States Code (emphasis added) prohibits the possession or use of "any gaming device" on tribal lands, except gaming conducted pursuant to a "tribal-State compact." Finally, plaintiffs argue that if secretarial procedures were to be used in a tribal or State jurisdiction, the court agrees that a general rule that secretarial procedures are inferior to tribal-State agreements would render many of IGRA's relationships to other laws unreasonable. Defendants, however, do not so interpret IGRA. Rather, defendants merely argue that the provisions regarding the approval or disapproval of tribal-State compacts contained in section 2710(d)(8) do not apply to the secretarial procedures imposed by section 2710(d)(7). The conclusion that tribal-State procedures and contracts are subject to different approval procedures "does not render [IGRA] unreasonable or unnecessary" (Cook, 594 F. 3d at 891). In invoking the absurdity rule, plaintiffs appear to have broadened the federal defendants' narrow distinction between tribal-State compacts and the Secretary's proceedings (limited only to the Secretary's requirement for approval of amendments) to a broader assertion that tribal-State compacts and proceedings should never be treated the same. For example, as noted above, plaintiffs point out that "if an agreement selected by a mediator and approved by the Secretary under § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii) is not treated as a contract under [IGRA], then [ 18 U. S. C. ] § 1166(18 U. S. C.)(7)(B)(vii) is not treated as a contract under [IGRA]."[18 U. S. C. ] § 1166 would require that tribal gaming conducted under such an agreement be in full compliance with all State laws applicable to non-Indian gaming. Plaintiffs' Reply 16. Similarly, plaintiffs argue that if the process is "legally distinct and inferior" to a tribal-State compact, gaming conducted pursuant to the process is unlawful under the Johnson Act (15 U. S. C. § 1175). § 25 U. S. C. § 2710(d)(6) (emphasis added) prohibits the possession or use of "any gaming device" on tribal lands, except gaming conducted pursuant to a "tribal-State compact." Finally, plaintiffs argue that if secretarial processes are "legally distinct and inferior" to tribal-State compacts, then gaming conducted pursuant to the process is unlawful under the Johnson Act (15 U. S. C. § 2710(d)(6) (emphasis added). ... § 2710(d)(6) (emphasis added) prohibits the possession or use of "any gaming device" on tribal lands, except gaming conducted pursuant to a "tribal-State compact." Finally, plaintiffs argue that if secretarial processes are "legally distinct and inferior" to tribal-State compacts, then gaming conducted pursuant to the Johnson Act (15 U. S. C. § 2710(d)(6) (emphasis added) would be unlawful under the Johnson Act (15 U. S. C. § 2710(d)(6)). § 2710(d)(6) (emphasis added) prohibits the possession or use of "any gaming device" on tribal lands, except gaming conducted pursuant to a "tribal-State compact." Finally, plaintiffs argue that if secretarial processes are "legally distinct and inferior" to tribal-State compacts, then Rather, the federal defendants merely argue that the provisions regarding the approval or disapproval of tribal-State compacts contained in section 2710(d)(8) do not apply to the secretarial procedures imposed by section 2710(d)(7). The conclusion that tribal-State procedures and contracts are subject to different approval procedures "does not render [IGRA] unreasonable or unnecessary" (Cook, 594 F. 3d at 891).

Unfortunately, many statutes contain "more than a few instances of deprivation," King v. Burwell, -- U. S. --, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492, 192 L. Ed. 2d 483 (2015), and we do not find it unreasonable that secretarial procedures and racially disaggregated statutory compacts should be treated alike when they are not, and differently when the text of the statute dictates that result. Moreover, as MGM MEM. at 13 points out, "the same words can convey different things, sometimes even different provisions of the same statute." Yates v. United States, - - U. S. ----, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1082, 191 L. Ed. 2d 64 (2015).

The Federal Defendants' interpretation is further supported by the legislative history of IGRA. See Federal Defendants Memorandum 7. In 2004, Senators Ben Campbell and Daniel Inouye of the Committee on Indian Affairs proposed an amendment to 25 U. S. C. 2710(d)(7)(b)(VII) to require the Secretary to implement the procedure within 180 days of the filing of the conciliator. S. Rep. 30 George Skivine, a senior department official, testified that the amendment would prevent the Secretary from indefinitely suspending the conduct of the proceeding while providing the Secretary "sufficient time to carefully consider in this proceeding the difficult questions of state and federal law that typically are involved in this proceeding." "Statement of George Skibine, Deputy Assistant Sec'y, Policy & amp; amp;? In re Indian Affairs at 2 (2004). 31 Although not available, this legislative history reflects the principle that 'Congress is well versed in how to impose deadlines on agency action, but only in certain provisions and circumstances.' Citizen, Inc. v. Rubber MFRS. Ass'n, 533 F. 3d 810, 817 (D. C. ir., 2008). If Congress intended the timing requirement of section 2710(d)(8) to apply to the approval of secretarial proceedings, the proposed amendment would explicitly add a timing requirement to the proceedings.

C. C. In practical consideration, the plaintiffs "delay or reject the parliament (procedure) due to strict laws and regulations on the discretion of the defendant and regulations on the examination and approval of amendments. There is no reason to think that it was intended to leave the discretion of simply ignoring it, "(PLS. OPP'N at 20). However, the Federal Defendant and the MGM have presented a compelling and practical consideration for the reasons the Federal Congress wants to do so. The Secretary's responsibility for contracting with the tribal government and the procedure of the Secretary can justify different approval procedures.

As described above, the relief provisions in Article 2710 (D) (7) stipulate some steps to promote the agreement between the state and the tribal in terms of compact tribal qualifications. However, if the state eventually refused or reached an agreement with the tribe, the secretary said, "In consultation with the Indian tribe, but the state eventually refuses or fails to agree with the tribe. The Secretary, "In consultation with the Indian tribe, the procedure will be determined according to the compact proposal selected by the mediator." IGRA] and relevant "state law". § The Secretary is responsible for independently considering the state law, IGRA, and pr e-submitted documents and consistent drooling procedures.

Therefore, the authority of the Secretary is not only approved by the state and tribes to approve the conditions. The plaintiff's schedule is to be "not hindered by bureaucratic delays after a long and difficult compact negotiations for agreement". Is pointing out correctly (PLS. OPP'N AT 20). While parliament has a strict deadline for the secretary of the tribal and the state, the time and discretion to design the state law, IGRA, existing proposals, and procedures that meet the duty of the Secretary's tribe. It makes sense to give the Secretary. See: Cap. Cap. Citizen, 533 F. 3D AT 817 (Despite being unable to "know what the purpose of the parliament is in mind," a reasonable explanation of the rules for the rules. I adopted it). The plaintiff has not identified the legislation and other evidence, and says, "As long as the (plaintiff's assertion) is involved in public policy, it has been directed to the wrong audience." The same page 820. Therefore, the authority of the Secretary is not only approved by state and tribes. The plaintiff's schedule is to be "not hindered by bureaucratic delays after a long and difficult compact negotiations for agreement". Is pointing out correctly (PLS. OPP'N AT 20). While parliament has a strict deadline for the secretary of the tribal and the state, the time and discretion to design the state law, IGRA, existing proposals, and procedures that meet the duty of the Secretary's tribe. It makes sense to give the Secretary. See: Cap. Cap. Citizen, 533 F. 3D AT 817 (Despite being unable to "know what the purpose of the parliament is in mind," a reasonable explanation of the rules for the rules. I adopted it). The plaintiff has not identified the legislation and other evidence, and says, "As long as the (plaintiff's assertion) is involved in public policy, it has been directed to the wrong audience." The same page 820. Therefore, the authority of the Secretary is not only approved by the state and tribes to approve the conditions. The plaintiff's schedule is to be "not hindered by bureaucratic delays after a long and difficult compact negotiations for agreement". Is pointing out correctly (PLS. OPP'N AT 20). While parliament has a strict deadline for the secretary of the tribal and the state, the time and discretion to design the state law, IGRA, existing proposals, and procedures that meet the duty of the Secretary's tribe. It makes sense to give the Secretary. See: Cap. Cap. Citizen, 533 F. 3D AT 817 (Despite being unable to "know what the purpose of the parliament is in mind," a reasonable explanation of the rules for the rules. I adopted it). The plaintiff has not identified the legislation and other evidence, and says, "As long as the (plaintiff's assertion) is involved in public policy, it has been directed to the wrong audience." The same page 820.

The plaintiff has appealed to the Law of Indian interpretation, as a last attempt to exceed the IGRA, the law of Indian interpretation IGRA. This rule calls for "freely interpreting laws and regulations in an advantage in Indians and interpreting ambiguous provisions in favor of Indians." MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION V. Hodel, 851 F. 2D 1439, 1444-45 (D. C. CIR. 1988) (cited omitted). According to the plaintiffs, the rules of the IGRA and its enforcement rules are "must be interpreted in favor of the Pecot tribes, and all the ambiguity must be solved by the Pecot tribes." PLS. Opp'N at 25. "However, this rule is applied only when the laws and regulations are ambiguous, and as described above, the simple meaning of IGRA is contracts and secretary procedures between tribes and states. And not ambiguous for the approval requirements. However, if it has a negative effect on the interests of other tribes, it is not applied for the interests of a tribe. " It is not clear that applying can benefit tribes in general. Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde CMTY. Jewell, 75 F. Supp. 387, 396 (D. D. C. 2014). Washington, 96 F. 3D 334, 340 (9T The plaintiffs have "freely interpreted the laws of the Indian interpretation," as the last attempt to exceed the law of the IGRA of the Indian interpretation. The ambiguous provisions are informed of the indirect. This rule is that the IGRA and its enforcement rules must be interpreted in favor of the Pecot tribes, and all the ambiguity must be solved by the Pecot tribes. at 25. "However, this rule is applied only when the laws and regulations are ambiguous, and as described above, the simple meaning of IGRA is the approval of contracts, secretary procedures, and corrections between tribes and states. It is not ambiguous for the requirements, 632 F. 3D 1278 (D. CIR. 2011). If it has a negative effect on profits, it is not applied for the interests of a tribe, "and applies the deadline for the §2710 (D) (8) compact tribe and the approval between the state. It is not clear that the tribes will be profitable to the general public. s Indian resolution v. Washington, 96 F. 3D 334, 340 (9TD. The last attempt to exceed the fair meaning of the IGRA IGRA in the 9TD. This rule calls for "freely interpreting laws and regulations in an advantage in Indians and interpreting ambiguous provisions in favor of Indians." MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION V. Hodel, 851 F. 2D 1439, 1444-45 (D. C. CIR. 1988) (cited omitted). According to the plaintiffs, the rules of the IGRA and its enforcement rules are "must be interpreted in favor of the Pecot tribes, and all the ambiguity must be solved by the Pecot tribes." PLS. Opp'N at 25. "However, this rule is applied only when the laws and regulations are ambiguous, and as described above, the simple meaning of IGRA is contracts and secretary procedures between tribes and states. And not ambiguous for the approval requirements. However, if it has a negative effect on the interests of other tribes, it is not applied for the interests of a tribe. " It is not clear that applying can benefit tribes in general. Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde CMTY. Jewell, 75 F. Supp. 387, 396 (D. D. C. 2014). Washington, 96 F. 3D 334, 340 (9T)

E. The plaintiff who could not persuade the court that the Pecot procedure of the inte r-tribal agreement in the same procedure as the Mojigan Agreement, Pecot and the State are, in accordance with Pecot procedures. It is argued that there is a de facto inte r-tribal agreement in accordance with the approval requirements of Article 2710 (D) (8) (a). The IGRA's article and the rules of the Bureau argue, as in the state's own position, argues.

The plaintiff's claim is based on the ministry's rules and the operation of Pecot procedures. The plaintiffs and others have a compact of the ministry's rules "is an inte r-government agreement concluded between tribal governments (based on IGRA) and state governments, and stipulates the conditions for the operation and regulations of class III tribal gaming activities. It is noted that it is defined as a "thing." 25 C. F. R. §293. 2. They argue that this is the definition because Pecot Problockage has stipulated the conditions for the operation of Pecot Gaming in Connecticut. PLS. OPP'N at 22-23. In addition, the state and PEQUOT argued that they have "fulfilled" an alignment contract by fulfilling the "long-term" procedures. The same (Black's Law Dictionary (10th edition of 2014) (the main definition of the verb "execution" is "fulfilling or completing a contract or obligation" (the punctuation point is omitted)). The PEQUOT procedure meets the compact standard specified in §293. 2-Specify the conditions for gaming-the plaintiff cannot prove that this procedure satisfies other compact criteria (the "inter-government agreement" concluded between Pecot and State under IGRA). E. The plaintiffs that have not been able to persuade the court to follow the same procedure requirements as the Mojigan Agreement, based on Pecot and state, Pecot and States are the United States Law Collection. It is argued that it has concluded a de facto inte r-tribal agreement in accordance with the approval requirements of Article 2710 (8) (A) in Article 25. The IGRA's article and the rules of the Bureau argue, as in the state's own position, argues.

The plaintiff's claim is based on the ministry's rules and the operation of Pecot procedures. The plaintiffs and others have a compact of the ministry's rules "is an inte r-government agreement concluded between tribal governments (based on IGRA) and state governments, and stipulates the conditions for the operation and regulations of class III tribal gaming activities. It is noted that it is defined as a "thing." 25 C. F. R. §293. 2. They argue that this is the definition because Pecot Problockage has stipulated the conditions for the operation of Pecot Gaming in Connecticut. PLS. OPP'N at 22-23. In addition, the state and PEQUOT argued that they have "fulfilled" an alignment contract by fulfilling the "long-term" procedures. The same (Black's Law Dictionary (10th edition of 2014) (the main definition of the verb "execution" is "fulfilling or completing a contract or obligation" (the punctuation point is omitted)). The PEQUOT procedure meets the compact standard specified in §293. 2-Specify the conditions for gaming-the plaintiff cannot prove that this procedure satisfies other compact criteria (the "inter-government agreement" concluded between Pecot and State under IGRA). E. The plaintiff who could not persuade the court that the Pecot procedure of the inte r-tribal agreement in the same procedure as the Mojigan Agreement, Pecot and the State are, in accordance with Pecot procedures. It is argued that there is a de facto inte r-tribal agreement in accordance with the approval requirements of Article 2710 (D) (8) (a). The IGRA's article and the rules of the Bureau argue, as in the state's own position, argues.

First, plaintiffs have failed to show that the PEQUOT procedure constitutes an intergovernmental agreement between the Pequot and the States. Indeed, the procedure is implemented under 25 U. S. C. § 2710(d)(7) (which directs the Secretary to impose the procedure if "the States do not consent" to a proposed compact). See also Pls. Opp'n at 12-13 (stating that § 2710(d)(7) allows tribes to enjoy the benefits of the compact "without the cooperation of the States"). The fact that the States and the Pequot have agreed to modify the procedure does not correct the lack of prior agreement that made PEQUOT the necessary procedure. Second, plaintiffs have failed to show that the Pequot procedure was "conducted" as a compact tribal government under IGRA. Plaintiffs' argument that a compact tribal state can be implemented by affiliation is contradicted by IGRA and Department regulations. States and tribes cannot implement a compact tribal state until a compact is enacted. A compact is effective only "when notice of the Secretary's approval of such compact has been published by the Secretary in the Federal Register." 25 CFR § 293. 15(a). And, as MGM responded in 16-17, the Secretary will not consider a proposed tribal status agreement for approval until the agreement is "implemented." § 293. 8(α). Thus, it is absurd to suggest that affiliation creates a tribal compact when a tribal compact must be in place before affiliation can occur. The legislative history of IGRA cited by MGM also supports this point. 33 See 73 Fed. Reg. 74, 004, 74, 006 (Dec. 5, 2008) (in response to a request that the Department require tribal terms of a compact to be "signed" before the Secretary can approve it, stating that "existing language in the regulations requiring a compact to be 'executed' by both parties accommodates this comment"). First, plaintiffs have failed to show that the PEQUOT procedure constitutes an intergovernmental agreement between the Pequots and the States. Indeed, the procedure is imposed under 25 U. S. C. § 2710(d)(7), which provides that, among other things, the State and the Tribe cannot agree on terms; id. § 2710(d)(7)(b)(vii) (directing the Secretary to impose the procedure if "the States do not consent" to a proposed compact). See also Pls. Opp'n at 12-13 (stating that § 2710(d)(7) permits tribes to enjoy the benefits of the compact "without the cooperation of the States"). The fact that the States and Pequot agreed to modify the procedure does not correct the lack of prior agreement that made PEQUOT the necessary procedure.

Second, plaintiffs cannot prove that the Pequot procedure was "executed" as a compact tribal government under IGRA. Plaintiffs' argument that a compact tribal state can be exercised by attribution is contradicted by IGRA and the Department's regulations. States and tribes cannot exercise under a compact tribal state until a compact is enacted. A compact is effective "only when notice of the Secretary's approval of such compact has been published by the Secretary in the Federal Register." 25 CFR § 293. 15(a). Also, as MGM responded at 16-17, the Secretary will not consider a proposed tribal status agreement for approval until the agreement is "executed," § 293. 8(α). Thus, it is absurd to suggest that affiliation creates an intertribal compact when an intertribal compact must be in place before affiliation can occur. The IGRA legislative history cited by MGM also supports this point. 33 See 73 Fed. Reg. 74, 004, 74, 006 (Dec. 5, 2008) (in response to a request for the Department to require that the tribal terms of a compact be "signed" before the Secretary can approve it, stating that "existing language in the regulations requiring that the compact be 'executed' by both parties accommodates this comment"). First, plaintiffs have failed to show that the PEQUOT proceeding constitutes an intergovernmental agreement between Pequot and the States. Indeed, this procedure is imposed under 25 U. S. C. § 2710(d)(7), specifically when States and Tribes cannot agree on terms; id. § 2710(d)(7)(b)(vii) (directing the Secretary to impose the procedure if "the States do not consent" to a proposed compact). See also Pls. Opp'n at 12-13 (stating that § 2710(d)(7) allows Tribes to enjoy the benefits of the compact "without the cooperation of the States"). The fact that the States and the Pequot agreed to modify the procedure does not correct the lack of prior agreement that made the Pequot the necessary procedure.

Second, Plaintiffs fail to show that the Pequot procedure was "executed" under IGRA as a compact tribal government. Plaintiffs' argument that compact tribal nations can be exercised by attribution is contradicted by IGRA and the Department's regulations. States and tribes cannot implement a compact tribal nation until a compact has been enacted. A compact is effective only "when notice of the Secretary's approval of such compact has been published by the Secretary in the Federal Register." 25 CFR § 293. 15(a). And, as MGM responded in 16-17, the Secretary will not consider a proposed tribal status agreement for approval until the agreement is "in operation." § 293. 8(α). Thus, it is absurd to suggest that affiliation creates a tribal compact when one must be in place before affiliation can occur. The IGRA legislative history cited by MGM supports this point. 33 See 73 Fed. Reg. 74, 004, 74, 006 (Dec. 5, 2008) (in response to a request that the Department require tribal terms of a compact to be “signed” before the Secretary can approve it, stating that “existing language in the regulations requiring that a compact be ‘executed’ by both parties accommodates this comment”).

Moreover, the State has expressly argued in its Attorney General briefs and in federal litigation that the PEQUOT procedure is not compact tribal status. Defendants' Reply Pls. Euphemism. DISCISS, Tassone v. Foxwoods Resort Casino, No. 11-1718, 2012 WL 12548954 (D. Conn. Filed Mar. 23, 2012). 2008 Att'y Gen. Op. No. 2008-005, 2008 WL 714081, at *3 n. 5 (Conn. A. G. Mar. 13, 2008) (noting that "the presumption governing the Mashantucket Pequot's gaming operations is not technically 'compact' because it was imposed on the State by the Secretary of the Interior under IGRA.") (citations omitted). The Court agrees. Plaintiffs also argue that Defendants' "own conduct" demonstrates the existence of compact racial status. Plaintiffs' Reply 23. First, Plaintiffs note that the Department published the PEQUAT procedures in the Federal Register in the same manner that it publishes compact tribal states. Id. at 23. Second, Plaintiffs note that the Department cited the procedures at 25 U. S. C. § 2710(d)(8) "in the course of providing technical assistance to tribes as they negotiate subject matter amendments with States." Pls. OPP'N at 24. Third, Plaintiffs state that the PEQUOT procedures cannot be amended without the Secretary's approval and promulgation pursuant to § 2710(d)(3)(b). 34 Pequot Procedures at 49-50. Plaintiffs, however, fail to explain that the Department's decision to treat the Department's compacts and the Secretary's procedures consistently indicates that in some respects the approval timing requirements that apply to tribes' compact status also apply to the procedures.

As D. C. C. CIRCUIT pointed out, administrative agencies can adopt an "additional procedure" that is not obliged by law, but the court "there is no authority to impose such procedures." Just because the Secretary imposes the requirements that the IGRA has not demanded in the Pecot procedure does not mean that the court can impose other additional requirements to the Secretary. Furthermore, as Article 2710 (D) (3) (b) does not mention the approval provisions, the approval provisions contained in Article 2710 (D) (8), as claimed by the plaintiff. The reason is not clear. It was reasonable for the 35 Secretary to maintain the revision of the Peco Congratulations and to keep the right to evaluate their amendments. The philosophy chosen by the plaintiff's technical support document, "Tribes and states have long rely on agreements" (Pages 9-5 and 9-13) are simple IGRAs. 36 is not to persuade the court to deviate from the meaning. , as pointed out by D. C. CIRCUIT, administrative organizations can adopt an "additional procedure" that is not obliged by laws and regulations, but the court "there is no authority to impose such procedures." 。 Just because the Secretary imposes the requirements that the IGRA has not demanded in the Pecot procedure does not mean that the court can impose other additional requirements to the Secretary. Furthermore, as Article 2710 (D) (3) (b) does not mention the approval provisions, the approval provisions contained in Article 2710 (D) (8), as claimed by the plaintiff. The reason is not clear. It was reasonable for the 35 Secretary to maintain the revision of the Peco Congratulations and to keep the right to evaluate their amendments. The philosophy chosen by the plaintiff's technical support document, "Tribes and states have long rely on agreements" (Pages 9-5 and 9-13) are simple IGRAs. 36 is not to persuade the court to deviate from the meaning. As D. C. C. CIRCUIT pointed out, administrative agencies can adopt an "additional procedure" that is not obliged by law, but the court "there is no authority to impose such procedures." Just because the Secretary imposes the requirements that the IGRA has not demanded in the Pecot procedure does not mean that the court can impose other additional requirements to the Secretary. Furthermore, as Article 2710 (D) (3) (b) does not mention the approval provisions, the approval provisions contained in Article 2710 (D) (8), as claimed by the plaintiff. The reason is not clear. It was reasonable for the 35 Secretary to maintain the revision of the Peco Congratulations and to keep the right to evaluate their amendments. Also, the philosophy of the plaintiff's technical support letter, "Tribes and states have long rely on agreements" (pages 9-5 and 9-13) are the simple IGRAs. 36 is not to persuade the court to deviate from the meaning.

f. Finally, the plaintiffs claim that the federal defendant should prohibit the claims of the Federal Defendant, regardless of whether they do. The Judicial Contractic Review stipulates that the parties who have succeeded in the lawsuit, saying, "Since the interest has changed, it is not possible to take the opposite position." New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U. S. 742, 749, 121 S. CT. 1808, 149 L. ED. 2D 968 (internal quotes and quotes are omitted). 18 Moore's Federal Practice § 134. 30, at 134-62 (3D ED. 2000) ("The Law of the Judicial Reversal is claimed in a lawsuit procedure that the parties have inconsistent with the claims received in the previous lawsuit. ") In general, it is the state that affects whether this is applied. Includes the parties in which the judiciary has been confused by the judicial position in the later litigation. Whether it succeeded in persuading the court to accept the court [to assign a contradictory position or make an unfair disadvantage to the other party. Whether or not, the plaintiff should prohibit the claim of the federal defendant, regardless of whether it is a judicial reversal. The parties who have succeeded in the lawsuit stipulated that "the change of interests cannot be taken in the opposite position." New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U. S. 742, 749, 121 S. CT. 1808, 149 L. ED. 2D 968 (internal quotes and quotes are omitted). 18 Moore's Federal Practice § 134. 30, at 134-62 (3D ED. 2000) ("The Law of the Judicial Reversal is claimed in a lawsuit procedure that the parties have inconsistent with the claims received in the previous lawsuit. ") In general, it is the state that affects whether this is applied. Includes the parties in which the judiciary has been confused by the judicial position in the later litigation. Whether it succeeded in persuading the court to accept the court [to assign a contradictory position or make an unfair disadvantage to the other party. Finally, the plaintiff is in the lawsuit that the defendant should be prohibited, regardless of the principle of judicial prohibition. The parties who claimed their success, stipulated, stipulated that "after that, because the interest has changed, it is not possible to take the opposite position." New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U. S. 742, 749, 121 S. CT. 1808, 149 L. ED. 2D 968 (internal quotes and quotes are omitted). 18 Moore's Federal Practice § 134. 30, at 134-62 (3D ED. 2000) ("The Law of the Judicial Reversal is claimed in a lawsuit procedure that the parties have inconsistent with the claims received in the previous lawsuit. ") In general, it is the state that affects whether this is applied. Includes the parties in which the judiciary has been confused by the judicial position in the later litigation. Whether it succeeded in persuading the court to accept the court [to assign a contradictory position or make an unfair disadvantage to the other party. Whether or not.

Plaintiffs' estoppel claim is based on the federal defendants' brief in Stand Up for Cal.! v. U. S. Dept. of the Interior, No. 16-2681,-F. Supp. 3d ----, 2018 WL 3473975 (E. D. Cal., 2018). In that case, plaintiffs alleged that certain secretarial procedures governing tribal gaming in California violate the Johnson Act, 25 U. S. C. § 2710(d)(6) (emphasis mine). Plaintiffs argued that because secretarial procedures are not a compact tribal status under IGRA, they are not exempt from the prohibition against the use of gaming devices on tribal lands, 15 U. S. C. § 1175. In response, Federal Defendants argue that such an interpretation renders IGRA and its relief provisions unreasonable, and that "the entire reading of IGRA makes clear that the secretarial proceedings are part of IGRA. A reading of IGRA makes it clear that the secretarial proceedings are designed to serve as a complete surrogate for the existence of compact tribal status. Stand Up, - F. Supp. 3d at --------, 2018 WL 3473975, at *6-8.

Plaintiffs argue that Federal Defendants' position here is completely inconsistent with the position they took and the Court adopted in Stand Up, and that "Federal Defendants should be relieved from taking both positions. Pls. Supp. Br. Supp. euphemism." Summ. J. ("Pls. Supp. Br.") at 8, ECF No. 54. The Federal Defendants specifically argue that they have not adopted "clearly inconsistent" positions and that the Plaintiffs have misstated their position in the matter. Federal Defendants' Response Pls. Supp. At 5-8, ECF No. Having considered the stand-up briefs, we agree with the Federal Defendants and do not apply judicial estoppel.

The federal defendant chose a different position in this lawsuit, where he opposed the state (Connecticut State) and the tribes (Pecot and Mojigan), where the state (California) and the tribe (The North Fork Rancheria of Manarch Indians) It supports, but the defendants are clearly inconsistent. As mentioned earlier, the plaintiffs are trying to assemble the federal defendant's claims in a broad sense and claim that the secretary process is "legally distinguished and smaller" from the compact tribal PLS. Alternatively, regarding IGRA in general, "secretary procedures are not a perfect and complete alternative of a compact tribal nation) (PLS. Supp. Br to at 7-8). Such a claim seems to be inconsistent with the stan d-up of the federal defendant that the secretary procedure is "designed to function as a complete alternative to a compact tribal nation." Stand Up, -F. Supp. 3D at ----, 2018 WL 3473975, at *6.

However, the federal defendant's claim in court is narrower. They simply argue that in that flat sense, the time provisions for the IGRA's approval and correction of compact tribal qualifications by the Secretary do not apply to the Secretary's procedure and the correction. Federal lawyer memorandum 6-7. Federal defendants' claims that compacts on the status of the tribal and the government's procedures are different when they are approved, and once approved for gaming on the tribal land, these two formats are functionally equivalent. It is not clearly inconsistent with the federal claim.

Based on the judicial bans, D. C. Circuit must be resolved by assuming that there is no contradiction. Comfort Corp. v. FCC, 600 F. 3D 642, 647 (647 ( D. C. CIR. (02)). Although the defendant is in a tension, the court claims that the claim in Stand Up is clearly inconsistent here. Select the solution based on this proposal.

When read together, 25 U. S. C. §§ 2710(d)(7) and 2710(d)(8) require the Secretary to reject or otherwise deem approved tribal-State compacts and compact amendments within a certain time after their submission, but such time requirements do not apply to clerical proceedings and amendments. Reliance on context and structure in statutory construction is a "delicate matter, requiring great care lest what is merely imputed should become invention, and that which is attempted statutory construction should not become legislation itself." King, 135 S. Ct. at 2495-96 (quoted Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 83, 60 S. Ct. 34, 84 L. Ed. (1939)). Applying this principle, the plain meaning of 25 U. S. C. § 2710(d) (1939) is: §§ 2710(d)(7) and 2710(d)(8) are sufficiently clear that the Court declines to depart from that meaning based on Plaintiffs' contextual arguments. Accordingly, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs' proposed amendments to the Pecot Minutes did not require the Secretary to act in the manner Plaintiffs assert.

B. Failure to State a Claim Because the Court concludes that IGRA does not require the Secretary to take the actions Plaintiffs assert, the Court must consider Defendants' argument that Plaintiffs have not stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. As noted above, "a claim under [U. S. C.] § 706(1) may proceed only if Plaintiffs allege that a corporation was required to take discriminatory agency action but failed to do so." SUWA, 542 U. S. at 64, 124 S. Ct. 2373. Thus, a plaintiff must allege that a defendant had a duty to perform nondiscretionary acts. See id. If no such duty exists, a plaintiff "has not stated a claim upon which relief may be granted." Ctr. for Biological Diversity, 260 F. Supp. 3d at 24 (cited SUWA, 542 U. S. at 63-64, 124 S. Ct. 2373 (noted that courts may not order relief under § 706(1) that is otherwise mandated by statute )).

Applying these principles, plaintiffs' complaint regarding the proposed amendments to the PEQUOT procedures fails to state a claim because it does not identify a non-obligation imposed by the IGRA or its implementing regulations. In Part I of the complaint, plaintiffs allege that "pursuant to 25 U. S. C. § 2710(1)," the Secretary "did not approve or disapprove the proposed amendments to the PEQUOT procedures within 45 days after they were submitted. Under 25 U. S. C. § 2710(d)(8)(C) and 293 CFR § 13, the amendments are deemed approved, and plaintiffs allege that the Secretary's failure to consider them was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA (5 U. S. C. § 706(2)). See § 25(1) of the complaint. ¶¶ 45-47. In Count II, Plaintiffs allege that "the amendments were deemed authorized by statute. Defendants owed Plaintiffs a clear mandatory duty to post a notice of approval pursuant to 25 U. S. C. §2710(d)(8)(d) and 25 C. F. R. §293. 15(b)" within 90 days of receiving the application for approval, and the Secretary's failure to post the notice was unlawful withheld agency action in violation of the APA, 5 U. S. C. §706(1). Supplement. 55-57. However, as discussed above, the statutory provisions and rules cited by Plaintiffs do not require the Secretary to act on proposed amendments to the PEQUOT procedures within 45 days of their filing. Applying these principles, plaintiffs' complaint regarding the proposed amendments to the PEQUOT procedures fails to state a claim because it does not identify a non-obligation imposed by the IGRA or its implementing regulations. In Part I of the complaint, plaintiffs allege that "pursuant to 25 U. S. C. § 2710(1)," the Secretary "did not approve or disapprove the proposed amendments to the PEQUOT procedures within 45 days after they were submitted. Under 25 U. S. C. § 2710(d)(8)(C) and 293 CFR § 13, the amendments are deemed approved, and plaintiffs allege that the Secretary's failure to consider them was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA (5 U. S. C. § 706(2)). See . ¶¶ 45-47. In Count II, Plaintiffs allege that "the amendments were deemed authorized by statute. Defendants owed Plaintiffs a clear mandatory duty to post a notice of approval pursuant to 25 U. S. C. §2710(d)(8)(d) and 25 C. F. R. §293. 15(b)" within 90 days of receiving the application for approval, and the Secretary's failure to post the notice was unlawful withheld agency action in violation of the APA, 5 U. S. C. §706(1). Supplement. 55-57. However, as discussed above, the statutory provisions and rules cited by Plaintiffs do not require the Secretary to act on proposed amendments to the PEQUOT procedures within 45 days of their filing. Applying these principles, plaintiffs' complaint regarding the proposed amendments to the PEQUOT procedures fails to state a claim because it does not identify a non-obligation imposed by the IGRA or its implementing regulations. In Part I of the complaint, plaintiffs allege that "pursuant to 25 U. S. C. § 2710(1)," the Secretary "did not approve or disapprove the proposed amendments to the PEQUOT procedures within 45 days after they were submitted. Under 25 U. S. C. § 2710(d)(8)(C) and 293 CFR § 13, the amendments are deemed approved, and plaintiffs allege that the Secretary's failure to consider them was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the APA (5 U. S. C. § 706(2)). See § 25(1) of the complaint. ¶¶ 45-47. In Count II, Plaintiffs allege that "the amendments were deemed authorized by statute. Defendants owed Plaintiffs a clear mandatory duty to post a notice of approval pursuant to 25 U. S. C. §2710(d)(8)(d) and 25 C. F. R. §293. 15(b)" within 90 days of receiving the application for approval, and the Secretary's failure to post the notice was unlawful withheld agency action in violation of the APA, 5 U. S. C. §706(1). Supplement. 55-57. However, as discussed above, the statutory provisions and rules cited by Plaintiffs do not require the Secretary to act on proposed amendments to the PEQUOT procedures within 45 days of their filing.

The Earl I claimed that the Secretary I had "not followed the law" in violation of Article 706 (2) of the APA, but the main claim of the Earl I had illegally concealed the act. (Considering that the Pecot procedure has been adopted). Nevertheless, the plaintiff has been claimed, "It was not possible to see that the petition of the Pecot procedure was approved], but Article 706 (Article 706, but Article 706 (1) in Article 706 (1). 2) If you have a characteristic from the viewpoint of "the hold of an illegal act", you will not have obtained a better result in 45 days. In some cases, the court has no obligation to publish approval in the Federal Gaze. However, the plaintiff, rather than claiming that the Secretary had unreasonably delayed the decision on the Pequot Procedures correction, was asked to "do not inaccuracy within the specified deadline, and that. He has neglected. " Apache Fort Sill Tribe V. Nat. Indian Gaming Com'n, 103 F. Supp. 3D 113, 1

VI. Consultation

For the above reasons, the court orders the following: The MGM participation claim (ECF No. 11) is allowed; 2. MGM's objection preparation document permission (ECF No. 30) is permitted; Authentged; 4. Federal defendant's local civil rules 7 (n) are allowed to be permitted; 5. 5. Plaintiffs' claims seeking a trial announcement (ECF No. 28) I admit. The defendant's claim for submitting a document (ECF No. 34) is rejected. 7. Correct the defendant's preparation document submission schedule (ECF No. 31). 8. Refers defendant's claims seeking evidence of the MGM Intermediate Current Status Report (ECF No. 44).

An order that matches this concept shall be issued separately at the same time.

All References --- F. Supp. 3D ----, 2018 WL 4681619 The Earl I claimed that the Secretary violated Article 706 (2) and did "not in accordance with the law" However, the main claim of the Earl I was to illegally concealed the act (considering that the Pecot procedure has been adopted). Nevertheless, the plaintiff has been claimed, "It was not possible to see that the petition of the Pecot procedure was approved], but Article 706 (Article 706, but Article 706 (1) in Article 706 (1). 2) If you have a characteristic from the viewpoint of "the hold of an illegal act", you will not have obtained a better result in 45 days. In some cases, the court has no obligation to publish approval in the Federal Gaze. However, the plaintiff, rather than claiming that the Secretary had unreasonably delayed the decision on the Pequot Procedures correction, was asked to "do not inaccuracy within the specified deadline, and that. He has neglected. " Apache Fort Sill Tribe V. Nat. Indian Gaming Com'n, 103 F. Supp. 3D 113, 1

VI. Consultation

An order that matches this concept shall be issued separately at the same time.

All References --- F. Supp. 3D ----, 2018 WL 4681619 Earl I argue that the Secretary violated Article 706 (2) of the APA and did not follow the law. However, the main claim of the Earl I was that the Secretary had illegally concealed the act (considering that the Pecot procedure has been adopted). Nevertheless, the plaintiff has been claimed, "It was not possible to see that the petition of the Pecot procedure was approved], but Article 706 (Article 706, but Article 706 (1) in Article 706 (1). 2) If you have a characteristic from the viewpoint of "the hold of an illegal act", you will not have obtained a better result in 45 days. In some cases, the court has no obligation to publish approval in the Federal Gaze. However, the plaintiff, rather than claiming that the Secretary had unreasonably delayed the decision on the Pequot Procedures correction, was asked to "do not inaccuracy within the specified deadline, and that. He has neglected. " Apache Fort Sill Tribe V. Nat. Indian Gaming Com'n, 103 F. Supp. 3D 113, 1

VI. Consultation

An order that matches this concept shall be issued separately at the same time.

All References --- F. Supp. 3D ----, 2018 WL 4681619

MGM cites a 2015 Government Accountability Office report noting that there are more than 200 tribes that operate casino gaming, but only three of them have procedures that allow gaming. MGM Mem. Supp. Fed. Defs. Mem. ("MGM Mem.") 2 n. 4 (U. S. General Accounting Office, Indian Gaming - Regulation and Oversight by the Federal Government, States, and Tribes ("GAO Report"), 4, 11 n. 24 (June 2015), https://www. gao. gov/assets/680/670603. pdf), citing ECF No. 21-1.

The Indian Gaming Bureau is located within the Bureau, and its "duties and responsibilities include administrative review and analysis of the legal and regulatory requirements of IGRA and related statutes, policy development, and technical assistance to tribal and state agencies." Indian Gaming Bureau, Overview, https://www. bia. gov/as-ia/oig.

The Department has issued rules that allow the Secretary to prescribe procedures when a State raises an Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity defense in a tribal lawsuit alleging that the State did not negotiate in good faith. See 25 CFR §291(3), which describes the elements necessary for a tribe to request the Secretary's Class III gaming procedures. The rules do not apply here because the State has not asserted an Eleventh Amendment defense to the Pequot lawsuit that gave rise to the Pequot lawsuit. See also Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v. Connecticut, 913 F. 2d 1024, 1032 (2d Cir., 1990), cert. 2d 717 (1991). 56 Fed. Reg. 15. 746 (Apr. 17, 1991). The Pequot Procedures and Mohegan Compact, along with the Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU"), are available at http://www. portal. ct. gov/dcp/gaming-division/gaming/tribal-state-compacts-and-agreements ("Pequot Procedures", "Pequot Mou", "Mohegan Compact", "Mohegan Mou"). The Court may take judicial notice of these documents without converting the federal defendants' motion to dismiss for summary judgment because the documents are incorporated by reference into the complaint. See Ruffin v. Gray, 443 Fed. Appx. 562, 563 (D. C. C., 2011).

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Last modified: 27.08.2024

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