Obligation of Contracts Article I. Legislative Department US Constitution Annotated Justia

Obligation of Contracts

Article 10, Section 1 No state shall enter into treaties, alliances, or leagues; grant letters of concession or reprisal; coin money or issue letters of credit; exact anything other than gold and silver for the payment of debts; approve imprisonment bills, ex post facto laws, or laws impairing the obligations of contracts, or grant titles of nobility.

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The Contracts Clause provides that no state may pass "laws affecting the obligations of contracts," where "laws" are statutes, constitutional provisions, municipal ordinances, or administrative regulations having the force of a statute. 2076 But does the clause include judicial decisions? At least until recently, the abstract principle of separation of powers forbade the idea of a court "thinking," and the word "passing" in the above clause seemed to limit it to a formal, recognized way of exercising its law-making function. Therefore, courts have often stated that this clause does not apply, no matter how erroneous the judicial decision or how it affects existing contractual rights. 2077 However, there are important exceptions to this rule, including the following:

State supreme courts usually have the final authority to interpret and determine the validity of contracts made under state law, and federal courts are bound by state supreme court decisions on such matters, but this rule does not apply when the contract is one whose obligations are allegedly impaired by state law. 2078 Similarly, state supreme courts usually have the final authority to interpret state laws and determine their validity in relation to state constitutions. However, the Supreme Court has had to bend even this rule to some extent in its interpretation of the contract clause. 2079

(1) Suppose that a municipality issued a bond to help a railway company based on the authority approved by a state law. (4) This abolition is supported by the state Supreme Court's ruling that laws that approved the state bonds were unconstitutional in the first place. In such cases, the Supreme Court appeals to the State Court and destroys the state court's unconstitutional ruling. 2080

However, it is supposed that the state parliament has determined that the state court is unconstitutional in the first place in the lawsuit of a paid clerk, without abolishing taxes. In this case, if the citizens of different states have reached the lowe r-ranking federal court, the Supreme Court will still give rescue. 2081 Because in this kind of case, the court used to be able to freely determine the basic fair issues on their own. In fact, in this case, the court seemed to feel freedom to judge the constitutionality of the state law that approves bonds, even if the Supreme Court in the state has not ruled bonds. 2082 (1) Suppose that a municipality issued a bond to help a railway company based on the authority approved by a state law. (4) This abolition is supported by the state Supreme Court's ruling that laws that approved the state bonds were unconstitutional in the first place. In such cases, the Supreme Court appeals to the State Court and destroys the state court's unconstitutional ruling. 2080

However, it is supposed that the state parliament has determined that the state court is unconstitutional in the first place in the lawsuit of a paid clerk, without abolishing taxes. In this case, if the citizens of different states have reached the lowe r-ranking federal court, the Supreme Court will still give rescue. 2081 Because in this kind of case, the court used to be able to freely determine the basic fair issues on their own. In fact, in this case, the court seemed to feel freedom to judge the constitutionality of the state law that approves bonds, even if the Supreme Court in the state has not ruled bonds. 2082 (1) Suppose that a municipality issued a bond to help a railway company based on the authority approved by a state law. (4) This abolition is supported by the state Supreme Court's ruling that laws that approved the state bonds were unconstitutional in the first place. In such cases, the Supreme Court appeals to the State Court and destroys the state court's unconstitutional ruling. 2080

In other words, in the jurisdiction of the court caused by the diversity of citizenship, the court's obligations may be as impaired by subsequent laws and regulations. It was possible to do it. On the other hand, in cases in which constitutional reasons and state courts only obtain jurisdictions, the position that the "law" used in Article 1, Paragraph 10 is always consistent in the position that judicial judgment is not included. I'm doing it. However, even in such cases, the contract concluded based on the existing judgment is intervened from the direct results that overturn such a judgment. 2083

In 1922, the Federal Congress was revised by the Justice Law, and the right of the Supreme Court was "in a lawsuit related to the validity of the tournament, and the change in state laws applied to the tournament and the Supreme Court of the State Supreme Court were interpreted by the Supreme Court in the United States. He tried to expand it to something that would be contrary to. . 2084 This seemed to be a solicitation to the court, saying that the court's subsequent ruling could weaken the obligations of the contract. However, in the opinion of Judge Taft, the court examined many cases of the previous section and rejected the invitation. In other words, in the jurisdiction of the court caused by the diversity of citizenship, the court may be impaired by subsequent ruling, as the obligations of the contract are inferior to subsequent laws and regulations. It was possible to prevent this. On the other hand, in cases in which constitutional reasons and state courts only obtain jurisdictions, the position that the "law" used in Article 1, Paragraph 10 is always consistent in the position that judicial judgment is not included. I'm doing it. However, even in such cases, the contract concluded based on the existing judgment is intervened from the direct results that overturn such a judgment. 2083

In 1922, the Federal Congress was revised by the Justice Law, and the right of the Supreme Court was "in a lawsuit related to the validity of the tournament, and the change in state laws applied to the tournament and the Supreme Court of the State Supreme Court were interpreted by the Supreme Court in the United States. He tried to expand it to something that would be contrary to. . 2084 This seemed to be a solicitation to the court, saying that the court's subsequent ruling could weaken the obligations of the contract. However, in the opinion of Judge Taft, the court examined many cases of the previous section and rejected the invitation. In other words, in the jurisdiction of the court caused by the diversity of citizenship, the court's obligations may be as impaired by subsequent laws and regulations. It was possible to do it. On the other hand, in cases in which constitutional reasons and state courts only obtain jurisdictions, the position that the "law" used in Article 1, Paragraph 10 is always consistent in the position that judicial judgment is not included. I'm doing it. However, even in such cases, the contract concluded based on the existing judgment is intervened from the direct results that overturn such a judgment. 2083

Chief Justice Taft, discussing Gelbke and subsequent decisions, stated: "These cases were not miscarriages of justice in the state supreme courts. They were appeals or default judgments in federal courts seeking recovery on municipal or county bonds or other forms of contracts, the validity of which had been upheld by decisions of the state supreme court before their execution, but which were overturned by that court after their issuance or execution. In such cases, the federal courts, exercising jurisdiction between citizens of different states, were free to determine what state law was, and to enforce state laws which had been decided by the state supreme courts before the contracts were made and which had not been decided by subsequent decisions. The federal courts relied not on Article I, Section 10 of the Federal Constitution, but on state laws decided by the states in various cases relating to civil rights under Article III of the Federal Constitution. 2085 No doubt such an explanation was possible in 1924, but in 1938, in Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins2086 , limited the power of federal courts to determine diversity of citizenship according to their own conception of "general principles of the common law." Chief Justice Taft, discussing Gelbke and subsequent decisions, stated: "These cases were not miscarriages of justice in the state supreme courts. They were appeals or defaults in federal courts for recovery of municipal or county bonds, or other forms of contracts, the validity of which had been upheld by decisions of the state supreme court before their execution, but which were overturned by that court after their issuance or execution. In such cases, the federal courts, exercising jurisdiction between citizens of different states, were free to determine what the state law was, and to enforce a state law which the state supreme court had decided before the contract was made and which had not been decided by any subsequent decision. The federal courts relied not on Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution, but on the state law as decided by the states in various cases relating to civil rights under Article III of the Constitution. 2085 No doubt such an explanation was possible in 1924, but in 1938, in Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins2086 , limited the power of federal courts to determine diversity of citizenship according to their own conception of "general principles of the common law." Chief Justice Taft, discussing Gelbke and subsequent decisions, stated: "These cases were not miscarriages of justice in the state supreme courts. They were appeals or default judgments in federal courts seeking recovery on municipal or county bonds or other forms of contracts, the validity of which had been upheld by decisions of the state supreme court before their execution, but which were overturned by that court after their issuance or execution. In such cases, the federal courts, exercising jurisdiction between citizens of different states, were free to determine what state law was, and to enforce state laws which had been decided by the state supreme courts before the contracts were made and which had not been decided by subsequent decisions. The federal courts relied not on Article I, Section 10 of the Federal Constitution, but on state laws decided by the states in various cases relating to civil rights under Article III of the Federal Constitution. 2085 No doubt such an explanation was possible in 1924, but in 1938, in Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins2086 , limited the power of federal courts to determine diversity of citizenship according to their own conception of "general principles of the common law."

"Obligations divide a contract into two elements: the contract, which derives from the parties, and the obligations, which derive from the law and make the contract binding on the parties. The concept of obligation is imported from civil law and its appearance in the Contracts Clause is attributed to James Wilson, a Scottish graduate and politician. In fact, the term as used in the Contracts Clause has been more or less marginalized by the doctrine that "the law existing at the time and place of the contract and in the place where it is to be performed enters into and forms part of the contract." "As a result, courts have either accepted or ignored the term in their decisions applying the provision. In Sturges v. Crowninshield, Chief Justice Marshall defined a "contractual obligation" as a law binding on the parties "to perform its business," but shortly thereafter, in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, he posed the following questions for consideration: "1. Is this contract protected by the United States Constitution? 2. Is this contract protected by the United States Constitution? 3. Is this contract protected by the United States Constitution? 4. Is this contract protected by the United States Constitution? 5. Is this contract protected by the United States Constitution? 6. Is this contract protected by the United States Constitution? 7. Is this contract protected by the United States Constitution? 8. Is this contract protected by the United States Constitution? 9. Is this contract protected by the United States Constitution? 10. Is this contract protected by the United States Constitution? 11. Is this contract protected by the United States Constitution? 12. Is this contract protected by the United States Constitution? 13. Is this contract protected by the United States Constitution? 14. Is this contract protected by the United States Constitution? 15. Is this contract protected by the United States Constitution? 16. Is this contract protected by the United States Constitution? 17. Is this contract protected by the United States Constitution? 18. Is this contract protected by the United States Constitution? 19. Is this contract protected by the United States Constitution? 20. Is this contract protected by the United States Constitution? 21. The word "obligation" arguably suggests that the Constitution is intended to protect only unexecuted contracts, i. e., contracts awaiting performance.

In the Houses Judge, in the home building and loan associations vs. Blay Dell (2090), "the duty of contracts is reduced by laws and regulations that disable, unlocked, or disappeared. And the impairment is based on a law that deviates on substantial contract rights without destroying the contract. " 2091 However, the book adds: "In order to determine the duty between the parties, not only the existing law is loaded into the contract, but also the reservation of the basic attributes of sovereigns is read in the contract. The policy of protecting the contract from abandoning a contract is based on the presumption that the government, which has a valuable contract, is maintained by a government that has enough authority to secure the peace and order of society. This principle of harmony between the constitutional prohibition and the residual of the necessary state power has gradually been recognized in the court's ruling, which has been gradually recognized, and further "progress. It must be understood that it includes a "target" constitution. 2093

The term "contract" in the contract clause is used in a general sense of agreement. Therefore, this clause does not protect vested rights that cannot be mentioned in such agreements between the state and individuals, such as recovery rights based on the court's order. Individuals in question can cause trials based on Article 14 of the Constitutional Fix, but cannot cause a trial based on Article 1, Paragraph 10.

A subsidy from the government, which is not a "contract, is not all of the subsidies from the government in the meaning of Article 1, Paragraph 10. In the Dart Mass College's ruling, Judge Marshall said, "If an incorporation act is the grant of political power, it will be used for government management if it is a political base. This is a problem that the state assembly can act in accordance with its own judgment without being detained in the 2095 constitution. The line between the corporations was made. 2096 Judge Hughes said in the home building and loan associated vs. Blazing case (2090), "the duty of the contract is disabled, canceled, or disappears. The decrease is based on a law that deviates the contract right without destroying the contract. " 2091 However, the book adds: "In order to determine the duty between the parties, not only the existing law is loaded into the contract, but also the reservation of the basic attributes of sovereigns is read in the contract. The policy of protecting the contract from abandoning a contract is based on the presumption that the government, which has a valuable contract, is maintained by a government that has enough authority to secure the peace and order of society. This principle of harmony between the constitutional prohibition and the residual of the necessary state power has gradually been recognized in the court's ruling, which has been gradually recognized, and further "progress. It must be understood that it includes a "target" constitution. 2093

A subsidy from the government, which is not a "contract, is not all of the subsidies from the government in the meaning of Article 1, Paragraph 10. In the Dart Mass College's ruling, Judge Marshall said, "If an incorporation act is the grant of political power, it will be used for government management if it is a political base. This is a problem that the state assembly can act in accordance with its own judgment without being detained in the 2095 constitution. The line between the corporations was made. In the 2096 Judge Hughes, in the Home Building and Loan Associations vs. Blazing Case (2090), the duty of contracts decreases by laws and regulations that disable, unlocked, and disappeared. And the impairment is based on a law that deviates the substantial contract right without destroying the contract. " 2091 However, the book adds: "In order to determine the duty between the parties, not only the existing law is loaded into the contract, but also the reservation of the basic attributes of sovereigns is read in the contract. The policy of protecting the contract from abandoning a contract is based on the presumption that the government, which has a valuable contract, is maintained by a government that has enough authority to secure the peace and order of society. This principle of harmony between the constitutional prohibition and the residual of the necessary state power has gradually been recognized in the court's ruling, which has been gradually recognized, and further "progress. It must be understood that it includes a "target" constitution. 2093

It has since been held on numerous occasions that municipal corporations are merely state organizations for the more convenient running of local government, and that all of their powers may be expanded, reduced, or revoked at the pleasure of the legislature. 2097 Moreover, the same principle applies to property rights that municipalities derive directly or indirectly from the state. This principle was first held in the case of the granting of franchises to municipalities for ferry operations, and has since been recognized as a universal rule. 2098 A 1923 case reported that the distinction between municipalities as agents of the state for governmental purposes and those as agents for the care of local needs on private or property land limits the legal liability of municipalities, but that the negligent acts or omissions of their officers or agents do not create constitutional limitations against the state in favor of their own municipalities. 2099 Thus, a statutory contractual right to relocate a county seat did not arise, even if the previous location had been determined by law to be "permanent" and the citizens of the community had donated land and provided bonds for the construction of public buildings. 2100 Similarly, there were statutes that changed the boundaries of school districts, gave to the new districts property within the boundaries owned by the old districts, and required the new districts to assume the debts of the old districts.

For the same reasons as public service, neither appointment nor election to any public office creates a contract as to tenure, salary, or duties under Article 1, Section 10. 2103 In fact, common law, as reflected in earlier cases, does not allow for ownership of power in this country. 2104 But when a service is once rendered, there is an implied contract to be compensated at the rate in effect at the time the service was rendered. 2105 Also, an express contract between the state and a person to render a specific service falls within the scope of constitutional protection. Thus, a contract made by the governor under an act empowering him to appoint commissioners to carry out geological, mineral, and agricultural surveys of the state, with a certain amount appropriated for that purpose, was carried out over a period of several years. The repeal of this act caused prejudice. 2106 However, the resolution of the local board of education to reduce the salaries of teachers for the 1933-1934 school year was held to have no effect on the contracts of teachers who had served for three years, pursuant to a legislative act authorizing such a measure.

If there is no dut y-free: contract, a court has tried to distinguish between the case of an individual or a corporation, the case where the privilege grant is a contract and a mere cancellation license. 。 According to a precedent established in the New Jersey vs. Wilson trial (2110), the state parliament could "a specific period of certain periods or a specific period of a specific period or permanently tax. In fact, if exemptions are given to companies in the articles of incorporation, the exemption of this type is always from the general law. If there is no

In State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 2112, the court held that the general banking law of Ohio provides that corporations governed by this law and their stockholders should be exempt from all taxes, except certain taxes, and that a bank organized under this law and its stockholders are a contract within the meaning of Article 1, Section 10. The Court held that this provision "is neither a legislative enactment nor a taxation rule until changed, but a contract which provides for its modification by the nature of the language used and the circumstances under which it is adopted."2113 However, it was held that the State of Michigan, by general legislative act, would not have imposed a tax in the constitutional sense if it had required any firm, company, or individual business which manufactures salt within the State not to be taxed from the water obtained from the drilling alleys used for that purpose, and furthermore to pay a bounty on the salt produced. "A general encouragement is an indiscriminate encouragement to all to engage in a particular trade or manufacture, and whether such encouragement is in the form of generosity, disadvantage, or other advantage, is always subject to legislative control and may be discontinued at any time."2114 With regard to the exemption from taxation, this 2 The differences are as follows:

Moreover, exemptions from taxation, even when granted by a specific legislative act, have been treated as arbitrarily repealed in some cases. Such cases always seem to be found when the beneficiary was already in existence when the exemption was created and did nothing of a more positive nature to qualify rather than continue to exist. 2115 However, the cases are not always easy to interpret in relation to each other, except that the views of the courts have changed from time to time. 2116

"Is this clause applied to protect only private contracts, or applied to protect public subsidies, or more in general, public contracts? The reason for the positive answer to this question is that it is applied to protect the contract. First of all, the term "duty" is different from the same species of the Northwest Ordinance (1787). It is not. There is enough reason to think that James Wilson was involved in these two changes. Two years ago, he had accused the North American Bank of Bank's current proposal to abolish the Pennsylvanian status. A terrible appearance that can be maintained in this case will never be useful in any case. These state laws, which have been considered as a solid anchor of privileges and property, will be the entertainment of all diverse people in the future.

Furthermore, in the first major constitutional case, Chishyorm vs. Georgia (2119), the court also raised the right to the original jurisdiction in a dispute litigation raised by South Carolina's citizens. It was judged. Of course, this interpretation of the Federal Justice was immediately discarded by Article 11, but did not affect the suggestion that contracts protected by the Constitution would include a contract with the government. "Is this clause applied to protect only private contracts, or applied to protect public subsidies, or more, more and more public contracts. Whether the state applies to protect the contract as a parties, the reason for the positive answer to this question is as early as 2117. First, this clause is different from the same species of the Northwest Ordinance (1787). "There is no word. There is enough reason to think that James Wilson was involved in these two changes. Two years ago, he had accused the North American Bank of Bank's current proposal to abolish the Pennsylvanian status. A terrible appearance that can be maintained in this case will never be useful in any case. These state laws, which have been considered as a solid anchor of privileges and property, will be the entertainment of all diverse people in the future.

Furthermore, in the first major constitutional case, Chishyorm vs. Georgia (2119), the court also raised the right to the original jurisdiction in a dispute litigation raised by South Carolina's citizens. It was judged. Of course, this interpretation of the Federal Justice was immediately discarded by Article 11, but did not affect the suggestion that contracts protected by the Constitution would include a contract with the government. "Is this clause applied to protect only private contracts, or applied to protect public subsidies, or more in general, public contracts? The reason for the positive answer to this question is that it is applied to protect the contract. First of all, the term "duty" is different from the same species of the Northwest Ordinance (1787). It is not. There is enough reason to think that James Wilson was involved in these two changes. Two years ago, he had accused the North American Bank of Bank's current proposal to abolish the Pennsylvanian status. A terrible appearance that can be maintained in this case will never be useful in any case. These state laws, which have been considered as a solid anchor of privileges and property, will be the entertainment of all diverse people in the future.

The important source of these diverse opinions is the spread of natural concepts about the law, which has been forgotten in the early constitutional theory, and the ambiguity of the "law" that resulted in. In the Star Jes s-t o-Crown Shield case, Judge Marshall defined the duty of the contract as a law to "carry out the business". 2120 Where does this law come from? As Marshall later denied a private contract, it is not 2121, if the law is derived only to the nation, the national contract is subject to this clause. However, on the other hand, if the law that generates a contract obligations includes the principle of natural law and affinity, as well as the laws issued from state power, the state itself is detained in such principles. The state obligations are subject to this clause, even if it is in harmony.

The Fretcher vs. Peck Incident (FLETCHER V. Peck 2122) is the first case that the Supreme Court recognized the detention of the national institution based on the Constitution, and the first case that the contract provision protects public grants. 。 According to the laws passed on January 7, 1795, the Georgia Congress called for the current largest land that consists of Alabama and Mississippi to four land companies. Once known, the passing of the bill was ensured by public and larg e-scale bribes. Thus, when the new parliament was launched in the winter of 1795 to 1796, most of the first actions were to withdraw the previous year's sale. The important source of such various opinions is the spread of natural concepts related to law, which has been forgotten in the early constitutional theory, and the ambiguity of the "law" that caused the result. In the Star Jes s-t o-Crown Shield case, Judge Marshall defined the duty of the contract as a law to "carry out the business". 2120 Where does this law come from? As Marshall later denied a private contract, it is not 2121, if the law is derived only to the nation, the national contract is subject to this clause. However, on the other hand, if the law that generates a contract obligations includes the principle of natural law and affinity, as well as the laws issued from state power, the state itself is detained in such principles. The state obligations are subject to this clause, even if it is in harmony.

The Fretcher vs. Peck Incident (FLETCHER V. Peck 2122) is the first case that the Supreme Court recognized the detention of the national institution based on the Constitution, and the first case that the contract provision protects public grants. 。 According to the laws passed on January 7, 1795, the Georgia Congress called for the current largest land that consists of Alabama and Mississippi to four land companies. Once known, the passing of the bill was ensured by public and larg e-scale bribes. Thus, when the new parliament was launched in the winter of 1795 to 1796, most of the first actions were to withdraw the previous year's sale. The important source of these diverse opinions is the spread of natural concepts about the law, which has been forgotten in the early constitutional theory, and the ambiguity of the "law" that resulted in. In the Star Jes s-t o-Crown Shield case, Judge Marshall defined the duty of the contract as a law to "carry out the business". 2120 Where does this law come from? As Marshall later denied a private contract, it is not 2121, if the law is derived only to the nation, the national contract is subject to this clause. However, on the other hand, if the law that generates a contract obligations includes the principle of natural law and affinity, as well as the laws issued from state power, the state itself is detained in such principles. The state obligations are subject to this clause, even if it is in harmony.

Meanwhile, land companies had disposed of millions of acres of land to speculators and prospective settlers, some of whom consulted Alexander Hamilton about their rights after the law was repealed. Hamilton, in what would no doubt have been a familiar opinion to the Court when it decided Fletcher v. Peck, called the repeal a violation of "the first principles of natural justice and social policy," especially in so far as it was made "with prejudice.... a third party.... without suspicion of fraud or corruption.... . He added: Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution declares that no state shall pass any law impairing the obligations of a treaty. This is the same as saying that no state shall pass any law revoking, nullifying, or altering a contract. Every grant from one person to another, whether the grantor be a state or an individual, is essentially a contract that the grantor shall possess and enjoy the thing granted to the grantor and his agents. Thus, if we take the provisions of the Constitution in their broadest terms and give effect to them according to their general spirit and policy, it would be reasonable to hold that the revocation of the grant by the Georgia Legislature was contrary to the Constitution of the United States.

Marshall's opinions in the Fletcher vs. Pec case performed two creative acts as long as the contract clause was applied. The binding contract was still fulfilled, in other words, an undecared contract, in other words, a land grant was an undecided agreement, that is, a transfer. However, Marshall claimed that everything given was accompanied by an "apocalypse contract" that did not regain what was given to the grant. Therefore, subsidies are in the category of contracts with continuous obligations, and thus into the category of Section 10. However, there is a question about the nature of this duty. Marshall's answer to this is to guess from the last description of the opinion. He says that Georgia's enactment of the invalidation law is "the general principles common to our free systems, and the specific provisions of the United States Constitution are prohibited." 2124

Such protections on land grants have been expanded in the New Jersey, Wilson trial (2125), and the New Jersey has expanded to tax exemptions given to a specific Indian land, and a few years later. In the trial (2126), it was expanded to the privilege of establishing an elementary corporation.

In the case of Elpaso City vs. Simmons (2127), Judge Black's strong opposition was revised the law on the sale of public land and restricted the rights of illegal actors who had previously unlimited. This clause did not violate. Marshall's opinion in the fletcher vs. Pec case performed two creative acts as long as the contract clause was applied. The binding contract was still fulfilled, in other words, an undecared contract, in other words, a land grant was an undecided agreement, that is, a transfer. However, Marshall claimed that everything given was accompanied by an "apocalypse contract" that did not regain what was given to the grant. Therefore, subsidies are in the category of contracts with continuous obligations, and thus into the category of Section 10. However, there is a question about the nature of this duty. Marshall's answer to this is to guess from the last description of the opinion. He says that Georgia's enactment of the invalidation law is "the general principles common to our free systems, and the specific provisions of the United States Constitution are prohibited." 2124

In the case of Elpaso City vs. Simmons (2127), Judge Black's strong opposition was revised the law on the sale of public land and restricted the rights of illegal actors who had previously unlimited. This clause did not violate. Marshall's opinions in the Fletcher vs. Pec case performed two creative acts as long as the contract clause was applied. The binding contract was still fulfilled, in other words, an undecared contract, in other words, a land grant was an undecided agreement, that is, a transfer. However, Marshall claimed that everything given was accompanied by an "apocalypse contract" that did not regain what was given to the grant. Therefore, subsidies are in the category of contracts with continuous obligations, and thus into the category of Section 10. However, there is a question about the nature of this duty. Marshall's answer to this is to guess from the last description of the opinion. He says that Georgia's enactment of the invalidation law is "the general principles common to our free systems, and the specific provisions of the United States Constitution are prohibited." 2124

Corporate Charter: There are three views on the company map. First, it is a license that is arbitrarily terminated by the state, such as alcoholic sales licenses and auctioner licenses, but as long as it is effective, provide privileges and benefits to clothing manufacturers in the company form. It is a view that it is done. If the company establishment permit today is issued on a daily basis to all legal applicants by administrators who act based on general laws and regulations It would be natural to think about. However, at the time of 1819, the Charter was directly granted by the state parliament in the form of a special law, and few companies were in the country. Later, the benefits of the dirt mass college ruling were expanded to corporations organized under the general law, and this happened without discussion.

Second, the corporate articles of incorporation can be regarded as a franchise, the interests or assets in the holder's hand, and thus loses only in cases of abuse or under its own conditions. Part of the early state court had seen this from the beginning. 2128 In addition, Blackstone, although it was not the same with parliamentary sovereignty, was considered so in the relationship with the royal privilege, and in the webstar's discussion in the Dartmas College vs. Woodward incident. The same view is expressed as a simultaneous view in history. 2129 Corporate Charter: There are three views on the company map. First, it is a license that is arbitrarily terminated by the state, such as alcoholic sales licenses and auctioner licenses, but as long as it is effective, provide privileges and benefits to clothing manufacturers in the company form. It is a view that it is done. If the company establishment permit today is issued on a daily basis to all legal applicants by administrators who act based on general laws and regulations It would be natural to think about. However, at the time of 1819, the Charter was directly granted by the state parliament in the form of a special law, and few companies were in the country. Later, the benefits of the dirt mass college ruling were expanded to corporations organized under the general law, and this happened without discussion.

Second, the corporate articles of incorporation can be regarded as a franchise, the interests or assets in the holder's hand, and thus loses only in cases of abuse or under its own conditions. Part of the early state court had seen this from the beginning. 2128 In addition, Blackstone, although it was not the same with parliamentary sovereignty, was considered so in the relationship with the royal privilege, and in the webstar's discussion in the Dartmas College vs. Woodward incident. The same view is expressed as a simultaneous view in history. 2129 Charter: There are three views on the company map. First, it is a license that is arbitrarily terminated by the state, such as alcoholic sales licenses and auctioner licenses, but as long as it is effective, provide privileges and benefits to clothing manufacturers in the company form. It is a view that it is done. If the company establishment permit today is issued on a daily basis to all legal applicants by administrators who act based on general laws and regulations It would be natural to think about. However, at the time of 1819, the Charter was directly granted by the state parliament in the form of a special law, and few companies were in the country. Later, the benefits of the dirt mass college ruling were expanded to corporations organized under the general law, and this happened without discussion.

The third view is that the Dart Mass College vs. Woodward Trial, which is the dominant opinion by Judge Marshall 2130. 2130, is the constitution of the pure private institution, Dart Mass College, on the other hand. On the other hand, it is the result of the contract between the British royal family and a partial record, and on the other hand, the New Hampshire state as the successor to the royal family, and the British government and trustee as the successor of the donor. It was a matter of continuing a valid contract in between. In other words, the Charter was not just a grant, but a document record of the existing contracted contract. The 2131 Marshall can directly appeal to the contract clause based on this view, which has been developed with a great deal of ingenuity and persuasive power, and further utilize the fiction of the incorporated contract associated in the fretcer vs. Peck trial. Not.

However, before the obligations, the contract had to be tested, that is, the requirement that both contracts were not completely free. Furthermore, the idea that the royal family urged Dart Mass College to roar was just speculation. It was composed of donors' gifts to the important public interest of education. Fortunately or unfortunately, Marshall used more exaggerated words than necessary. "The purpose of a corporation is what the government wants to promote. These are beneficial to the country, and this profit is the paid for grants, most of which are the only paid. "In other words, from the country's point of view, it is important that this constitution has been approved. Prior to this doctrine, the court is 2133 in the Providence Bank vs. Bings, Charles River Bridge. In the Warlen Bridge case, 2134, the third view of the Dart Mass College Judgment was applied to the

Restoration of the right to change or abolish the corporate articles of incorporation-There are four principles or theories that the court denied the effect of the dirt trout college and greatly supported the state parliament. According to the logic of the Dart Mass College itself, the state can reserve the right to "change, change, abolition" in the corporate articles of incorporation, and this reservation is part of the contract between the state and the founder. , Exercise of rights does not impair its obligations. 2135 The subsequent ruling shows that the state can maintain the right to modify, change, and abolish the state by general law, and that this reserves has the effect of incorporating all the articles of incorporation. 2136 However, there is a difference between reserves by law and reserves based on the constitutional provisions. The former can be abolished in the later map by specific clause, but the latter is not possible. 2137

Is the right to "revise" or "change" of the Charter unlimited by the state? In general, if the right to "abandon" is likely to be obvious, the answer to this question is sel f-evident. Nevertheless, this authority is not limited, must be exercised rationally and honestly, and that changes must be in line with the scope and purpose of the grant. be. But 2138 However, some state courts have applied this kind of test to the prohibited law, but the UK Supreme Court has never applied. 2139 Restoration of the Right to Change or Direct Company Articles of Incorporation-There are four principles or theories that the court denied the effect of the dirt mass college and greatly supported the state parliament. According to the logic of the Dart Mass College itself, the state can reserve the right to "change, change, abolition" in the corporate articles of incorporation, and this reservation is part of the contract between the state and the founder. , Exercise of rights does not impair its obligations. 2135 The subsequent ruling shows that the state can maintain the right to modify, change, and abolish the state by general law, and that this reserves has the effect of incorporating all the articles of incorporation. 2136 However, there is a difference between reserves by law and reserves based on the constitutional provisions. The former can be abolished in the later map by specific clause, but the latter is not possible. 2137

Is the right to "revise" or "change" of the Charter unlimited by the state? In general, if the right to "abandon" is likely to be obvious, the answer to this question is sel f-evident. Nevertheless, this authority is not limited, must be exercised rationally and honestly, and that changes must be in line with the scope and purpose of the grant. be. 2138 However, some state courts have applied this kind of test to the prohibited law, but the UK Supreme Court has never applied. 2139 Restoration of the right to change or abolish the corporate articles of incorporation-There are four principles or theories that the court denied the effect of the dirt mass college and greatly supported the state parliament. According to the logic of the Dart Mass College itself, the state can save the right to "change, change, abolition" in the corporate articles of incorporation, and this reservation is part of the contract between the state and the founder. , Exercise of rights does not impair its obligations. 2135 The subsequent ruling shows that the state can maintain the right to modify, change, and abolish the state by general law, and that this reserves has the effect of incorporating all the articles of incorporation. 2136 However, there is a difference between reserves by law and reserves based on the constitutional provisions. The former can be abolished in the later map by specific clause, but the latter is not possible. 2137

It is quite different in that a case points out, on the one hand, the franchises and privileges which a company derives from its articles of incorporation, and, on the other hand, the property and contractual rights which arise therefrom while the company continues to exist. The absolute abolition of the former does not exclude the latter, nor does it force the latter to avoid the state. The first heirs of an organisation are its creditors, but after they have satisfied the old stockholders, anything of value remains. 2140 But because of the pre-emptive burden of power, he who invests in a corporation whose articles may be amended or abolished by legislation does so at his own risk. Such a contract does not alter or modify the relationship between the state and the corporation, with regard to the state's right to alter, amend or modify such articles. . . 2141 But later joins to this rule. 2142

Suppose the state neglects to reserve the right to alter, amend or abolish a legal entity, which is subject to law and police power. Does the state then have no power to manage the legal entity as a creation? Not at all. A private corporation, like any other private business, is always presumed to be subject to the legislative power of the state. From this, the immunity granted by its articles of incorporation must be treated as an exception to the administrative rule. This principle was recognized by Chief Justice Marshall in Providence Bank v. Billings (2143), where he held that a bank is subject to the taxing power of the state unless the articles of incorporation expressly or reasonably implied to the contrary.

And, of course, the same principle is applied to the exercise of police rights by the state. In the Vermont State Supreme Court, in a typical case before the Civil War, the state parliament set up a fence on the track to a charter company that operates the railway for public safety and place livestock soldiers. It was determined that he had the right to demand. The court stated that in such a nature, the railway company was equivalent to those engaged in the same business, unless the articles of incorporation could prove the opposition. 2144 Since then, this rule has been applied many times to justify the state regulations on railways, and in 2145, the state prohibition law has been applied to companies that have been explicitly chartered for beer production. Even this has become possible. 2146

Strict interpretation of the Charter and Tax exemptio n-The principle of these precedents has been strongly reinforced by the other two cases, long before the last case quoted.

The best one was the Charles River Bridge vs. Warren Bridge (2147), who was virtually a new court, shortly after the Supreme Court Trial Marshall. The issue was whether the state would prevent the state from allowed to operate a free bridge in the immediate vicinity of another company in the immediate vicin. It was. The first company was able to point out that the articles of incorporation had no particular clause that recognized exclusive rights, so the court stated that the second company was valid based on the principle described above. The story judge is a reasonable result from the Charles River Bridge Company, as well as the Imperial College's Imperial College and the permanent transactions, as well as the permanent transactions. He made a persuasive objection, but had no effect. And, of course, the same principle is also applied to the exercise of national police. In the Vermont State Supreme Court, in a typical case before the Civil War, the state parliament set up a fence on the track to a charter company that operates the railway for public safety and place livestock soldiers. It was determined that he had the right to demand. The court stated that in such a nature, the railway company was equivalent to those engaged in the same business, unless the articles of incorporation could prove the opposition. 2144 Since then, this rule has been applied many times to justify the state regulations on railways, and in 2145, the state prohibition law has been applied to companies that have been explicitly chartered for beer production. Even this has become possible. 2146

Strict interpretation of the Charter and Tax exemptio n-The principle of these precedents has been strongly reinforced by the other two cases, long before the last case quoted.

The best one was the Charles River Bridge vs. Warren Bridge (2147), who was virtually a new court, shortly after the Supreme Court Trial Marshall. The issue was whether the state would prevent the state from allowed to operate a free bridge in the immediate vicinity of another company in the immediate vicin. It was. The first company was able to point out that the articles of incorporation had no particular clause that recognized exclusive rights, so the court stated that the second company was valid based on the principle described above. The story judge is a reasonable result from the Charles River Bridge Company, as well as the Imperial College's Imperial College and the permanent transactions, as well as the permanent transactions. He made a persuasive objection, but had no effect. And, of course, the same principle is applied to the exercise of police rights by the state. In the Vermont State Supreme Court, in a typical case before the Civil War, the state parliament set up a fence on the track to a charter company that operates the railway for public safety and place livestock soldiers. It was determined that he had the right to demand. The court stated that in such a nature, the railway company was equivalent to those engaged in the same business, unless the articles of incorporation could prove the opposition. 2144 Since then, this rule has been applied many times to justify the state regulations on railways, and in 2145, the state prohibition law has been applied to companies that have been explicitly chartered for beer production. Even this has become possible. 2146

Strict interpretation of the Charter and Tax exemptio n-The principle of these precedents has been strongly reinforced by the other two cases, long before the last case quoted.

The Court actually created new law because it saw things from a new perspective. This was a time when judicial recognition of police power was beginning to take on a doctrinal character. It was also a time when railroads were in their infancy. Chief Justice Taney's opinion shows the influence of both developments. The power to secure the internal happiness and prosperity of the nation, he argued, should not be deviated from mere legal intent, nor should the ability to profit by the light of modern science be frustrated by the outdated interests of the old corporations. 2148

The Court reiterated the strict rule of construction again and again. In Blair v. City of Chicago, 2149, decided nearly 70 years after the Charles River Bridge, the court stated: "A grant of a legislative privilege of this nature must be in such unmistakable form of expression that its character and importance is clearly impressed upon the mind of the legislator if it is to be intelligibly granted or purposely withheld. Privileges of this kind are usually prepared by interested parties and presented to the legislature in order to obtain from them the most generous privileges the legislature is willing to grant. This is one of the many reasons why grants must be strictly construed.... The principle is that every right affirmed against the state must be clearly defined and not raised by inference or presumption. And where the charter is silent on a power, that power does not exist. If a fair reading of the charter gives rise to a reasonable doubt as to the proper construction to be given in the charter, that doubt must be resolved in favor of the state. And if the charter is silent on a power, then the charter must be read in such a way that it may be interpreted ... "When two meanings are involved, one limiting the power of the company and the other expanding it, the interpretation which is least damaging to the state must be adopted." 2150

As a special example of the operation of this rule on dut y-free, such a personality tax exemption must be considered to be intended only for the profit of the company that is exempted, so unless there is a national expression, the successor. There is a derivative theory that it cannot be relocated to a person. Thus, the new company was subject to tax if the ta x-exempted two companies were allowed by legislative prefectures. 2152 In addition, the laws that give all the "rights and privileges" of the corporation preceding a corporation are not given the latter "exemption". 2153 Again, if legally acknowledged the heritage, property, rights, privileges, and franchise transfer of the old corporation from a corporation to another, it is said that the latter corporation does not give the old corporation tax exemption privilege. Ta. 2154

Furthermore, tax exemption must be strictly interpreted, even in the case of those who have the right. Thus, tax exemption from the articles of incorporation of the railway company did not apply to the branch roads built under the later enacted laws and regulations. 2155 In addition, the general tax exemption to the company's property would only be applied to the property used in the business. 2156 In addition, the tax exemption of the capital of "10 years after the completion of the road" was invalid until the road was completed. 2157 In addition, the exemption between the university fund and the university donation fund was abandoned, even though it was a part of the funds, to abandon the land of other universities. The provisions under laws and regulations that bonds in the 2158 states and their political underwear are not taxed and should not be taxed are not tax exempted by the owner's income. 2159

Strict Construction and Police Powers Police powers have also often benefited from the principle of strict construction. Here are some striking cases: Even if a railroad company's articles of incorporation contained a provision allowing it to set reasonable rates, it was left to the legislature to decide what rates were reasonable. But when a railroad company agreed to accept a particular rate for a particular period, the question of the reasonableness of the rates was expressed. 2161 A company granted a right to supply water to a city for 25 years in order to prevent the same city from granting a similar right to another company. 2162 A promise by a city not to make similar grants to other persons or companies in the articles of incorporation of a water company was held not to prevent the city from engaging in the business itself. 2163 A 30-year franchise agreement for a water company contained a clause stating that "the company shall charge the following rates," but this was held not to prevent the city from lowering such rates. 2164 More broadly, however, granting a municipality the power to regulate the rates of public utilities did not give it the right to contract for such power. 2165 In fact, the fact that a private operator claims to have such power has not been held to prevent that operator from exercising such power. Strict Construction and Police Power "Police power has also often benefited from the principle of strict construction. Here are some striking cases. Even if a railroad company's articles of incorporation contained a provision allowing it to set reasonable rates, it was left to the legislature to decide what rates were reasonable. But when a railroad company agreed to accept a particular rate for a particular period of time, the question of the reasonableness of the rate was expressed. 2161 A company granted a right to supply water to a city for 25 years in order to prevent the same city from granting a similar right to another company. 2162 A city's promise not to make similar grants to other persons or companies in the articles of incorporation of a water company was held to be no prevention of the city engaging in business itself. 2163 A 30-year franchise agreement for a water company contained a clause stating that "the company shall charge the following rates," but this was held to be no prevention of the city lowering such rates. 2164 More broadly, however, granting a municipality the power to regulate the rates of public utilities does not give it the right to contract out such power. 2165 Indeed, the fact that a private utility claims to have such power does not preclude that utility from exercising it. Strict Construction and Police Powers Police powers have also often benefited from the principle of strict construction. Here are some striking cases: Even if a railroad company's articles of incorporation contained a provision allowing it to set reasonable rates, it was left to the legislature to decide what rates were reasonable. But when a railroad company agreed to accept a particular rate for a particular period, the question of the reasonableness of the rates was expressed. 2161 A company granted a right to supply water to a city for 25 years in order to prevent the same city from granting a similar right to another company. 2162 A promise by a city not to make similar grants to other persons or companies in the articles of incorporation of a water company was held not to prevent the city from engaging in the business itself. 2163 A 30-year franchise agreement for a water company contained a clause stating that "the company shall charge the following rates," but this was held not to prevent the city from lowering such rates. 2164 More broadly, however, granting a municipality the power to regulate the rates of public utilities did not give it the right to contract for such power. 2165 Indeed, it was held that the mere fact that a private operator claims to have such powers does not prevent that operator from exercising them.

The doctrine of non-ideology applied to the surface department, taxation, and police power. - The second of the above doctrines, which reinforces the principle that all, whether corporate or individual, are subordinate to the legislative power of the state, is the doctrine that certain powers of the state are inviolable, and that any attempt by the state to alienate others, whatever the cost, is ipso facto invalid, and therefore cannot give rise to a "contract" within the meaning of Article I, Section 10. One of the first cases asserting this principle was decided in New York in 1826. The New York City Corporation conveyed certain land for the purpose of a church and cemetery, with a covenant of quiet enjoyment, but later passed a law prohibiting its use as a cemetery. Despite the city's lawsuit for breach of the covenant, the state court stated that the defendant "had no power, as a party to the covenant, to enter into any contract which should control or humiliate its legislative powers or offices." 2167

The Supreme Court first applied a similar principle in 1848 in a case involving the grant of an exclusive right to build a bridge at a particular site. The Court upheld the right of Vermont to grant new rights to a competing company, and held that the obligation of the previous exclusive right was sufficient to justify the claim for compensation. The franchise of a company was subject to the authority of the surface rights, like all other forms of ownership. 2168

This reasoning was reinforced by reliance on the theory of state sovereignty, which entails the inference of noninterference of all the principal powers of the state.

Since then, the court has maintained that all imperial and privileges are subordinated to unresolved territory rights. Even if the state explicitly agreed to abandon the exercise of unresolved domain rights, it will not be effective. 2169 Rather, the state can cancel the unexpected provision of public property without relying on unresolved territorial rights. Such services are originally exceeded the authority of the state. Therefore, in 1869, the Illinois Congress transferred to Illinois Central Railway Companies and its successors and transferees, and transfer the state rights and ownership of about 1, 000 acres under the Lake Michigan along the Chicago Port. Four years later, if he tried to cancel the transfer, the court supported the state's recovery lawsuit in a fou r-t o-three ruling. This abandonment is inconsistent with the exercise of a trust that requires the state government to preserve such water for public use. Trusts entrusted to the government for the public are fulfilled only by the management and control of public interests, and cannot be abandoned by the transfer of property. .. All such provisions can be canceled inevitably, and the use of a trusted trust is inevitably canceled.

On the other hand, repeated attempts to try to make tax exemption based on inseparable principles have been supported by a strong minority judge, but failed. 2171 In January 1952, Georgia Railway Companies tried to force the company to pay the Georgia Revenue Committee, contrary to the special laws enacted in 1833. He said that the Federal Court had the right to ask for an injunction. In contrast to the claim that this is a lawsuit that is contrary to Article 11 of the Constitutional Amendment, the court has been exempt from the federal jurisdiction stipulated by Article 11 of the Constitutional Amendment. No, "he said. 2172 Since then, the court has maintained all imperial and privileges subordinated to unresolved domain rights. Even if the state explicitly agreed to abandon the exercise of unresolved domain rights, it will not be effective. 2169 Rather, the state can cancel the unexpected provision of public property without relying on unresolved territorial rights. Such services are originally exceeded the authority of the state. Therefore, in 1869, the Illinois Congress transferred to Illinois Central Railway Companies and its successors and transferees, and transfer the state rights and ownership of about 1, 000 acres under the Lake Michigan along the Chicago Port. Four years later, if he tried to cancel the transfer, the court supported the state's recovery lawsuit in a fou r-t o-three ruling. This abandonment is inconsistent with the exercise of a trust that requires the state government to preserve such water for public use. Trusts entrusted to the government for the public are fulfilled only by the management and control of public interests, and cannot be abandoned by the transfer of property. .. All such provisions can be canceled inevitably, and the use of a trusted trust is inevitably canceled.

On the other hand, repeated attempts to try to make tax exemption based on inseparable principles have been supported by a strong minority judge, but failed. 2171 In January 1952, Georgia Railway Company companies tried to force the company to pay the Georgia Revenue Committee, contrary to the special laws enacted in 1833. He said that the Federal Court had the right to ask for an injunction. In contrast to the claim that this is a lawsuit that is contrary to Article 11 of the Constitutional Amendment, the court has been exempt from the federal jurisdiction stipulated by Article 11 of the Constitutional Amendment, "as well as those who act as executives without constitutional authority. No, "he said. 2172 Since then, the court has maintained that all imperial and privileges are subordinate to unresolved domain rights. Even if the state explicitly agreed to abandon the exercise of unresolved domain rights, it will not be effective. 2169 Rather, the state can cancel the unexpected provision of public property without relying on unresolved territorial rights. Such services are originally exceeded the authority of the state. Therefore, in 1869, the Illinois Congress transferred to Illinois Central Railway Companies and its successors and transferees, and transfer the state rights and ownership of about 1, 000 acres under the Lake Michigan along the Chicago Port. Four years later, if he tried to cancel the transfer, the court supported the state's recovery lawsuit in a fou r-t o-three ruling. This abandonment is inconsistent with the exercise of a trust that requires the state government to preserve such water for public use. Trusts entrusted to the government for the public are fulfilled only by the management and control of public interests, and cannot be abandoned by the transfer of property. .. All such provisions can be canceled inevitably, and the use of a trusted trust is inevitably canceled.

Stone vs. Mississippi is a typical case over police power. 2173 In 1867, the Mississippi Congress established a corporation that explicitly given the authority to carry out lottery. Two years later, the state adopted a new constitution, including a clause that prohibits lottery, and one year later, the parliament passed the law to enact the provisions. After supporting the law and the constitutional provisions, the court states: "Administrative rights are trusted by the people and cannot be granted. The sovereignty has established an institution to maintain public health, maintaining public morals, and protect public and private rights. "The only thing that can be obtained in the Charter to" stop the right of a certain government for its own interest, and can withdraw freely. " 2174

Shortly thereafter, the court fought for the rights to infringe the exclusive privileges of a company that was engaged in cow meat processing in New Orleans and gave another company to engage in the same business. The same theory was applied in the case. Louisiana did not offer compensation for lost monopoly, but was supported as being taken for public health. 2175 However, when New Orleans depends on this case and has been granted by a company for 50 years, the court is in this case, when the court tries to destroy the exclusive franchise to supply natural gas to residents. The 2176 explained that it was not either hygiene, public morals, or public safety, and hindered the veto.

However, subsequent rulings apply the principle of knowledge widely. Both the contract clause and the "appropriate article" also have the effects that exceed the national power that rationally necessary regulations to ensure the health, safety, order, comfort, and general welfare of the local community. No. And all rights regarding the contract and property are subject to the exercise under its wise law. "2177 Stone vs. Mississippi is a typical case over police power. In 1867, the Mississippi Council has established a corporation that explicitly granted the lottery. Later, the state adopted a new constitution, including a clause that prohibits the lottery, and one year later, the Congress has passed the law to enact the provisions and the constitutional provisions. : "Administrative rights are trusts entrusted to the government and cannot be granted. The sovereignty, the sovereignty, maintains public health and public and private rights. The institution has been established to protect, and these institutions cannot be given or selling a lottery. It is only to stop certain government rights and can withdraw freely. " 2174

However, subsequent rulings apply the principle of knowledge widely. Both the contract clause and the "appropriate article" also have the effects that exceed the national power that rationally necessary regulations to ensure the health, safety, order, comfort, and general welfare of the local community. No. And all rights regarding the contract and property are subject to the exercise under its wise law. "Stone vs. Mississippi is a representative case about 2177 Police power. In 1867, the Mississippi Council has established a corporation that explicitly granted the lottery. The court has adopted a new constitution, including a clause that prohibits the lottery, and in one year, the court passed the law to enact the clause and the constitutional provisions. He says: "Administrative power is a trust entrusted to the government and cannot be granted. The sovereign is the maintenance of public health and public and private rights. The institution has been established, and these institutions cannot be given or sold a lottery that can be handed out in a certain government. It is only to stop the right of the right, and you can withdraw freely. " 2174

Today, it is not enough for a corporation to rely on charter privileges or special concessions from a state to resist the application of measures supposedly enacted under the police power of that state. If this argument is maintained, the obligation of the contract clause is not invoked, and if not, the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides sufficient credibility. In other words, the contradiction that once existed between the court's theories on the preemption of police power in these two adjacent areas of the Constitution has now clearly ceased. In fact, there is usually no good reason why a right based on public grant should be considered more sacred than a right that relates to the same subject but has a different origin.

The term "private contract" is of course not all-inclusive. Judgments, although granted in favor of creditors, are not contracts within the meaning of the Constitution, nor is marriage. 2178. 2179 And whether a particular contract is a valid contract is a question for the courts in invoking the protection of contracts, and ultimately for the Supreme Court. 2180

The question of the nature and source of contractual obligations, which was breached in Fletcher v. Peck and Dartmouth College and had very important consequences, was finally resolved and answered by the courts in relation to private contracts. The first Supreme Court case on such contracts was Sturges v. Crowninshield (2181), in which the debtor tried to hide behind a state bankruptcy law that was later in date than the note. The law was struck down, but it was not clear at the time whether it was for retroactivity in this particular case or for the broader reason of releasing the debtor's promises. As mentioned above, Chief Justice Marshall's decision to make the contractual obligations binding on the parties' business was not without ambiguity, as the understanding of the term "law" was uncertain. 2182

Today, it is not sufficient for a company to rely on chartering privileges or special concessions from a state to resist the application of measures supposedly enacted under the police power of that state. If this argument is sustained, the obligation of the Contracts Clause is not invoked, and if not, the Due Process of Law Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides sufficient credibility. In other words, the conflict that once existed between the Court's theories on the preemption of police power in these two adjacent areas of the Constitution is now clearly at an end. In fact, there is usually no good reason why a right based on public subsidy should be considered more sacred than a right that relates to the same subject matter but has a different origin.

The term "private contract" is of course not all-inclusive. Judgments, although granted in favor of creditors, are not contracts within the meaning of the Constitution, and neither is marriage. 2178

2179 And whether a particular contract is a valid contract is a question for the courts in invoking the protection of contracts, and ultimately a question for the Supreme Court. 2180

The questions regarding the nature and source of the obligation of contracts, which were breached in Fletcher v. Peck and Dartmouth College and had extremely important consequences, are ultimately resolved and answered by the Court in relation to private contracts. The first Supreme Court case on such a contract was Sturges v. Crowninshield (2181), where a debtor tried to hide behind a state bankruptcy law that was dated later than the note. The law was struck down, but it was not clear at the time whether it was because of its retroactivity in this particular case or because of the broader reason of exempting the debtor from his promise. As noted above, Chief Justice Marshall's decision to make the contractual obligations binding on the parties' business was not without ambiguity, as the term "law" was not understood with any certainty. 2182 Today, it is not enough for a corporation to rely on charter privileges or special concessions from a state to resist the application of measures supposedly enacted under that state's police power. If this argument is maintained, the obligations of the contract clause are not invoked, and if not, the Due Process of Law Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides sufficient credibility. In other words, the conflict that once existed between the Court's theories on the preemption of police power in these two adjacent areas of the Constitution is now clearly at an end. In fact, there is usually no good reason why rights based on public grants should be considered more sacred than rights of different origin that relate to the same subject matter.

The term "private contract" is of course not all-encompassing. Judgments, although granted in favor of creditors, are not contracts within the meaning of the Constitution, nor is marriage. 2178

And whether a particular contract is a valid contract is a matter for the courts in invoking the protection of contracts, and ultimately for the Supreme Court. 2180

The questions as to the nature and source of contractual obligations, which were breached in Fletcher v. Peck and Dartmouth College with crucial consequences, were ultimately resolved and answered by the courts in relation to private contracts. The first Supreme Court case on such contracts was Sturges v. Crowninshield (2181), in which a debtor sought to hide behind a state bankruptcy law that was later dated than the note. The Act was struck down, but it was unclear at the time whether it was for retroactivity in this particular case or for the broader reason of exempting debtors from their promises. As noted above, Chief Justice Marshall's decision to make contractual obligations binding on the parties to carry out their business was not without ambiguity, as he was uncertain about the understanding of the term "law."2182

This confusion was finally resolved in Ogden v. Saunders, 2183, where the timing of the statute and the associated contract was completely reversed, with the former preceding the latter. Chief Justice Marshall unsuccessfully argued that the statute was invalid because it relieved the debtor of the inherent obligations which always attach under natural law to free and voluntary acts. "When we look to the course of reading which American statesmen generally undertook in their youth," he wrote, "we must suppose that the framers of our Constitution were well acquainted with the writings of those wise and learned men who have guided public opinion on the subject of obligations and contracts in their treatises on the law of nature and of states, and that they derived their views on these subjects from these sources." He also raised the question of what would become of the Contracts Clause if the states could enact laws declaring that all contracts thereafter entered into were subject to the supervision of the legislature. 2184

For the first and only time, the majority of the court abandoned the prime minister's leadership. Speaking from the D. C. Circuit, the Court held that private contract obligations derive from state law and judicial decisions, which are municipal laws, and that the prohibition in Article 1, Section 10 is limited to legislative acts enacted after the contracts it affects, with the following exceptions: The Court also, by a curiously convoluted line of reasoning, held that state bankruptcy laws, even ex post facto, cannot alter the former's rights under contracts when the creditor is not a resident.

If we seek to find that the obligations of a private contract derive from the municipal law existing at the time the contract was made, a further question arises as to which part of the municipal law we are referring to. There is no doubt that the law determining the validity of a contract is itself a part of that law. Also, the law interpreting the terms used in the contract or prescribing certain terms when other terms are used is also part of such law. For example, a constitutional provision or statute prescribing what is a "lawful tender" for the payment of a debt, or a court decision interpreting the term "for the receipt of a security" used in a bill of exchange. In short, all the laws by which the parties' rights and obligations in their relationship to each other are measured at the time of the contract are included in the obligation. Bread The proposition that the obligations of a private contract derive from the municipal law existing at the time the contract was made presents a further question. There is no doubt that the law determining the validity of a contract is itself a part of the municipal law. Also, the law interpreting the terms used in the contract or prescribing certain terms to be used in the contract is also part of such law.

It cures a part of a private debt, unless one of the contracting parties fails to perform the obligations thus provided for. The contract itself may be considered terminated, but the injured party nevertheless has new rights in its place, given by the law of remedies, including the law of action. In the case of a mortgage, attachment may be made; in the case of a registry, an action may be brought; and in certain cases, specific performance may be demanded. A further question therefore arises as to whether this law should be considered as part of the law governing the obligations of contracts, since, as we have just seen, it does not actually come into force until the contract is broken. But it is clear that the sanctions it gives to contracts are extremely important, and are, in fact, indispensable. In time, it became the general doctrine that the part of the law giving the contracting parties remedies in the event of the other party's failure to comply with the contract, as interpreted in due course, is a "contractual obligation" in the constitutional sense, and cannot be altered in such a way as to seriously weaken the existing contract. In the words of the Court, "Nothing is more important to an obligation than the means of enforcement. A contract, without a remedy, is, indeed, enforceable by its remedy. 2186 Here, legislation was subsequently enacted which provided that an Illinois mortgage gave the mortgagee an unlimited right of sale in the event of the mortgagee's default, and further required the mortgaged building to be sold for at least two-thirds of its assessed value, and allowed the mortgagee a year to redeem. By thus altering an existing remedy, this legislation was held to have violated the constitutional prohibition and was therefore invalid. The following year, in McCracken v. Hayward (2187), a similar decision was made with respect to a provision of the statute that personal property could not be sold by enforcement for less than two-thirds of its assessed value.

However, the rules laid down in these cases do not mean that states cannot change remedies or procedural laws affecting existing contracts. The Court has stated that "the legislature may amend or modify existing remedies or prescribe new procedural methods, provided that substantial or effective remedies remain or are provided for under the contract by which the parties may exercise their rights." 2188 Thus, states are constantly restructuring their judicial systems and patterns of practice, without being humiliated by treaty provisions. 2189 The right of states to abolish imprisonment for debt was recognized early on. 2190 The right of states to shorten the time for filing an action has also been recognized in respect of existing causes of action, with the proviso that a reasonable time must be allowed for the filing of the action. 2191 On the other hand, statutes that abolished the jurisdiction to enforce satisfaction of certain types of judgments by mandamus were invalidated. 2192 In the words of the Court, "Each case must be decided on its own merits. 2193 Later it added: "In all such cases the question is .... the decision of which rests primarily with the legislature." 2194

Municipal bond contracts are worthy of special mention. Although the city is, on the one hand, merely an expression of the sovereign power of the government and its agent, when it borrows money it is considered to be acting in a corporate or private capacity and therefore has command power in its contracts. Moreover, as held in Von Hoffman v. Quincy, U. S. 2195, "when the state has permitted a municipality to exercise and abridge its power to levy local taxes to the extent necessary to satisfy its debts, it cannot withdraw the power granted until the contract is performed." In that case, the court issued a writ of mandamus to compel the city officials to levy taxes to satisfy the judgment on the bonds, according to the law enacted at the time of the bond issue. 2196 Nor can the state allow a municipality to escape its obligations by dividing it into other municipalities. The debts follow the obligation to levy and collect taxes to satisfy the territory and the subsequent extension of the corporation and its officers. 2197 But where the abolition of the offices has practically wiped out the municipal structure, and the functions of government were again performed directly by the state, the courts have so far found it impossible to thwart the dissolution plan. 2198 But there is no reason why the state should enact a criminal role in an attempt to relieve municipalities of their obligation to honor their honest debts. Thus, in 1931, during the Great Depression, New Jersey created a Municipal Finance Board with the power to administer insolvent municipalities. In response to the complaint of some bondholders that this act relieved them of their contractual obligations, the court pointed out, in the words of Justice Frankfurter, that the practical value of an uncovered bond against a city was the "efficiency of the city's taxing power." 2199

Personal contracts and police right s-The public subsidies are subordinate to the state police rights, as mentioned earlier. In this regard, it is clearly extremely abnormal that purely private contracts are in a stronger position. In fact, the ability to restrict government's power by the simple sophistry of private parties contracts with each other is, except for one special exception, the state ties their hands by delegating their own power. It is even lower. Thus, in the early trials of Pennsylvania, the law that banned issuance of bank tickets by an unoranted bank association affects the existing contracts of such members of the association. When he claimed to violate, the State Supreme Court replied: So what about? Is such a violation of contracts prohibited by the United States Constitution? Think about what such interpretation brings. Some states have no laws to prohibit gambling, chicken, horse racing, and masks, and a corporation has been established for the purpose of doing these acts. ... "In that case, does the legislative have the authority to prohibit these? The answer is:

The general doctrine is clearly written by the United States Supreme Court: "Prohibition of laws and regulations that affect the obligations of contracts, or the authority required for public welfare to promote public welfare. It does not hinder the exercise, but it is the theory of the court that the contract that has been concluded earlier may be affected. The legislature cannot prevent the enactment intended law for public interests. " The subordination of is as mentioned earlier. In this regard, it is clearly extremely abnormal that purely private contracts are in a stronger position. In fact, the ability to restrict government's power by the simple sophistry of private parties contracts with each other is, except for one special exception, the state ties their hands by delegating their own power. It is even lower. Thus, in the early trials of Pennsylvania, the law that banned issuance of bank tickets by an unoranted bank association affects the existing contracts of such members of the association. When he claimed to violate, the State Supreme Court replied: So what about? Is such a violation of contracts prohibited by the United States Constitution? Think about what such interpretation brings. Some states have no laws to prohibit gambling, chicken, horse racing, and masks, and a corporation has been established for the purpose of doing these acts. ... "In that case, does the legislative have the authority to prohibit these? The answer is:

The general doctrine is clearly written by the United States Supreme Court: "Prohibition of laws and regulations that affect the obligations of contracts, or the authority required for public welfare to promote public welfare. It does not hinder the exercise, but it is the theory of the court that the contract that has been concluded before the individual may be affected. The legislature cannot prevent the enactment intended law for public interests. " What is being stuck is as mentioned earlier. In this regard, it is clearly extremely abnormal that purely private contracts are in a stronger position. In fact, the ability to restrict government's power by the simple sophistry of a private partner to contract with each other, except for one special exception, the state ties its own power by delegating its own power. It is even lower. Thus, in the early trials of Pennsylvania, the law that banned issuance of bank tickets by an unoranted bank association affects the existing contracts of such members of the association. When he claimed to violate, the State Supreme Court replied: So what about? Is such a violation of contracts prohibited by the United States Constitution? Think about what such interpretation brings. Some states have no laws to prohibit gambling, chicken, horse racing, and masks, and a corporation has been established for the purpose of doing these acts. ... "In that case, does the legislative have the authority to prohibit these? The answer is:

Thus, in early cases, state records laws were affirmed as petitions on deeds dating back to the passage of the law. 2202 Subsequent cases showed that police power, in its most general aspect, applied to private contracts as well as to public contracts. A lottery, valid when issued, was necessarily invalidated by a law prohibiting the lottery business. 2203 A contract to sell beer, valid when it was introduced, was likewise invalidated by a state prohibition law. 2204 And an employment contract was modified by a subsequent law on employers' liability and workmen's compensation. 2205 Similarly, a contract between plaintiff and defendant does not prevent a state from making a concession to the latter and invalidating the contract. 2206 And a contract between two railroad companies as to freight rates does not prevent a state from charging different freight rates. 2207 And a contract between an electric utility and a customer does not prevent the agreed-upon rates from being replaced by rates set by the state. 2208 Similarly, a contract to transport water across state lines does not prevent a state from prohibiting that transportation. 2209

In recent years, however, the most prominent effect on private contracts and other private interests has caused war and economic recession. During World War I, New York states have enacted laws and regulations to declare an emergency, prohibited the conditions for abandonment of ownership at the end of the rental contract, and completely deprived the housing of the housing owner for a certain period of time. At the time of the law, including apartments and apartments in New York City and adjacent counties, it has completely deprived the means of livestock to remove the lessee living on the premises. In the case, the court responded to this law under the contract clause, as follows: "But the contract has a good reason, as we say we are. In some cases, the exercise of state power is high, but the legitimate emergency declaration should be greatly respected. In recent years, Police Power's most prominent acts of private contracts and other private interests have caused war and economic recession in World War I. The enactment of laws and regulations, prohibiting the conditions for abandonment of ownership at the end of the rental contract, and completely deprived the housing of the housing owner for a certain period of time, including apartments and apartments in New York and adjacent counties. At the time of the law, the livestock to evict the rented lessee on the premises was completely deprived of this law. , As follows: "However, the contract is subject to exercising state power if there is a legitimate reason, as we are, but in the later precedent The legitimate emergency declaration should be greatly respected, but in recent years has not been persuasive, but in recent years it has been most prominent in private contracts and other private interests. During World War I, the economic recession was caused by the Emergency State, and prohibited the conditions for the abandonment of ownership at the end of the rental contract. , The means of livestock to resign the lessee at the site when this law comes into effect, including apartments and apartments in New York City and adjacent counties, which completely stripped the housing owner. The court was completely deprived, saying, "But the contract was so, as we were. In the case of a legitimate reason, the exercise of state power is 2210, but the legitimate emergency declaration should be greatly respected.

The contract clause should not be concluded that it is currently completely disappeared. Even before the latest ruling, this provision provides a certain ground for conducting a certain judicial examination on the de facto legitimacy importance of the state parliament that the state parliament will exercise police rights. In the case of legislation that affects the right, it provides a strong and visible barrier to the erosion due to legislation. Also, as we have seen, this is not surprising, taking into account the fact that these rights were the strongest in the hearts of clause holders. Court attitudes for bankruptcy law, redemption method, disclosure method, assessment method, etc. must always be allowed retroactive operation. Home Building & Amp; Amp; This law pointed out the existence of a serious economic and financial crisis for several years and the frequent mortgage execution at an inadequate price. He claimed to have caused the necessary economic emergency, and allows the court to extend the redemption period from the mortgage eraser until the court is legitimate and equilibrium (in any case, in May 1935. After 1 day). It should not be concluded that the contract clause is currently completely disappeared. Even before the latest ruling, this provision provides a certain ground for conducting a certain judicial examination on the de facto legitimacy importance of the state parliament that the state parliament will exercise police rights. In the case of legislation that affects the right, it provides a strong and visible barrier to the erosion due to legislation. Also, as we have seen, this is not surprising, taking into account the fact that these rights were the strongest in the hearts of clause holders. Court attitudes for bankruptcy law, redemption method, disclosure method, assessment method, etc. must always be allowed retroactive operation. Home Building & Amp; Amp; This law pointed out the existence of a serious economic and financial crisis for several years and the frequent mortgage execution at an inadequate price. He claimed to have caused the necessary economic emergency, and allows the court to extend the redemption period from the mortgage eraser until the court is legitimate and equilibrium (in any case, in May 1935. After 1 day). The contract clause should not be concluded that it is currently completely disappeared. Even before the latest ruling, this provision provides a certain ground for conducting a certain judicial examination on the de facto legitimacy importance of the state parliament that the state parliament will exercise police rights. In the case of legislation that affects the right, it provides a strong and visible barrier to the erosion due to legislation. Also, as we have seen, this is not surprising, taking into account the fact that these rights were the strongest in the hearts of clause holders. Court attitudes for bankruptcy law, redemption method, disclosure method, assessment method, etc. must always be allowed retroactive operation. Home Building & Amp; Amp; This law pointed out the existence of a serious economic and financial crisis for several years and the frequent mortgage execution at an inadequate price. He claimed to have caused the necessary economic emergency, and allows the court to extend the redemption period from the mortgage eraser until the court is legitimate and equilibrium (in any case, in May 1935. After 1 day).

The certificate also requires the ownership of the mortgage during the extension period and pays the right rent to be determined by the court. At the same time, however, in Missouri and Arkanseau, more carefully created laws and regulations, which are not so considering the rights of creditors, were destroyed as violating the contract clause. 2216 "The state has the freedom to regulate the procedures in the court, even if the states have already concluded. In such a case, it is not the format or label, but the change in relief measures that are currently inhabited, not the label. With the significance, it is considered that these revisions are considered compassionate and unnecessary to the collateral. In the case of the species, the court has approved the Moratorium Law in New York.

On the other hand, if the court determined that the price of real estate purchased by the mortgage in auctions is equal to the debt secured by the mortgage, the real estate mortgage will not obtain a shortage in auction litigation. He supported the New York State Law. 2219 "The mortgage has no rights of the constitution, and has the right to maintain the interests of forced sales based on the special agreement. It is equivalent to the agreement with the opportunity to receive a special contract. It also requires that the mortgage owners have owned the ownership during the extension period and pay the proper rent determined by the court. At the same time, however, in Missouri and Arkanseau, more carefully created laws and regulations, which are not so considering the rights of creditors, were destroyed as violating the contract clause. 2216 "The state has the freedom to regulate the procedures in the court, even if the states have already concluded. In such a case, it is not the format or label, but the change in relief measures that are currently inhabited, not the label. With the significance, it is considered that these revisions are considered compassionate and unnecessary to the collateral. In the case of the species, the court has approved the Moratorium Law in New York.

On the other hand, if the court determined that the price of real estate purchased by the mortgage in auctions is equal to the debt secured by the mortgage, the real estate mortgage will not obtain a shortage in auction litigation. He supported the New York State Law. 2219 "The mortgage has no rights of the constitution, and has the right to maintain the interests of forced sales based on the special agreement. It is equivalent to threatening property rights with the opportunity to receive a special contract. During the extension period, the mortgage left the ownership and paid the right rent to be determined by the court. At the same time, however, in Missouri and Arkanseau, more carefully created laws and regulations, which are not so considering the rights of creditors, were destroyed as violating the contract clause. 2216 "The state has the freedom to regulate the procedures in the court, even if the states have already concluded. In such a case, it is not the format or label, but the change in relief measures that are currently inhabited, not the label. With the significance, it is considered that these revisions are considered compassionate and unnecessary to the collateral. In the case of the species, the court has approved the Moratorium Law in New York.

More importantly, the court has recently confirmed the effectiveness of this clause.

"The treaty is still part of the constitution." 2221 Instead, the court captured the state law in two cases, a case related to government contract obligations and a private contract. The recognition that the 2222 contract "impaired" is only a preliminary stage to evaluate the effectiveness of national acts. 2223 However, in both cases, the court has applied a more strict scrutiny than usual to legal measures. In the case of public contracts, it seems that the state was trying to avoid it because of its duty, and in the private case, the law helped the "narrow order". 2224

The approach in each case is to balance. "The significance of the impairment measures the magnitude of the disability that the state council must clear. If the contract obligations are minor changes, the survey can be terminated at the first stage. In the case of the state law, the court's legitimacy was determined to be seriously damaged in 2225 and 2226.

In the United State Trust case, the damage was affirmed only when it was "necessary" and "rational" to fulfill a significant public purpose. However, these two terms have a restrictive meaning. Necessity is only shown when the state of the state cannot be achieved by changing a more dramatic contract. Rationality is a function that caused a change in the contract due to a situation that was not predicted at the time of the contract. The abolition of the will of the will was rejected by both items in this test. 2227 More importantly, the court has recently begun to confirm the effectiveness of this clause.

In the United State Trust case, the damage was affirmed only when it was "necessary" and "rational" to fulfill a significant public purpose. However, these two terms have a restrictive meaning. Necessity is only shown when the state of the state cannot be achieved by changing a more dramatic contract. Rationality is a function that caused a change in the contract due to a situation that was not predicted at the time of the contract. The abolition of the will of the will was rejected by both items in this test. 2227 Even more important is that the court has recently confirmed the effectiveness of this clause.

In the Spannaus case, the court has derived the following four criteria from past cases: the law deals with a wide range of common economic and social issues, and is already a national regulation when contract obligations are concluded. It was operated in the fields that were subject to. It is only a temporary change in contracted, and applies to a wide range of individuals or stakeholders affected by the law. The court determined that the dispute law had no characteristics and disabled it. 2228

In contrast to the extreme preferential measures shown by such legislation under the appropriate procedure clause and equality protection clause, it is a problem. It is. Both precedents include the width of the government's police rights that can be exercised to promote public interests and the emphasis that emphasizes that it is based on a limited judicial examination. Nevertheless, "If the contract provision holds some meaning, it is ... the contract clause will break the existing contract relationship, even if it is a legal exercise of police rights. It must be understood that the national authority imposes a certain limit. " 2229

2074 Dodge vs. Woolsie Trial 59 U. S. (1856); Ohio & M. R. R. V. McClure, 77 U. S. (10 Wall) Light co. , 115 U. S. 650 (1885); Bier v. Mcgehee, 148 U. S. S. 140 (1893).

2075 New Orleans WATER-WORKS Co. V. Rivers, 115 U. S. 674 (1885); Burg καά Waterworks Co, 202 U. S. 453 (1906) ; Atlantic Coast LINE R. V. GoldSboro, 232 U. S. 548 (1914); Cuyahoga Power Co v. CITY of AKRON, 240 U. S. 462 (1916).

2076 ID δ επίση ο Grand Trunk ry. V. Indiana R. R. COMM'N, 221 U. S. 400 (1911); Appleby V. Delaney, 271 U. S.

2077 Central Land Co. V. Laidley, 159 U. S. 103 (1895). Βέπε NEW ORLEANS WORKS Co. καά davies, 163 U. S. 273 (1896). Ross v. OREGON, 227 U. S. 150 (1913). Detroit United Ry, 242 U. S. 238 (1916). COY καά Union αυωμέ R. CO. , 247 U. S. 354 (1918); . S. 444 (1924).

2078 Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 66 U. S. (1 Bl.) 436, 443 (1862); Bridge Proprietors v. Hoboken Co、 68 U. S. (1 Wall.) 116, 145 (1863); Wright v. Nagle, 101 U. S. 791, 793 (1880); McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 662, 667 (1890); Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34, 35 (1894); Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U. S. A. 223, 232-33 (1900); Coombes v. Getz, 285 U. S. 434, 441 (1932); Atlantic Coast Line R. R. v. Phillips, 332 U. S. 168, 170 (1947).

2079 McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U. S. 102 (1898); Houston & amp; Texas Central Rd. Co； Texas Central Rd. Co. v. Texas, 177 U. S. 66, 76, 77 (1900); Hubert v. New Orleans, 215 U. S. 170, 175 (1909); Carondelet Canal Co. v. Louisiana, 233 U. S. 362, 376 (1914); Carondelet Canal Co. Louisiana Ry. & amp; amp; & amp; amp. Co. v. New Orleans, 235 U. S. 164, 171 (1914).

2080 State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 57 U. S. (16 How.) 369 (1854) (後述)、Ohio Life Ins. and Trust Co. v. Debolt, 57 U. S. (16 How.) 416 (1854)が有力な判例である。また、Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 66 U. S. (1 Bl.) 436 (1862); Louisiana v. Pilsbury, 105 U. S. 278 (1882); McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 662 (1890); Mobile & amp; amp. Bacon v. Texas, 163 U. S. A. 207 (1896); McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U. S. 102 (1898).

2081 Gelpcke v. City of Debuque, 68 U. S. (1 Wall.) 175, 206 (1865); Havemayer v. County of Iowa, 70 U. S. (3 Wall.) 294 (1866); Thomson v. Lee County, 70 U. S. (3 Wall.) 327 (1866); The City v. Lamson, 76 U. S. (9 Wall.) 477 (1870); Olcott v. The Supervisors, 83 U. (16 Wall.) 678 (1873); Taylor v. Highlander. S. (9 Wall.) 477 (1870); Olcott v. The Supervisors, 83 U. S. (16 Wall.) 678 (1873); Taylor v. Highlander, 105 U. S. 60 (1882); Anderson v. Santa Anna, 116 U. S. 356 (1886); Wilkes County v. Coler, 180 U. S. 506 (1901).

2082 Great Southern Hotel Co. v. Jones, 193 U. S. 532, 548 (1904).

2083 Sauer v. New York, 206 U. S. 536 (1907); Muhlker v. New York & amp; amp； Muhlker v. New York & amp; amp; Harlem R., 197 U. S. 544, 570 (1905).

2085 Tidal Oil Co. v. Flannagan, 263 U. S. 444, 452 (1924).

2087 Walker v. Whitehead, 83 U. S. (16 Wall.) 314, 317 (1873); Wood v. Lovett, 313 U. S. 362, 370 (1941).

2088 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 197 (1819); Curran v. Arkansas, 56 U. S. (15 How.) 304 (1854)も参照。

2089 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 627 (1819).

2090 290 U. S. 398 (1934 年)。

2092 290 U. S. at 435. また、City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U. S. 497 (1965)も参照のこと。

2093 "Blaisdell represents a realistic understanding of the fact that we are an evolving society and that the general language of contract clauses is not intended to paralyze the legislature. Judge Black, Wood v. Lovett, 313 U. S. 362, 383 (1941).

2094 Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U. S. 142, 145-46 (1922); Louisiana Ex Rel. Folsom v. Mayor of New Orleans, 109 U. S. 285, 288 (1883); Morley v. Lake Shore Ry, 146 U. S. 162, 169 (1892); Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U. S. (2 Pet.) 380, 413 (1829); Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U. S. As the Court had already stated in S. (11 Pet.) 420, 539-40 (1837), the contract clause simply does not protect vested interests.

2095 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 629 (1819).

2096 Munn v. Illinois (94 U. S. 113, 1877) recognized the category of "businesses affected by the public interest" and their property was "for the public use." Corporations engaged in such business became "quasi-public" corporations and had greater state power to regulate than purely private corporations. Since most corporations receiving public franchises are of this nature, the end result of Munn was to expand the police power of the states in the case of the main beneficiary of the Dartmouth College decision.

2097 Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U. S. 472 (1880); Covington v. Kentucky, 173 U. S. 231 (1899); Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U. S. 161 (1907).

2098 East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co, 51 U. S. (10 How.) 511 (1851); Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U. S. 161 (1907).

2099 City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182, 191 (1923).

2100 Newton v. Commissioners, 100 U. S. 548 (1880).

2101 Michigan Ex Rel. Kies v. Lowrey, 199 U. S. 233 (1905). 2102 Faitoute Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U. S. 502 (1942). 2103 Butler v. Pennsylvania, 51 U. S. (10 How.) 402 (1850); Fisk v. Jefferson Police Jury, 116 U. S. 131 (1885). Dodge v. Board of Education, 302 U. S. 7 4 (1937); Mississippi Ex Rel. Robertson v. Miller, 276 U. S. 174 (1928). 2104 Butler v. Pennsylvania, 51 U. S. (10 How.) 420 (1850). Marbury v. Madison, 5 U. S. (1 cr.) 137 (1803); Hoke v. Henderson, 154 N. C. (4 Dev.) 1 (1833); see also United States v. Fisher, 109 U. S. 143 (1883); United States v. Mitchell, 109 U. S. 146 (1883); Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U. S. 99 (1890).

2105 Fisk v. Jefferson Police Jury, 116 U. S. 131 (1885); Fisk v. Jefferson Police Jury, 116 U. S. 131 (1885). Mississippi Ex. Sch. Robertson v. Miller, 276 U. S. 174 (1928).

2106 Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 U. S. 5 (1880). 参照。Higginbotham v. City of Baton Rouge, 306 U. S. 535 (1930).

2107 フェルプス対教育委員会事件、300 U. S. 319 (1937 年)。

2108 Dodge v. Board of Education, 302 U. S. 74 (1937).

2109 Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U. S. 95 (1938 年)。

2110 11 U. S. (7 Cr.) 164 (1812 年)。

2111 The Delaware Railroad Tax , 85 U. S. (18 Wall.) 206, 225 (1874); Pacific R. R. v. Maguire, 87 U. S. (20 Wall.) 36, 43 (1874); Humphrey v. Pegues, 83 U. S. (16 Wall.) 244, 249 (1873); Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 75 U. S. (8 Wall.) 430, 438 (1869).

2112 57 U. S. A. (16 How.) 369 (1854 年)。

2114 Salt Company v. East Saginaw, 80 U. S. (13 Wall.) 373, 379 (1872). Welch v. Cook, 97 U. S. 541 (1879); Grand Lodge v. New Orleans, 166 U. S. 143 (1897); Wisconsin & amp; amp. Powers, 191 U. S. 379 (1903); cf. Ettor v. Tacoma. Ettor v. Tacoma, 228 U. S. 148 (1913)では、道路等級の変更による結果的損害賠償を規定する法令の廃止は、既に発生した賠償請求権に憲法上影響を及ぼすことはできないとされた。

2115 Βλ. Rector of Christ Church v. County of Philadelphia, 65 U. S. (24 How.) 300, 302 (1861); Seton Hall College εναντίον South Orange, 242 U. S. 100 (1916).

2116 Συγκρίνετε τις παραπάνω περιπτώσεις με το Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 75 U. S. (8 Wall.) 430, 437 (1869); Illinois Cent, R. R. v. Decatur, 147 U. S. 190 (1893), με το Wisconsin & amp; amp; Michigan Ry. Co. v. Powers, 191 U. S. 379 (1903).

2117 According to Benjamin F. Wright, "the Contract Clause was considered in nearly 40 percent of all cases involving the validity of state laws" during the first century of constitutional government. But the sheer number of such grants does not necessarily indicate their relative importance in terms of the public interest. B. Wright, The Contract Clause of the Constitution 95 (1938). Madison explained the clause by suggesting that it had occurred "in the internal affairs of the states" in the years before the Constitutional Convention with respect to private debts. Contract violations were common in the form of corrupted documents that became legal tender, property that took the place of money, installment laws, and gridlocked judicial courts. 3 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 548 (Rev., 1937). The Federalist, no. 44 (J. Cooke ed., 1961), 301-302.

2118 2 The Works of James Wilson 834 (R. McCloskey ed., 1967).

2119 2 U. S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).

2120 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 197 (1819).

2121 Ogden v. Sanders, 25 U. S. (12 Wheat) 213, 338 (1827).

2122 10 U. S. (6 cr.) 87 (1810).

2123 B. Wright, The Contract Clause of the Constitution 22 (1938). Professor Wright dates Hamilton's pamphlet to 1796.

2124 10 U. S. (6 cr.) 87, 139 (1810). Justice Johnson, in his concurring opinion, relied only on general principles. "I do not hesitate to declare that the States have no power to revoke their own grants; but I do so on general principles founded on the reason and nature of things." p. 143.

2125 11 U. S. (7 cr.) 164 (1812). The exemption in this case was established in 1886 by a consent of the landowners to be taxed for 60 years. Since v. Wright, 117 U. S. 648 (1886).

2126 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U. S. (4 Wheat) 518 (1819).

2127 379 U. S. 497 (1965); see also Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U. S. 268, 278-79 (1969).

2128 In 1806, Chief Justice Parsons of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, without reference to the contract clause, stated that the rights legally vested in a corporation cannot be "destroyed by subsequent acts, unless the power therefor is reserved to the legislature in the act of incorporation." Wales v. Stetson, 2 Mass. 142 (1806); see also Stoughton v. Baker, 4 Mass. 521 (1808); see also 360 (1812). The purpose of the contract clause was allegedly to counter the paper money and bankruptcy laws. These cases taken together lead to the conclusion that the Massachusetts courts relied on "fundamental principles," not contract clauses.

2129 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) at 577-95 (Webster's argument); id. at 666 (Story's opinion). Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U. S. (9 Cr.) see also Story, 43 (1815).

2130 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).

2132 17 U. S. at 637; see also Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 75 U. S. (8 Wall.) 430, 437 (1869).

2133 29 U. S. (4 Pet.) 514 (1830).

2134 36 U. S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).

2135 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U. S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 712 (1819) (Story, Jr.).

2136 Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 75 U. S. (8 Wall.) 430, 438 (1869); Pennsylvania College Cases, 80 U. S. (13 Wall.) 190, 213 (1872); Miller v. New York, 82 U. S. (15 Wall.) 478 (1873); Murray v. Charleston, 96 U. S. 432 (1878); Greenwood v. Freight Co., 105 U. S. 1 3 (1882); Chesapeake & amp; amp; Chesapeake & amp; amp; See also Holyoke Company v. Lyman, 82 U. S. (15 Wall.) 500, 520 (1873); Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. S. Fair Haven R. v. New Haven, 203 U. S. 379 (1906); Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45 (1908). Also, Lothrop v. Stedman, 15 Fed. Cas. 922 (No. 8519) (C. C. D. Conn. 1875), where the principles of natural justice are considered to limit the power.

2139 See on this point the cases cited by Justice Sutherland in Phillips Oil Co. v. Jenkins, 297 U. S. 629 (1936).

2140 Curran v. Arkansas, 56 U. S. (1553); Shields v. Ohio, 95 U. 319 (1877). Greenwood v. ck ry. v. new york , 176 U. S. 335 (1900); Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U. S. 223 (1900); chicago, M. & amp; amp; st. r. v. ETZ, 285 U. S. 434 (1932).

2141 Summary, 80 U. S. (13 Wall.) 190, 218 (1872); Calder v. Michigan, 218 U. S. 591 (1910).

2142 Lake Shore & amp; amp; Mich. SO. RY. V. SMITH, 173 U. S. 690 (1899); COOMBES V. Getz, 285 U. S. 434 (1932). FREIGHT CO 105 U. S. 13, 17 (1882) is quoted, but there is no obvious legitimacy.

2143 29 U. S. (4 Pet.) 514 (1830).

2144 Thorpe v. Rutland & amp; amp; Burlington R., 27 VT. 140 (1854).

Therefore, railways may be required to eliminate railroad crossings, regardless of their costs and interests (New York & Amp; Amp; N. E. R. V. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556 (18944) ), Great Northern Ry. V. Minnesota Ex Rel. Clara City, 246 U. S. 434 (1918), Northern Bridge repair, Northern Bridge Repair, Northern Bridge repair, Northern Bridge repair, Northern Bridge repair The Pacific Railway vs. 208 U. S. 583 (1908), and the Rights have the right to pass along the road, although the rights to pass through the road. Requests to remove the track from the road intersection with a high traffic road intersection. In this case, the disadvantages and expenses related to the public are significantly improved. Even if the abolition is permitted and the conditions have been observed, the state can request the restoration of the abolished station to the railway company for public benefits. U. S. 1 (1881). In addition, the state is responsible for the railway company if a fire occurs by the locomotive, despite previously allowed the locomotive to use the locomotive. CHICAGO & amp; amp; R. V. Tranbarger, 238 U. S. 67 (1915).

2146 Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S. 25 (1878); Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde Park, 97 U. S. 659 (1878); see also Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U. S. 322, 345 (1909).

2147 36 U. S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).

2149 U. S. 201 400 (1906).

2150 201 U. S. at 471, 472, cited The Binghamton Bridge, 70 U. S. (3 Wall.) 51, 75 (1866).

2152 Atlantic & amp; amp; Gulf R. R. v. Georgia, 98 U. S. 359, 365 (1879).

2153 Phoenix F. & amp; amp; amp. v. Tennessee, 161 U. S. 174 (1896).

2154 Rochester Ry. v. Rochester, 205 U. S. 236 (1907); Wright v. Georgia R. & amp; amp; Banking Co. of Georgia, 216 U. S. 420 (1910); see Rapid Transit Corp. v. New York, 303 U. S. 573 (1938). See Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U. S. 139 (1886).

2155 Chicago, B. & amp; amp; K. C. R. v. Guffey, 120 U. S. 569 (1887).

2156 Ford v. Delta and Pine Land Company, 164 U. S. 662 (1897).

2157 Vicksburg, S. & amp; amp; P. R. R. v. Dennis, 116 U. S. 665 (1886).

2158 Millsaps College v. City of Jackson, 275 U. S. 129 (1927).

2159 Hale v. State Board, 302 U. S. 95 (1937).

2160 Railroad Comm'n Cases (Stone v. Farmers' Loan & amp; Trust Co.), 116 U. S. 307, 330 (1886) was expanded in Southern Pacific Co. v. Campbell, 230 U. S. 537 (1913) to cases where the word "reasonable" did not seem to satisfy the toll authority of the company. See also American Bridge Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 307 U. S. 486 (1939).

2161 Georgia Ry. v. Town of Decatur, 262 U. S. 432 (1923); Southern Iowa Elec. Co. v. City of Chariton, 255 U. S. 539 (1921).

2162 City of Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co, 172 U. S. 1, 15 (1898). 2163 Skaneateles Water Co. v. Skaneateles, 184 U. S. 354 (1902); Water Co. v. City of Knoxville, 200 U. S. 22 (1906); Madera Water Works v. City of Madera, 228 U. S. 454 (1913). 2164 Rogers Park Water Co. v. Fergus, 180 U. S. 624 (1901). See also 2166 Puget Sound Traction Co. v. Reynolds, 244 U. S. 574 (1917). "Before one can find impairment of a contract, one must find impairment of the obligations of the contract. The contract relied upon is between a political subdivision of a state and a private citizen, and well-established principles of construction require that the obligations alleged to be impaired be clearly and unambiguously expressed." Keefe v. Clark, 322 U. S. 393, 396-397 (1944).

2167 Brick Presbyterian Church v. New York, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 538, 540 (1826).

2168 WEST RIVER BRIDGE Co. V. V. Dix, 47 U. (6 How.) 507 (1848); backus v. Lebanon, 11 N. H. 19 (1840); White River Turnpike Co. V. Vermont Cent. Vermont Cent. R. CO. 21 vt. 590 (1849); and bonaparte v. Camden & amp; amp; & amp; amp.

2169 HOSPITAL OF PENNSYLVANIA V. City of Philadelphia, 245 U. S. 20 (1917).

2170 Illinois Center. R. R. V. Illinois, 146 U. S. 387, 453, 455 (1892).

2171 See House of Friendless V. Rouses, 75 U. S. (8 Wall) 430 (1869) and University of Washington V. Rouse, 75 U. S. (8 Wall) 439 (1869).

2172 Georgia R. R. & amp; AMP; Banking Co v. Redwine, 342 U. S. 299, 305-06 (1952). This lawsuit says that this lawsuit "virtually states to gain a specification of a contract with the state. It was distinguished from Re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443 (1887). 342 U. S. at 305.

2173 101 U. S. 814 (1880).

2174 101 U. S. at 820-21.

2175 slaughterhouse / livestock company vs. Crescent City slaughterhouse / livestock company, 111 U. S. 746 (1884).

2176 New Orleans Gas, Louisiana Light, 115 U. S. 650 (1885).

2177 ATHLETIC ATHLETIC LINE R. V. CITY OF GOLDSBORO, 232 U. S. 548, 558 (1914). CHICAGO & Amp; AMP; Alton R. V. Nsylvania Hospital v. Philadelphia, 245 U. S. 20 ( See also 1917); Regarding the loss of sints, the police right and the famous divisions are treated on the same criteria. Wavash Railway vs. Deference, 167 U. S. 88, 97 (1897)? Original text TEL. & Amp; amp; CITY OF LOS ANGELES, 211 U. S. 265 (1908).

2178 MORLEY V. Lake shore ry. p; amp. co v. See SEBASTIAN COUNTY, 249 U. S. 170 (1919); See LivingSton's Lessee V. Moore, 32 U. S. (7 PET.) 469, 549 (1833); And Garrison V. New York, 88 U. S. (21 Wall.) 196, 203 (1875). In the case of debt litigation crisis, it suggests that different views had previously been accepted.

2179 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190 (1888); Dartmouth College v. 17 U. S. (4 while.) 518, 629 (1819). Andrews, 188 U. 14 1903). The question of whether the wife's right to shared property in the California Law was on a contract was proposed in Moffit V. Kelly, 218 U. S. 400 (1910), but no ruling was issued.

2180 NEW ORLEANS καά New Orleans Works Co, 142 U. S. 79 (1891); Zane καά Hamilton County, 189 U. S. 370, 381 (1903).

2181 17 U. S. (4 σ ι.) 122 (1819).

2182 17 U. S. (4 Wheat) at 197. 2183 25 U. S. (12 Wheat) at 213 (1827).

2185 United States ex rel. Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 71 U. S. (4 Wall.) 535, 552 (1867). 2186 42 U. S. A. (1 How.) 311 (1843).

2187 43 U. S. A. (2 How.) 608 (1844).

2188 Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh, 187 U. S. 437, 439 (1903); City & amp; amp; Lake R. R. v. New Orleans, 157 U. S. 219 (1895).

2189 Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U. S. 769 (1883). 2190 This right was upheld in Mason v. Haile, 25 U. S. (12 Wheat.) 370 (1827), and again in Penniman, 103 U. S. 714 (1881). 2191 McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U. S. 662 (1890).

2192 Louisiana v. New Orleans, 102 U. S. 203 (1880).

Elim Poon - Journalist, Creative Writer

Last modified: 27.08.2024

The Fourteenth Amendment (Amendment XIV) to the United States Constitution was adopted on July 9, , as one of the Reconstruction Amendments. The LII version of the US Constitution contains annotations prepared by the 21 “US Constitution,” lcusoccer.org, accessed 3 March , http://. Chadha [lcusoccer.org], the Supreme Court held that legislative vetoes violate Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution.

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