Sustainability Free Full-Text Esports Governance Exploring Stakeholder Dynamics

Esports Governance: Exploring Stakeholder Dynamics

Esports is a fast-growing industry. However, the unrecognized governance structure of the industry contributes to various activities that undermine integrity. By exploring the dynamics of stakeholders in esports, this paper answers the question: "Is the governance model of esports sustainable?" Data were extracted from documents, focus groups (N = 3) and semi-structured interviews (N = 6). Thematic analysis was conducted using Nvivo. The results suggest that (1) the current esports governance framework is characterized as a "network run by a top organization" with power mainly lies with game publishers. (2) The increasing power of other stakeholders in the network who seek to address integrity issues is causing fragmentation of the esports governance framework. (3) Esports governance is evolving towards a network administration organization (NAO) model. This evolution has several challenges, especially compliance by game publishers. Given the social impact of integrity issues, governments will have an important role to play in promoting the NAO model. Keywords

The development of digital technology provides opportunities for new and emerging industries. These emerging industries require regulation and governance, not only from a business and legal perspective, but also to ensure appropriate social impact. Esports is one example of such an industry. Although its definition is debated, esports typically refers to competitive video games (professional and amateur)[1]. This paper focuses on the governance of esports and the ability of the esports ecosystem to improve integrity-compromising activities. While esports continues to expand exponentially, the industry faces many potential challenges. One of the biggest, if not the biggest, problems for esports is the lack of a formal and robust governance structure that fits the unique characteristics and circumstances of esports[2]. In other words, the current governance and regulatory landscape surrounding esports is opaque[3].

1. Introduction

Despite the no formal governance mechanism, the Esports industry is growing economic growth. ESPORTS is a rapidly growing industry, and in 2019, the US $ 9507. 5 million has been generated from 20. 3%to 20. 3%, and the annual growth rate from 2018 to 2023 is expected to be 15. 5%[4. ]. Not surprisingly, the financial rewards provided are increasing the same sincere activities as ordinary sports, such as misconduct, doping, coaching, and illegal gambling [5, 6, 7]. The issue has not been dealt with by conventional policies and law enforcement mechanisms, so the ESPORTS industry has started its own integrity promotion activities. However, the effort is inconsistent and faces a crisis. Against this background, this paper explores the current ESPORTS Governance model through network governance lenses and verifies the interaction between major network members. This is to understand the current ESPORTS ecosystem and to be in a clearer position to propose policies to improve the governance. The reason for this study is that there is a lack of research that focuses on the mechanics of governance, governance, and stakeholders. In addition, the inconsistency of the e-sports and ecosystem

(1) Who are the main stakeholders and new stakeholders in the ESPORTS governance system?

(2) What is the current ESPORTS governance framework and why? (3) How do they promote / restrict the evolution of Esports governance? Despite the no official governance mechanism, the Esports industry is growing economic growth. ESPORTS is a rapidly growing industry, and in 2019, the US $ 9507. 5 million has been generated from 20. 3%to 20. 3%, and the annual growth rate from 2018 to 2023 is expected to be 15. 5%[4. ]. Not surprisingly, the financial rewards provided are increasing the same sincere activities as ordinary sports, such as misconduct, doping, coaching, and illegal gambling [5, 6, 7]. The issue has not been dealt with by conventional policies and law enforcement mechanisms, so the ESPORTS industry has started its own integrity promotion activities. However, the effort is inconsistent and faces a crisis. Against this background, this paper explores the current ESPORTS Governance model through network governance lenses and verifies the interaction between major network members. This is to understand the current ESPORTS ecosystem and to be in a clearer position to propose policies to improve the governance. The reason for this study is that there is a lack of research that focuses on the mechanics of governance, governance, and stakeholders. In addition, the inconsistency of the e-sports and ecosystem (1) Who are the main stakeholders and new stakeholders in the ESPORTS governance system?

2. Literature Review

2.1. The Esports Ecosystem as a Network

(2) What is the current ESPORTS governance framework and why?

(3) How do they promote / restrict the evolution of Esports governance? Despite the no formal governance mechanism, the Esports industry is growing economic growth. ESPORTS is a rapidly growing industry, and in 2019, the US $ 9507. 5 million has been generated from 20. 3%to 20. 3%, and the annual growth rate from 2018 to 2023 is expected to be 15. 5%[4. ]. Not surprisingly, the financial rewards provided are increasing the same sincere activities as ordinary sports, such as misconduct, doping, coaching, and illegal gambling [5, 6, 7]. The issue has not been dealt with by conventional policies and law enforcement mechanisms, so the ESPORTS industry has started its own integrity promotion activities. However, the effort is inconsistent and faces a crisis. Against this background, this paper explores the current ESPORTS Governance model through network governance lenses and verifies the interaction between major network members. This is to understand the current ESPORTS ecosystem and to be in a clearer position to propose policies to improve the governance. The reason for this study is that there is a lack of research that focuses on the mechanics of governance, governance, and stakeholders. In addition, the inconsistency of the e-sports and ecosystem

(1) Who are the main stakeholders and new stakeholders in the ESPORTS governance system?

2.2. Network Governance, Rationalities and Forms

(2) What is the current ESPORTS governance framework and why?

(3) How do they promote / restrict the evolution of Esports governance?

To address the governance of the esports ecosystem, it is important to first understand the actors and their relationships. Scholz [10] points out that "the esports industry, with its various stakeholders, can be seen as an interwoven network that requires each other to work together and succeed." Scholz [10] presented an initial taxonomy of esports stakeholders and, more generally, the esports ecosystem (Figure 1). Within the esports ecosystem, esports players are positioned as unique actors, along with game developers, professional players, tournament teams and organizers. Beyond these actors, non-existent stakeholders such as media, sponsors, investors, suppliers, providers and shareholders interact with each other and provide resources for the ecosystem to develop. Despite the clear consideration of the social and ecological aspects of the esports ecosystem, Scholz [10] focuses exclusively on the economic/business aspects. His claim is that "many esports organizations follow an entrepreneurial narrative, without government regulation and therefore without the legal possibility of a non-profit strategy" [10].

However, not all esports organizations follow a business scenario. For example, organizations like the International Esports Association and the National Esports Association, forcibly illustrated in Figure 1, are not entrepreneurial, but rather interested in the sustainability of the esports ecosystem at the international and national levels. Another limitation of the entrepreneurial perspective adopted by Scholz [10] is that it treats players as only interested in making money, without considering the health and social issues they may face. Ultimately, if Scholz [10] provides a good starting point for thinking about the esports ecosystem as a network, its lack of inclusion of non-profit players and the ensuing social dimension reinforces the need to embrace governance of the entire esports network without relying on a business approach.

The general theory of network governance [11] and its further developments (e. g., Provan and Kenis [12]) provide a suitable conceptual framework for this study, as it takes into account not only the conditions of exchange but also social mechanisms.

Network governance refers to the coordination of complex products and services by a network of organizations in an uncertain and competitive environment, as opposed to bureaucratic structures within organizations or formal contractual relationships between organizations. [11] A network includes a group of at least three legally autonomous organizations working together to achieve not only individual goals but also collective goals that cannot be produced by any single actor alone. [12] To explore the governance model of esports and its possible evolutionary trajectory, it is necessary to understand the basis, form, and evolution of network governance.

Sørensen and Torfing [13] propose four rationalities for network governance: (1) substantive rationality, (2) procedural rationality, (3) normative rationality, and (4) negotiation logic. Substantive rationality is hierarchical social governance, usually conducted by the state. Procedural rationality stems from market-oriented network governance, which chooses to reduce state intervention and increase market procedures and regulations. Normative rationality emphasizes the “informal sector” and civil society as governmental institutions of society [14, 15, 16]. Negotiated rationality recognizes that in reality, there is not always a clear choice between the state, the market, and civil society [17, 18]. Based on the presentation of the esports network provided by Scholz (2020), procedural rationality may seem most appropriate to describe the reality of the sector. However, considering factors not included in Scholz’s [10] analysis may provide a different perspective on the rationality of esports network governance.

Based on different rationalities and interaction dynamics among network members, network governance can take different forms. Provan and Kenis [12] distinguish three forms of network governance: (1) leading organizations, and (2) managerial network organizations. This typology is widely cited and recognized as one of the most important concepts in network governance [19].

3. Method

3.1. Data Collection

Shade governance is a basic form of network governance. This is operated by the members of the network, and there is no independent official governance. Organizational governance contains more asymmetrical forces between the leading tissue and a series of weak organizations, including the network of the network. Organizational governance occurs when the organization has sufficient resources and legitimacy to play leadership, or when it occupies a central position in the flow of customers and major resources. All major networ k-level activities and important decisions are adjusted through this single participant. The network management organization (NAO) refers to "an independent management organization specially established to manage the network and its activities." Like the head tissue model, the Governance structure of NAO is often centralized, and the network broker (that is, NAO) plays an important role in adjusting and maintaining the network. NAO is sometimes formulated based on internal perceptions of mutual dependent organizations. For example, when the number of tissues is relatively large, or when it is necessary to accept a variety of expertise and build the legitimacy of the network [20]. Therefore, the construction of a coalition network leads to the interests of the following organizations.

The mutual dependence of stakeholders emphasized by Scholz (2020) suggests the validity of shared governance. However, when considering actors that are not included in SCHOLZ [10], such as international ESPORTS Association and ESPORTS Association in Japan, I wonder if the busines s-led Esports organization needs shared governance with them and accepts them. Maybe. Shade governance is the basic form of network governance. This is operated by the members of the network, and there is no independent official governance. Organizational governance contains more asymmetrical forces between the leading tissue and a series of weak organizations, including the network of the network. Organizational governance occurs when the organization has sufficient resources and legitimacy to play leadership, or when it occupies a central position in the flow of customers and major resources. All major networ k-level activities and important decisions are adjusted through this single participant. The network management organization (NAO) refers to "an independent management organization specially established to manage the network and its activities." Like the head tissue model, the Governance structure of NAO is often centralized, and the network broker (that is, NAO) plays an important role in adjusting and maintaining the network. NAO is sometimes formulated based on internal perceptions of mutual dependent organizations. For example, when the number of tissues is relatively large, or when it is necessary to accept a variety of expertise and build the legitimacy of the network [20]. Therefore, the construction of a coalition network leads to the interests of the following organizations.

The mutual dependence of stakeholders emphasized by Scholz (2020) suggests the validity of shared governance. However, when considering actors that are not included in SCHOLZ [10], such as international ESPORTS Association and ESPORTS Association in Japan, I wonder if the busines s-led Esports organization needs shared governance with them and accepts them. Maybe. Shade governance is a basic form of network governance. This is operated by the members of the network, and there is no independent official governance. Organizational governance contains more asymmetrical forces between the leading tissue and a series of weak organizations, including the network of the network. Organizational governance occurs when the organization has sufficient resources and legitimacy to play leadership, or when it occupies a central position in the flow of customers and major resources. All major networ k-level activities and important decisions are adjusted through this single participant. The network management organization (NAO) refers to "an independent management organization specially established to manage the network and its activities." Like the head tissue model, the Governance structure of NAO is often centralized, and the network broker (that is, NAO) plays an important role in adjusting and maintaining the network. NAO is sometimes formulated based on internal perceptions of mutual dependent organizations. For example, when the number of tissues is relatively large, or when it is necessary to accept a variety of expertise and build the legitimacy of the network [20]. Therefore, the construction of a coalition network leads to the interests of the following organizations.

3.2. Data Analysis

In addition to the above, network members are likely to change because the members of the network are constantly adapting to complexity, mutual dependence, and dynamics. Previous studies have identified some factors that promote the evolution of network and governance. For example, Provan and Kenis [12] pointed out that the evolution of network governance generally obey logic that requires higher efficiency. Joint governance networks may evolve into supervisor and NAO governance when the size of the network is increased and a more effective network governance is required. Furthermore, based on resourc e-dependent theory, the network is more advantageous to access valuable and rare resources (eg, knowledge and technology) and maintain competitive advantage as a whole. Evolines in [24]. The construction of legitimacy is also an important factor that affects the evolution of the network [25]. In order to maintain a network, it is important to recognize high status and reliability for groups both inside and outside the company. [26] Externally, the network can adjust the strategic structure according to the social political environment, such as the government's rules, regulations and standards, in order to gain legitimacy among a wide range of stakeholders. can. Internally, networks can also change political and economic situations. In addition to the above, the network members are likely to change because they always adapt to complexity, mutual dependence, and dynamics. Previous studies have identified some factors that promote the evolution of network and governance. For example, Provan and Kenis [12] pointed out that the evolution of network governance generally obey logic that requires higher efficiency. Joint governance networks may evolve into supervisor and NAO governance when the size of the network is increased and a more effective network governance is required. Furthermore, based on resourc e-dependent theory, the network is more advantageous to access valuable and rare resources (eg, knowledge and technology) and maintain competitive advantage as a whole. Evolines in [24]. The construction of legitimacy is also an important factor that affects the evolution of the network [25]. In order to maintain a network, it is important to recognize high status and reliability for groups both inside and outside the company. [26] Externally, the network can adjust the strategic structure according to the social political environment, such as the government's rules, regulations and standards, in order to gain legitimacy among a wide range of stakeholders. can. Internally, networks can also change political and economic situations. In addition to the above, network members are likely to change because the members of the network are constantly adapting to complexity, mutual dependence, and dynamics. Previous studies have identified some factors that promote the evolution of network and governance. For example, Provan and Kenis [12] pointed out that the evolution of network governance generally obey logic that requires higher efficiency. Joint governance networks may evolve into supervisor and NAO governance when the size of the network is increased and a more effective network governance is required. Furthermore, based on resourc e-dependent theory, the network is more advantageous to access valuable and rare resources (eg, knowledge and technology) and maintain competitive advantage as a whole. Evolines in [24]. The construction of legitimacy is also an important factor that affects the evolution of the network [25]. In order to maintain a network, it is important to recognize high status and reliability for groups both inside and outside the company. [26] Externally, the network can adjust the strategic structure according to the social political environment, such as the government's rules, regulations and standards, in order to gain legitimacy among a wide range of stakeholders. can. Internally, networks can also change political and economic situations.

4. Findings

Therefore, as a result of various impacts, the three forms of network governance introduced above evolve from a very basic form (ie, shared governance) to the other two forms (that is, a guide or NAO). Can be done [12]. The organizational governance network appears when the tissue in the original network gains power and vitality and acquire the most important and irreplaceable resources (core technologies, intellectual property, etc.). When a powerful organization cannot maintain the internal legitimacy and is no longer trusted by the members, the initiative may become NAO. Therefore, an independent organization that represents network profits must be created. The transition from shared governance and the form of a leading organization to the NAO forms means a change in accidental factors, such as the diffusion of trust among members and the lack of a network of organizational authority, which plays a leading role in other members. Externally, the governmen t-like forced force is imposed on the network, or a nao form mandate is formed due to concerns about the network.

4.1. Key Stakeholders: Game Publishers Are the Dominant Powers

PROVAN and KENIS [12] also reported that once management leadership is established, the possibility that leads and NAO forms will evolve into a shared governance form. NAO is definitely the most stable and formal network governance form of three, so once this type of governance is established, it is unlikely that NAO will change to another form.

Since research on Esport Governance models is limited, this study used a search case study design. When answering the questions of "What (what)", "Why (why)", and "How (how)", the case research design focuses on the hypothesis and overall. It suggests that there are clear advantages because it can maintain a realistic perspective. Therefore, as a result of various impacts, the three forms of network governance introduced above are from a very basic form (ie, shared governance) to the other two forms (that is, a guide or NAO). And can evolve [12]. The organizational governance network appears when the tissue in the original network gains power and vitality and acquire the most important and irreplaceable resources (core technologies, intellectual property, etc.). When a powerful organization cannot maintain the internal legitimacy and is no longer trusted by the members, the initiative may become NAO. Therefore, an independent organization that represents network profits must be created. The transition from shared governance and the form of a leading organization to the NAO forms means a change in accidental factors, such as the diffusion of trust among members and the lack of a network of organizational authority, which plays a leading role in other members. Externally, the governmen t-like forced force is imposed on the network, or a nao form mandate is formed due to concerns about the network.

Since research on Esport Governance models is limited, this study used a search case study design. When answering the questions of "What (what)", "Why (why)", and "How (how)", the case research design focuses on the hypothesis and overall. It suggests that there are clear advantages because it can maintain a realistic perspective. Therefore, as a result of various impacts, the three forms of network governance introduced above evolve from a very basic form (ie, shared governance) to the other two forms (that is, a guide or NAO). Can be done [12]. The organizational governance network appears when the tissue in the original network gains power and vitality and acquire the most important and irreplaceable resources (core technologies, intellectual property, etc.). When a powerful organization cannot maintain its internal legitimacy and no longer trusts the members, the leading organization may become NAO. Therefore, an independent organization that represents network profits must be created. The transition from shared governance and the form of the leading organization to the NAO form means a change in accidental factors, such as the diffusion of trust among members and the lack of a network of organizational authority, which plays a leading role in other members. Externally, the governmen t-like forced force is imposed on the network, or a nao form mandate is formed due to concerns about the network.

We rely on secondary data to answer the first research quest (that is, who is the main and new actor in the ESPORTS Governance system). Search for keywords such as ESPORTS/GOMING GOVERNANANCE, Esports/Gaming Regulation, Esports Integrity, Esports Observer, ESPORTS NEWS UK ( Nuk), Esports Marketing Blog, Twitch, Nuel, Esports Integrity Commission (Esic), etc. ESPORTS Media Platform identified online articles, for example, (for example, British Esports Association and UK Interactive Entertainment Association (UKIE)) British ESPORTS Association, British Interactive Entertainment Association (UKIE), etc. He also investigated the policies and documents published by various countries related to ESPORTS (the International ESPORTS Federation, the Global ESPORTS Federation, the World ESPORTS Association). The document was selected based on the standards of credibility and reliability. We rely on secondary data to answer the first research quest (that is, who is the main and emerging actors in the Esports governance system). Search for keywords such as ESPORTS/GOMING GOVERNANANCE, Esports/Gaming Regulation, Esports Integrity, Esports Observer, ESPORTS NEWS UK ( Nuk), Esports Marketing Blog, Twitch, Nuel, Esports Integrity Commission (Esic), etc. ESPORTS Media Platform identified online articles, for example, (for example, British Esports Association and UK Interactive Entertainment Association (UKIE)) British ESPORTS Association, British Interactive Entertainment Association (UKIE), etc. He also investigated the policies and documents published by various countries related to ESPORTS (the International ESPORTS Federation, the Global ESPORTS Federation, the World ESPORTS Association). The document was selected based on the standards of credibility and reliability. We rely on secondary data to answer the first research quest (that is, who is the main and new actor in the ESPORTS Governance system). Search for keywords such as ESPORTS/GOMING GOVERNANANCE, Esports/Gaming Regulation, Esports Integrity, Esports Observer, ESPORTS NEWS UK ( Nuk), Esports Marketing Blog, Twitch, Nuel, Esports Integrity Commission (Esic), etc. ESPORTS Media Platform identified online articles, for example, (for example, British Esports Association and UK Interactive Entertainment Association (UKIE)) British ESPORTS Association, British Interactive Entertainment Association (UKIE), etc. He also investigated the policies and documents published by various countries related to ESPORTS (the International ESPORTS Federation, the Global ESPORTS Federation, the World ESPORTS Association). The document was selected based on the standards of credibility and reliability.

The Focus Group and the hal f-stroke interview were conducted to deepen the dynamic relationship between stakeholders in ESPORTS. The focus group will check how the participants respond to each other's opinions and provide opportunities to create a view from the interactions conducted within the group. He held three focus groups focusing on the topic of "ESPORTS Governance" and gathered most of the representatives of stakeholders specified in the first step (example). Participants recruited through social media (eg Facebook) and e-mail. As a criterion for participants, the participants must be (1) 18 years or older. (2) Being involved in esports for more than 2 years. Participants were able to participate as professional or amateur players, enthusiastic spectators, and tournament organizers, regardless of gender. The three focus groups were organized according to the participants' convenience. The first focus group was composed of 10 participants (three women and seven men) for two hours. The second and third focus groups consisted of five participants (one woman in each group and four men), each in about an hour. All focus groups began with some fre e-style questions, such as "How many years have you been involved in ESPORTS?" And "What was your experience involved in the ESPORTS industry? The Focus Group and the hal f-stroke interview were implemented to deepen the dynamic relationship between stakeholders in ESPORTS. Focus Group is a participant. Researchers confirm how they respond to their opinions and provide the opportunity to create a view from the interaction within the group. Was implemented and gathered most of the representatives of stakeholders specified in the first step (example). Participants recruited through social media (eg Facebook) and e-mail. As a criterion for participants, the participants must be (1) 18 years or older. (2) Being involved in esports for more than 2 years. Participants were able to participate as professional or amateur players, enthusiastic spectators, and tournament organizers, regardless of gender. The three focus groups were organized according to the participants' convenience. The first focus group was composed of 10 participants (three women and seven men) for two hours. The second and third focus groups consisted of five participants (one woman in each group and four men), each in about an hour. All focus groups began with some fre e-style questions, such as "How many years have you been involved in ESPORTS?" "What did the experience involved in the ESPORTS industry? The focus group and the hal f-construction interview were implemented to deepen the dynamic relationship between stakeholders in ESPORTS. The Focus Group has an opinion on each other's opinions. The researchers will confirm how they will react and provide three focus groups that focus on the topic of the mutual effects of the group. Most of the representatives of stakeholders identified in the first step (example). Participants recruited through social media (eg Facebook) and e-mail. As a criterion for participants, the participants must be (1) 18 years or older. (2) Being involved in esports for more than 2 years. Participants were able to participate as professional or amateur players, enthusiastic spectators, and tournament organizers, regardless of gender. The three focus groups were organized according to the participants' convenience. The first focus group was composed of 10 participants (three women and seven men) for two hours. The second and third focus groups consisted of five participants (one woman in each group and four men), each in about an hour. All focus groups began with some fre e-style questions, such as "How many years have you been involved in ESPORTS?" And "What are your experience involved in the ESPORTS industry?

Skype and telephone hal f-structure interviews (all male) were held six times (all male). The question was performed in the same style as the focus group used in the Focus Group (see Examples of Appendix B). These questions were made in a flexible way, responding to the survey and information provider's actions. As a result, a natural conversation flow was created between the investigators and the respondents. These interviews were selected by the purpose of recruiting participants to relate to the proposed research questions [30]. All six participants had a wealth of experience in the ESPORTS industry and were familiar with the current ESPORTS governance, so he became an "ideal" candidate to discuss this topic. The interview was recorded digital and was conducted within one to two hours. In order to maintain a confidentiality, the respondents gave a pseudonym (R1, R2, R3, ... R6). Table 1 shows the profile of Focus Group and interview participants. Skype and a hal f-structured interview were held six times (all male). The question was performed in the same style as the focus group used in the Focus Group (see Examples of Appendix B). These questions were made in a flexible way, responding to the survey and information provider's actions. As a result, a natural conversation flow was created between the investigators and the respondents. These interviews were selected by the purpose of recruiting participants to relate to the proposed research questions [30]. All six participants had a wealth of experience in the ESPORTS industry and were familiar with the current ESPORTS governance, so he became an "ideal" candidate to discuss this topic. The interview was recorded digital and was conducted within one to two hours. In order to maintain a confidentiality, the respondents gave a pseudonym (R1, R2, R3, ... R6). Table 1 shows the profile of Focus Group and interview participants. Skype and telephone hal f-structure interviews (all male) were held six times (all male). The question was performed in the same style as the focus group used in the Focus Group (see Examples of Appendix B). These questions were made in a flexible way, responding to the survey and information provider's actions. As a result, a natural conversation flow was created between the investigators and the respondents. These interviews were selected by the purpose of recruiting participants to relate to the proposed research questions [30]. All six participants had a wealth of experience in the ESPORTS industry and were familiar with the current ESPORTS governance, so he became an "ideal" candidate to discuss this topic. The interview was recorded digital and was conducted within one to two hours. In order to maintain a confidentiality, the respondents gave a pseudonym (R1, R2, R3, ... R6). Table 1 shows the profile of Focus Group and interview participants.

The first step in data analysis is to create a comprehensive list of stakeholders and identify whether they are core (ie core of the ecosystem) or emerging (ie, emerging of the ecosystem). there were. In the ecosystem, it was to identify whether the core officials were unable to deal with them, or they were an emerging person who supported problems that were interested in dealing with them). This was implemented by reviewing the collected documents. The second stage was based on the focus group and interview data for the theme analysis [31]. The data analysis is first assembled based on the three forms and four rationality of the Sørensen and TORFING [13] network and governance, and what is the current ESPORTS Governance framework? It was done to answer, why? For this reason, four themes were first identified: “public as a leading organization”, “legitimacy”, “legitimacy for stimuli”, and “tension / conflict”. In order to convey the relationship between different stakeholders and the changes in these relationships in a timely manner, a new theme has been emerged. After several theme clustering, five major themes remained: tension / conflict, power, interest, justice, division. These themes were used to explore the answers to the third research quest (that is, how stakeholders promote or restrict soccer evolution). The first step in data analysis creates a comprehensive list of stakeholders, specifying whether they are core (core of the ecosystem) or emerging (ie, emerging ecosystem). It was to do. In the ecosystem, it was to identify whether the core officials were unable to deal with them, or they were an emerging person who supported problems that were interested in dealing with them). This was implemented by reviewing the collected documents. The second stage was based on the focus group and interview data for the theme analysis [31]. The data analysis is first assembled based on the three forms and four rationality of the Sørensen and TORFING [13] network and governance, and what is the current ESPORTS Governance framework? It was done to answer, why? For this reason, four themes were first identified: “public as a leading organization”, “legitimacy”, “legitimacy for stimuli”, and “tension / conflict”. In order to convey the relationship between different stakeholders and the changes in these relationships in a timely manner, a new theme has been emerged. After several theme clustering, five major themes remained: tension / conflict, power, interest, justice, division. These themes were used to explore the answers to the third research quest (that is, how stakeholders promote or restrict soccer evolution). The first step in data analysis is to create a comprehensive list of stakeholders and identify whether they are core (ie core of the ecosystem) or emerging (ie, emerging of the ecosystem). there were. In the ecosystem, it was to identify whether the core officials were unable to deal with them, or they were an emerging person who supported problems that were interested in dealing with them). This was implemented by reviewing the collected documents. The second stage was based on the focus group and interview data for the theme analysis [31]. The data analysis is first assembled based on the three forms and four rationality of the Sørensen and TORFING [13] network and governance, and what is the current ESPORTS Governance framework? It was done to answer, why? For this reason, four themes were first identified: “public as a leading organization”, “legitimacy”, “legitimacy for stimuli”, and “tension / conflict”. In order to convey the relationship between different stakeholders and the changes in these relationships in a timely manner, a new theme has been emerged. After several theme clustering, five major themes remained: tension / conflict, power, interest, justice, division. These themes were used to explore the answers to the third research quest (that is, how stakeholders promote or restrict soccer evolution).

In this section, the main stakeholders and emerging stakeholders in the ESPORTS Governance Network derived from the list of ESPORTS Governance stakeholders specified in the first stage of data collection. Explore the dynamics of. It also verifies how each of these stakeholders promotes, restricts governance mechanisms in relation to their integrity and regulations. There are two main discoveries that emerged from data analysis. (2) A new stakeholder with a variety of stakeholders has created a division of ESPORTS governance. This section consists of these two main discoveries.

Publishers provide funds to video games design, development, marketing and distribution. Therefore, they are the final owners of the intellectual property of video games [2, 34]. In terms of governance, each esport game is governed by its publishers, and different publishers may have their own governance approach. [35] This means that the Esports governance network is fragmentary. Some publishers have a higher governance mechanism than other publishers. For example, Riot Games tends to be more aggressive in games than Brizzards (Liot Games and Brizzard Entertainment are both tw o-game publisher based in the United States), and this is a university league of legend. Riot Score Association of America, established as a general organization, has proven. Despite the difference in governance approach, the role of the publisher is substantially similar throughout ESPORTS, and as the focus group respondents asked about the recognition of the publishers, at the center of ESPORTS Governance Network. It is considered to be:

They (publishers) can like them in their games. It's not like FIFA stops playing soccer on you or my house. But Riot has League of Legends. They can give you it, they can take it, and they can change the meta they are always doing (FG1).

As is clear from the interviews, publishers have the ultimate power in the esports industry because they are the owners of the games. Publishers want to control esports as an extension of their marketing efforts. One interviewee commented:

Esports is the top 400 people. Riot is a business, EA is a business. Esports exists at their whim, for their pleasure and progress. Look at Storm Hero, you see that. Look at Storm Hero, you see that? Is that where you're heading? We're not esports (FG1) anymore.

Esports is less stable than other industries due to constant updates, changes, and publishers taking down video games. Governance of esports is controlled by publishers. Therefore, publishers tend to be interested in the governance of esports games to maintain their popularity and reputation. For example, Blizzard requires tournament organizers to obtain licenses and meet certain standards regarding moderation and the exclusion of certain sponsors [36]:

4.2. Emerging Stakeholders: Diversified Interests Lead to Fragmented Governance

If you broadcast a competition online, you are responsible for ensuring that the accompanying chat is moderated sufficiently to avoid becoming a vulgar, abusive, or disparate environment.

4.2.1. National and International Esports (Governing) Entities: A Legitimacy Issue

Contests cannot be sponsored by companies that sell or promote the following products or services: any multinational consumer brand or any product or service related to the video game industry that is not approved by Blizzard; pornography (or extremely mature material); alcohol; marijuana; or tobacco or cigarettes.

Publishers ensure that stakeholders such as tournament organizers will adhere to their interests by using licensing agreements to create governance frameworks. As a result, a network is emerging with publishers as the most important organizational group, as shown in Figure 2. This representation contrasts with Scholz's [10] perspective, which places game publishers, not players, at the center of the network.

Waterfall will provide other levels of regulations for tournaments and league organizers. For example, ESL (an abbreviation of Electronic Sports League, Esport Organizer and Production Companies, which produce global tournaments of video games), are related to the tournament, including permissions of players and teams and penalties for harassment and hate speech. We have created a rule book for players, teams, and sponsors:

Participants must not give harassment or hate speech in any way. This includes gender, gender identity and expression, sexual orientation, races, ethnic, disability, physical appearance, physique, aged, aging, aggressive behavior, and rants. Not limited [37].

Those who violate the Code of Conduct, such as ESL or the organizers of the league, have penalties (penalty points, barriers, immediate and permanent entry areas, etc.) to suppress unwanted behavior. Huh. Media like Twitch also has rules such as both streamers and viewers from posting explicitly or suggestive content, but the definition of Twitch sexual content is ambiguous. It is subjective and contradictory, and is recognized that discrimination is acceptable.

ESPORTS players and fans coexist on a virtual platform, commonly called "community." Players can participate in groups in a group to train themselves at various skill levels. Fans can see other people's play to learn specific game skills [1]. If they are not related to organized tournaments such as tournaments and league games, these groups are often not directly managed by publicishers. Therefore, as the respondents pointed out, "lo w-level ones have toxicity in the Esports community" (FG 3). The respondents with FG 2 give an example:

There was a 1 5-yea r-old player who defeated the world's best player in the tournament and knocked out, but his fans posted it to social media and were abusive.

FG 1 participants emphasize the exploitation of ESPORTS players who have turned from amateurs to sem i-professionals and professional levels: Waterfall will provide other levels of regulations on the tournament and league organizers. For example, ESL (an abbreviation of Electronic Sports League, Esport Organizer and Production Companies, which produce global tournaments of video games), are related to the tournament, including permissions of players and teams and penalties for harassment and hate speech. We have created a rule book for players, teams, and sponsors:

4.2.2. Self-Proclaimed Industry Guardian Organisations

There was a 1 5-yea r-old player who defeated the world's best player in the tournament and knocked out, but his fans posted it to social media and were abusive.

FG 1 participants emphasized the exploitation of ESPORTS players, which turned from amateur to sem i-professional and professional levels: Waterfall provides other levels of regulations by the tournament and league organizers. For example, ESL (an abbreviation of Electronic Sports League, Esport Organizer and Production Companies, which produce global tournaments of video games), are related to the tournament, including permissions of players and teams and penalties for harassment and hate speech. We have created a rule book for players, teams, and sponsors:

5. Discussion

There was a 1 5-yea r-old player who defeated the world's best player in the tournament and knocked out, but his fans posted it to social media and were abusive.

The FG 1 participants emphasized the exploitation of Esports players who changed from amateur to sem i-professional and professional levels:

I'm literally watching every week. It's a terrible situation that players from amateurs to professionals will be exploited in this really dark sem i-professional scene. The lower the level of the play, the worse it goes. So there is a big problem. However, it is now beyond the central regulations unless the game publisher does something in the community. Frankly, I haven't seen Will. I talk regularly with all publishers. I have never seen any form of organizing the path to professionals.

Game publishers are not interested in across the industry as a leading role in operating the ESPORTS industry at the elite level. In particular, game publishers do not adjust the important network level activities, such as exploitation of no n-elite players. According to 12], game publishers are the main gavanance networks, as all important networ k-level activities and important decisions are assumed to be adjusted by major organizations through major organizations. It is not considered an organization. The meaning is that activities that are not adjusted by the game publisher require regulation by other actors or open the door of regulation. As a result, some stakeholders in the industry have begun to emerge to promote network governance.

Despite the authority of the ESPORTS Governance network, it is an authoritative and perhaps monopoly, but this network has influenced stakeholders. Based on its characteristics, these initiatives are classified into two types, (1) domestic and international (supervision) groups, and (2) sel f-proclaimed industry. The rise of these esports stakeholders has caused governance divisions in the industry.

5.1. The Dynamics amongst Publishers and Emerging Stakeholders

In order to protect their interests, some ESPORTS League / Tournament organizers, teams, and players cooperate to establish domestic or international ESPORTS coordinates separately from the game publisher. 。 As a result of such efforts, several ESPORTS supervision have been born. I literally watch every week. It's a terrible situation that players from amateurs to professionals will be exploited in this really dark sem i-professional scene. The lower the level of the play, the worse it goes. So there is a big problem. However, it is now beyond the central regulations unless the game publisher does something in the community. Frankly, I haven't seen Will. I talk regularly with all publishers. I have never seen any form of organizing the path to professionals.

5.2. Evolution of Esports Governance: From Fragmentation to Network Administration Organisation?

In order to protect their interests, some ESPORTS League / Tournament organizers, teams, and players cooperate to establish domestic or international ESPORTS coordinates separately from the game publisher. 。 As a result of such efforts, several ESPORTS supervision have been born. I'm literally watching every week. It's a terrible situation that players from amateurs to professionals will be exploited in this really dark sem i-professional scene. The lower the level of the play, the worse it goes. So there is a big problem. However, it is now beyond the central regulations unless the game publisher does something in the community. Frankly, I haven't seen Will. I talk regularly with all publishers. I have never seen any form of organizing the path to professionals.

6. Conclusions

Currently, three organizations are claiming that Esports is an international general organization. The International Esport Federation (IESF) is a member of the 63 countries, aiming to legalize esports as sports. The World ESPORTS Association (WESA) is the result of a joint effort between professional ESPORTS teams and tournament organizers (ESL, etc.). [41] The World Esports Federation (GEF) had a slightly similar mission to IESF and partnered with Tencent, one of the largest game publishers. Although there is a tension, none of them seem to have gained the legitimacy necessary to globally govern the ESPORTS. Some respondents comment:

None are important. This is because in games such as top ESPORTS, Tiawan ESPORTS, League of Legends and counter strikes, no one cares about the country. Nobody cares about the country. What they care about is tea m-t o-teams, and no one recognizes them as legal organizations, so there is no power to implement regulations to act as government agencies (R4).

Author Contributions

Because they don't have the legal authority to run the game without the permission of the game publisher, and they don't think they will soon get off. When such an international organization asked about the background of lack of legitimacy, the respondents pointed out:

Funding

None of the organizations want to abandon their independence in any aspect of their business. This is a summary. They do not want to delegate their authority to one problem other than their business (FG 1).

Acknowledgments

At the domestic level, it is rare that one country has multiple ESPORTS supervision organizations. However, according to the current status of international ESPORTS Governance, ESPORTS supervisions in each country have shown various loyalty. For example, the IESF members of the Australia ESPORTS Association (AESA) will focus on the vision of officially recognizing ESPORTS in Australia. British Esports Association (BESA), a member of the World Esports Federation, will focus on education and spread of esports at the grassroots level. It should be noted that the ESPORTS Association of each country, such as AESA and BESA, is not a general organization, but for ESPORTS in each country. It is acknowledged that it is a domestic (defender) organization. .

Conflicts of Interest

Respondents pointed out the issues in which ESPORTS Federation in each country would take effective governance approaches, that is, to impose regulations on the ESPORTS industry:

Appendix A. Focus Group Questions

If you make a barrier in a country and decide to implement a series of regulations in France, you need to keep in mind that the ESPORTS industry has the option of going to another place. You are not going to solve the problem. Everyone judges that France is not his place and goes to Germany, Italy, and Spain (R1). International e-sports organizations use a variety of strategies to gain legitimacy. This includes the construction of a governance structure using the articles of incorporation and the already linked with legal organizations. For example, IESF is a regular sports group's governance structure, and members of the board representing the interests of members (such as the ESPORTS Association in each country) and members of the board are regularly gathered to make decisions in the group. [39] explained by installing a general meeting. The IESF also created a rule that stipulates the role, rules, and obligations of the organization and its members. [39] In addition, IESF and GEF are working with traditional sports organizations such as WADA and Olympic Committee in each country to legitimate the governance. [39, 41]. Respondents pointed out the issues in which ESPORTS Federation in each country would take effective governance approaches, that is, to impose regulations on the ESPORTS industry: If you make a barrier in a country and decide to implement a series of regulations in France, you need to keep in mind that the ESPORTS industry has the option of going to another place. You are not going to solve the problem. Everyone judges that France is not his place and goes to Germany, Italy, and Spain (R1). International e-sports organizations use a variety of strategies to gain legitimacy. This includes the construction of a governance structure using the articles of incorporation and the already linked with legal organizations. For example, IESF is a regular sports group's governance structure, and members of the board representing the interests of members (such as the ESPORTS Association in each country) and members of the board are regularly gathered to make decisions in the group. [39] explained by installing a general meeting. The IESF also created a rule that stipulates the role, rules, and obligations of the organization and its members. [39] In addition, IESF and GEF are working with traditional sports organizations such as WADA and Olympic Committee in each country to legitimate the governance. [39, 41]. Respondents pointed out the issues in which ESPORTS Federation in each country would take effective governance approaches, that is, to impose regulations on the ESPORTS industry: If you make a barrier in a country and decide to implement a series of regulations in France, you need to keep in mind that the ESPORTS industry has the option of going to another place. You are not going to solve the problem. Everyone judges that France is not his place and goes to Germany, Italy, and Spain (R1). International e-sports organizations use a variety of strategies to gain legitimacy. This includes the construction of a governance structure using the articles of incorporation and the already linked with legal organizations. For example, IESF is a regular sports group's governance structure, and members of the board representing the interests of members (such as the ESPORTS Association in each country) and members of the board are regularly gathered to make decisions in the group. [39] explained by installing a general meeting. The IESF also created a rule that stipulates the role, rules, and obligations of the organization and its members. [39] In addition, IESF and GEF are working with traditional sports organizations such as WADA and Olympic Committee in each country to legitimate the governance. [39, 41]. In some countries, the government is involved. For example, in South Korea, the government has approved the establishment of the Korean Electronic Sports Association (KESPA) and operates electronic sports in Korea. As a result, Kespa has jurisdiction in the operating league. This includes the ability to accuse players and teams in criminal crimes, based on the country's criminal law. In France, there is a law that protects and regulates professional esports players, and the player's contract period is up to 5 years and at least 12 months. In addition, it is prohibited that players under the age of 12 will participate in tournaments that provide prize money. In China, esports was not only officially recognized by the government as a sport, but also esports players were considered an athlete. In this sense, ESPORTS's ecosystems in China are completely different from other countries, and the Chinese government is the authority to directly govern the domestic ESPORTS industry, including game publishers and players, through the organization of the National Newspaper Publishing Radio Movie Television. I have. In addition to ESPORTS players, teams, tournament organizers, game publishers, what are called "sel f-proclaimed industry surveillance organizations." One example is Esports Integrity Commission (Esic), a no n-profit organization that cooperates with stakeholders to protect the endability of Esports. ESIC is for players, teams, tournaments and league organizers, as well as international and international (government) ESPORTS organizers to address match operations, betting fraud, and other integrity issues caused by ESPORTS. [46] Created a voluntary code of conduct. The representative of Esic commented: We create sets of standards and regulations that can be voluntarily complied with various stakeholders, and in very narrow areas of regulations, corruption, and honesty (R4), literally for each company. I try to accept it voluntarily. Some major ESPORTS tournament operators, such as ESL and Dreamhack, have adopted ESIC regulations, as the ESIC regulatory framework is effective in corruption countermeasures in e-sports. However, there are also issues in which this voluntary organization faces when working on a widespread ESPORTS community in the regulation framework:

Appendix B. Interview Questions

This is because all the publishers are competitors, and not all companies want to cooperate. In a sense, my job is to persuade that cooperating is a commercial profit, which is a very difficult job (R4). Another example is Entertainment Software Association (ESA), Association for Uk Interactive ENTERTAINMENT (UKIE), Interactive Games and Entertainment. International game industries such as on Australia and New Zealand (IGEA) and Entertainment Software Association of Canada (ESAC) There is an industry organization. These organizations in a joint statement, four principles, which are expected to comply with members of each organization, including game publishers, that is, "safety and welfare", "honesty and fair play", "respect and diversity." [47] Following these principles can lead to a reputation and image for game publishers, and can be used for corporate social responsibility strategies. These aspects can be the driving force for gaming publishers to accept external regulations and indirectly cooperate. The emergence of such a governor ti e-up with publicity has given the emerging industry to take the opportunity to take the governance issues that the public has been left, but the current ESPORTS governance is quite fragile due to different roles and interests. It is something.

The results of this survey show the answer to three research issues. In fact, the following became clear:

(1) There are seven major stakeholders and three new actors (see Table 2) in (1) Esports Governance (at least).

(2) The current ESPORTS Governance framework is mainly formed by power publishers, and has a certain characteristics of "network operated by top organizations."

(3) The increase in the power of other (emerging) stakeholders in the network that tries to deal with consistency issues has caused fragmentation of the ESPORTS governance framework. In this section, the mechanics between the publishers and the emerging stakeholders is further considered (5. 1), and then proposes the evolution of ESPORTS governance from subdivision to the governance of the network management organization (NAO) model (5. 2). Macey et al. [7] pointed out that "the rapid growth of ESPORTS does not exist in many sports, combined with the nature of the glass roots," says Macey et al. This is reflected in our survey results in the current ESPORTS industry, indicating that there is a to p-down governance model aspects of leading organizations. Specifically, the game publisher functions as a to p-level elite organization in each game network. Game publishers are the main players in the network because they own the intellectual property of video games. Game publishers adjust the network to achieve the network goals closely matching their goals, that is, to achieve maximization of networks, by regulating ESPORTS players, teams, sponsors, sponsors, broadcasting stations, and tournament organizers. 48] As a marke t-oriented governance network derived from the procedure rationality [13], the ESPORTS industry chooses smaller state interventions and more market procedures and regulations in its governance mechanism.

References

However, there is a drawback in rational governance, which is ineffective in preventing instability, externalism, and inequality. In the current ESPORTS governance model, game publishers tend to have a high interest in elite Esports governance, and have low incentives that have a small amount of profitable opportunities, such as the grassroots level of Esports. This inefficiency leads to an increase in no n-ethical behavior in the ESPORTS community, resulting in a serious consequence on the mental health of the player and the endability of Esports. Macey et al. [7] pointed out that "the rapid growth of ESPORTS does not exist in many sports, combined with the nature of glass roots," said. This is reflected in our survey results in the current ESPORTS industry, indicating that there is a to p-down governance model aspects of leading organizations. Specifically, the game publisher functions as a to p-level elite organization in each game network. Game publishers are the main players in the network because they own the intellectual property of video games. Game publishers adjust the network to achieve the network goals closely matching their goals, that is, to achieve maximization of networks, by regulating ESPORTS players, teams, sponsors, sponsors, broadcasting stations, and tournament organizers. 48] As a marke t-oriented governance network derived from the procedure rationality [13], the ESPORTS industry chooses smaller state interventions and more market procedures and regulations in its governance mechanism.
However, there is a drawback in rational governance, which is ineffective in preventing instability, externalism, and inequality. In the current ESPORTS governance model, game publishers tend to have a high interest in elite Esports governance, and have low incentives that have a small amount of profitable opportunities, such as the grassroots level of Esports. This inefficiency leads to an increase in no n-ethical behavior in the ESPORTS community, resulting in a serious consequence on the mental health of the player and the endability of Esports. Macey et al. [7] pointed out that "the rapid growth of ESPORTS does not exist in many sports, combined with the nature of the glass roots," says Macey et al. This is reflected in our survey results in the current ESPORTS industry, indicating that there is a to p-down governance model aspects of leading organizations. Specifically, the game publisher functions as a to p-level elite organization in each game network. Game publishers are the main players in the network because they own the intellectual property of video games. Game publishers adjust the network to achieve the network goals closely matching their goals, that is, to achieve maximization of networks, by regulating ESPORTS players, teams, sponsors, sponsors, broadcasting stations, and tournament organizers. 48] As a marke t-oriented governance network derived from the procedure rationality [13], the ESPORTS industry chooses smaller state interventions and more market procedures and regulations in its governance mechanism.
However, there is a drawback in rational governance, which is ineffective in preventing instability, externalism, and inequality. In the current ESPORTS governance model, game publishers tend to have a high interest in elite Esports governance, and have low incentives that have a small amount of profitable opportunities, such as the grassroots level of Esports. This inefficiency leads to an increase in no n-ethical behavior in the ESPORTS community, resulting in a serious consequence on the mental health of the player and the endability of Esports.
ESPORTS players, teams, tournament organizers, and in some cases the government and thir d-party organizations (ESICs, etc.) are trying to solve governance issues in the ESPORTS community. However, these coalitions are in conflict with publishers in terms of ownership of intellectual property rights. Due to the exclusiveness of publishers, these new coalitions cannot be legitimate in the governance of the industry. Independent thir d-party organizations, such as ESIC and gaming international industry groups, also exist as the role of defending rather than the government's role in the industry for this tension. In this sense, the publisher has a limit to building a comprehensive governance mechanism in consideration of the protection and representatives of all stakeholders, especially weak stakeholders.
Despite suffering from legitimate issues, the new ESPORTS Governance Alliance has followed the trend to the network management model (NAO) from fragmentation. Provan and Kenis [12] point out that if the ability to solve the problem by network members may have an organizational rule, it may not lead to lon g-term sustainability. There is. In the ESPORTS industry, it is clear that game publishers cannot cope with or do not want to deal with them, and for more sustainable and healthy ecosystem, all stakeholders. It is essential to have them consider. NAO's governance model offers potential solutions. NAO members usually commit to the target of the network and are strategically involved as a whole. Therefore, in the NAO format, the target consensus and the conditions for achieving such goals are preferred. Esports players, teams, tournaments, and in some cases, the government and thir d-party organizations (ESICs, etc.) are trying to solve governance issues in the ESPORTS community. However, these coalitions are in conflict with publishers in terms of ownership of intellectual property rights. Due to the exclusiveness of publishers, these new coalitions cannot be legitimate in the governance of the industry. Independent thir d-party organizations, such as ESIC and gaming international industry groups, also exist as the role of defending rather than the government's role in the industry for this tension. In this sense, the publisher has a limit to building a comprehensive governance mechanism in consideration of the protection and representatives of all stakeholders, especially weak stakeholders.
Despite suffering from legitimate issues, the new ESPORTS Governance Alliance has followed the trend to the network management model (NAO) from fragmentation. Provan and Kenis [12] point out that if the ability to solve the problem by network members may have an organizational rule, it may not lead to lon g-term sustainability. There is. In the ESPORTS industry, it is clear that game publishers cannot cope with or do not want to deal with them, and for more sustainable and healthy ecosystem, all stakeholders. It is essential to have them consider. NAO's governance model offers potential solutions. NAO members usually commit to the target of the network and are strategically involved as a whole. Therefore, in the NAO format, the consensus of the target and the creation of conditions to achieve such a goal are preferred. ESPORTS players, teams, tournament organizers, and in some cases the government and thir d-party organizations (ESICs, etc.) are trying to solve governance issues in the ESPORTS community. However, these coalitions are in conflict with publishers in terms of ownership of intellectual property rights. Due to the exclusiveness of publishers, these new coalitions cannot be legitimate in the governance of the industry. Independent thir d-party organizations, such as ESIC and gaming international industry groups, also exist as the role of defending rather than the government's role in the industry for this tension. In this sense, the publisher has a limit to building a comprehensive governance mechanism in consideration of the protection and representatives of all stakeholders, especially weak stakeholders.
Despite suffering from legitimate issues, the new ESPORTS Governance Alliance has followed the trend to the network management model (NAO) from fragmentation. Provan and Kenis [12] point out that if the ability to solve the problem by network members may have an organizational rule, it may not lead to lon g-term sustainability. There is. In the ESPORTS industry, it is clear that game publishers cannot cope with or do not want to deal with them, and for more sustainable and healthy ecosystem, all stakeholders. It is essential to have them consider. NAO's governance model offers potential solutions. NAO members usually commit to the target of the network and are strategically involved as a whole. Therefore, in the NAO format, the target consensus and the conditions for achieving such goals are preferred.
However, there are several challenges in building a NAO governance model in esports. First and foremost is game publisher compliance. Without publisher involvement, NAO has limited power in the governance of the industry. Few current “governing” bodies for NAO, such as national or international governing bodies, involve publishers in their governance approach. As such, their existence is essentially as mere tournament organizers working with publishers, or trainers aiming to educate and train esports players. They have no real power to govern the industry, which is detrimental to the sustainability of such networks. Human and Provan [25] point out that failure to establish legitimacy could lead to the collapse of the network. However, the cases of China and France, where governments are involved in the governance of esports, may provide a solution to this challenge. With the growing number of social issues facing the esports industry (e. g., the esports industry is a game industry that is increasingly being regulated by the government, but this solution is likely to work most effectively where political relationships are essential, even for game publishers.
Another challenge is the fragmented reality of the esports industry. Game publishers have different approaches to governing their games, and different countries have different policies and regulations (e. g., some recognize esports as a sport, others do not). Esports as an international phenomenon makes it difficult to regulate the industry with a standardized approach. NAOs are probably best suited to a network that requires a wide variety of capabilities, such as the esports industry,[12] but it is still too early to fully develop the mix of a model run by a top-level elite organization and overall fragmentation. NAO models that cater to the diversity of the esports industry are still in the early stages of development. This is by no means to suggest that an effective NAO model will not come to fruition at some point in the future, but it may take time for stakeholders to converge and agree that such an NAO model should exist.
In this study, we examined the sustainability of the ESPORTS governance model. The latter is currently fragmented and may impair its sustainability. However, the recent trend from fragmentation to a network management model (NAO) may improve the sustainability of the Esports governance model. Thus, this paper provides a foundation for developing a more sustainable and healthy ESPORTS ecosystem that contributes to the interests and rights of all stakeholders, as well as publishers.
This study has several practical implications and theoretical contributions. There are three suggestions in practical aspects. First, through a comprehensive exploration of governance structure in the ESPORTS industry, this paper offers an overall perspective for stakeholders in the ESPORTS industry to understand the responsibility of existing organizations. Second, this paper provides some explanations on the current fragmentary governance mechanism due to the gap between the interests and mechanics between the gamepers and stakeholders. This is especially because sports companies such as the National Basketball League (NBA), major league baseball (MLB), NASCAR, and F1 have now used ESPORTS instead of lost sports programs and content. It is especially related to unique stakeholders such as sports organizations. In fact, it is necessary for these tissues to be managed in a way that does not cause reputational damage in connection with ESPORTS, so that the latter can deal with potential problems. In fact, the ESPORTS network is not managed in a way that can respond quickly and appropriately to the problems facing. Despite the rapid growth and charm of e-sports, this may be at risk of growing through partnerships with other industries. In this study, we examined the sustainability of the Esports governance model. The latter is currently fragmented and may impair its sustainability. However, the recent trend from fragmentation to a network management model (NAO) may improve the sustainability of the Esports governance model. Thus, this paper provides a foundation for developing a more sustainable and healthy ESPORTS ecosystem that contributes to the interests and rights of all stakeholders, as well as publishers.
This study has several practical implications and theoretical contributions. There are three suggestions in practical aspects. First, through a comprehensive exploration of governance structure in the ESPORTS industry, this paper offers an overall perspective for stakeholders in the ESPORTS industry to understand the responsibility of existing organizations. Second, this paper provides some explanations on the current fragmentary governance mechanism due to the gap between the interests and mechanics between the gamepers and stakeholders. This is especially because sports companies such as the National Basketball League (NBA), major league baseball (MLB), NASCAR, and F1 have now used ESPORTS instead of lost sports programs and content. It is especially related to unique stakeholders such as sports organizations. In fact, it is necessary for these tissues to be managed in a way that does not cause reputational damage in connection with ESPORTS, so that the latter can deal with potential problems. In fact, the ESPORTS network is not managed in a way that can respond quickly and appropriately to the problems facing. Despite the rapid growth and charm of e-sports, this may be at risk of growing further through partnerships with other industries. In this study, we examined the sustainability of the ESPORTS governance model. The latter is currently fragmented and may impair its sustainability. However, the recent trend from fragmentation to a network management model (NAO) may improve the sustainability of the Esports governance model. Thus, this paper provides a foundation for developing a more sustainable and healthy ESPORTS ecosystem that contributes to the interests and rights of all stakeholders, as well as publishers.
This study has several practical implications and theoretical contributions. There are three suggestions in practical aspects. First, through a comprehensive exploration of governance structure in the ESPORTS industry, this paper offers an overall perspective for stakeholders in the ESPORTS industry to understand the responsibility of existing organizations. Second, this paper provides some explanations on the current fragmentary governance mechanism due to the gap between the interests and mechanics between the gamepers and stakeholders. This is especially because sports companies such as the National Basketball League (NBA), major league baseball (MLB), NASCAR, and F1 have now used ESPORTS instead of lost sports programs and content. It is especially related to unique stakeholders such as sports organizations. In fact, it is necessary for these tissues to be managed in a way that does not cause reputational damage in connection with ESPORTS, so that the latter can deal with potential problems. In fact, the ESPORTS network is not managed in a way that can respond quickly and appropriately to the problems facing. Despite the rapid growth and charm of e-sports, this may be at risk of growing further through partnerships with other industries.
In terms of theoretical, there are three contributions. Based on the research of PROVAN and KENIS [12], this paper verifies mechanics (power, conflict, interest, etc.) between major stakeholders in the Esports industry and emerging stakeholders. This contributes to understanding the evolution from Esports network governance to another form. Finally, from the perspective of evolving governance structures and mechanisms, it offers some developments that will be useful for future research on digital technology and new media.
Format analysis, Q. P.; Data Curation, Data Curation, Q., G. D., N. S., R. M. B. writin g-Q. P. ., R. M. B .; Supervision, J. G; Project Management, Q. P., G. D., Supervision, J. G., Project Management, Q. P., G. D.
This study has not received external funding.
The authors are grateful for the participants in the 2019 Games (SMAANZ (Sports Management Association of Australia and New Zealand), which gave me the university that provided internal funds and the previous version of this study. do. I am also grateful for the comments of three reviewers and editors. All mistakes are the author's own.
The author has declared that there is no conflict of interest.
How many years have you been to participate in ESPORTS?
What is your role (as an ESPORTS game player, employee or employer)?
Please tell us your experience of participating in the esports industry.
Have you encountered an unpleasant/ unfair experience as an ESPORTS player? Please let me know if there is an example.
What is your reaction and response to such an event?
How is the reaction of the game publisher and the ESPORTS community?
If so, were their interventions supported and effective?
Do you know which organization to consult if an unfair incident occurs (again)?
Who is responsible for the ESPORTS regulation / governance or responsible?
How can Esport governance improve?
Please briefly introduce your role and your organization.
Please tell me the position of the organization in the ESPORTS industry.
Can you share your understanding of the current situation of ESPORTS Governance?
In this industry, are you working on problems with various stakeholders working together?
What are the issues?
Who should or do you think should be the lead organization to standardize rules and regulations for the esports industry (e. g., governments, publishers, tournament organizers, leagues)?
Which stakeholders are involved in the decision-making process and why?
What impact does current regulation have?
What is missing in the current esports governance model?
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Elim Poon - Journalist, Creative Writer

Last modified: 27.08.2024

However, several reasons could explain why the game publishers would tend to retain a complete control over their esports titles [11]: 1) Game. This article synthesizes existing literature on esport across different fields focusing particularly on IS. Esports Governance: Exploring. Stakeholder Dynamics. Sustainability, 12, Reitman, J. G. & Steinkuehler, C. (). Esports and Domain General Research.

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